rAMj,,,,:;.,-.' 


UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


Forty  Years  of  German- American 
Political  Relations  ^ 


6}!.^^ 


JEANNETTE  KEIM 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED    TO    THE    FACULTY    OF    THE    GRADUATE    SCHOOL 

IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT    OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 

THE   DEGREE   OF   DOCTOR   OF   PHILOSOPHY 


PHILADELPHIA 

PRINTED  BY  WILLIAM  J.  DORNAN 
1919 


COPYKIGHT 

iJEANNETTE  KEIM 
1919 

EXCHANGE 


PREFACE 


The  study  covered  by  this  thesis  was  begun  in  the  autumn  of 
1916  and  was  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the  general 
character  of  tlie  relationship  between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many after  both  nations  had  become  world  powers,  but  before 
events  occurred  leading  immediately  to  the  great  war.;  Covering 
so  long  a  period,  I  have  confined  my  study  fairly  closely  to  the 
field  of  government  publications  and  to  autobiography.  The 
nature  of  the  subject,  the  recent  character  of  the  material  and  the 
conditions  of  the  times  have  prevented  access  to  the  manuscript 
archives  of  either  government.  Therefore  the  only  unpublished 
materials  available  were  the  very  interesting  Bancroft  and  Davis 
manuscripts  dealing  with  the  1870  period.  I  have  found,  however, 
such  an  abundance  of  material  in  the  published  sources  mentioned, 
that  I  feel  justified  in  tracing  from  it  the  following  conclusions: 

First :  The  general  relationship  between  the  two  countries  shows 
tjiree  main  periods  of  development:  There  was  the  earh'  period, 
comprising  approximately  the  first  decade  after  the  founding  of 
the  Empire,  in  which  the  relations  were  spontaneously  cordial. 
This  was  followed  by  a  period  of  friction  developed  partly  by  the 
increasing  economic  rivah-y  of  the  two  countries,  but  mostly  by 
the  development  in  Germany  of  an  aggressive  expansion  system, 
and  characterized  by  an  indifi'erence  on  the  part  of  the  German 
Government  toward  the  eft'ect  of  that  policy  upon  the  Unitefl 
States.  The  third  period,  comprising  the  decade  following  the 
Spanish-American  war,  shows  a  status  again  of  generally  good 
relations,  created  in  part  by  the  solution  of  certain  outstanding 
controversies  and  in  part  by  the  deliberate  policy  of  the  German 
Government  to  cultivate  in  the  interests  of  the  empire  the  friend- 
ship of  the  United  States.  The  ex^aiisimi— policy  ])rogressed 
steadily,  but  it  took  into  account  the  factor  of  the  United  States. 


IV  PREFACE 

Second:  The  commercial  controversies  between  the  two  coun- 
tries centered  chiefly  in  their  contrasting  interpretations  of  the 
"most-favored-nation"  principle  as  expressed  in  the  Prussian 
Treaty  of  1S2S.  The  United  States  correctly  maintained  that  the 
treaty  sti})ulated  clearly  for  a  basis  of  reciprocity,  and  the  American 
Government  acted  uniformly  upon  this  principle  thi*oughout  the 
negotiations.  Germany,  ignoring  the  equivalence  clause  of  the 
treaty,  incorrectly  claimed  unconditional  "  most -favored-nation  " 
treatment  and  did  not  itself  throughout  this  period  act  uniformly 
upon  that  ])rinciple.  The  German  Government,  however,  ulti- 
mately adopted  the  interpretation  of  the  United  States. 

Third:  The  policies^of  the  two  countries  toward  the  natives  of 
the  lands  of  theif'commercial  enterprise  were  in  contrast.  Tliis 
was  shown  in  the  several  distant  spheres  in  which  the  German  and 
American  commercial  interests  came  in  contact  with  each  other, 
particularly  in  Samoa,  in  China,  and  in  Venezuela.  The  German 
Government  asserted  German  interests  in  these  spheres,  with 
some  deference  to  the  policy  of  other  great  powers,  but  with  little 
or  no  concern  for  the  rights  or  independence  of  the  natives "oi"of 
tile  politically  weak  goveriunents  rightfully  sovereign  there.  The 
Unijed  States,  on  the  other  hand,  whether  working  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Samoans,  for  the  integrity  of  China  or  for  the 
prevention  of  forcible  measures  against  Venezuela,  threw  its 
influence  constantly  in  defense  of  native  peoples,  their  rights  to 
self-government  and  to  undisputed  possession  of  their  territory. 

IMaterial  for  this  thesis  has  been  found  in  the  libraries  of  the 
University  of  Pennsylvania,  in  the  Public  Library  of  Xew  York 
City  and  in  the  Library  of  Congress  in  Washington.  I  am  indebted 
to  Mr.  Paulsitz,  of  the  maiuiscript  division  of  the  Xew  York 
Library,  and  to  the  statf  of  the  manuscript  division  of  the  Library 
of  Congress  for  their  interest  and  assistance  in  my  work.  I  am 
especially  indebted  to  Miss  Helen  S.  Crowne,  Miss  Anna  W.  Hill, 
Miss  Nellie  C.  Smith  and  others  of  the  library  staff  of  the  Uni- 
versitx'  of  Pennsylvania  for  their  generous  help  throughout  my 
three  years'  work  at  the  I'niversity.  I  wish,  finally,  to  express  to 
^liss  Julia  Uussell  my  grateful  ai)preciation  of  her  cordial  and 
efficient  co(')])erati()n  as  my  secretary. 


CONTENTS 


Preface iii 

^  CHAPTER  I 

\  Relations  between'  the  United  States  and  Germany,  1S70    .     .  7 

V                                                        CHAPTER  II 
ATreatv  Relationship 3G 

CHAPTER  III 
-^American  Citizens  of  German  Birth— Their  Rights  in  Germany    .       51 

CHAPTER  IV 

^COMAIERCIAL   RELATIONS 64 

CHAPTER  V 

Samoa:   The  United  States  and  Germany  in  the  Pacific  .      .      .     112 

CHAPTER  VI 
The  Spanish-American  War 216 

CHAPTER  VII 
Germany  and  the  Open  Door  in  China 244 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Germany  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 273 


Bibliography    ...  ;i05 

Appendix      .      . 319 


ABBREVIATIONS 


A.  &  P.  Accounts  and  Papers  (British  State  Papers). 

F.  R.  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States  (U.  S.  diplomatic 

correspondence  with  foreign  countries). 

V.  R.  Verhandlungen  des  Reichstags. 

R.  Gbl.  Reichs-Gesetzblatt. 

M.  INIalloy's  "Treaties,  Conventions,  etc." 

Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  Senate  Executive;  Documents. 

House  Ex.  Doc.  House  Executive  Documents. 

Sen.  Misc.  Doc.  Senate  Miscellaneous  Documents. 

House  Misc.  Doc.  House  Miscellaneous  Documents. 

Sen.  Rep.  Senate  Reports. 

House  Rep.  House  Reports. 

R.  L.  S.  Robert  Louis  Stevenson:  "A  footnote  to  history,"  etc. 


For  description  of  the  above  works  and  other  sources  used  see  Bibliography. 


FORTY  YEARS  OF  GERMAN-AMERICAN 
POLITICAL  RELATIONS 


CHAPTER    I 

RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
GERIMANY,  1870 

The  newly  created  German  Empire  received  a  cordial  welcome 
from  the  United  States.  Many  factors  combined  to  create  in 
the  American  Republic  a  feeling  of  warm  sympathy  for  the 
German  people  (vho  had  just  fought  a  successful  war  against  a 
monarch  imiJopular  in  the  United  States,;  and  who  were  now 
uniting,  like  tliose  states,  into  a  federal  union.'^^his  sympathy 
had  a  natural  basis  in  the  large  and  steadily  increasing  population 
of  German  extraction  in  the  United  States,^  and  in  the  personal 
and  political  intercourse  between  the  two  countries  which  this 
engendered.  There  was  also  present  the  reminiscence  of  the 
recent  American  Civil  War,  during  which  Prussia,  the  leading 
state  in  the  new  German  nation,  had  been  one  of  the  few  friends  of 
the  Union  cause  in  Europe,  wdiereas  the  most  hostile  of  European 
powers  during  the  American  crisis  was  in  1870  the  foe  of  Germany. 
Such  forces,  making  for  friendly  relationship,  were  increased  in 
their  effect  by  the  pronounced  sympathies  of  the  American 
minister  to  Germany  for  the  country  of  his  residence  and  his 
earnest  personal  desire  to  see  cultivated  a  close  friendship  between 
the  new  empire  and  the  United  States. 

The  American  friendliness  for  Germany  was  l)roug]it  out 
during  the  Franco-Prussian  war.  In  spite  of  the  careful  neutral 
stand  taken  by  the  go^'ernment,  there  was,  at  the  i->eginning  of 
the  conflict  at  least,  much  unconcealed  satisfaction  over  the 
successes  of  the  German  armies.     Mr.  Davis,  Assistant  Secretary 

'  Congressional  Globe,  1870-71,  Part  2,  p.  956,  41st  Congress,  3cl  Session. 
Senator  Sumner  reported  Bismarck  as  declariiifi  that — 

"Germany  had  in  the  United  States  her  second  largest  state  after  Prussia." 


8     ;!R'Ei,A,Tigtl4s^^ETVKEN' UNITED  STATES  AXD  GERMAXY,    1870 

of  State  records  in  his  Journal-  an  incident  of  a  meeting  of  the 
Cabinet  during  the  early  days  of  the  war: 

"While  we  were  talking, "  he  writes,  "  news  was  brought  in  from 
the  Associated  Press  that  Weissenbruch  had  been  captured  by  the 
Prussians  after  a  bloody  fight.  The  defeat  of  the  French  did  not 
seem  to  make  anyone  less  cheerful." 

During  the  same  Cabinet  meeting  President  Grant  conversed 
with  the  Assistant  Secretary  on  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
to  the  belligerents.  He  instructed  Mr.  Davis  to  inform  IMr. 
Berthemy,  the  French  ^Minister,  when  the  opportunity  offered, 
"That  it  was  the  intention  of  the  United  States  Government  to 
preserve  a  strict  neutrality  in  the  war,  but  that  he  must  not  be 
surprised  if  a  strong  feeling  manifested  itself  among  the  people 
in  favor  of  the  Prussians;  that  the  people  had  good  memories, 
and  they  remembered  that  while  the  Germans  sympathized  with 
the  Union  and  took  its  bonds  freely  during  the  war  the  French 
people  had  manifested  no  sympathy  for  the  Union  but  had  nego- 
tiated a  loan  for  the  Rebels,  and  the  French  Government  had  sent 
an  expedition  into  ]\Iexico  which  had  been  construed  by  the 
people  as  an  act  hostile  to  this  country."  That  the  President's 
predictions  were  verified  was  attested  by  ]\Ir.  John  ■\I.  Read,  an 
American  consular  official  in  Paris,  who  wrote''  that  there  was  a 
very  strong  prejudice  in  that  country  against  Americans  on 
account  of  the  sympathy  shown  by  the  people  of  the  United  States 
for    Germany.     The    French  Minister,    I\I.  Berthemy,  analyzed^ 


2  J.  C.  B.  Davis,  Journal,  1870-71  (August  5,  1870). 
'  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss. 

37  AvExuE  Austin, 
Paris,  August  16,  1870. 
John  ^Ieredith  Read  to  Davis: 

".  .  .  Since  the  war  was  declared  I  have  been  charged  with  the 
consular  affairs  of  the  North  German  Confederation  throughout  France  and 
as  the  representative  in  this  particular  of  the  '"Prussians"  I  am  not  looked 
upon  with  favor  by  the  masses  of  the  French.  There  is  a  very  strong  preju- 
dice against  all  Americans  on  account  of  the  sympathy  shown  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States  for  Germany,  and  when  one  adds  to  this  the  offense  of 
representing  in  any  respect  the  ''Prussians"  it  does  not  add  to  one's  safety." 

*  J.  C.  B.  Davis,  Journal,  September  6,  1870.     Also  Congressional  Globe, 
42d  Congress,  2d  Session,  Part  2,  1871-72,  p.  1069. 


X 


AMKHU'AX   SYMPATHIES   DITUINCJ    FHANCO-PUUSSIAN   VVAH        9 

the  American  stMitinient  as  divided  along  party  lines,  the  Demo- 
crats favoring  the  French  and  the  Republicans  symjiathizing  witii 
Germany.  The  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  replied  to  him 
that  he  had  not  himself  been  aware  of  such  a  division;  that  it  was 
his  ])rivate  opinion,  however,  that  the  American  sentiment  was 
personal  to  the  Emperor  and  his  dynasty  and  not  against  France 
or  the  French  people.  The  French  Minister  could  not  wonder 
that  there  should  be  in  the  United  States  such  a  feeling  against 
the  Emperor  and  his  government  because  of  their  policy  during 
the  recent  American  war,  when  they  gave  aid  to  the  Rebels  by 
permitting  loans  in  Paris  to  the  Confederacy,  and  in  addition  to 
this,  attempted  to  establish  a  monarchy  on  the  southern  border 
of  the  United  States.  The  political  division  mentioned  by  the 
French  ]Minister  was  also  voiced  in  Congress,  Senator  Morton, 
of  Indiana,  declaring  it  to  be  a  notorious  fact  that  the  sympathy 
of  the  Republican  party,  as  a  general  thing,  was  in  favor  of  Ger- 
many and  against  France,  and  equally  notorious  that  the  sympathy 
of  the  Democratic  party  was  for  France  and  against  Germany. 
Among  the  reasons  for  this,  he  stated,  were  the  liberal  sentiments 
of  the  Germans,  which  accorded  with  the  principles  of  the  Repub- 
lican party.  There  was  also  the  feeling  that  Louis  Napoleon,  a/ 
usurper,  had  overturned  a  republic  and  had  declared  war  against 

Germany  without  adequate  and  proper  cause.  ' 

Sentiments  toward  the  two  warring  countries  found  expression 
in  a  Senate  discussion^  over  the  sending  of  a  relief  ship  to  Europe. 
The  joint  resolution  provided  that  a  naval  vessel  be  authorized  to 
carry  to  Europe  "such  supplies  as  may  be  furnished  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States  for  the  destitute  and  suffering  i)eoi)le  of 
France  and  Germany."  This  resolution  being  introduced  in 
February,  1871,  after  the  German  armies  had  overrun  France, 
one  of  the  Senators,  Mr.  Howard,  of  Michigan,  declared  that  he 
did  not  consider  that  the  Germans  were  in  need  of  any  supplies 
from  the  United  States,  and  moved  to  strike  out  the  words  "and 

5  Congressional  Globe,  1870-71,  Part  2,  p.  954  ff,  41st  Congress,  3d  Session, 
February  4,  1871. 


10       RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANTT,    1870 

Germany."  This  motion  called  forth  prompt  opposition  and  led 
to  a  discussion  of  the  comparative  relations  of  the  United  States 
to  the  two  belligerents.  Senator  Pomeroy,  of  Kansas,  declared 
that  though  the  French  were  the  ancient  allies  of  the  United  States, 
the  Germans  were  the  modern  allies,  had  helped  to  recruit  the 
northern  armies  with  men  and  had  saved  the  life  of  the  nation. 
Senator  Morton,  of  Indiana,  stated  that  this  war  was  inaugurated 
and  brought  on  by  France — that  he  could  s\Tapathize,  however, 
with  the  suffering  of  the  French  people,  who  were  in  no  way 
responsible  for  it.  ]\Ir.  Fowler,  of  Tennessee,  took  a  different 
stand.  He  said  he  failed  to  see  any  evidence  that  Germany  had 
ever  been  an  ally  of  the  United  States  or  that  the  country  had 
received  any  particular  assistance  from  Germany'  during  the 
late  war,  and  that  since  the  German  Government's  raid  on  the 
people  of  France  after  the  battle  of  Sedan  he  had  personally  no 
sympathy  with  it.  Senator  Stewart,  of  Nevada,  reminded  him 
that  Germany  alone  had  taken  five  or  six  hundred  million  dollars 
of  United  States  bonds  when  the  country  was  most  in  need  of 
credit  and  when  those  bonds  were  debarred  from  the  exchange  in 
London  and  from  the  Bourse  in  Paris.  The  Senator  from  Ten- 
nessee replied  that  that  fact  only  showed  that  the  Germans  had 
made  a  good  business  investment,  that,  moreover,  he  had  never 
seen  any  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Germans  to  establish  free  and 
independent  governments,  but  that  they  had  shown  a  concen- 
tration of  despotic  power,  while  the  French  people  were  the 
freest  on  the  continent  and  had  been  constantly  struggling  for 
free  institutions.  At  this  juncture  Senator  Schurz,  of  IMissouri, 
rose  to  the  defense  of  the  land  of  his  birth  and  declared  that  he 
did  not  think  there  were  any  governments  on  the  face  of  the 
globe  who  expressed  their  sympathy  with  the  cause  of  the  I'nion 
as  straightforwardly  and  emphatically  as  the  Government  of 
Prussia  and  the  German  governments  generally,  and  it  was  the 
same  with  the  German  people.  Moreover,  in  the  matter  of  the 
United  States  bonds,  these  were  taken  by  Germany  when  the 
issue  of  the  war  was  by  no  means  decided;  it  was  a  dangerous 
venture,  but  they  embarked  on  it  because  they  believed   in  the 


PRO-GEU.MAN   SYMI'ATIIIKS    OF    BANCROFT  11 

Rc'l)iil)lic'  of  the  United  States,  had  faith  in  the  ^nvat  destinies 
of  the  country,  and  because  tlieir  sympathies  impelled  them  to 
risk  their  interests  with  the  fortunes  of  the  American  Government. 
In  conclusion  of  the  discussion,  Senator  Sumner,  of  Massachusetts, 
acknowledged  the  equal  debt  of  the  United  States  to  both  nations. 
After  re\iewino;  the  services  of  France  at  the  time  of  the  Revo- 
lution and  the  j^ermanent  obligation  arising  from  it,  he  con- 
tinued: 

"But  is  our  obligation  to  Germany  less?  I  cannot  forget  that 
this  great  country,  fertile  in  men  as  in  thought,  has  contributed 
to  ours  a  population  numerous  and  enlightened,  by  which  the 
Republic  has  been  strengthened  and  our  civilization  elevated. 
France  contributed  to  national  independence,  Germany  to  national 
strength  and  life.  How  shall  I  undertake  to  determine  the 
difference  between  these  two  obligations?  We  owe  infinitely  to 
France,  we  owe  infiniteh^  to  Germany." 

The  discussion  gave  no  evidence  of  a  division  of  sentiment  on  / 
political   lines,   all  the  speakers  being  Republican,   but  was   in 
general  illustrative  of  the  prevailing  friendly  feeling  toward  tl>e ' 
German  nation  at  this  time.  ^ 

An  extreme  exponent  of  this  attitude  was  Mr.  George  Bancroft, 
American  INIinister  to  the  North  German  Union  and  subsequently 
accredited  to  the  German  Empire.  His  dispatches  to  Mr.  Hamil- 
ton Fish,  Secretary  of  State,  and  to  his  own  nephew,  Mr.  J.  C. 
Bancroft  Davis,  then  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  are  filled  with 
sympathy  for  the  German  cause  in  the  war,  with  admiration  for 
German  character  and  institutions  and  with  unaffected  effort  to 
promote  a  very  close  political  relationship  between  the  new  Empire 
and  the  United  States.  He  consiflered  the  war  throughout  to  be 
one  of  "aggression"  and  "without  a  cause""  on  the  part  of  France, 
and  one  of  self-defense  on  the  part  of  Germany.  When,  after  the 
series  of  Prussian  victories,  which  he  terms   "magnificent,"  the  . 


8  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.,  Bancroft  to  Davis,  Berlin,  September  5,  1870. 
Also  Bancroft  Mss.,  No.  136,  Berlin,  Septemher  21,  1870.  See  also  in  J.  C. 
B.  Davis's  Mss.  a  letter  from  Henry  W.  Ryder,  American  Consul  at  Chem- 
nitz, to  Davis,  August  30,  1870. 


12       RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND   GEmiANY,    1S70 

demands  against  France  were  presented  by  Bismarck,  Bancroft^ 
reported  that  these  demands  were  considered  throughout  neutral 

'Bancroft  Mss.,  No.  136. 

American  Legation, 
Berlin,  September  21,  1870. 
Sir: 

I  am  able  to  report  to  you  on  the  best  authority  the  views  which  are 
entertained  by  the  aUied  German  governments  in  relation  to  the  conditions 
of  peace  to  be  established  between  themselves  and  France.  The  pledges  for 
peace  contained  in  the  Plebiscite  so  lately  adopted  in  France  have  not  been 
made  good.  Events  have  shown  that  excitabiUty  of  the  disposition  of  the 
French  nation.  The  majority  of  the  French  Chamber,  the  Senate,  and  the 
organs  of  public  opinion  through  the  press  have  demanded  a  war  of  conquest 
against  Germany  so  loudly  that  the  isolated  friends  of  peace  lost  all  courage  to 
oppose,  and  the  Emperor  may  have  thought  himself  justified  in  asserting 
that  he  had  been  forced  into  the  war  by  public  opinion. 

In  view  of  these  facts  the  German  allied  governments  cannot  find  a  guaran- 
tee of  peace  in  the  disposition  of  the  French  people.  They  must  not  therefore 
deceive  themselves  into  the  belief  that  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  after  this 
peace  a  speedy  renewal  of  attack.  Whatever  may  be  the  conditions  which 
may  be  demanded  from  France,  the  French  nation  will  never  forgive  the 
series  of  defeats  which  have  attended  their  present  war  of  aggression.  Even 
though  the  Germans  were  to  demand  no  cession  of  territory,  no  indemnity, 
no  advantage  except  the  glory  of  their  arms,  there  would  remain  the  wounded 
self-love  of  the  French  people  and  their  hereditary  desire  of  conquests,  and 
they  would  only  wait  for  a  day  when  they  might  hope  to  renew  the  war  with 
better  success.  The  forbearance  of  the  German  Governments  in  1867  was  due 
to  their  desire  not  to  conjure  up  an  era  of  bitterness  and  angrj^  passions,  but  by 
patience  and  the  careful  culture  of  friendly  relations  between  the  two  nations 
to  lay  the  foundations  of  an  era  of  peace  and  reciprocal  good-will.  As  this 
moderation  failed  of  its  effect,  and  as  the  Germans  against  all  their  efforts 
have  been  comjwUed  to  encounter  a  war  of  aggression,  they  regard  it  hence- 
forward as  necessary  to  look  for  some  securities  against  the  next  attack  other 
than  can  be  found  in  the  good-will  of  France.  The  guarantees  which  were 
established  in  1815  against  the  same  ambition  of  the  French  people  have  lost 
their  effect  and  Germany  must  now  rely  on  its  own  strength  and  its  own 
resources.  The  Germans  ought  not  to  be  continually  exposed  to  the  necessity 
of  again  making  the  same  exertions  which  they  have  done  at  this  time,  and 
material  securities  are  therefore  needed  for  their  own  protection  and  for  the 
preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe.  These  securities  are  to  be  demanded 
not  from  any  transient  government  of  France  but  from  the  French  nation, 
which  has  shown  itself  ready,  as  the  history  of  past  centuries  proves,  to 
follow  any  government  into  war  and  under  any  government  to  seek  acquisi- 
tions of  territory  from  Germany.  In  order  therefore  to  establish  peace, 
securities  must  be  obtained  against  the  next  imminent  attack  from  France 
and  that  can  be  found  only  in  the  change  of  the  present  defenseless  boundary 
of  South  Germany,  so  that  the  point  from  which  future  attacks  may  emanate 
maj'  be  more  remote  and  the  fortresses  with  which  France  has  hitherto  threat- 
ened Ciermany  may  so  far  be  brought  into  the  power  of  Germany  as  to  con- 
stitute hereafter  defensive  bulwarks  against  invasion. 

The  views  which  I  have  here  detailed  to  you  I  know  to  be  those  which  are 
entertained  in  the  cabinets  of  the  German  jirinces.  They  also  exist  in  all  but 
irresistible  strength  in  the  mind  of  the  German  people. 

I  will  add  but  one  remark  of  my  own:  A  true  guarantee  for  Germany 
against  future  attacks  from  France  would  be  the  political  union  of  Germany 
itself,  and  the  most  earnest  negotiations  are  now  pending  between  N.  Ger- 


Bancroft's  views  on  German  terms  13 

Europe  to  be  "moderate"  iiiul  to  be  necessary  securities  afi;aiust 
the  "next  imminent  attack  from  France."  Should  Germany 
retire  from  France,  he  wrote,^  leaving  boundaries  as  they  were, 

France  would  soon  renew  the  battle  for  the  Rhine,  and  as  the 

■ __/ 

man}'  on  the  one  side,  and  S.  Germany,  especially  Wurteml)urg  and  Bavaria, 
on  the  other,  for  the  accomplishment  of  that  object.  Germany,  being  united, 
will  have  nothing  to  fear  from  France  on  the  one  side,  or  Russia  on  the  other. 

Bancroft  Mss.,  No.  145. 

American  Legation, 
Berlin,  September  29,  1870. 
Sir: 

On  the  24th  of  this  month  I  sent  j'ou  the  following  telegram: 

Fish,  Secretary,  Washington,  District  Columbia, 

"Bismarck  offered  Favre  truce.  Conditions:  Convention  to  he  called; 
Germany  to  hold  Strasburg,  Verdun,  Toul.     Yesterday  Favre  rejected  offer. 

B.ANCROFT." 

"The  account  conveyed  in  the  telegram  is  authentic.  In  the  opinion  of 
Europe  the  terms  offered  were  moderate.  The  statement  that  the  Germans 
demanded  Mount  Valerien  is  a  misrepresentation.  Now,  the  fall  of  Toul 
has  been  followed  by  the  momentous  event  of  the  surrender  of  Strasburg 
just  189  3'ears  after  the  daj'  on  which  it  was  seized  by  Louis  XIV.  Seventy 
thousand  troops  are  thus  set  free  to  invade  southwestern  France;  the  left 
wing  to  touch  Lyons.  The  effects  of  the  surrender  on  the  war  are  immense.  I 
cannot  represent  to  you  strongly  enough  the  fixedness  of  the  purpose  of 
Germany  to  retain  Strasburg  and  with  it  Alsace  as  a  part  of  Germany.  All 
Germany  demands  it  from  a  patriotic  national  feeling,  S.  Germany  as  a 
necessary  defense.  The  acquisition  of  this  territory  proves  the  strongest 
incentive  to  the  S.  Germans  to  form  themselves  into  one  empire  ^Aith  the 
N.  Germans,  for  Alsace  is  the  bulwark  of  S.  western  Germany  and  the  trans- 
rhinane  possessions  of  Bavaria  leave  her  no  option  but  to  overcome  her 
jealousy  of  Prussia  and  assist  in  forming  a  united  Germany.     .     .     ." 

8  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.,  Bancroft  to  Davis. 

Berlin,  October  12,  1870. 

( _.) 

"This  government  disclaims  utterly  any  desire  for  territory  as  such,  and 
wishes  for  no  acquisition  for  Prussia;  the  change  of  boundary  is  the  demand 
of  the  military  as  a  line  of  defense.  Were  Germany  to  retire  from  France 
now,  leaving  boundaries  and  fortresses  as  they  were,  France  would  soon  renew 
the  battle  for  the  Rhine.  The  day  will  inevital)ly  come  when  Belgium  will 
be  annexed  to  France,  and  then  the  German-Rhenish  provinces  would  be 
exposed  to  the  most  imminent  danger.  To  guard  against  it,  CJermany 
demands  Strasburg,  a  demand  which  is  now  in  Europe  not  censured  as  extrava- 
gant; Germany  demands  also  ]\Ietz,  and  on  that  the  European  mind  is  more 
divided.  These  demands  are  made  primarily  in  the  interests  oi  South  Ger- 
mam%  whose  princes  formerly  constituted  the  Rheinlnind  of  Napoleon,  and 
have  held  their  lands  on  sufferance.  France  holding  Straslnirg  could  at 
any  time  march  to  Munich.  This  sense  of  danger  is  contnjlling,  and  j'ou 
may  set  it  down  as  fixed  and  resolved  upon  to  hold  at  the  peace  both  Metz 
and  Strasburg.  On  the  right  of  demand  I  give  no  opinion;  h\it  peace  depends 
on  its  being  compUed  with." 


14      RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED  STATES   AND   GERMANY,    1870 

day  would  come  when  Belgium  would  be  annexed  to  France,  the 
German  Rhenish  province  would  be  exposed  to  imminent  danger. 
To  prevent  this  Germany  was  demanding  Strasburg,  and  this 
demand  was  not  censured  in  Europe  as  extravagant.  ^Yith 
regard  to  the  demand  for  ]\Ietz,  opinion  was  divided,  and  while 
not  expressing  his  own  opinion  on  the  right  of  this  demand,  the" 
minister  asserted  that  peace  depended  on  its  being  complied  with. 
"Finally,"  he  wrote,  "I  will  not  withhold  my  opinion  that  the 
German  armies  are  now  engaged  in  a  war  not  only  for  the  peace, 
independence  and  union  of  Germany,  but  also  for  the  best  inter- 
ests of  civilization,  of  civil  and  religious  liberty  and  of  popular 
freedom."  ^ 

Holding  such  a  viewpoint  toward  the  two  belligerents,  it  is  not 
surprising  to  find  the  American  minister  hoping  for  some  evidence 
of  similar  feelings  on  the  part  of  his  home  government.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1870,  ]Mr.  Bancroft^"  wrote  in  confidence  to  his  nephew, 
Mr.  Davis,  that  he  had  been  hoping  to  see  from  ]Mr.  Fish  "some 
good  strong  word  expressing  a  complaint  of  a  declaration  of  war 
so  injurious  to  commerce  and  without  a  cause,"  or  if  this  could  not 


^  Bancroft  Mss.,  No.  121  (to  Secretary  of  State  Fish). 

'"  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.,  Geo.  Bancroft  to  Davis.     (Secret  and  confidential.) 

"  Dear  John: 

I  have  been  hoping  to  see  from  Mr.  Fish  some  good  strong  word,  not 
violating  neutrahty,  but  perhaps  expressing  a  complaint  of  a  declaration 
of  war  so  injurious  to  commerce  without  a  cause,  and  if  that  cannot  be,  then 
what  all  Europe  and  all  neutral  governments  would  respond  to,  an  energetic 
remonstrance  against  the  needless  cruelties  exercised  toward  the  Germans 
domiciled  in  France,  a  most  numerous,  a  most  industrious,  wealthy,  orderly, 
peace-loving,  cultivated  people.  A  good  letter  expressing  sympathy  with 
the  Germans  would  have  a  most  important  effect  and  perhaps  in  our  elections 
carry  them  in  November.  I  am  certain  it  is  best,  i.  e.,  right  in  itself  and  politic 
for  the  Government,  in  some  way  to  mark  strongly  a  sympathy  with  the 
Germans. 

Another  consideration  not  so  free  from  doubt  presents  itself.  The  neutral 
European  powers  will,  when  the  negotiations  for  peace  begin,  attempt  to 
exercise  a  prcs:^ure  adverse  to  the  Germans.  The  question  arises  whether 
we  could,  and  if  we  can,  whether  we  should,  exercise  a  counter-jM'essure,  so 
as  to  leave  the  matter  to  be  settled  exclusively  by  the  two  nationalities, 
German  and  French,  without  meddlesome  intervention  from  powers  that 
like  ourselves  profess  neutraUty.  I  do  not  presume  to  offer  an  opinion  on 
this  subject,  only  to  call  attention  to  an  aspect  of  the  negotiations  which  is 
very  likely  to  arise. 

I  am  ever  affectionately  yours, 

Geo.  B.\ncroft." 


EKFOKTS    Tt)    fSEC'lKI-:    ACTION'    IN    KAVOH    OF    CiEHMANY  15 

be,  then  at  least  "an  energetic  remonstrance  against  the  needless 
cruelties  toward  the  Germans  domiciled  in  I^'rance."  Such  a 
letter  expressing  sympathy  with  these  Germans  would,  he  declared, 
have  an  important  effect  and  perhaps  carry  the  home  elections  in 
November.  He  considered  it  both  right  in  itself  and  politic  for 
the  United  States  Government  "  in  some  way  to  mark  strongly  a 
sym])ath\-  with  the  Germans."  IMoreover,  in  regard  to  the  future, 
he  hoi)c(l  that  if  the  neutral  European  powers  should  attempt  to 
exercise  tluring  the  peace  negotiations  "  a  pressure  adverse  to  the 
Germans,"  that  the  United  States  would  "exercise  a  counter- 
pressure,  so  as  to  leave  the  matter  to  be  settled  exclusively  by  the 
two  nationalities,  German  and  French." 

In  reply  the  Assistant  Secretary  summed  up^^  the  general  attitude 

"  J.  C.  B.  Davis  INIss  (to  Bancroft,  reply  to  September  5  letter  from  B.)- 

Washington,  September  23,  1870. 
"My  Dear  Uncle: 

( ) 

1  don't  see  how  Mr.  Fish  could  have  well  done  more  than  he  did  do  toi 
manifest  ovir  individual  symi)athy  for  the  German  cause  in  this  war.  There' 
was  throughout  the  country  a  deep-seated  feeling  in  their  favor  until  it  was 
believed  they  showed  a  determination  to  prolong  the  war  for  the  sake  of 
acquiring  territory  inhabited  by  a  population  that  does  not  wish  to  come 
under  their  sway.  When  the  public  got  this  idea,  which  may  or  may  not 
have  been  correct,  they  ceased  to  feel  the  intense  sympathy  which  they  had 
previously  exhibited,  and  an  attempt  by  the  administration  to  interfere  in 
any  way  in  their  favor,  or  to  swerve  from  a  rigid  neutrality,  would  have  been 
resented  by  the  good  sense  of  America. 

We  have  not  received  here  any  evidence  of  needless  cruelties  toward  the 
Germans  in  the  execution  of  the  decree  of  expulsion.  Washl)urne  has  made  no 
complaint.  The  decree  itself  may  have  been  harsh  and  uncalled  for,  but 
it  seems  to  have  been  a  military  measure,  entirely  within  the  discretion  of 
the  French  military  authorities.  Sherman  did  the  same  thing  at  Atlanta — so 
that  we  are  the  last  i)eoi)le  who  could  comi)lain  of  the  principle. 

There  has  been  a  studied  and  persistent  pressure  from  the  German  Legation 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  force  us  into  an  attitude  toward  France 
inconsistent  with  our  neutrality.  Baron  Gerolt  has  spared  no  effort  to  entrap 
me  into  imi)r()]ier  positions.  He  tried  to  make  me  protest  against  the  expul- 
sion (jf  the  Germans.  What  right  had  we  to  jn-otest  in  an  affair  which  did 
not  concern  us  until  we  were  asked  by  the  North  German  government  to  be 
their  mouthpiece — which  they  have  never  done.  He  grew  angry  when  I 
told  him  of  open  violations  of  the  neutrality  laws  by  his  consul  in  New  York, 
and  refu.sed  at  first  to  take  any  warning.  And  he  had  several  times  pressed 
similar  questions  ujjon  me  in  a  way  that  has  ol)liged  me  t(}  be  almost  harsh 
with  the  old  gentleman.  What  he  has  done  to  Air.  Fish  I  cannot  say.  In 
sjjite  of  all  this,  we  have  always  construed,  and  without  giving  France  cause 
of  offense,  that  the  symj)athies  of  the  Administration  arc  with  Germany. 
I  think  1  may  safely  say  that  the  whole  country  is  satisfietl  with  the  course 
Mr.  Fish  has  pursued  in  this  matter. 

As  to  intervention  on  our  part,  I  do  not  think  that  it  will  take  place  without 
the  previous  consent  of  l)()th  jiarties — nor  will  it  take  place  then  by  any 
prospect  if  it  is  to  be  done  jointh'  with  other  powers." 
2 


16      RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY,    1870 

of  the  i\merican  people  and  the  administration  toward  Germany. 
He  stated  that  there  was  a  deep-seated  feehng  throughout  the 
country  in  favor  of  the  Germans  until  they  sought  to  prolong  the 
war,  in  order  to  acquire  territory  inhabitated  by  a  people  who  did 
not  wish  to  come  under  their  rule,^-  after  the  American  public  had 
received  the  impression  that  this  was  being  done,  there  was  less 
sympathy  for  Germany,  and  "  an  attempt  by  the  administration  to 
interfere  in  any  way"  in  favor  of  the  Germans  or  "to  swerve  from 
a  rigid  neutrality  would  have  been  resented  by  the  good  sense 
of  America."  IVIr.  Davis  set  forth  the  difficulties  encountered 
in  maintaining  that  rigid  neutrality.  Baron  Gerolt,  the  German 
Minister,  he  wrote,  spared  no  effort  to  entrap  him  into  improper 
positions,  seeking  to  have  the  Government  protest  against  the 
expulsion  of  German  civilians  from  France.  While  that  expulsion 
decree  may  have  been  harsh  and  uncalled  for,  it  seemed  to  him  to 
be  a  military  measure  within  the  discretion  of  the  French  military 
authorities.  Moreover,  he  had  had  to  complain  to  the  German 
minister  of  the  open  violation  of  the  American  neutrality  law  by 
the  German  consul  in  New  York,  who  had  been  assisting  German 
officers  to  return  to  the  army.'"*    In  spite  of  such  actions  he  had 

12  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Journal,  August  29,  1870. 

"  Baron  Gerolt  said  he  had  called  in  consequence  of  information  received 
through  the  Associated  Press  that  England,  Russia  and  Austria  intended 
intervening  in  the  war  to  make  peace,  to  ask  what  would  be  the  public  feehng 
in  the  country  in  regard  to  such  an  intervention — that  those  powers  natur- 
ally looked  with  jealousy  on  the  increase  of  German  influence  and  power 
and  would  oppose  an  increase  of  territory.  He  added  that  he  was  induced 
to  make  the  request  because  I  had  told  him  at  my  house  that  the  people  of 
this  country  would  not  look  favorably  on  the  conquest  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine. 

I  replied  that  what  I  had  said  to  him  I  had  said  privately  as  one  gentleman 
to  another  in  my  own  house;  and  that  I  had  no  objection  to  repeat  in  the 
same  way  that  it  was  my  individual  opinion  that  the  demand  of  territory 
would  prolong  the  war  and  in  that  way  would  not  be  favorably  regarded  by 
the  people  of  the  Ihiited  States — but  that  ofhcially  1  had  only  to  say  to  him 
that  while  the  United  States  do  not  permit  European  intervention  in  the 
affairs  of  their  continent,  they  did  not  on  the  other  hand  intervene  in  European 
affairs." 

"J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.,  1870-71. 

AuGXLST  1,  1870. 

"The  Baron  responded  at  once  to  my  note.  I  told  him  that  I  had  taken 
the  liberty  to  ask  him  to  call  at  the  Department  because  I  had  seen  in  the 
newspajiers   and   heard   otherwise   that    Mr.    Roessing,    the    North   German 


CAREFUL   NEUTRALITY    OK    AMERICAN   COVERNMENT  17 

always  construed,  "  and  without  giving  France  cause  of  offense, 
that  the  sympathies  of  the  administration  were  with  Germany." 
In  reference  to  intervention,  Mr.  Davis  asserted  that  such  would 
iiardly  take  place  without  the  consent  of  both  belligerents,  and 
not  at  all  if  it  required  joint  action  with  other  powers. 

The  claims  of  the  German  ]Minister  and  of  Bancroft  that  the 
United  States  should  issue  a  protest  against  the  expulsion  of 
German  civilians  from  France  were  based  on  the  function,  which 
had  been  assumed  by  the  xA.merican  Government,  of  acting  as 
protector  in  France  of  all  citizens  of  the  North  German  Union. ^^ 
This  immense  work  was  in  the  hands  of  "Sir.  E.  B.  Washburne, 
United  States  Ambassador  to  Parish  In  addition  to  other  services, 
he  distribufed  among  needy  Germans  the  funds  forwarded  to  him 


Consul  at  New  York,  was  receiving  persons  at  the  consulate  and  furnishing 
them  with  the  means  of  returning  to  Germany  to  take  part  in  the  war,  and 
that  I  thought  it  due  tn  the  Baron  as  a  friendly  act,  to  say  that  if  that  was 
so  he  had  lietter  he  cautioned,  as  this  Government  intended  to  preserve  and 
enforce  its  neutrality  in  this  contest.  The  Baron  answered  quite  testily, 
that  Mr.  Roessing  had  done  nothing  to  violate  our  laws — that  over  600 
people  had  applied  to  him  for  means  to  go  hack,  but  that  he  had  refused  all 
except  persons  who  had  left  Germany  under  written  obligations  to  return 
in  case  of  war  and  serve  out  their  term  in  the  army — that  there  were  a  dozen 
or  sixteen  of  such  persons  to  whom  he  had  loaned  money  to  pay  their  expenses 
back  to  enable  them  to  go  into  the  army — that  such  persons  were  not  citizens 
of  the  United  States — that  we  had  no  claim  upon  them — that  they  were  bound 
to  go  back — that  they  were  now  in  the  Prussian  army — that  if  they  did  not 
go  back  they  would  be  deserters — that  Mr.  Roessing  in  assisting  them  did 
not  violate  the  law — that  in  what  he  had  done  he  had  acted  with  the  sanction 
of  the  Baron — and  that  they  would  return  individually  and  not  in  squads. 
I  got  the  statute  and  pointed  out  to  the  Baron  that  it  was  an  offense  to  assist 
(?)  a  person  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  to  go  beyond  their 
limits  with  intent  to  enter  in  the  .service  of  a  foreign  jmnce,  as  a  soldier,  marine 
or  seaman,  and  I  told  him  that  I  was  afraid  that  Mr.  Roessing  would  be 
held  Iw  our  courts  to  have  already  violated  that  law,  and  I  thought  it  but  a 
friendly  act  to  caution  him.  The  Baron  replied  that  it  could  not  be  so. 
Mr.  Roessing  had  violated  no  law  of  the  United  States — no  court  would 
hold  so — and  proceedings  could  be  commenced  against  him  to  test  it  if  we 
thought  he  had  done  wrong.  Seeing  the  temper  he  was  in  I  contented  myself 
with  saying  that  I  had  given  him  notice  and  he  must  exercise  his  own  judgment 
as  to  what  he  would  do.     .     .     ." 

'■•Bancroft  Mss.  No.  121  (to  Secretary  of  State  Fish). 

Mr.  Bancroft  wrote  that  England  having  taken  over  the  protection  of  the 
French  in  Germany  would  have  gladly  undertaken  to  help  matters,  even  the 
protection  of  Germans  in  France.  Bismarck,  however,  "refused  to  allow 
this  and  by  turning  over  the  office  to  our  government,  called  the  United 
States  visibly  into  the  circle  of  first  class  powers." 


18       RELATIONS   BETWEEN  UNITED  STATES   AND   GERMANTT,    1870 

by  the  Prussian  Government.  Mr.  Washburne  at  one  time  wrote 
to  Bismarck  that  he  was  giving  assistance  to  twenty-nine  hundred 
Germans. ^^  His  efficient  services  in  this  capacity,  while  satisr 
factory  to  France,  won  the  praise  of  Bismarck  and  the  German 
Emperor^*^  and  contributed  effectively  to  the  good  feeling  in 
Germany  toward  the  United  States.  At  the  time  of  the  French 
order  of  expulsion  of  the  North  Germans  from  France,  Mr.  Wash- 
burne, acting  under  private  instructions  from  the  State  Depart- 
ment, presented  to  the  Duke  of  Gramont  an  appeal,^^  "  in  the  name 


''Hepner,  Adolf:     "America's  Aid  to  Germany  in  1870-71,"  No.  123. 
Mr.  Washburne  to  Count  Bismarck,  Paris,  March  3,  1871. 
'^  Ibid.,  No.  154,  Prince  Bismarck  to  Mr.  Washburne: 

Berlin,  June  13,  1871. 
.  .  .  "His  Majestj'  has  commanded  me  to  convey  to  your  Excellency 
his  grateful  recognition  of  the  zeal  and  kindness  j'ou  have  devoted  to  the 
interests  of  the  German  residents  under  circumstances  of  extraordinary 
difficulty,  and  with  corresponding  sacrifice  of  time  and  personal  comfort. 
I  beg  to  add  the  reiterated  expression  of  the  sense  of  obhgation  I  shall  ever 
preserve  for  the  uniform  promptness  and  courtesy  I  have  experienced  from 
you  in  a  business  connection  of  nearly  a  twelvemonth's  duration. 

With  sentiments  of  the  highest  consideration,  I  have  the  honor  to  be 

Your  Excellency's  obedient  servant 

Bismarck. 

Also  Bancroft  Mss.  No.  126,  Bancroft  to  Fish,  Berhn,  August  22,  1870. 
Also  Congr.  Globe,  42nd  Congress,  2nd  Session,  Part  III,  p.  2456. 
Cameron  (of  Pennsylvania),  April  16,  1872. 

"I  ask  leave  to  introduce  a  joint  resolution,  and  in  introducing  it,  I  desire 
to  say  a  single  word.  The  Emperor  of  Germany,  wishing  to  manifest  his 
gratitude  to  ministers  and  consuls  of  the  United  States  in  France,  is  desirous 
of  paying  them  some  substantial  compliment,  but  that  cannot  be  done  with- 
out the  i^ermission  of  Congress.  I,  therefore,  offer  a  joint  resolution  on  the 
subject  for  the  purpose  of  having  it  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations. 

There  being  no  objection,  leave  was  granted  to  introduce  a  joint  resolution 
(S.  R.,  No.  6)  permitting  certain  diplomatic  and  consular  officials  of  the 
United  States  in  France  to  accept  testimonials  from  the  Emperor  of  Germany 
for  their  friendly  services  to  the  subjects  of  the  Emperor  during  the  war 
between  France  and  Germany;  which  was  read  twice  by  its  title,  referred  to 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  ordered  to  be  printed." 

1^  For  Washburne's  protest  to  Gramont  against  Expulsion  Order  of  North 
Germans  from  France  see  Correspondence  of  E.  B.  Washburne,  Franco- 
German  War  and  Insurrection  of  the  Commune.  Washington  Gov.  Print. 
Office,  1878,  No.  44.     Washburne  to  Fish,  August  22,  1S70,  pp.  40  ff. 

"I  said  (to  Gramont)  further  that  in  carrying  out  the  wishes  and  instruc- 
tions of  my  Government,  I  wished  in  the  name  of  humanity  to  make  an 


REMONSTRANCE   AGAINST   EXITLSION   (W   GERMANS  19 

of  huinanity,"  to  revoke  the  order,  or  if  that  were  not  possible  to 
so  modify  it  as  to  permit  the  larger  class  of  Germans  in  Paris  to 
remain,  whose  conduct  could  give  no  possible  cause  of  complaint  to 
the  French  Govcnnnent."  Secretary  of  State  Fish  directed"* 
Assistant  Secretary  Davis  to  instruct  Mr.  Washburne  to  do  what 
he  coukl  consistently  with  public  law  and  with  the  United  States' 
position  as  a  neutral  to  mitigate  the  severity  of  the  recent  French 
order.  Mr.  Fisii  considers  that,  the  measure  being  within  the 
recognized  rights  of  a  belligerent,  the  United  States  could  not 
"protest"  but  might  "remonstrate"  and  "use  good  offices."  Mr. 
Davis  informed  Baron  Gerolt  of  Mr.  Washburne's  remonstrance 
and  the  German  Minister  wished  to  have  the  action  of  the  United 
States  made  public.  This,  however,  the  Secretary,  in  the  interests 
of  neutrality,  refused  to  do.^^ 

earnest  appeal  to  the  French  Government,  through  him,  to  revoke  the  order 
if  it  should  be  considered  possilile;  and  if  that  could  not  be  clone  to  so  modify 
it  as  to  permit  the  large  class  of  Germans  in  Paris  to  remain  whose  conduct 
could  give  no  possible  cause  for  complaint  to  the  French  Government." 

Formal  note  August  17,  1870,  Enclosure  2  m.  No.  44,  p.  46. 

.  .  .  "Under  these  circumstances  therefore,  I  feel  that  I  should  fail 
to  discharge  the  full  measure  of  the  duty  devolving  upon  me  in  this  regard, 
and  that  I  should  be  forgetful  of  the  ol)ligations  of  humanity  did  I  not  make 
the  strongest  appeal  to  the  government  of  his  Majesty,  through  your  Excel- 
lency, to  further  consider  this  question  and  to  ask  that  if  it  be  not  possible 
to  suspend  action  altogether,  that  there  may  be  at  least  some  modification 
of  the  measures  already  taken  so  as  to  permit  such  subjects  of  the  belligerent 
powers  as  are  under  my  protection,  who  are  now  in  France,  to  remain  in  the 
country  so  long  as  their  conduct  shall  give  no  cause  of  comj^laint,  and  further 
to  ask  for  them  that  protection  which  the  law  of  nations  accords  to  unarmed 
enemies.  In  making  this  apjieal  I  l)ut  obey  the  wishes  of  my  Government, 
which  has  instructed  me  to  do  everything  which  is  consistent  with  the  posi- 
tion of  my  country  as  a  neutral,  and  with  the  law  of  nations  to  alleviate  the 
conditionof  things  now  existing  as  regards  these  people  with  whose  protection 
I  have  been  charged." 

'»J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.  Hamilton  Fish  to  Davis,  Garrisons,  Tuesday 
morning,  August  16,  1870. 

^"^  Upon  the  Baron's  insisting,  Assistant  Secretary  Davis  informed  him 
that  he  could  not  permit  any  foreign  minister  to  advise  the  department  as  to 
the  arrangement  of  its  affairs  and  that  it  was  for  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment to  decide  whether  it  would  or  would  not  make  public  its  acts.     .     .     . 

J.  C.  B.  Davis  Journal,  Augiist  13,  1870. 

"Received  this  morning  a  telegram  from  Washburne  that  Germans  were 
ordered  to  (luit  France — that  many  were  poor,  without  means  to  go — that 
great  suffering  might  result  and  tliathe  wished  to  know  if  the  Pru.ssian  Govern- 


20      RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY,    1870 

A  factor  holding  possibilities  adverse  to  the  friendly  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany  at  this  time  was  the  sale 


ment  would  place  means  at  his  control  to  pay  for  their  passage.  Sent  at 
once  a  copy  to  Mr.  Bancroft  and  to  Baron  Gerolt.  The  Baron  called  to 
know  what  we  intended  to  do.  I  answered  that  we  had  communicated  the 
information  to  Bancroft,  and  that  it  was  for  the  Prussian  Government,  not 
for  us,  to  now  decide  what  should  be  done.  He  said,  "Will  you  not  instruct 
Mr.  Washburne  to  protest  against  this?  It  is  an  act  of  cruelty  the  like  of 
which  has  not  been  perpetrated  for  over  three  hundred  years.  There  are 
over  two  hundred  thousand  Germans  in  Paris,  most  of  them  poor  operatives, 
and  the  suffering  will  be  incredible.  This  must  be  the  act  of  a  mob.  It 
cannot  be  the  act  of  the  French  Government."  I  answered  that  Mr.  Wash- 
burne had  already  protested — that  three  weeks  ago  the  Due  de  Gramont 
had  given  notice  that  it  might  become  necessary  to  take  such  a  step  and 
that  Air.  Washburne  had  written  a  long  and  able  paper  trying  to  prevent  it, 
and  that  his  course  meets  with  the  approbation  of  the  department.  I  added 
they  have  the  right  to  do  this,  cruel  as  it  maj'  be,  aiid  having  decided  to  do 
it,  after  full  representations  from  this  government  of  reasons  why  it  should  not 
be  done,  it  is  for  Prussia  to  decide  whether  she  will  or  will  not  provide  the 
means  for  moving  these  unfortunate  men.  He  said  the  thing  was  cruel  and 
wrong,  and  that  at  least  the  department  ought  to  make  public  what  had  been 
done.  I  answered  that  it  was  for  this  government  to  judge  whether  it  would 
or  would  not  make  public  its  acts,  that  in  case  it  seemed  to  me  proper  that 
we  should  not  i^ublish  what  we  had  done — whatever  were  our  individual  sym- 
pathies, whether  with  France  or  Germany,  we  intended  to  maintain  a  strict 
neutrality  and  would  do  no  act  which  could  be  construed  by  either  party  as 
done  in  the  interest  of  the  other.  He  showing  a  purpose  to  continue  the 
discussion,  I  said  I  would  not  permit  anj-  foreign  minister  to  advise  us  as 
to  the  management  of  the  internal  affairs  of  this  department." 

The  whole  State  Department  seems  to  have  had  its  trials  with  the  German 
minister,  Baron  Gerolt,  who  apparently  was  retained  because  of  having  been 
so  long  in  the  service.  Mr.  Bancroft  wrote  that  at  the  least  suggestion 
from  the  Department  the  German  Chancellor  would  recall  him. 

See  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.     Bancroft  to  Davis,  October  12,  1870. 

"As  to  the  manner  and  matter  of  Gerolt,  he  would  be  disavowed  here. 
I  have  jH-ivately  requested  a  friend  of  his  to  give  him  a  warning,  but  he  is 
too  weak  and  too  dull  to  be  teachable;  were  I  to  speak  to  the  government, 
Bismarck,  who  cannot  endiu'c  his  imbecility,  would  insist  immediately  on  his 
recall.  So  a  word,  a  half  word,  or  a  whisper,  and  the  good  old  man  will  be 
left  with  leisure  to  prepare  for  a  better  world.  I  would  get  him  reproved,  but 
Bismarck  would  mark  the  sincerity  of  the  reproof  by  removing  him.  Perhaps 
this  had  better  he  done.  With  France  represented  by  an  able  man  like 
Berthemy  or  Paradet,  Germanj-  should  no  longer  be  represented  by  a  broken 
down  old  man  who  in  his  best  years  was  not  the  wisest  of  mankind." 

J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.     Hamilton  Fish  to  Davis,  Washington,  October  13,  1870. 

"This  is  Thursday — "Dip.  day."  I  am  in  momentary  apprehension  of 
the  apparition  of  Gerolt  witli  his  pocket  full  of  papers  covered  with  German 
text — uncertain  which  is  the  paper  he  wishes  to  let  off  at  me,  and  when  he 
has  made  several  mistaken  selections  and  has  appealed  to  me  to  know  what 
it  was  he  came  to  say,  the  good  little  old  man  at  last  may  rememlier  that  he 
has  l)een  instructed  to  l)ring  to  my  notice  the  shipment  in  French  steamers 
of  guns  packed  'in  original  cases'  having  the  name  of  the  U.  S.,  etc.,  etc.     In 


SALE    OF    MrNITIOXS   TO    FRANCE  21 

of  Anu'i-ican  iniuiitions  to  Franco.    It  was  recognized  that  tliis  was   ■ 
within  the  riiiht  of  private  firms,-"  hut  the  question  of  neutrality 
was  raised  when  such  arms  were  found  to  bear  the  mark  of  United 
States  Government  arsenals.    The  i)rotests  came  from  the  citizens 
and  senators  of  German  sympathies  within  the  United  States   ( 
rather  than  from  German  official  sources.     Mr.  Bancroft  wrote  \ 
that  he  had  seen  no  evidence  of  dissatisfaction  in  German^'  against 
the  actions  of  the  United  States  in  this  matter  and  that  the 
German  Government  was  satisfied  that  the  President  had  per- 
fectly fulfilled  his  duty  as  a  neutral.^i    Since  the  close  of  the  Civil 
War  the  United  States  Government  had  been  selling  wherever  it 
could  the  oversupply  of  munitions  left  on  its  hands,^-  and  after 

vain  will  I  remind  him  of  the  late  proclamation  for  which  he  professed  so 
much  gratitude,  in  vain  will  1  tell  him  that  France  thinks  the  Proclamation 
of  the  S'  Aout  unkind — that  Berthemy  has  told  me  it  would  'cause  great 
regret  in  France' — in  vain  will  I  tell  him  that  during  our  Civil  War  Germany 
sold  arms  to  us  and  also  to  the  Rebels.  All  in  vain — the  Fal)le  of  the  Justice 
and  the  Farmer — one's  bull  goring  the  other's  ox — was  made  to  illustrate 
the  relative  position  of  Belligerents  and  Neutrals.  It  can't  be  helped.  I 
sliall  have  to  listen  to  Gerolt.     1  have  alreadj^  listened  to  Berthemy. 


While  writing  this  last  sentence  Gerolt  is  announced.  I  go  to  it,  invoking 
all  the  patience  of  which  I  am  capable  and  hoping  for  the  particular  inspiration 
of  a  little  more. 

"Tis  done — the  long  agony  is  o'er."  He  had  nothing  to  say  except  that 
he  "goes  this  afternoon  to  Baltimore  to  see  his  Banker" — the  only  significance 
I  can  see  in  this  important  communication  is  in  connection  with  a  cheque 
which  Gerolt  i:)assed  through  the  Dei^irtment  to  the  Secretary  of  War  yester- 
day for  one  hundred  and  three  27  dollars  [$103.27]  to  procure  the  release  of  a 
soldier.  What  may  not  France  say  to  Germany  for  obtaining  a  soldier  in  the 
imiform  of  the  United  States  'in  original  cases.' 

By  the  time  you  return  we  shall  have  a  nice  batch  of  intricate  questions — 
shall  I  keep  them  in  'the  original  cases?'  " 

2°  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.     Bancroft  to  Davis  (P.S.,  January  23,  1871  or  2). 

"Our  relations  are  too  i)lain  for  question.  Our  treaties  with  Frederic  the 
Great,  with  his  successor  and  with  tlie  father  of  the  present  king  all  set  forth 
in  the  clearest  terms  the  right  of  Americans  to  carry  contraliand  of  war  to 
a  power  at  war  with  Prassia — all  on  our  side  having  the  sanction  successively 
of  Franklin,  John  Adams,  and  Jefferson,  of  John  Q.  Adams  and  Henry  Clay. 
In  Statutes  at  Large  Treaties,  \'ol.  Mil,  page  90,  Articles  XII,  XIII,  page 
K)!^,  Articles  XII,  XIII,  page  3S4,  Article  Xll.  I  have,  therefore,  been  able 
here  to  ]ireserve  myself  and  you  from  the  slightest  charge  of  unfriendliness 
though  regrets  have  been  expressed  as  when  at  Orleans  most  all  the  guns 
taken  were  Springfield  guns." 

Also  F.  R.,  1871,  p.  374.     Bancroft  to  Fish,  No.  160. 

21  Bancroft  Mss.  No.  156.     Bancroft  to  Fish.     Berlin,  November  2,  1870. 
--  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.     Hamilton  Fish  to  Davis.     Washington,  October  13, 
1870. 


22        RELATIONS    BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMAN^',    1870 

the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  war  it  continued  to  sell  these 
government-made  arms  to  American  munitions  firms  within  its 
own  borders.  When,  however,  certain  of  those  firms  were  found 
to  be  acting  as  agents  for  the  French  Government,  these  sales, 
according  to  the  statement  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  were  discon- 
tinued. Nevertheless,  he  wrote  to  IMr.  Davis,  that  he  did  not  see 
why  a  "manufacturer  or  dealer  in  arms  three  or  four  thousand 
miles  oft'  should  be  expected  to  shut  up  shop  whenever  Lew  Xap  and 
Bill  Hohenzollern  take  off  their  coats  and  go  to  fisticuffs  to  settle 
which  is  the  better  man  or  whether  their  boundary  should  be  this 
or  that  side  of  the  goose-pond."  Despite  the  lack  of  formal  pro- 
test from  Germany,  the  subject  was  brought  up  in  the  Senate  and, 
upon  a  resolution  introduced  by  Senator  Sumner  of  Masschusetts, 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  special  committee  for  investigation.-^ 
The  committee  report  cleared  the  Government-^  of  any  infringe- 
ment of  the  laws  of  neutrality,  declaring  that  Congress  having 
directed  the  Secretary  of  War  to  dispose  of  these  stores  of  ammu- 
nition, they  might  have  been  delivered  to  Frederick  William  or 
Louis  Napoleon  in  person,  without  violating  the  obligations  of 
neutrality,  and  the  decision  not  to  sell  arms  to  the  firm  of  Reming- 
ton &  Co.,  had  been  an  unnecessary  prudence.  The  issue  of  this 
report  practically  closed  the  controversy  on  the  subject,  though 
Senator  Sumner  registered  his  protest  against  the  report  on  the 
ground  that  the  investigating  committee  was  composed  only  of 


2'  Congressional  Globe,  42nd  Congress,  2nd  Session,  Part  2,  1871-72,  pp. 
953  ff.  and  pp.  1014  ff. 

"It  was  Sumner's  allegation  that  at  the  time  when  arms  were  sold  by 
the  Government  to  Remington  it  was  known  that  the  firm  was  an  agent  of 
the  Freneh  Government.  This  was  denied  by  ojiponents  of  the  measure,  who 
contended  that  Mr.  Sunnier  and  Mr.  Schurz  were  trying  to  establish  a  case 
which  if  estabhshed  would  authorize  Prussia  to  demand  an  apology  and 
indemnity  for  a  violation  concerning  which  it  had  not  occurred  to  that  country 
to  protest." 

2''  Senate  Report  No.  183  "Sales  of  Ordnance,"  42nd  Congress,  2nd  Session, 
p.  XII  also  pp.  XVII  and  XVIII.     Conclusion  of  report. 

"Your  Committee,  duly  jealous  of  the  honor  of  our  country  and  the  repu- 
tation of  the  officers  of  our  Government,  have  great  satisfaction  in  being 
able,  after  the  most  thorough  and  impartial  investigation,  to  say  that  there 
is  nothing  in  these  transactions  which  reflects  dishonor  upon  cither." 


Bismarck's  oriental  policy,  1S70  23 

those  opposed  altogether  to  the  inquiry .^^  The  general  subject 
of  munitions  sales  had  received  more  attention  from  Congress 
than  from  the  diplomatic  departments  of  the  two  countries 
involved. 

Among  many  connnon  interests  pointed  out  by  ]Mr.  Bancroft 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States  was  an  agreement 
expressed  at  this  time  on  policy  toward  the  Far  East.  The  Chinese 
mission  under  Mr.  Anson  Burlingame-''  received  a  cordial  welcome 
in  Germany  and  the  Chancellor  marked  throughout  its  stay  a 
s\Tnpathy  with  the  Chinese"  and  a  desire  to  "  do  his  part  in  saving 

"Congressional  Globe,  42nd  Congress,  2nd  Session,  Pt.  2,  1S71-72,  p.  3325. 
Carl  Schurz:  "Speeches,"  etc.,  vol.  V,  p.  .34  ff.  , 

To  Edward  L.  Pierce. 

New  York,  November  23,  1S89. 

"The  Senate  constituted  the  investigating  committee  for  the  evident 
purpose  of  acquitting.  In  defiance  of  well-estal)lished  customs,  those  who 
moved  the  inquiry  were  rigidly  excluded  from  membership.  On  the  contrary 
they  were  made  to  appear  as  accused  parties.  I  was,  however,  permitted  to 
ask  questions.     Nevertheless,  the  investigation  clearly  established  two  things: 

I.  That  the  rule  of  neutral  duty  as  laid  down  Ijy  the  Administration  itself 
had  l)een  glaringly  violated,  and  that  the  defense  of  the  War  Department 
consist etl  of  the  most  transparent  subterfuges;  and 

II.  That  in  making  these  sales  the  laws  governing  the  sale  of  arms  and 
anmnmition  of  the  Government  had  been  most  unceremoniously  set  aside." 

Memoirs  and  Letters  of  Charles  Sumner  liy  Edward  L.  Pierce,  vol.  IV,  iip. 
504  to  514. 

In  connection  with  the  debate  in  the  Senate  on  the  sul)ject  of  munitions 
sales  to  France,  Senator  Schurz  answered  the  charge  that  it  was  "unpatriotic 
to  expose  a  breach  of  neutrality  on  the  part  of  the  Administration,"  saying, 
"The  Senator  from  Wisconsin  cannot  frighten  me  by  exclaiming, '  My  country, 
right  or  uTong!'  In  one  sense  I  say  so  too.  My  country — and  my  country 
is  the  great  American  Republic — my  country  right  or  wrong;  if  right,  to  be 
kept  right,  and  if  wrong  to  be  set  right!"  a  retort  which  drew  applause  from 
the  galleries." 

2«  Bancroft  Mss.  No.  65.     Bancroft  to  Fish.     Berlin,  January  IS,  1870. 

"  Bancroft  Mss.  No.  73.     Bancroft  to  Fi.sh.     Berlin,  March  3,  1870. 

According  to  Mr.  Bancroft,  Mr.  Burlingame  met  with  a  very  different 
policy  on  the  part  of  France. 

"P.  S.  Secret.  In  Paris  Mr.  Burlingame  at  first  met  with  some  obstructions. 
The  French  minister  was  slow  to  receive  the  idea  that  China  could  lay  claim 
to  equal  respect.  One  day  de  Lavalette  talked  to  him  in  a  very  high  strain 
in  the  interest  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  Claims  were  even  put  forwanl 
for  proi)erty  belonging  to  the  Catholics  centuries  ago  before  they  were  driven 
out  of  the  emjiire  and  very  high  words  were  used  and  even  menaces  of  war 
by  de  Lavalette  in  regard  to  the  liberty  and  protection  that  are  now  to  be 


24      RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES    AXD    GERMANY,    1870 

the  Chinese  Empire  from  disintegration. "  The  American  minister 
asserted,  further,  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  that  Count  Bis- 
marck was  "  particularly  pleased  to  place  his  country  side  by  side 
with  the  United  States  on  a  question  so  important  not  for  com- 
merce only,  but  for  the  future  history  of  the  world. "  In  regard  to 
the  measures  to  be  taken  at  this  time  by  the  powers  for  the  pro- 
tection of  native  Christians  in  Japan,-*  the  German  Government 
(then  the  government  of  the  North  German  Union)  instructed 
its  representatives  to  act  in  harmony  especially  with  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  United  States.  At  the  request  of  the  American 
Government,  Count  Bismarck  during  the  Franco-Prussian  war 
agreed  to  sign  a  truce  with  France  in  regard  to  the  naval  forces  of 
the  two  countries  operating  in  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters.-'^  In 
general,  Mr.  Bancroft  wTote  to  the  Secretary  of  State'''  that  he  was 

accorded  to  missionaries  in  every  part  of  the  Chinese  empire.  The  language 
of  the  French  minister  became  at  last  so  unreasonable  and  menacing  that 
J\lr.  Burhngame  interrupted  him  sajang,  'I  see  that  I  must  write  to  the 
Chinese  Government  that  they  must  prepare  for  war;  but  if  France  should 
really  undertake  a  war  against  China  I  assure  you  it  would  not  be  a  short  or 
a  light  war  but  a  verj^  serious  one  (far  more  serious  than  the  affair  in  Mexico), 
one  of  the  most  difficult  and  serious  in  wliich  France  was  ever  engaged.'  " 

28  Bancroft  AIss.  No.    99.     Bancroft  to  Fish.     BerHn,  June  9,  1870.     (See 
footnote  30.) 

^'  Bancroft  ]Mss.  No.  162.     Bancroft  to  Fish.     Berlin,  November  10,  1870. 

"Sm:^ 

Your  communication  respecting  a  truce  respecting  France  and  Germany 
in  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  waters,  was  forwarded  to  Headquarters,  and 
I  have  received  from  the  foreign  office  the  telegraphic  answer  of  Count  Bis- 
marck of  the  14th  of  this  month  in  which  he  declares  that  the  minister  of 
the  marine  sees  no  objection  to  the  concluding  of  a  formal  convention  as 
proposed  l)y  America  for  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  waters,  and  I  have  been 
requested  to  communicate  to  you  the  assent  of  this  government.  I  annex 
to  the  Despatch  a  copy  of  the  telegram. 
I  remain,  Sir, 

Yours  sincerely, 

(signed)     Geo.  Bancroft." 

Telegram  to  Count  Bismarck  from  Versailles  to  the  Foreign  Office,  Berlin, 
November  14,  1877. 

"  Marine  Minister  kein  Bedenken  gegen  den  von  Amerika  vorgeschlagenen 
Abschluss  formhcher  Convention  fucr  die  japanesisch-chinesischen  Gewacsser. 
Bitte  Herrn  Bancroft  unsere  Zustimmung  auszusprechen." 

Bismarck. 
^  Bancroft  Mss.  No.  90.     Bancroft  to  Fish. 

Americ.\x  Legation, 
Berlin,  May  23,  1870. 
"Sir: 

Your  instruction  No.  190,  was,  in  substance,  immediately  communicated 
by  me  to  the   North  German  Government.     I  jxarticularly  explained  the 


PKORLKM    OF    AMERICAN    MEDIATION  25 

authorized  to  state  that  tlie  German  Government  desired  "to  liold 
the  same  ])()licy  with  the  United  States  in  its  deahngs  with  China 
and  Japan  and  would  always  be  found  ready  to  develop  that  ])olicy 
which  the  connnon  interest  and  sense  of  justice  of  the  two  nations 
had  initiated. " 

With  the  proclamation  of  the  republic  in  France  and  its  prompt 
iTcoynition  by  the  I'nited  States^'  there  was  presented  the  problem 
of  the  United  States'  mediation  between  the  two  belligerents.  A 
request  that  the  United  States  join  the  other  powers  in  intervention 
for  the  purpose  of  peace  was  presented  l)y  the  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  inmiediately  on  receiving  the  news  of  the  United 
States'  recognition  of  the  new  republic.  The  proposal  for  joint 
action  was  at  once  rejected''^  as  being  contrary  to  a  uniform 

caution  which  you  desired  to  exercise  in  the  Chinese  seas  and  the  grounds  of 
it.  In  reply  I  have  received  repeated  heartj^  assurances  of  the  wish  of  this 
Government  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  United  States  in  its  Eastern  Asiatic 
pohcy.     It  accepted  unconditionally  every  suggestion  made  by  you.     .     .     ." 

Bancroft  Mss  No.  99.     Bancroft  to  Fish. 

American  Legation, 

Berlin,  June  9,  1870. 
"Sir: 

Today  I  am  able  to  reply  to  your  No.  192  of  April  18,  '70,  in  relation  to 
the  sj'stematic  persecution  of  the  native  Christians  by  the  authorities  of 
Japan.  The  protocols  of  the  conferences  of  the  representatives  of  the  treaty 
powers  were  duly  communicated  to  the  cabinet  of  Berlin.  This  Government 
is  sincerely  disposed  to  move  in  concert  with  the  U.  S.  It  has  therefore 
instructed  its  representatives  in  Japan  to  act  in  harmony  with  his  colleagues, 
especially  with  the  representative  of  the  U.  S.  The  instructions  direct  him 
for  the  present  at  least  not  to  employ  force  and  not  to  make  any  menace  of 
an  intention  to  employ  force,  but  if  by  any  necessity  armed  force  should  be 
employed  l)y  the  U.  S.  and  North  Germaiw  for  any  other  imperative  reason, 
it  might  then  become  not  improper  to  take  advantage  of  the  situation  to 
speak  with  more  energy  for  the  protection  of  the  Christians  in  the  Japanese 
Empire.  This  Government  will  be  willing  to  issue  to  its  own  representatives 
instructions  analogous  to  yours. 

I  am  authorized  to  add  as  a  general  rule  this  Government  desires  to  liold 
the  same  jiolicy  with  the  U.  S.  in  its  dealings  with  China  and  Japan  and  will 
always  be  found  ready  to  develo]!  that  policy  which  the  common  interest  and 
sense  of  justice  of  the  two  nations  have  initiated. 
I  remain.  Sir, 

Yours  sincerely, 

(signed)     Geo.  Bancroft. 
s'F.  R.,  1870,  I))).  HI,  IK)  and  117. 
»-'  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Journal. 

Seftemher  8,  1870. 
"The  President  called  at  11  o'clock.  I  told  him  that  Washburne  had 
recognized  the  new  government  in  Paris  and  that  Favre  liad  expressed  pro- 
found emotion.  I  read  the  dispatch  stating  that  France  desired  me  to  join 
the  other  powers  in  efforts  for  peace.  He  said  that  his  impressions  were 
against  that.  I  said  that  mine  were,  too,  and  that  in  no  event  would  I  make 
a  joint  effort,  to  which  he  assented.     .     .     ." 


2(3        RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY,    1870 

foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  but  Mr.  Bancroft  was  in- 
structed^^ to  ascertain  whether  Germany  desired  to  have  the  good 
offices  of  the  United  States  interposed.  The  American  minister 
advised  emphatically  against  intervention'^'  in  any  form,  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  be  rejectpd  by  Germany  and  therefore  prove 
embarrassing  to  the  Americin  Government  and  of  no  benefit  to 
any  other.  In  fuller  explanation  of  his  cabled  message,  Mr. 
Bancroft  set  forth  in  two  despatches'^  further  reasons  why  the 


''  F.  R.,  1870,  p.  193. 

No.  142. 

Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Bancroft  (telegram). 

Department  of  State, 

September  9,  1870. 

"Washburne  telegraphs  that  France  requests  United  States  to  join  other 
powers  in  effort  for  peace.  Uniform  policy  and  true  interest  of  United  States 
not  to  join  European  powers  in  interference  in  European  questions.  President 
strongly  desires  to  see  war  arrested  and  blessings  of  peace  restored.  If 
Germany  also  desires  to  have  good  offices  of  United  States  interposed,  President 
will  be  glad  to  contribute  all  aid  in  his  power  to  secure  restoration  of  peace 
between  the  two  great  powers  now  at  war,  and  with  whom  United  States  has 
so  many  traditions  of  friendship.  Ascertain  if  North  Germany  desires  such 
offices,  but  without  making  the  tender  thereof  unless  assured  they  will  be 
accepted." 

Fish. 

3^F.  R.,  1870,  p.  206,  No.  160. 

Mr.  Bancroft  to  Mr.  Fish  (cable  telegram). 

Berlin,  September  11,  1S70. 

(Received  September  11.) 
"No   time  now  for   America  to  intervene.     Germany  rejects  all  foreign 
interference.     Every  other  power  holds  back.     America  would  stand  alone 
and  unable  to  accomplish  anything.     Our  interest,  dignity  require  us  for  the 
present  to  stand  aloof." 

Bancroft. 
35  Bancroft  Mss.  Nos.  132  and  133. 

No.  132. 

American  Legation,  Berlin, 
September  12,  1870. 

"Nothing  can  l)e  more  easy  than  to  give  an  answer  to  your  inquiries  by 
telegram.  In  the  first  place,  no  jiower  of  Europe  has  as  yet  made  any  effort  at 
mediation  or  intervention  or  interference  for  the  restoration  of  {)eace  lietween 
Germany  and  France;  and  therefore  there  are  no  jiowers  which  the  United 
States  could  join.  Secondly,  at  the  time  when  France  ineditatetl  the  unpro- 
voked declaration  of  war,  neither  a  Eurojiean  jjower  nor  the  United  States 
interi)()sed  their  influence  to  prevent  the  war  of  aggression  and  conquest. 
It  is  therefore  the  unanimous  o]iinion  of  Germany,  expressed  in  the  most 
solenm  maniu>r  by  addressees  from  its  considerable  cities,  that  Germany  and 
France  should,  without  foreign  interposition,  IV  left  to  themselves  to  settle 
the  peace.  The  German  Gov(>rnment  have  not  formally  given  their  adhesion 
to  these  addresses,  but  I  have  no  doubt  that  they  sulistantially  express  their 
policy.     I  give  it  as  my  imdouliting  o])inion,  that  the  interposition  of  the 


BANCROFTS    OPPOSITION   TO    AMERICAN   MEDIATION  St 

United  States  should  undertake  no  action  at  tiiat  time  between 
the  warrintr  powers.  When  France  mecHtated,  said  Bancroft, 
"the  unprovoked  deehiration  of  war,  neither  a  European  i)ower 
nor  the  United  States  had  interposed  their  influence  to  prevent  the 
war  of  aggression  and  conquest."  It  was  therefore  the  opinion 
throughout  Germany  that  the  two  nations  should  he  left  to  them- 
selves to  settle  the  peace.  IMoreover,  if  the  various  European 
powers  should  "combine  to  exercise  a  pressure  unjustly  on  either 

United  States  as  a  mediating  power  would,  at  the  present  time  prove 
embarrassing  to  our  own  Government  and  of  no  l>enefit  to  any  other." 

No.  133. 

American  Leg.\tiox,  Berlix, 
September  12,  1870. 
"Sir: 

In  further  reply  to  your  telegram  received  on  the  tenth,  it  may  be  said 
that  mam-  reasons  e:?ist  why  the  American  Government  should  as  yet  adhere 
strictly  to  its  traditional  pohcy  with  regard  to  foreign  affairs.  Should  the 
European  powers  combine  to  exercise  a  pressure  unjustly  on  either  of  the 
belligerents  the  question  might  arise  whether  the  United  States  might  not 
properly  exercise  a  counter-influence  on  the  side  of  right.  Even  in  this  con- 
tingency there  would  still  be  room  for  doubt.  As  things  stand  at  present,  I 
think  tiie  United  States  cannot  interfere  in  any  manner  consistent  with  its 
dignity. 

We  all  as  Americans  are  ready  to  welcome  the  restoration  of  the  republic 
in  France,  and  to  desire  for  it  a  chance  for  free  development.  I  certainly 
wish  to  see  it  established  as  the  permanent  form!  The  strength  of  our  repub- 
lican sympathies  formally  expressed  by  our  highest  representative  in  France 
might  in  the  eyes  of  many  unfit  us  for  the  strict  impartiality  of  a  mediator. 

A  great  difficulty  i)resents  itself  at  the  threshold  in  the  want  of  a  recog- 
nized government  in  France.  We  acknowledge  that  which  has  just  lieen 
constituted  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville  but  more  than  half  of  Europe  has  not  done 
so.  Germany  has  not  done  so.  The  United  States  would  therefore  appear 
in  the  attitude  of  deciding  for  Europe  and  for  one  of  the  belligerents  the 
question  as  to  the  valid  government  of  France.  In  about  three  weeks  France 
has  seen  three  ministers  succeed  each  other.  We  may  believe  in  the  perma- 
nence of  the  present  ministry,  but  a  large  jxart  of  Europe  will  hardly  do  so. 
It  is  uncertain  if  the  people  of  France  would  consider  themselves  bound  by 
a  j^eace  which  the  present  government  should  form.  There  are  many  who 
insist  that  according  to  legal  forms  the  regency  has  not  been  properly  deposed 
and  that  the  new  ministry  has  not  yet  received  the  sanction  of  a  j^opular  vote 
or  a  jiohtic  constituent  assembly. 

To  those  who  reason  in  that  way  General  Trochu  is  the  only  authorized 
agent  of  the  government.  For  he  had  the  sanction  of  the  two  chambers  of 
the  regency  and  also  of  the  gathering  at  the  Hotel  de  Ville. 

Further  the  United  States  would  be  embarrassed  in  any  attempt  to  suggest 
just  and  i)roper  conditions  of  i)eace.  .  .  .  The  demands  of  moral  support 
on  the  side  of  France  would  necessarily  be  verj-  exacting,  so  that  the  attempt 
to  befriend  might  end  in  the  deej)  and  permanent  dissatisfaction  of  the  party 
that  asked  to  be  befriended.  The  Germans  are  bent  on  the  reannexation 
of  Alsace  and  German  Lorraine.  This  is  a  point  on  which  the  United  States 
Government  might  prefer  not  to  give  advice." 


28      RELATIONS   BETWEEN    UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY,    18/ 0 

of  the  belligerents  the  question  might  arise  whether  the  United 
States  might  not  properly  exercise  a  counter-influence  on  the  side 
of  right.  "^^  There  was  also  the  difficulty  of  determining  whether 
the  present  ministry  in  France,  though  recognized  by  the  United 
States,  was  a  permanent  one.  P\irthermore,  "the  United  States 
would  be  embarrassed  in  any  attempt  to  suggest  just  and  proper 
conditions  of  peace."  The  Germans  were  bent  on  the  "reannex- 
ation  of  Alsace  and  German  Lorraine,"  and  this  was  a  question 
"on  which  the  United  States  might  prefer  not  to  give  advice." 
From  the  various  reasons  set  forth  by  ]\Ir.  Bancroft,  it  is  evident 
that  the  American  ^Minister  did  not  wish  the  United  States  to  be  a 
party  to  any  movement  that  would  rob  Germany  of  the  fruits  of 
victory."  These  reasons  set  forth  by  Mr.  Bancroft  were  acknowl- 
edged shortly  afterward  by  the  Secretary  of  State''*  to  be  "among 

3^  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Mss.     Bancroft  to  Davis.     September  5,  1870. 
There  is  little  difficulty  in  determining  the  belKgerent  referred  to  by  "the 
side  of  right."     (See  confidential  letter  to  Davis,  quoted  in  footnote  10.) 
^^  Carl  Schurz:   "Speeches,"  etc.,  vol.  I,  p.  519  ff. 
This  viewpoint  was  also  held  by  Senator  Schurz. 
Letter  from  Carl  Schurz  to  Hamilton  Fish,  Sec'y  of  State. 

St.  Louis, 
September  10,  1870. 

"The  telegraph  informs  me  that  the  President  has  signified  to  the  Prussian 
Government  his  willingness  to  serve  as  a  mediator  between  the  belligerents 
in  Europe.  Judging  from  the  tone  of  the  German  press  and  all  the  indications 
which  float  on  the  surface,  there  seems  to  be  but  little  probability  that  the 
offer  will  be  accepted.  I  am  glad  you  disclaimed  at  the  same  time  any  inten- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  take  part  in  any  combination  of 
neutral  Powers  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  a  settlement  of  the  conflict. 
From  a  purely  American  point  of  view  I  think  it  will  be  the  best  policy  for 
us  to  let  the  denouement  of  that  war  take  care  of  itself.  As  to  giving  an 
expression  of  our  moral  sympathy  with  the  Republic  as  such — and  in  France 
it  exists  only  in  name — ^Ir.  Washburne  has  devoted  himself  to  that  in  his 
own  way.  I  fear  he  has  created  hopes  which  will  be  doomed  to  disappoint- 
ment: the  men  who  have  undertaken  to  revive  the  traditions  of  1792 — an 
im])ossible  task  under  existing  circumstances — will  l)e  apt  to  catch  at  straws 
and  then  abuse  other  people  for  leaving  them  in  the  lurch,  because  the  straws 
are  not  timbers." 

38  F.  R.,  1870,  p.  194,  Xo.  1-16. 
Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Bancroft. 

Dep.\rtment  of  State, 
Washington,  September  30,  1870. 
No.  246. 
"Sir:     Your  dispatch  No.  133,  of  the  12th  instant,  has  l)een  received. 

The  reasons  which  you  present  against  an  American  intervention  between 
France   and   Germany   are  sul)stantially   among  the   considerations,   which 


S1MIL.\RITY   OF  GERMAN   AND   AMERICAN   FEDERATIONS         29 

the  considerntions  which  deterniined  the  President"  in  the  poHcy 
of  "rejectini;-  all  idea  of  nie<liatioii  unless  ii])on  the  joint  request 
of  i)oth  of  the  warriui;'  powers." 

A  further  important  factor  creating  in  the  United  States  a 
marked  friendliness  toward  the  new  German  Empire  was  the 
prevailing  belief  that  that  Empire  represented  really  a  confeder- 
ation, the  United  States  of  Germany,  and  that  the  German  people 
were  going  through  a  unification  process  very  similar  to  that  of 
the  original  American  States.  It  was  the  conviction  of  American 
statesmen  that  the  unification  of  Germany  signified  the  adoption 
in  F^urope  of  the  American  s^'Stem  of  federation  and  American 
liberal  ideas  of  representative  government.  The  outcome  of  the 
American  civil  war  was  held  to  have  demonstrated  the  success  of 
a  republican  form  of  government  and  to  have  therefore  influenced 
the  German  statesmen  to  try  a  similar  form.  Referring  to  the 
constitution  of  the  North  German  Union,  Mr.  Bancroft  asked 
Count  Bismarck^^  whether   the  striking   points   of   resemblance 

determined  the  President  in  the  course  and  pohcy  indicated  to  you  in  the 
cable  dispatch  from  this  office  on  the  9th  instant,  and  in  rejecting  all  idea 
of  mediation  unless  upon  the  joint  request  of  both  of  the  warring  powers. 

It  continues  to  be  the  hope  of  the  President,  as  it  is  the  interest  of  the 
people  of  this  country,  that  the  unhappy  war  in  which  France  and  North 
Germany  are  engaged  should  find  an  early  end. 

This  Government  will  not  express  any  opinion  as  to  the  terms  or  conditions 
upon  which  a  peace  may  or  should  be  established  between  two  governments 
equally  sharing  its  friendship,  but  it  is  hoped  that  the  prolongation  of  the 
war  may  not  find  its  cause  either  in  extreme  demands  on  the  one  side,  or 
extreme  sensitiveness  on  the  other  side. 

So  far  as  you  can  consistently  and  without  any  official  interposition  of 
advice  or  of  counsel,  it  is  hoped  that  you  will  lose  no  proper  opportunity  to 
indicate  the  wishes  and  hopes  of  the  President  and  of  the  American  people 
as  above  represented,  and  to  contribute  what  you  may  to  the  presentation 
of  such  terms  of  peace  as  befit  the  greatness  and  the  power  which  North 
Germany  has  manifested,  and  as  shall  not  be  humiliating  or  derogatory  to  the 
pride  of  the  great  people  who  were  our  earliest  and  fast  ally. 

I  am,  sir,  your  ol)edient  servant, 
Hamilton  Fish." 

'"  Bancroft  Mss.     (Table  conversation  with  Count  Bismarck.) 

Thursday,  September  26,  1867. 
"During  dinner  he  was  exceedingly  courteous  directing  a  word  to  one  and 
another  but  talking  with  me  more  than  the  rest.  I  reminded  him  of  the 
strong  points  of  resemblance  between  our  (constitution  antl  the  constitution 
of  the  North  German  Union,  and  asked  him  if  it  was  the  result  of  imitation 
or  that  the  same  necessity  led  to  the  same  residts.  He  said  'a  little  of  each.' 
The  Bundesra.th  he  regarded  as  in  fact  a  Chamber.     It  had  the  power  of  pro- 


30        RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES    AND   GERilANY,    1870 

between  it  and  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  were  the 
result  of  imitation  or  whether  "the  same  necessity  led  to  the  same 
results,"  and  the  Count  replied,  "a  little  of  each."  Later  the 
American  minister  reports*'^  that  in  remodelling  the  constitution 

posing  laws,  amending  them  and  negativing  them.  The  members  of  it  were 
indeed  subject  to  recall,  but  then,  though  they  appeared  as  the  representatives 
of  various  sovereigns,  those  sovereigns  were  restrained  by  their  respective 
constitutions,  representative  assemblies  and  responsible  ministries  so  that 
there  was  none  of  them  likely  to  send  a  delegate  who  should  not  substantially 
represent  the  opinion  of  the  state  to  which  he  belonged." 

«  Bancroft  Mss.  No.  152. 

American  Legatiox, 
Berlin,  October  17,  1870. 

"Sir: 

There  is  much  discussion  of  the  constitution  best  adapted  to  United 
Germany.  For  centuries  the  Enghsh  constitution  was  for  continental  Europe 
the  model  of  constitutional  freedom;  but  it  is  no  longer  looked  to  for  an 
example,  and  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  is  now  the  study  of  the 
statesmen  who  wish  to  renovate  Europe.  A  federal  union  is  now  become 
the  ideal.  The  opinion  prevails  that  the  system  of  two  legislative  chambers 
is  better  than  that  of  one  and  that  the  present  Reichsrath  of  North  Germany 
is  not  sufficiently  invested  with  co-ordinate  powers  of  legislation.  The  want 
is  felt  of  a  body  hke  our  Senate,  which  should  have  an  organic  life  as  a  whole 
and  life  in  all  its  parts.  The  Councillor  who  last  went  from  the  Foreign 
Office  to  Headquarters  took  with  him  a  copy  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  and  a  commentary  upon  it.  As  the  several  provinces  of  Prussia  and 
all  the  states  of  Germany  have  their  respective  Diets,  a  Senate  for  Germany 
might  be  elected  precisely  in  the  same  manner  as  our  Senate  is  elected. 

In  a  leading  article  of  the  11th  of  this  month  the  new  Prussian  gazette, 
reputed  to  be  the  organ  of  conservatism,  eulegizes  our  Senate  as  the  body 
that  harmoniously  unites  the  principle  of  general  unioii  and  the  principle  of 
the  vitality  of  the  several  states,  and  in  commenting  on  the  forms  necessary 
for  Germany  it  remarks:  'The  Senate  of  the  United  States  of  America  gives 
the  most  striking  proof  that  such  a  house  of  states  is  not  a  mere  monarchical 
and  still  less  a  mere  feudal  institution,  luit  that  it  is  necessary  for  every 
federal  union,  if  that  union  is  also  to  maintain  its  federal  character.' 

As  yet  the  members  of  the  Reichsrath  will  be  chosen  by  the  several  provin- 
cial legislatures,  but  the  princiijle  of  election  and  not  of  descent  is  established 
and  will  not  be  changed.  In  the  present  constitution  of  the  North  German 
Union  there  is  no  hereditary  i)ower  whatever  recognized  except  that  of  its 
head  and  I  believe  that  no  change  in  this  respect  will  take  place.  Suggestions 
have  indeed  been  made  for  the  estalilishment  of  a  house  of  princes,  but  I 
think  that  the  question  has  Iwen  settled  in  favor  of  the  example  of  the  United 
States.  Germany  will  have  an  elective  senate,  not  an  imitation  of  the  British 
House  of  Lords.  The  federation  union  of  all  Germany  has  not  as  yet  been 
definitely  agreed  ujion;  but  to  my  question  the  answer  from  those  who  know 
best  is  that  there  is  good  ground  for  hope.  The  difficulty  at  present  hes 
mainly  in  settling  the  place  of  Bavaria  in  the  event  of  a  general  union.  At 
the, present  moment  it  seems  probable  that  the  King  of  Prussia  will  not  he 
proclaimed  Emperor  of  Germany;  that  the  ])resent  North  German  Union  will 
become  more  nearly  a  German  union;  and  that  it  will  remain,  as  it  now  is,  a 
republic  with  a  permanent  hereditary  executive.  According  to  our  American 
ideas  of  republicanism,  there  is  more  of  solid,  substantial,  law-respecting, 
enduring  republicanism  in  Germany  than  in  anj^  other  state  of  Europe,  not 


BANCHDFT's    EXrEC'TATlOXS    OF    HEl'L'BLICAMS.M    IN    GERMANY      31 

of  the  Xm-th  German  riiion  to  suit  the  needs  of  United  Germany, 
German  statesmen  were  studying  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States  rather  than  that  of  Great  Britain,  since  a  federal  union  had 
become  their  ideah  The  United  States  Senate  was  praised  in  the 
German  press  as  "a  body  that  harmoniously  united  the  principle 
of  general  union  and  the  princii)le  of  the  vitality  of  the  several 
states."  In  the  constitution  of  the  North  German  Union  no 
hereditary  power  was  recognized  except  that  of  its  head,  and  Mr. 
Bancroft  believed  no  change  would  take  place  in  that  respect 
in  the  enlargement  of  the  union.  At  that  time  (October,  1870)  it 
seemed  to  him  probable  that  the  King  of  Prussia  would  not  be 
proclaimed  Emperor  of  Germany  but  that  the  country  would 
remain,  as  he  then  considered  it,  a  republic  with  a  permanent 
hereditary  executive.  In  summing  up  the  political  situation  the 
American  minister  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State: 

"According  to  our  American  ideas  of  republicanism  there  is 
more  of  solid,  substantial,  law-respecting,  enduring  republicanism 
in  Germany  tlian  in  any  other  state  of  Europe,  not  excepting 
England,  and  it  proceeds  in  part  from  the  character  of  the  German 
mind,  in  part  from  the  very  great  number  of  little  republics  with 
which  Germany  was  crowded  through  many  hundred  years,  till 
the  close  of  the  last  century  and  even  in  the  beginning  of  the 
present.  This  has  had  an  influence  on  laws,  language  and  pre- 
cedents which  facilitate  the  general  transformation  of  Germany 
into  a  popular,  federal  union. " 

The  final  change  of  name  for  the  "Chief  of  the  United  States 
of  Germany  "  from  that  of  President  to  that  of  Emperor  was  made, 
according  to  Bancroft,"*^  at  the  request  of  Bavaria.  The  title  of 
Kaiser,  he  asserted,  was  not  especially  in  favor,  regenerated  (xcr- 
many  having  renounced  all  affinities  with  the  Roman  empire  of  the 

excepting  England,  and  it  proceeds  in  part  from  the  character  of  the  German 
mind,  in  part  from  the  very  great  number  of  httle  republics  with  which 
Germany  was  crowded  through  many  hundred  years  till  the  close  of  the 
last  century  and  even  in  the  l)eginning  of  the  present.  This  has  had  an 
influence  on  laws,  language  and  i)recodents,  which  facilitates  the  general 
transformation  of  Germany  into  a  ])oi)ular,  federal  union." 

^'  Bancroft  jNIss.  No.  165. 
3 


32      RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMAN^*,    1870 

middle  ages.  In  general  the  American  minister  expected  to  see  for 
United  Germany 'the  establishment  of  the  "most  liberal  govern- 
ment in  Europe."  In  one  sense  he  considered  it  the  "child  of 
America,"  since  but  for  the  success  of  the  Union  cause  in  the 
American  civil  war  it  would  not  have  been  established.  That 
success  "sowed  the  seeds  of  regeneration  of  Europe,"  of  which  the 
New  Germany  was  a  product. 

This  opinion  that  the  New  Germany  stood  for  liberal  tendencies 
of  government  was  not  held  by  Bancroft  alone.  Senator  Schurz, 
himself  a  fugitive  from  Prussian  rule  in  1S49,  predicted**-  at  this 
time  that  in  spite  of  the  monarchical  form  of  government 
Germany  would  turn  out  to  be  "the  most  progressive  power, 
steadily  progressive."  This  new  Germany  and  the  United  States 
together  would  have  to  make  the  international  law  of  the  world 
and  the  two  nations  would  find  their  interests  to  agree  on  all 
essential  points.  President  Grant  himself  emphasized  the  simi- 
larities between  the  two  unions,  the  American  and  the  German. 
In  a  special  message  to  Congress*^  in  February,  1871,  in  which  he 

«  Carl  Schurz:  "Speeches,"  etc.,  Vol.  I,  p.  519  ff. 

Letter  from  Carl  Schurz  to  Hamilton  "Fish,  Sec'y  of  State. 

St.  Louis,  September  10,  1870. 

One  thing  i.s  settled  now.  Germany  is  destined  to  be  the  great  power  of 
Europe,  and  it  will  be  a  very  substantial  one.  There  are  no  humbugs  and 
shams  about  it.  It  is  all  solid  and  real  from  top  to  bottom.  And  in  spite  of 
its  monarchical  form  of  government,  it  will  also  turn  out  to  be  the  most 
progressive  power,  steadily  progressive.  And  this  Germany  and  the  L'nitod 
States  together  will  have  to  make  the  international  law  of  the  world.  I 
expressed  that  opinion  long  before  Sadowa,  and  now  it  must  ])e  apparent  to 
everyone  who  knows  the  two  countries.  They  will  find  their  interests  to 
agree  in  all  essential  points,  and  before  long  they  will,  without  pre-concert, 
meet  in  the  pursuit  of  common  olijects.  especially  as  far  as  the  regulation  of 
the  trade  of  the  world  is  concerned.  We  ought  to  keep  this  prospect  in  view 
in  all  our  diplomatic  doings." 

^3  House  Misc.  Doc.  210,  Part  7,  53rd  Congress,  2nd  Session.  "Messages 
and  Papers  of  the  Presidents."     (Richardson),  p.  120  f. 

Executive  Mansion, 

February  7,  1871. 
"To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives: 

The  union  of  the  States  of  Germany  into  a  form  of  government  similar 
in  many  respects  to  that  of  the  American  Union  is  an  event  that  cannot 
fail  to  touch  deeply  the  sympathies  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

This   union   has  been  brought   about   by   the  long-continued,   persistent 


(;haxt's  views  on  the  unieication  oe  Germany         '.]'.] 

rix'ommended  that  the  American  representatives  at  BerUn  be 
jihu'ed  on  the  same  footinij;  with  the  American  rei)resentatives  in 
London  and  Paris,  he  took  occasion  to  snm  np  the  many  common 
interests  of  the  two  conntries.  The  American  people,  he  declared, 
saw  in  the  union  of  Germany  an  attempt  to  reproduce  in  Europe 
some  of  the  best  features  of  the  American  constitution.  The  local 
.<j;o\ernments  of  the  several  states  were  preserved  while  the  power 
conferred  on  the  chief  would  impart  strength  for  purposes  of  self- 


efforts  of  the  people,  with  the  deUberate  approval  of  the  governments  and 
jieojile  of  twenty-four  of  the  German  States,  through  their  regularly  constituted 
representatives.  . 

In  it  the  American  people  see  an  attempt  to  reproduce  in  Europe  some 
of  the  best  features  of  our  own  Constitution,  with  such  modifications  as  the 
history  and  condition  of  Germany  seem  to  reciuire.  The  local  governments 
of  the  several  members  of  the  union  are  preserved,  while  the  power  conferred 
upon  the  chief  imparts  strength  for  the  purposes  of  self-defense,  without 
authority  to  enter  upon  wars  of  conquest  and  ambition. 

The  cherished  aspiration  for  national  unity  which  for  ages  has  inspired  the 
many  miUions  of  people  speaking  the  same  language,  inhabiting  a  contiguous 
and  compact  territory,  but  unnaturally  separated  and  divided  by  dynastic 
jealousies  and  the  aml^ition  of  short-sighted  rulers,  has  been  attained,  and 
Germany  now  contains  a  population  of  about  34,000,000,  united,  like  our  own, 
under  one  Government  for  its  relations  with  other  powers,  but  retaining  in 
its  several  members  the  right  and  power  of  control  of  their  local  interests, 
habits,  and  institutions. 

The  l)ringing  of  great  masses  of  thoughtful  and  free  people  under  a  single 
government  must  tend  to  make  governments  what  alone  they  shovdd  be — 
the  representatives  of  the  will  and  the  organization  of  the  power  of  the  peoi)le. 

The  adoption  in  Europe  of  the  American  system  of  union  under  the  control 
and  direction  of  a  free  people,  educated  to  self-restraint,  cannot  fail  to  extend 
popular  institutions  and  to  enlarge  the  peaceful  influence  of  American  ideas. 

The  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Germany  are  intimate  and  cordial. 
The  commercial  intercourse  between  the  two  countries  is  extensive  and  is 
increasing  from  year  to  year;  and  the  large  numl)er  of  citizens  and  residents 
in  the  I'nited  States  of  German  extraction  and  the  continued  flow  of  emigra- 
tion thence  to  this  coimtry  have  ])roduced  an  intimacy  of  personal  and  political 
intercourse  approaching,  if  not  equal  to,  that  with  the  country  from  which  the 
founders  of  our  Government  derived  their  origin. 

The  extent  of  these  interests  and  the  greatness  of  the  German  Union  seem 
to  require  that  in  the  classification  of  the  reprtvsentatives  of  this  Government 
to  foreign  powers  there  should  be  no  longer  an  a])parent  under-valuation  of 
the  importance  of  the  German  mission,  such  as  is  made  in  the  difi'erence 
between  the  compensation  allowed  by  law  to  the  minister  to  Germany  and 
those  to  Great  Britain  and  France.  There  would  seem  to  be  a  great  pro- 
priety in  placing  the  representative  of  this  Government  at  Berlin  on  the  same 
footing  with  that  of  its  rejiresentatives  at  London  and  Paris.  The  union  of 
the  several  States  of  Germany  under  one  government  and  the  increasing 
commercial  and  personal  intercourse  between  the  two  countries  will  also  add 
to  the  labors  ami  the  responsibilities  of  the  legation. 

I  therefore  recommend  that  the  salaries  of  the  minister  and  of  the  secretary 
of  legation  at  Berlin  lie  respectively  increased  to  the  same  amounts  as  are 
allowed  to  those  at  London  and  Paris. 

U.  S.  Gr.^nt." 


34      RELATIONS   BETWEEN   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY,    1870 

defense  without  authority  to  enter  upon  wars  of  conquest  and 
ambition.  The  unification  of  great  masses  of  thoughtful  and  free 
people  under  a  single  government  must  tend  to  make  that  govern- 
ment the  representative  of  the  will  and  the  organizer  of  the  power 
of  the  people.  The  result  of  the  adoption  in  Europe  of  the  Ameri- 
can system  of  federation  must  be  "to  extend  popular  institutions 
and  to  enlarge  the  peaceful  influence  of  American  ideas."  The 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  were  "  intimate 
and  cordial "  and  the  commerce  between  the  two  countries  "exten- 
sive and  increasing."  It  was  therefore  very  fitting  that  the 
mission  to  Germany  should  be  plaged  on  an  equality  with  the 
missions  to  England  and  France. 

In  the  final  summing  up  of  the  important  ties  between  the  two 
countries  the  American  ^Minister  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State^^ 
that  if  the  United  States  needed  the  "trusty  good-will  of  any 
government  in  Europe  it  could  have  that  best  with  Germany, 

^^  Bancroft  (Howe)  to  Hamilton  Fish. 

Berlin,  October  IS,  1870. 

".  .  .  As  to  this  war,  Count  Bismarck's  words  to  me  were:  'I  clearly 
understand  why  your  government  should  choose  to  be  neutral;'  at  the  same 
time  he  has  always  desired  to  cultivate  particularly  friendly  political  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  the  United  States.  Our  foreign  political  interests 
almost  always  run  parallel  with  those  of  Germany  and  are  often  in  direct  con- 
flict with  those  of  France.  Bismarck  and  the  king  were  true  to  our  union 
during  our  civil  war,  when  France  took  sides  against  us.  Germany  respected 
the  independence  of  Mexico;  the  French  supported  the  Austrian  adventurer. 
The  United  States  were  the  first  power  to  speak  for  the  security  of  private 
propertj'  at  sea  in  time  of  war;  German}'  is  the  only  power  which  as  yet 
fully  adopts  the  American  idea.  Germany  desires  to  follow  the  East  Asiatic 
policy  of  the  United  States;  France,  whose  commerce  with  China  is  but  one 
per  cent,  of  the  whole,  intrigues  for  i)ower  through  the  monstrous  demands 
of  its  Jesuit  missionaries.  Germany,  like  America,  is  adverse  to  ultramontane 
usurpations;  it  was  the  French  Repul)hc  which  destroyed  the  Roman  republic 
and  garrisoned  the  Papal  dominions.  Germany  adopts  from  us  the  federative 
system;  France,  whether  empire,  monarchy,  or  reiniblic,  adheres  to  the 
system  of  centralization.  Germany  leaves  Spain  to  choose  her  own  govern- 
ment and  regulate  her  own  affairs;  and  for  160  years  France  has  steadily 
endeavored  to  subordinate  Spanish  interests  and  poUcy  to  her  own.  The 
relations  of  Germany  and  formerl.y  of  Prussia  to  England  are  much  the  same 
as  ours;  and  they  have  l)een  so  for  a  hundred  years.  And  Bismarck  loves  to 
give  the  United  States  jjrominence  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  as  a  balance  to 
Great  Britain.  If  we  need  the  solid,  trusty  good-will  of  any  government  in 
Euroj^e,  we  can  have  it  best  with  Germany;  because  German  institutions  and 
ours  most  nearly  resemble  each  other;  and  because  so  many  millions  of  Ger- 
mans have  become  our  countrymen.  This  war  will  leave  Germany  the  most 
powerful  state  in  Eurojje,  and  the  most  free;  its  frienilship  is,  therefore,  most 
important  to  us  and  has  its  foundations  in  history  and  in  nature." 


FACTORS   CREATINE    COMMUNITY    OF    INTERESTS  35 

because  German  institutions  and  American  most  nearl\'  resembled 
each  other  and  because  so  many  millions  of  Germans  had  become 
American  citizens.  The  war  would  leave  Germany  the  most 
powerful  state  in  Europe  and  the  most  free.  Its  friendship  was 
therefore  most  imjjortant  to  the  United  States."  This  feelino;  of 
connnunity  of  interests  was  to  no  small  degree  reciprocated  l)y 
Bismarck,  who  was  fond  of  giving  the  United  States  prominence 
in  the  eyes  of  Europe  as  a  balance  to  Great  Britain,  and  who 
referred  on  many  occasions  to  the  good  relations  existing  unbroken 
since  they  were  first  inaugurated  by  Frederick  the  Great. ^^  An 
event  reinforcing  the  relationship  thus  outlined  was  the  decision 
rendered  by  Emperor  William  I  in  1872,  who,  as  arbitrator  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  on  the  question  of  the  North- 
west boundary,  rendered  his  verdict  according  to  the  American 
claims.^*^  The  emperor  decreed  that  the  boundary  line  should  be 
drawn  through  the  Haro  Channel.  This  confirmed  to  the  United 
States  its  claim  to  San  Juan  and  the  archipelago  of  islands  lying 
between  the  continent  and  Vancouver  Island,  a  claim  which  had 
been  contested  by  Great  Britain  for  more  than  twenty-six  years. 

«  Bancroft  (Howe),  p.  223  f. 
To  Elihu  B.  Washburn.      , 

Berlin,  March  5,  1869. 

«  F.  R.,  1872,  p.  IV  and  V.     (Annual  xMessage  of  the  President.) 

Mr.  Bancroft  recommended  that  the  German  Emperor  be  invited  to  act 
as  arbitrator  (Bancroft  Mss.  No.  61,  Berlin,  January  10,  '70),  and  the  American 
minister  himself  conducted  the  case  for  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER   II 
TREATY  RELATIONSHIP 

During  the  forty  years  following  the  unification  of  Germany 
there  were  but  two  treaties  concluded  and  formally  ratified  between 
the  Empire  and  the  United  States.^  The  first  of  these  was  a  Con- 
sular Convention  concluded  by  ]\Ir.  Bancroft  with  the  new  German 
Empire,  almost  at  its  inception,  in  December  of  1871.-  By  it  the 
consuls  and  consular  agents  of  each  country  were  granted  recipro- 
cally all  privileges  and  immunities  enjoyed  by  the  agents  of  the 
same  rank  of  the  most-favored-nation.  Customary  provisions  for 
the  inviolability  of  consular  archives  and  premises,  for  the  filling 
of  temporary  vacancies  and  for  the  communications  ^^ith  authori- 
ties, were  included.  The  treaty  provided  also  for  the  disposal  of 
the  property  of  decedents  and  for  the  succession  to  inheritance 
on  the  basis  of  equality  with  native  citizens.  Consuls  of  each 
nation  reciprocally  were  given  jurisdiction  over  disputes  between 
officers  and  crews  of  ships,  over  the  problem  of  deserting  seamen 
and  over  questions  of  damages  to  vessels.  It  was  agreed  that  all 
proceedings  concerning  the  salvage  of  wrecked  vessels  should  he 
in  accordance  Anth  the  laws  of  the  country  where  the  wreck 
occurred.  A  final  article  provided  for  the  reciprocal  protection  of 
trade-marks — the  citizens  of  each  country  enjoying,  while  within 
the  boundaries  of  the  other,  equal  protection  in  this  respect  with 
native  citizens. 

The  second  of  the  treaties^  was  concluded  almost  at  the  end  of 
the  forty  years  under  consideration,  and  was  limited  to  the  subject 


'  This  excludes  the  several  agreements  concluded  between  the  two  countries 
through  their  diplomatic  representatives  without  congressional  action.  It 
excludes  also  the  treaties  to  which  the  United  States  and  Germany  were 
signatories  together  with  one  or  more  other  powers. 

2  Malloy,  Vol  I,  pp.  550  ff.  ^  Malloy,  Vol.  I,  pp.  578  and  579. 


COMMERCIAL   AGREEMENTS  37 

of  patent  protection.  This  patent  convention  was  concluded  and 
ratified  in  1900,  anel  })rovided  that  the  restrictions  api)hed  to 
patents  should  in  each  country  be  the  same  for  citizens  of  the  other 
country  as  for  native  citizens,  and  that  the  working  of  a  patent 
in  the  territory  of  one  of  the  contracting  parties  should  be  con- 
sidered as  equivalent  to  its  working  in  the  territory  of  the  other 
party. 

In  the  long  penod  between  these  two  conventions  a  number  of 
agreements  were  concluded  between  the  two  nations,  but  these 
did  not  assume  the  character  of  treaties  requiring  ratification,   | 
Of  chief  importance  were  the  series  of  commercial  agreements,*  ^ 
occurring  in  1S91  (the  "Saratoga  Agreement"),  1900  and  1907, 
which  served  to  adjust  temporarily  the  trade  relations,  following 
changes  of  tariff,  but  which  could  be  altered  at  short  notice. 
There  was  also  concluded  in  1892  a  Copyright  Agreement^  by  which     ' 
the  full  benefit  of  the  legal  provisions  in  force  in  both  countries 
in  regard  to  copyright  were  assured  to  subjects  and  citizens  of 
both  countries  on  an  equal  basis.    In  1901  an  agreement  by  the   \ 
exchange  of  notes®  provided  for  the  reciprocal  protection  of  trade-  | 
marks  in  ^Morocco.     The  consular  agents  of  both  countries  in 
INIorocco  were  instructed  to  give  equal  protection  to  the  trade- 
marks of  citizens  of  both  countries  ahke  against  infringements 
by  United  States  and  German  citizens  in  that  country,  provided 
those  trade-marks  had  been  duly  registered  in  the  country  extend- 
ing this  protection.     In  1905  a  similar  agreement^  was  effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  in  regard  to  the  protection  of  trade-marks 
in  China,  the  two  countries  guaranteeing  the  reciprocal  protection 
against  infringement  in  China  by  citizens  and  subjects  of  the 
respective  nations  of  trade-marks  duly  registered  in  Germany 
and  the  United  States. 

There  being  thus  no  formal  treaty  of  a  general  nature  between    | 
the  I'nited  States  and  the  German  Empire,  it  was  necessary  in    j 

*  Provisions  of  these  agreements  and  negotiations  attending  their  conclusion 
are  treated  in  Chapter  IV,  Commercial  Relations. 

»  Malloy,  Vol.  I,  p.  557.  «  Malloy,  Vol.  I,  jtp.  559  and  560. 

'  Malloy,  Vol.  I,  p.  560. 


38 


TREATY  RELATIONSHIP 


questions  of  broad  policy  to  refer  to  the  treaties  formed  before 
the  unification  of  the  Empire,  between  the  United  States  and  the 
separate  states  of  Germany.^  Of  these,  the  one  which  became 
recognized  as  fundamental  to  the  relationship  between  the  two 
countries  was  the  treaty  concluded  in  1828  with  the  kingdom  of 
Prussia.  This  Treaty  of  Commerce  and  Navigation  revived  a 
number  of  provisions^  of  the  former  Treaty  of  1799  concerning 
reciprocal  rights  and  duties  in  case  of  war.  It  also  revived  one 
article  from  the  earliest  treaty  concluded  between  the  United 
States  and  Prussia,  that  of  1785,  the  renewed  article  containing 
the  principle  that  "free  ships  make  free  goods,"^"  a  principle 
which  had  been  omitted  from  the  treaty  of  1799  for  the  expressed 
reason  that  experience  had  proved  that  it  was  not  sufficiently 
respected."  This  article  renewed  from  the  1785  treaty  and  pro- 
viding that  "all  things  shall  be  adjudged  free  which  shall  be  on 
board  any  vessel  belonging  to  the  neutral  party,"  was  modified  and 
limited  by  one  of  the  articles^-  taken  over  from  the  1799  treaty, 


*  For  list  of  these  treaties  see  Appendix. 

'  Articles  XIII  to  XXIV  inclusive,  e.xcept  the  last  paragraph  in  the  nine- 
teenth article  relating  to  treaties  with  Great  Britain,  were  revived.  (Malloy, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  1490  ff.)  These  articles  provide  for  neutral  and  belligerent  rights 
and  duties,  in  case  one  of  the  contracting  parties  is  at  war  with  a  third  power, 
in  case  both  are  at  war  with  the  same  power,  and  in  case  they  should  be  at 
war  with  each  other.     See  Appendix. 

"Malloy,  Vol.  II,  p.  1481. 

ARTICLE  XII. 

"If  one  of  the  contracting  parties  should  be  engaged  in  war  with  any  other 
Power,  the  free  intercourse  and  commerce  of  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  the 
party  remaining  neuter  with  the  belligerent  Powers  shall  not  be  interrui)ted. 
On  the  contrary  in  that  case,  as  in  full  peace,  the  vessels  of  the  neutral  party 
may  navigate  freely  to  and  from  the  ports  and  on  the  coasts  of  the  lielligerent 
parties,  free  vessels  making  free  goods,  insomuch  that  all  things  shall  be 
adjudged  free  which  shall  be  on  board  any  vessel  belonging  to  the  neutral 
j)arty,  although  such  things  belong  to  an  enemy  of  the  other;  and  the  same 
freedom  shall  he  (>xtended  to  persons  who  shall  be  on  board  a  free  vessel 
although  they  should  be  enemies  to  the  other  party,  unless  they  be  soldiers 
in  actual  service  of  such  enemy." 

"  Malloy,  Vol.  II,  p.  1490. 
12  Malloy,  Vol.  II,  p.  1490. 

ARTICLE  XIII    (OF  TREATY   OF    1799). 

"And  in  case  of  one  of  the  contracting  parties  being  engaged  in  war  with 
any  other  Power,  to  prevent  all  the  difficulties  and  misunderstandings  that 


PRi^VISIONS   GOVERNING    PRIVATE    PROPERTY   ON  HIGH  SEAS      39 

which  i)rovi(le<l  for  the  ri^lit  of  visit  and  search  of  vessels  and  for 
the  removal  of  contraban<l  witli  subsequent  full  payment  to  the 
owners  of  the  ijootls. 

The  situation  provided  for  jn  these  articles  renewed  from  the 
former  Prussian  treaties  was  furnished  by  the  Franco-Prussian 
war.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Germany  announced  that  ])ri\ate 
property  on  the  hio;h  seas  would  be  exempt  from  seizure  without 
regard  to  reciprocity.^^  This  policy  went  beyond  the  provision 
contained  in  the  treat>'  with  the  United  States,  since  it  included 
private  property  carried  in  enemy  vessels.    It  was,  however,  later 

usually  arise  respecting  merchandise  of  contraband,  such  as  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, and  military  stores  of  every  kind,  no  such  articles  carried  in  the  vessels, 
or  by  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  either  party,  to  the  enemies  of  the  other,  shall 
be  deemed  contraband,  so  as  to  induce  confiscation  or  condemnation  and  a 
loss  of  property  to  individuals.  Nevertheless,  it  shall  be  lawful  to  stop  such 
vessels  and  articles  and  detain  them  for  such  length  of  time  as  the  captors 
may  think  necessary  to  prevent  the  inconvenience  or  damage  that  might 
ensue  from  their  proceeding,  paying,  however,  a  reasonable  com])ensation  for 
the  loss  such  arrest  shall  occasion  to  the  proprietors;  and  it  shall  further  be 
allowed  to  use  in  the  service  of  the  captors  the  whole  or  anv  part  of  the  military 
stores  so  detained,  paying  the  owners  the  full  value  of  the  same,  to  be  ascer- 
tained bj'  the  current  price  at  the  place  of  its  destination.  But  in  the  case 
supposed  of  a  vessel  stopped  for  articles  of  contraband,  if  the  master  of  the 
vessel  stopped  will  deliver  out  the  goods  supposed  to  be  of  a  contraband 
nature,  he  shall  be  admitted  to  do  it,  and  the  vessel  shall  not  in  that  case  be 
carried  into  any  port,  nor  further  detained,  but  shall  be  allowed  to  proceed  on 
her  voyage. 

All  cannons,  mortars,  fire-arms,  pistols,  bombs,  grenades,  bullets,  balls, 
muskets,  flints,  matches,  powder,  saltpeter,  sulphur,  cuirasses,  pikes,  swords, 
belts,  cartouche  boxes,  saddles  and  bridles,  beyond  the  quantity  necessary 
for  the  use  of  the  ship,  or  beyond  that  which  every  man  serving  on  board  the 
vessel,  or  passenger,  ought  to  have;  and  in  general  whatever  is  comprised 
under  the  denomination  of  arms  and  military  stores,  of  what  descrii)tion 
soever,  shall  be  deemed  objects  of  contraband." 

"F.  R.,  1870,  p.  217. 

Secretary  Fish  wrote  to  Baron  Gerolt,  the  German  minister  to  the  United 
States  in  regard  to  the  announcement  of  German  policy: 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  receives  with  great  pleasure  the 
renewed  adherence  of  a  great  and  enlightened  German  government  to  the 
principle  temporarily  established  l)y  the  treaty  of  1785,  and  since  then  advo- 
cated by  this  Government  whenever  opportunity  has  offered 

Count  Bismarck's  dis])atch  .  .  .  shows  that  North  Germany  is  willing 
to  recognize  this  princii)]e  (even  without  reciprocity)  in  the  war  which  has 
now  imhapi)ily  liroken  out  between  that  country  and  France.  This  gives 
reason  to  hope  that  the  Ciovernment  and  people  of  the  United  States  may 
soon  be  gratified  by  seeing  it  universally  recognized  as  another  restraining 
and  harmonizing  influence  imposed  by  modern  civilization  upon  the  art  of 
war." 


40  TREATY   RELATIONSHIP 

abandoned  by  Germany,  who  revoked  her  declaration^^  on  the 
ground  that  the  treatment  of  German  merchant  ships  by  France 
made  it  necessary  to  give  up  the  position  taken  earHer  in  the  war. 
Upon  the  revocation  of  the  order,  however,  Bismarck  assured  the 
United  States  Government  that  all  action  toward  American  vessels 
would,  as  a  matter  of  course,  be  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty  of  1799/^  exempting  from  seizure,  when  carried  in 
American  vessels,  all  private  property  except  contraband.  The 
latter  might  be  removed  from  the  vessels  and  used  by  the  bellig- 
erent power  if  compensation  were  later  made  to  the  owners.  In 
taking  this  stand  Bismarck  therefore  based  the  policy  of  the  North 
German  Union  in  this  regard  on  the  narrower  principle  of  Article 
XIII,  revived  from  the  treaty  of  1799,  rather  than  on  the  broad 
principle  of  "free  ships  make  free  goods"  embodied  in  Article  XII 
revived  from  the  treaty  of  1785. 

"F.  R.,  1871,  pp.403  ff. 

On  receiving  notice  of  the  revocation  of  the  German  declaration  the  Ameri- 
can Secretaiy  of  State  expressed  to  the  German  minister  the 

"great  regret  with  which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  receives  the 
information  that  circumstances  have  arisen  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
government  of  North  Germany,  justif}^  its  withdrawal  from  a  position  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  regarded  with  very  great  satisfaction 
as  taken  in  the  best  interests  of  civihzation." 

'5F.  R.,  1871,  pp.  411  and  412. 

There  was  a  misunderstanding  at  first  as  to  the  scope  of  the  first  declaration 
by  Germany.  The  United  States  considered  that  since  no  mention  had  been 
made  concerning  contraband,  the  declaration  exempted  this  form  of  "private 
property"  also;  and  therefore  that  even  though  its  protection  when  carried 
l)y  French  shi]:)s  had  l^een  withdrawn,  it  would  still  l^e  exempt  from  seizure 
when  carried  by  American  vessels.  Bismarck,  however,  declared  that  men- 
tion of  contraband  had  not  lieen  made  in  his  first  declaration,  because  it  was 
assumed  that  "according  to  international  usages,"  contraband  had  always 
been  considered  subject  to  seizure.  He  set  forth  that  this  principle  had  been 
endorsed  by  the  United  States  itself  in  1856  in  regard  to  the  declaration  of 
Paris.  Upon  being  asked  to  adhere  to  the  four  provisions  of  the  Paris  declara- 
tion the  United  States  had  "declared  its  readiness  to  do  so  only  on  condition 
that  the  property  of  subjects  of  a  belligerent  state  should  be  exempt  from 
capture  at  sea,  by  the  war  vessels  of  the  other  partly,  contraband  of  war 
excepted." 


APPLICATION    OF  TREATY   OF   1828  TO    FRANCO-PRUSSIAN   WAR      41 

Tlu'  negotiations  on  this  subject  are  significant  aside  from  tlieir 
immetliate  concern,  because  of  the  fact  that  the  treaty  of  1828 
was  assumed  without  question  to  be  binding  upon  the  North 
German  I'nion,  although  it  had  been  concluded  only  with  Prussia. 
The  United  States  also  assumed  that  its  obligations  as  a  neutral 
under  that  treaty  were  binding  uixni  it  in  relation  to  the  North 
German  Union  just  as  they  would  have  been  were  Prussia  alone 
involved  in  the  war.  This  was  illustrated  in  the  neutrality  i)rocla- 
mation  issued  by  President  Grant,  in  which  he  set  forth  the  rights 
and  duties  of  American  citizens  as  determined  by  the  neutrality 
law  of  the  United  States  and  by  its  treaty  oliligations.  The  Presi- 
dent applied  to  the  situation  at  that  time  the  treaty  privilege  of 
the  belligerent  to  carry  in  and  out  of  the  ports  of  the  neutral 
without  search  or  hindrance,  any  jDrizes  captured  from  the  enemy. 
This  privilege  he  declared  under  the  Prussian  treaty  of  1799, 
re\i\-ed  by  the  treaty  of  1828,  to  be  still  in  force.^*'  Later  in  the 
intercourse  between  the  two  countries  doubt  was  expressed  at 
various  times  by  each  of  the  nations  as  to  whether  the  treaty  of 
1828  and  certain  other  treaties  formed  with  individual  German 
States  before  the  unification  could  be  considered  valid  for  the 
whole  empire. 


i«F.  R.,  1871,  p.  46. 

BY   THE  PRESIDENT  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES  OF 
AMERICA. 

A   PROCLAMATION. 

(August  22,  1S70 — Enjoining  neutvality  in  the  present  war  between  France 
and  the  North  German  Confederation  and  its  aUies.) 

"And  I  do  further  declare  and  proclaim  that  by  the  nineteenth  article  of 
the  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  which  was  concluded  ):)etween  his  Majesty 
the  King  of  Prussia  and  the  United  States  of  America,  on  the  11th  day  of 
July,  A.  D.  1799,  which  article  was  revived  by  the  treaty  of  May  1,  a.  »•  1828, 
l)etween  the  same  parties  and  is  still  in  force,  it  was  agreed  that  'the  vessels 
of  war,  public  and  private,  of  both  i)arties,  shall  carry  freely  wheresoever 
they  please,  the  ves.sels  and  effects  taken  from  their  enemies,  without  being 
obliged  to  pay  any  duties,  charges  or  fees  to  officers  of  admiralty,  of  the 
customs,  or  any  others;  nor  shall  such  i)rizes  be  arrested,  searched  or  jnit  under 
any  legal  process,  when  they  come  to  and  enter  the  ports  of  the  other  party, 
but  may  freely  be  carried  out  again  at  any  time  by  their  cai>tors  to  the  places 
expressed  in  their  commissions,  which  the  commanding  officer  of  such  vessel 
shall  be  obhged  to  show." 


42  TREATY    RELATIONSHIP 

By  the  treaty  of  1828,"  Prussia  and  the  United  States  had 
guaranteed  to  each  other  freedom  of  commerce  and  navigation. 
There  was  to  be  no  discrimination  in  the  form  of  tonnage  dues  or 
other  port  charges,  in  the  ports  of  either  nation  against  the  vessels 
of  the  other.     The  vessels  of  each  country  in  this  respect  were 
placed  on  an  equal  footing  with  its  own  national  vessels  except 
in  the  case  of  the  ships  engaged  in  coastwise  trade.     Similarly 
with  regard  to  imports  it  was  agreed  that  there  should  be  no  dis- 
crimination in  the  form  of  duties  placed  on  the  products  of  one 
I  country  upon  their  importation  into  the  other.    Though  the  term 
"most-favored-nation"  was  not  used  in  the  treaty  the  two  coun- 
1    tries   established   their   relations   on   this   basis.     The  idea   was 
\     embodied  in  Articles  V  and  IX  of  the  treaty,  which  read  as  follows: 

Article  v. 

"  No  higher  or  other  duties  shall  be  imposed  on  the  importation 
into  the  United  States  of  any  article  the  produce  or  manufacture  of 
Prussia,  and  no  higher  or  other  duties  shall  be  imposed  on  the 
importation  into  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia  of  any  article  the  produce 
or  manufacture  of  the  United  States,  than  are  or  shall  be  payable 
on  the  like  article  being  the  produce  or  manufacture  of  any  other 
foreign  country.  Nor  shall  any  prohibition  be  imposed  on  the 
importation  or  exportation  of  any  article  the  produce  or  manu- 
facture of  the  United  States  or  of  Prussia,  to  or  from  the  ports  of 
the  United  States  or  to  or  from  the  ports  of  Prussia,  which  shall 
not  equally  extend  to  all  other  nations." 

Article  ix. 

"If  either  party  shall  hereafter  grant  to  any  other  nation  any 
particular  favor  in  navigation  or  commerce,  it  shall  immediately 
become  common  to  the  other  party,  freely  where  it  is  freely 
granted  to  such  other  nation,  or  on  yielding  the  same  compensation, 
when  the  grant  is  conditional." 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  latter  article  is  in  a  sense  contradictory 
to  the  former.    Article  V,  if  taken  literally,  establishes  an  uncon- 


"  Malloy,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1496  ff. 


MOST-FAVORED-XATION    PRINCIPLE    UNDER   TREATY    OF    1S2.S      A'.] 

ditioiial  in(>st-fav()rc'(l-iiati(Mi  basis  in  respect  to  import  duties. 
.  If  this  article  stctul  alone  in  the  treaty  it  would  he  difficult  to  see 
how  either  of  the  coutracthig  parties  could  <i:rant,  for  instance 
any  tariff  reduction  to  any  third  nation,  without  extending  the 
same  hwor  automatically  and  unqualifiedly  to  the  other  con- 
tracting i)arty.  Article  IX,  however,  places  an  important  restric- 
tion on  this  sweei^ing  most-favored-nation  principle.  Each  of 
the  contracting  parties  can  claim  from  the  other,  according  to  this 
article,  the  benefits  of  a  privilege  granted  to  a  third  nation,  only 
if  that  privilege  was  extended  gratuitously  to  that  third  nation. 
Otherwise  there  must  be  a  bargaining.  The  second  contracting 
party  must  offer  to  the  first-some  favor  equivalent  to  that  offered 
by  the  third  nation,  before  it  can  become  entitled  by  the  treaty 
to  the  privilege  under  discussion.  In  short.  Article  IX  establishes 
the  restricted  most-favored-nation  theory  or  reciprocity.^^ 

Though  frequently  made  the  basis  of  diplomatic  negotiations 
between  the  two  countries,  the  treaty  of  1828  was  never  formally 
extended  to  the  whole  German  Empire.  The  nearest  approach 
to  any  statutory  recognition  was  the  fact  that  the  constitution^^ 
of  the  Gemian  Empire  declared  that  all  legislation  concerning 
customs  duties  and  commerce  and  all  organization  for  the  protec- 
tion of  German  trade  and  navigation  should  be  under  the  suj)er- 
vision  of  the  empire.  No  mention  was  made,  however,  of  the  past 
legislation  or  contracts  on  this  subject  made  by  the  individual 
States.  The  applicability,  therefore,  of  the  constitutional  provis- 
ions to  the  treaty  of  1828  with  Prussia,  or  to  the  similar  treat>' 

'8  For  the  interpretation  of  these  articles  by  the  two  nations  see  Chapter 
III  "Commercial  Relations."  The  United  States  held  consistently  to  the 
principle  of  reciprocity.  Germany's  policy  varied.  The  German  Govern- 
ment at  times  acted  on  the  principle  of  unrestricted  and  at  times  on  the 
principle  of  restricted  most-favored-nation  treatment  in  regard  to  the  United 
States. 

See  also  Sen.  Doc.  29,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Session. 

Also  article  on  "Most-favored-nation  Relations,  German-Aineriran,"  Ijv 
Dr.  (1.  M.  Fisk  in  Journal  of  Political  Fcoiiomy,  March,  19().">,  and  the  work 
by  Richard  Calwer,  Berlin,  1902,  entitled  "Die  Meistbeguenstigung  der 
Vereinigten  Staatcn  von  Nordamerica." 

"  F.  R.,  1871,  Article  4  (pp.  384  and  385)  and  Article  35  (pp.  387  and  388). 


44  TREATY    RELATIONSHIP 

of  1827  with  the  Hanseatic  RepubHcs.^"  is  very  vague,  and  was 
seldom  referred  to  in  the  practical  negotiations  as  evidence  of  the 
vaKdity  of  that  treaty  for  the  whole  empire. 

The  fact  that  this  important  treaty  had  never  by  formal  agree- 
ment been  declared  binding  upon  United  Germany  caused  its 
validity  to  be  ciuestioned  at  various  times  by  each  of  the  two 
countries.  Officials  of  each  nation  differed  from  one  another  in 
their  opinion  on  this  subject.  In  1897  a  heated  discussion"-^  took 
place  in  the  Reichstag  concerning  the  future  commercial  policy 
of  Germany  toward  the  United  States  as  affected  by  the  Dingley 
tariff.  In  the  course  of  the  debate  the  binding  character  of  the 
Prussian  and  Hanseatic  treaties  was  seriously  questioned.  Count 
von  Kanitz-Podangen,  Conservative,  said  that  the  American 
Union  and  Germany  treated  each  other  reciprocally  as  most 
favored  countries,  although  no  commercial  or  most-favored-natio7i 
treaty  had  ever  taken  place  between  the  two  states.  (Staatengruppen.) 
He  then  referred  to  the  1827  and  1828  treaties  as  being — whether 
rightly  or  wrongly — (mit  Recht  oder  Unrecht),  considered  the  basis 
of  the  commercial  relations  between  the  two  countries.  Person- 
ally, however,  he  considered  that  to  revert  to  these  treaties  was 
legally  inadmissible  (nicht  statthaft).  The  interpellation  of  the 
Count  and  his  colleagues  w^as  answered  by  Baron  von  ]\Iarschall, 
]Minister  of  State  and  Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office,  who  declared 
himself  to  be  of  quite  different  opinion  concerning  the  treaty 
I  under  discussion.  The  question  of  the  validity  and  of  the  limits 
of  the  region  of  application  of  these  treaties,  he  declared,  had 
never  been  specifically  fliscussed--  or  decided  by  the  two  countries. 

20  Malloy,  Vol.  I,  pp.  901  ff. 

Article  IX  of  this  treaty  with  the  Hanseatic  Repubhcs  constituted  a  reci- 
procity clause  almost  identic  in  wording  with  Article  IX  of  the  treaty  with 
Prussia  the  following  year. 

-'  V.  R.,  lS95-lS97,Vol.  VIII,  pp.  5701  ff.,  213  Sitz.     (May  3,  1897). 

=2  Ibid.,  p.  5706. 

"Die  Frage  der  Giltigkeit  unci  dos  Geltungsbereichs  dieses  preussischen 
Vertrages  ist  zwischen  den  Vereinigten  Staaten  und  Deutschland  niemals 
prinzipiell  zur  Eroerterung  und  zur  Entscheidung  gelangt." 

It  was  inaccurate  to  state  that  the  subject  had  never  been  discussed,  but 
correct  that  it  had  never  been  formally  decided. 


VALIDITY    OF    PRT'SSIAN-A]\IERICAN   TREATY    OF    1S2S  45 

Similar  treaties  existed  with  Sweden,  Norway  and  Denmarlc,  and 
the  iiovernnient  had  ahvays  jjroeeeded  U])()n  the  ])rineii)le  tliat 
tliese  liad  not  li^st  their  vahdity  throuf2;h  the  founthnu;  of  the  Cier- 
nian  Empire  hut  liad  heen  transferred,  together  with  their  rights 
and  ohhgations,  to  the  German  ?^.mpire,  in  appHcation  of  Artieles 
4  and  85  of  the  Constitution  wliieh  gave  over  to  the  Empire  the 
entire  tariff  and  commerce  legislation.  Moreover,  he  continued, 
these  treaties  had  lost  their  territorially  restricted  character  before 
the  founding  of  the  eni})Ire,  at  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the 
ZoUverein.  The  principal  proof,  however,  of  the  binding  power  of 
these  treaties.  Baron  von  IMarschall  declared  to  be  the  fact  that 
both  parties  had  recognized  their  validity  through  conclusive 
acts.  Rights  had  been  claimed  for  and  obHgations  fulfilled  by  the 
whole  German  Empire  on  the  basis  of  certain  paragraphs  of  this 
treaty.  In  1S85,  for  example,  the  chancellor  had  declared,  apropos 
of  a  commercial  treaty  with  Spain,  that  the  United  States,  Sweden 
and  Denmark  could  claim  most-favored-nation  privileges^  through 
their  special  treaties  with  single  States,  w^hich  could  now  no  longer 
be  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  empire.  Germany  had  repeatedly 
claimed  and  obtained  rights  from  the  Ignited  States  on  the  ground 
of  the  Prussian  treaty,  and  the  United  States  had  in  turn  recog- 
nized the  treaty  as  a  basis  for  claims  from  Germany.-^  Its  binding 
character  had  thus  been  tacitly  assumed  by  both  nations.  This 
fact,  the  ^Minister  of  State  considered,  established  in  itself  the 
validit^'  of  the  treatv. 


-^  For  accounts  of  negotiations  involving  these  treaties,  see  Chapter  IV, 
"Commercial  Relations."  See  also  negotiations  between  Bismarck  and 
Mr.  Kasson  (American  Minister)  on  German  Differential  Railroad  Rates, 
1884.  (G.  M.  Fisk,  Most-Fa vorcd-Xation  Relations — German-American,  in 
Journal  of  Political  Economy,  March,  190.3.) 

In  1885  Baron  von  Alvensleben,  the  German  minister,  wrote  to  .Secretary 
Bayard  to  claim  for  Germany,  on  the  ground  of  the  treaty,  the  reduced  tonnage 
dues  just  extended  by  the  United  States  to  vessels  from  certain  South  Ameri- 
can countries.  He  stated  that  Article  IX  of  the  Prussian-American  Treaty 
had  been  "in  the  correspondence  between  the  cabinets  of  Berlin  and  Wash- 
ington concerning  the  petroleum  railroad  rates  as  well  as  ])ecause  of  the 
Spani.sh-American  treaty  concerning  the  trade  of  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico, 
successively  asserted  by  both  Governments  to  be  valid  for  all  Germany." 
(See  F.  R.,  1885.) 


46  TREATY   RELATIONSHIP 

A  similar  debate  was  held  in  the  Reichstag  in  1899.-^  Again 
Count  von  Kanitz,  as  the  representative  of  the  German  Conserva- 
tives, spoke  against  the  Prussian  treaty,  declaring  that  it  had 
been  rendered  null  and  void  by  the  American  tariff  legislation. 
This  Aiewpoint  was  seconded  by  Baron  Herrnsheim,  of  the  National 
Liberals,  who  added  that  it  was  evident  that  the  Americans  con- 
sidered the  treaty  to  be  no  longer  in  force,  since  American  Secre- 
taries of  State  Gresham  and  Olney  had  stated  that  there  was  no 
evidence  for  considering  that  the  treaty  concluded  with  Prussia 
had  been  extended  to  the  German  Empire.  This  view  was  at  once 
contradicted  by  von  Buelow,  IMinister  of  State  and  Secretary  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  who  declared  explicitly  that  the  commercial 
relations  between  Germany  and  the  United  States"  rested  contract- 
ually (vertragsrechtlich)  on  the  treaty  of  1S2S  with  Prussia  and 
on  the  similar  agreements  with  other  German  seaboard  States. 
The  differences  with  America  on  the  subject,  he  said,  were  due  to 
a  different  conception  of  the  scope  of  the  most-favored-nation 
clause.  This  declaration  of  the  Minister  of  State  was  received 
with  satisfaction  by  the  more  radical  parties-^  and  was  endorsed 
by  Count  von  Posadowsky-Wehner,  Representative  of  the  Chan- 
cellor and  Secretary  of  the  Interior. 

In  the  United  States  there  was  also  uncertainty  as  to  whether 
the  treaty  covered  more  than  the  State  of  Prussia,  with  which  it 
had  been  concluded.  Claims  had  been  made  to  the  Government 
of  the  Empire,  based  on  the  most-favored-nation  status  granted 
to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty,-^  which  was  a  tacit  recognition 
of  its  binding  qualities  upon  the  empire,  and  there  seems  never 
to  have  been  any  objection  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
having  the  government  of  the  empire  base  its  claims  against  the 
United  States  on  the  agreement  concluded  by  the  government  of 
one  German  State,  Nevertheless,  the  view  was  held  by  at  least 
two  American  Secretaries  of  State  that  the  treaty  could  not  be 

2"  V.  R.,  '95 -'00,  Bd.  I,  30  Sitz.     February  11,  '99,  S.  787,  B.  ff. 

See  also  Chapter  on  Commercial  Relations. 

^^  Ibid.,  S.  800.     See  speech  of  Herr  Richter  of  the  Freisinnige  \'olkspartei. 

26  F.  R.,  1885,  p.  443. 


API'LICATIDX    OF    1S2S   TREATY   TO   THE    GERMAN'    EMPIRE       47 

used  hy  Germany  as  a  basis  for  claims  exteiidinsjc  beyond  the  terri- 
tory of  Prussia.  In  1894.  wlien  (Germany  protested  against  the 
terms  of  the  American  tariff  affecting  the  importation  of  German 
sugar,-'  Secretary  Gresham,  though  admitting  the  justice  of  the 
German  chiim  on  the  grounds  of  Articles  V  and  TX  of  the  LS28 
treaty,  declared:  "  The  stipulations  of  these  two  articles  place  the 
commercial  intercourse  oj  the  United  States  and  Prussia,  not  the 
fiifirc  German  Empire,  on  the  most^favored-nation  basis."  He 
therefore  assumed  "that  the  German  Government  did  not. claim 
that  the  treaty  afforded  any  just  ground  for  protest  against  the 
additional  duty  on  sugars  not  shown  to  be  the  produce  or  manu- 
facture of  Prussia^  This  opinion  of  the  Secretary  of  State  was 
upheld  by  the  United  States  Attorney-General.  INIr.  Olney  was 
asked  to  render  his  official  opinion  on  the  claims  of  Germany  to  be 
exempted  from  the  payment  of  duty  on  German  salt.  One  of  the 
grounds  of  the  German  claim  being  based  on  the  most-favored- 
nation  provisions  of  the  LS2S  treaty,  the  Attorney-General  ren- 
dered his  decision  against  Germany  partly  on  the  ground  of  the 
invalidity  of  the  treaty  for  the  whole  empire. 

"It  should  be  noted,"  he  states,-*  "that  while  this  treaty  is  to 
be  taken  as  operative  as  respects  so  much  of  the  German  Empire 
as  constitutes  the  kingdom  of  Prussia,  no  facts  or  considerations 
\\\t\\  which  I  have  been  made  acquainted  justify  the  assumption 
that  it  is  to  be  taken  as  effective  as  regards  other  portions  of  the 
empire.  Neither  am  I  informed  whether  the  German  salt,  for  which 
free  admission  into  this  country  is  demanded,  is  a  product  or 
manufacture  of  Prussia  proper  or  of  some  other  part  or  parts  of  the 
German  Empire."  Two  years  later  Mr,  Olney,  Secretary  of  State, 
had  occasion  to  pass  upon  the  same  question.^'-*  Referring  to  his 
opinion  given  in  1894,  he  wrote  to  Baron  von  Thielmann,  German 
minister,  as  follows: 

-^See  Chapt.  IV,  Commercial  Relations.  Also  F.  R.,  194,  p.  2:^9  and  Sen. 
Misc.  Doc.  Xo.  52,  53rd  Cong.,  lird  8ess. 

2*  Sen.  Misc.  Doc.  No.  52,  53rd  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  p.  5. 

29  F.  R.,  1896,  p.  209. 

Secretary  Olney  expressed  hy  implication  a  request  for  the  Geniuin  Govern- 
ment's view  in  this  matter.  , 
4 


48  TREATY    RELATIONSHIP 

"In  that  opinion  I  discussed  the  several  grounds  upon  which 
you  had  claimed  by  your  preceding  notes  that  German  salt  is 
entitled  to  come  into  the  United  States  free.  The  first  of  these 
grounds  was  the  applicability  of  the  most-favored-nation  clause 
in  the  treaty  of  May  1,  1828,  between  the  United  States  and 
Prussia;  and  upon  this  point  I  remark  that  your  note  is  silent, 
so  that  I  am,  as  Secretary  of  State,  still  without  the  information 
which  I  lacked  while  Attorney-General,  as  to  whether  the  treaty 
with  Prussia  is  to  be  taken  as  effective  as  regards  other  portions 
of  the  Empire  or  whether  the  German  salt,  for  which  free  admis- 
sion into  this  country  is  demanded,  is  a  product  or  manufacture 
of  Prussia  proper  or  of  some  other  part  or  parts  of  the  German 
Empire." 

In  contrast  to  these  officials  of  the  State  Department,  Congress 
seemed  to  have  no  doubts  about  the  treaty  but  simply  assumed  its 
validity.  In  1885  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  recommended 
to  the  House  for  adoption  the  following  resolution  :^^ 

"Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
that  the  President  of  the  United  States  be  requested  to  take  imme- 
diate steps  to  secure  to  the  United  States  equal  benefits  in  the 
German  Empire  with  other  nations  as  to  all  articles  of  commerce 
of  the  United  States,  under  the  most-favored-nation  clause  of  the 
treaty  of  1828,  made  with  Prussia  and  now  in  force  between  the 
United  States  and  the  German  Empire." 

In  spite  of  this  acknowledged  uncertainty  as  to  the  validity  of 
the  treaty,  the  nations  took  no  formal  action  to  establish  its  status, 
but  continued  throughout  this  whole  period  to  make  practical 
use  of  it  as  a  basis  for  temporary  agreements  to  regulate  their 
reciprocal  commercial  relations. ^^ 

"It  wovild  much  facilitate  my  examination  of  the  subject  were  I  informed 
of  the  grounds,  if  any,  for  regarding  the  treaty  stipulation  concluded  with 
Prussia  in  1828  as  now  operative  with  respect  to  the  whole  German  Empire, 
and  if  this  be  not  the  case,  how  and  to  what  extent  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia 
may  seek  to  adduce  its  treaty  with  the  United  States  in  support  of  a  claim 
for  the  exemption  from  duty  on  salt  produced  in  and  exported  from  Prussia." 

The  published  correspondence  of  the  two  countries  gi\es  no  evidence  of  a 
reply  from  Germany  to  this  question. 

3"  House  Report,  No.  2682,  48th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess. 
'1  See  Chapt.  IV,  Commercial  Relations. 
•See  also  F.  R.,  1883,  p.  369. 


THE    I?.\X(M?OFT   TREATIES  49 

Another  phase  of  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany,  concernino;  which  the  treaty  provisions  were  inadequate 
and  uncertain,  was  that  of  the  status  of  the  naturaUzed  citizen 
and  liis  ritjhts  and  innnunities  upon  liis  return  to  the  land  of  his 
hirth.'-'  This  subject  was  refi;ulated  by  a  j2:roup  of  treaties  con- 
cluded before  the  unification  of  the  empire  with  the  separate 
states  of  Baden,  Bavaria,  Hesse,  Wurtemburg  and  the  North 
German  Union.  Besides  differing  from  one  another  in  minor 
respects,  which  caused  some  difficulty,  these  treaties  left  unregu- 
lated the  status  of  the  former  citizens  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Just  as 
it  was  never  formally  determined  whether  the  1S2S  treaty  with 
Prussia  had  been  extended  to  include  the  whole  German  Empire, 
so  it  was  never  formally  agreed  upon  by  both  countries  whether 
or  not  the  naturalization  treaty  concluded  with  the  Xorth  German 
Union,  or  any  of  the  other  treaties  of  the  group,  were  valid  for  the 
whole  empire  and  hence  governed  the  status  of  American  citizens 
born  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  final  published  correspondence  up 
to  the  year  1910  showed  the  two  governments  taking  opposite 
stands  on  the  question — the  German  Government  holding  the  ^ 
treaties  inapplicable^^  to  former  citizens  of  the  two  provinces  and  ' 
the  United  States  refusing  to  admit  this  stand.^* 

It  is  thus  seen  that  throughout  this  period  of  forty  years  the 
intercourse  between  the  two  great  nations,  important  as  it  was  in  , 
volume  of  trade  and  in  social  and  political  relations,  was  never  at 
any  time  adequately  regulated  by  treaty.  ThjC  only  formal  treaties 
covered  subjects  of  less  general  importance,  while  the  whole  basis 
of  the  relationship  of  the  two  countries  in  their  commercial  inter-  , 
course  was  rendered  unstal)le  by  reason  of  a  disagreement  as  to 
the  interpretation  of  the  oldcK  treaties  and  by  reason  of  an  uncer- 
tainty as  to  whether  they  were  really  valid.^^    It  was  inevitable  i 


'-For  account  of  negotiations  on  this  subject,  see  Chapter  III  "American 
Citizens  of  German  Birth,  their  Rights  in  Germany." 

"  F.  R.,  '03,  p.  443  and  F.  R.,  '00,  p.  052. 

"F.  R.,  '04,  p.  319. 

'^  In  1904  a  Compilation  of  Treaties  in  Force  was  prepared  \mder  a  Reso- 
kition  of  the  United  States  Senate.  (Sen.  Doc.  No.  318,  58th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.) 
Under  treaties  in  force  with  the  German  Empire  only  two  were  given,  the 


50  TREATY    RELATIONSHIP 

that  the  relationship  as  a  whole  between  the  two  nations  should 
be  adversely  affected  by  these  conditions.  This  was  realized  by 
the  officials  of  both  governments,  but  attempts  to  remedy  the 
situation  and  conclude  a  comprehensive  treaty  were  defeated  by 
the  opposing  American  and  German  economic  protection  policies. ^^ 


Consular  Convention  of  1876  and  the  Commercial  Agreement  of  1900.  The 
treaties  with  Prussia  and  the  several  German  states  were  listed  separately 
under  the  names  of  Prussia,  Baden,  Bavaria,  etc.,  as  still  in  force  for  those 
states — but  no  statement  is  made  as  to  whether  or  not  they  are  in  force  for 
the  Empire. 

'^  See  Chapter  IV,  Commercial  Relations. 

The  conclusion  of  a  naturahzation  treaty  to  take  the  place  of  the  "Ban- 
croft" Treaties  of  1868  was  apparently  blocked  by  Germany.  See  Chapter 
III,  "American  Citizens  of  German  Birth,  their  Rights  in  Germany." 


CHAPTER   III 

a:meri(\\x  citizf.xs  of  ger:\iax  birth— their 
rights  ix  germaxy 

The  first  question  of  important  and  extended  diplomatic  dis- 
cussion to  come  before  the  two  nations  after  the  foundation  of  the 
Empire  was  that  of  the  rights  of  American  citizens  of  German 
liirtli,  upon  their  return  to  Germany — particularly  their  rights  to 
exemption  from  military  service.  The  efforts  of  Bancroft  in 
behalf  of  these  naturalized  citizens  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a 
group  of  naturalization  treaties^  with  the  X'orth  German  Union, 
Bavaria,  Baden,  Wuerttemberg  and  Hesse  respectively,  in  the 
year  1868.  These  are  known  as  the  "Bancroft  treaties,"  and 
became  the  basis  of  diplomatic  correspondence,  lasting  throughout 
the  whole  period  of  forty  years.  Shortly  after  their  conclusion,  it 
was  evident  that  the  treaties  were,  from  the  American  stand- 
point unsatisfactor\'  for  the  chief  reasons  that,  as  pointed  out  by 
Secretary  Fish:- 

"They  are  not  coextensive  with  the  limits  of  the  Empire.  The 
provisions  of  none  of  the  existing  treaties  extend  to  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  which  form  an  integral  part  of  the  empire;  and  from 
which  there  has  long  been  a  large  and  valuable  emigration  to  the 
I'nited  States,  whose  status  deserves  recognition  and  protection." 

And  secondly: 

"They  make  different,  and  in  some  respects,  conflicting  pro- 
visions respecting  the  naturalized  citizens." 

In  defense  of  the  treaties,  Bancroft  replied''  that  the  German 
Government  was  not  disposed  to  deny  to  the  emigrants  from  those 

'Sen.  Doc.  No.  318,  58th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  Vol.  XXXVII. 
2  F.  R.,  73,  p.  280.  3  F.  R.,  73,  p.  287. 


52  RIGHTS   OF   AMERICAN  CITIZENS   OF   GERMAN   BIRTH 

two  provinces  (Alsace  and  Lorraine)  the  benefits  of  the  treaty 
with  the  North  German  Union  and  that,  though  there  were 
shght  differences  between  the  treaties,  they  were  interpreted  and 
executed  ahke.  .  .  .  He  explained  at  the  same  time  that  it 
would  not  be  ad\isable  to  negotiate  for  a  single  treaty  with  the 
empire,  because,  being  directly  at  the  close  of  the  Franco-Prussian 
war,  the  moment  was  a  "most  inauspicious  one  for  bringing  before 
the  German  Parliament  any  document  exempting  men  of  German 
birth  from  obedience  to  German  mihtary  law."^  The  auspicious 
moment  apparently  never  came,  for  the  Bancroft  treaties  with 
\  the  five  separate  German  States  have  remained  in  force  and  the 
long  diplomatic  discussions  have  centered  in  a  changing  inter- 
pretation of  their  clauses,  and  in  the  extent  of  their  application. 

The  treaty  formed  with  the  North  German  Union  was  the  first 
to  be  concluded,  and  became  the  one  chiefly  used  as  the  basis  for 
discussions.  The  clauses  most  often  brought  to  bear  are  the 
following:'^ 

Article  I. 

"Citizens  of  the  North  German  Confederation  who  become 
naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  shall 
have  resided  uninterruptedly  within  the  United  States  five  years, 
shall  be  held  by  the  North  German  Confederation  to  be  American 
citizens,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such." 

Article  IU 

"  A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party  on  return  to  the  territory 
of  the  other  party  remains  liable  to  trial  and  pmiishment  for  an 
action  punishable  by  the  laws  of  his  original  country  and  com- 
mitted before  his  emigration." 

Article  IV. 

"If  a  German  naturalized  in  America  renews  his  residence  in 
North  Germanv  without  the  intent  to  return  to  America,  he  shall 
'  be  held  to  have  renounced  his  natm-alization  in  the  United  States. 
.  .  .  The  intent  not  to  return  may  be  held  to  exist  when 
the  person  naturalized  in  the  one  country  resides  more  than  two 
years  in  the  other  country." 

« F.  R.,  73,  p.  289.  '  U.,  Vol.  II,  p.  1298. 


THE  BAXCROFT  TREATIES  53 

Tilt'  principle  through  which  Bancroft  was  able  to  .secure  the 
treaties''  was  that — endorsed  by  Bismarck  himself — of  the  natural 
right  of  emigration  and  the  prohibition  of  any  punishment  inflicted 
because  of  the  act  of  emigration  itself.  Before  this  time  the 
German  kingdoms  had  not  recognized  tte  right  of  subjects  to 
dissolve  their  allegiance  to  their  sovereign  without  his  consent. 
The  Bancroft  treaties  have  therefore  been  considered  "a  great 
achievement  of  American  diplomacy  which  has  made  a  breach  in  an 
old  feudal  principle  of  monarchical  states."^ 

Although  the  I'nited  States,  in  the  words  of  President  Hayes,*^ 
admitted  "no  distinction  whatever  between  the  rights  of  a  native 
and  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States,"  the  pohcy  was 
adhered  to  of  investigating  carefully  each  case  of  molestation,  and 
only  those  protests  were  forwarded  to  the  German  authorities 
which  had  been  found  In-  the  United  States  Consuls  to  be  covered 
by  the  treaty  stipulation,  /.  c,  when  the  intent  to  return  to  the 
United  States  had  been  satisfactorily  demonstrated.^  Germany, 
on  the  other  hand,  reserved  the  right  to  punish  (by  forced  military 
sersice,  imprisonment,  fine  or  expulsion)  or  to  release  the  citizen 
in  cpiestion.  As  reported  by  the  United  States  ]Minister  at 
Berlin,  J.  C.  B.  Davis, ^^  "Release  from  fine  or  arrest  of  returned 
American  citizens  of  German  birth  has  been  granted  by  use  of  the 
royal  prerogative  of  pardon.  It  has  not  been  regarded  as  a  right 
which  can  be  asserted  and  enforced  under  German  law  by  the 
injured  party." 

Though  Germany  throughout  the  controversies  manifested  a 
desire  to  adhere  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty, ^^  the  interpretation  of 
those  tenns,  and  the  fact  of  the  discrepancies  between  the  treaties 
signed  with  the  separate  States  left  room  for  much  fluctuation  of 
policy.  As  the  treaty  with  Baden^'-  contained  no  two-year  clause, 
former  citizens  of  that  State  on  their  return  were  apt  to  be  molested 

6  F.  R.,  '73,  p.  284. 

'  House  Report  No.  2590,  48th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  5. 
8  F.  R.,  '79,  p.  xiii.  ^  F.  R.,  '84,  p.  212. 

»"  F.  R.,  '75,  p.  5G8.  "  F.  R.,  '79,  p.  xiii. 

12  M.,  Vol.  I,  p.  53. 


54  RIGHTS    OF   AMERICAN   CITIZENS    OF    GERMAN   BIRTH 

upon  their  arrival,  or  Avithin  a  short  time  thereafter,  and  found 
difficulty  in  proving  their  intent  to  return.  Although  the  United 
States  never  construed  the  two-year  clause  of  the  treaty  to  mean  that 
the  United  States  citizenship  was  lost  by  the  two  years'  residence/^ 
nevertheless  in  practice  it  acquiesced  in  Germany's  right  by  treaty 
to  expel  or  to  force  to  become  naturalized  any  former  Germaft 


"  F.  R.,  '85,  p.  397,  No.  287. 

Mr.  Frelinghuysen  to  Mr.  Kasson. 


Department  of  State, 
Washington, 

January  15,  1885. 


"Under  these  treaties,  a  two  years'  residence  in  his  native  country  of  a 
citizen  naturalized  in  the  United  States  of  America  does  not  of  itself  divest 
him  of  his  adopted  citizenship.  The  treaties  provide  that  when  a  citizen 
of  either  country  naturalized  in  the  other  shall  renew  his  residence  in  the 
country  of  his  birth  without  the  intent  to  return  to  his  adopted  country,  he 
shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  his  naturalization,  and  further  that  the 
intent  not  to  return  ^may  be  held  to  exist'  after  the  residence  in  the  native 
country  shall  exceed  two  years.  The  residence,  therefore,  is  the  only  evidence 
open  to  rebuttal  of  lack  of  intention  to  return  to  the  adopted  country.  The 
treaty,  therefore,  by  itself  does  not  work  forfeiture  of  citizenship,  and  in  this 
case  some  affirmative  governmental  act  was  necessary  to  show  that  the  elder 
Klingenmeyer  had  through  residence  in  Germany,  without  intent  to  return 
here,  forfeited  his  naturalization. 

This  is  the  construction  of  the  fourth  article  of  the  treaty  of  1868,  which 
has  been  maintained  by  this  Department  and,  so  far  as  is  known,  admitted 
by  the  German  Government." 

Supplement,  1913,  to  Senate  DoC.  No.  357,  61st  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.  "Treaties, 
Conventions,  International  Acts,  etc.,"  p.  125. 

Later  the  United  States  seems  to  have  modified  its  views  slightly  concerning 
the  principle  of  the  two-years'  residence.  In  1906  a  convention  on  the  status 
of  naturalized  citizens  was  concluded  with  the  South  and  Central  American 
countries.  This  convention  included  the  two-year  residence  principle  of  the 
Bancroft  treaties,  but  it  was  worded  so  as  to  lay  more  emphasis  on  the  two- 
year  residence  as  evidence  that  the  naturalized  person  residing  in  his  native 
country  did  not  intend  to  return  to  the  country  of  his  adoption.  The  Articles 
read  as  follows: 

"Art.  I.  If  a  citizen,  a  native  of  any  of  the  countries  signing  the  present 
convention  and  naturalized  in  another,  shall  again  take  up  residence  in  his 
native  coimtry  without  the  intention  of  returning  to  the  country  in  which 
he  has  been  naturalized,  he  will  be  considered  as  having  reassumed  his  original 
citizenship,  and  as  having  renounced  the  citizenship  acquired  by  the  said 
naturalization. 

Art.  II.  The  intention  not  to  return  will  be  presumed  to  exist  when  the 

naturalized  per?on  shall  have  resided  in  his  native  country  for  more  than 

two  years.  But  this  presumption  may  be  destroyed  by  evidence  to  the 
contrary." 


TWO-YEA H    HKSIDENCE    CLAUSE  '  55 

citizens  after  a  residence  of  two  years  in  Germany."  It  also 
acquiesced  in  the  ris^ht  of  expulsion  before  the  hniit  of  two  years 
had  expired,  provided  that  the  intention  of  the  individual  not  to 
return  could  be  satisfactorily  demonstrated.^^  The  enforcement 
of  such  right  was  exercised  by  Germany  mostly  in  the  case  of  men 
of  miHtary  age,^"  older  German-Americans  being  allowed  to  reside 
indefinitely  in  the  Fatherland. ^^  ^^ 

"  F.  R.,  '84,  p.  212,  Inclosiire.2  in  No.  74,  Mr.  Kasson  to  Mr.  Reichard. 

Legation  of  the  United  States, 

Berlin,  November  14,  1884; 


"In  reply  to  your  third  inquiry  the  legation  is  of  the  opinion  that  recm- 
ring  visits  to  Germany,  not  i)rolonged  be^'ond  two  years,  are  permissible  under 
the  treaty,  if  preceded  liy  bona  jide  resumptions  of  residence  in  the  United 
States,  and  that  the  residence  of  six  months  which  preceded  your  recent  return 
to  Germany  should  ])e  regarded  as  such  a  residence. 

In  the  opinion  of  this  legation,  the  German  Government  reserved  the  right 
in  ({uestion  in  order  to  act  or  decline  to  act  upon  each  case  as  it  should  he 
presented  at  the  time  for  action,  without  interference  by  the  United  States. 
\Ve  do  not  therefore  believe  that  you  would  now  obtain  from  them  a  satis- 
factory rejily,  and  do  not  think  it  advisable  to  transmit  your  application  to 
them,  thus  caUing  special  attention  to  your  case  and  that  of  your  children. 
The  only  effect,  in  our  view  of  the  case,  of  your  overstaying  two  years  would 
be  to  give  the  German  authorities  the  right  to  say  (without  our  interference) 
that  you  or  your  children,  or  l^oth,  must  become  naturalized  or  leave  the 
countrj'.  As  long  as  you  hold  to  the  bona  fide  intention  of  return  to  the 
United  States  to  reside  there  as  a  citizen,  we  hold  you  and  your  minor  children 
to  be  still  American  citizens." 

'5  F.  R.,  '85,  p.  401.  "5  F.  R.,  '84,  p.  194. 

I'F.  R.,  '83,  p.  331. 

'^  AutoWography  of  A.  D.  White,  Vol.  I,  p.  534  ff . 

"In  those  days  an  American  minister  at  Berlin  was  likely  to  find  his  personal 
relations  with  the  German  minister  of  foreign  affairs  cordial,  but  his  official 
relations  continuous  war.  Hardly  a  day  passed  without  some  skirmish 
regarding  the  rights  of  "German-Americans"  in  their  Fatherland.  The  old 
story  constantly  recurred  in  new  forms.  Generally  it  was  sprung  l)y  some  man 
who  had  left  German}'  just  at  the  age  for  entering  the  army,  had  remained 
in  America  just  long  enough  to  secure  naturahzation,  and  then,  without  a 
thought  of  tlischarging  any  of  his  American  duties,  had  come  back  to  claim 
exemption  from  his  German  duties,  and  to  flaunt  his  American  citizen  i)apers 
in  the  face  of  the  authorities  of  the  province  where  he  was  born.  This  was 
very  galling  to  these  authorities,  from  the  fact  that  such  Americans  were 
often  inclined  to  glory  over  their  old  schoolmates  and  associates  who  had 
not  taken  this  means  of  escajifng  military  duty;  and  it  was  no  wonder  that 
these  brand  new  citizens,  if  their  i)apers  were  not  perfectly  regular,  were 
sometimes  held  for  desertion  imtil  the  American  representative  could  intervene. 

Still  other  cases  were  those  where  fines  had  l)een  im))osed  U])()ii  men  of  this 
class  for  non-appearance  when  summoned  to  military  duty,  and  an  American 
minister  was  expected  to  secure  their  remission. 

In  simple  justice  to  Germanv,  it  ought  to  lie  said  that  there  is  no  foreign 
matter  of  such  importance  so  iittle  understood  in  the  United  States  as  this. 


56  RIGHTS    OF   AMERICAN   CITIZENS    OF    GERMAN   BIRTH 

The  years  1884  and  1885  marked  the  beginnings  of  a  more 
stringent  mihtary  pohcy  on  the  part  of  the  Germans  and  the 
tendency  to  extend  the  restrictions  governing  former  German 
subjects  on  their  return  to  the  country.^^  It  became  the  pre- 
cedent to  consider  that  the  two  years'  residence  in  Germany 
di^•ested  automatically  any  former  German  of  his  acquired  citizen- 
ship.2°  It  also  extended  its  policy  of  the  right  of  expulsion  to  the 
minor  children  of  such  a  returning  citizen.  A  definite  ruling  in 
regard  to  the  fathers  and  sons  in  question  was  issued  by  the 
Go\'ernment.-^ 

1.  "Fathers  naturalized  in  America  and  returning  to  Germany 
to  reside,  and  there  sojourning  for  more  than  two  years,  are  to 
be  regarded  as  having  renounced  their  naturalization  under  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  of  1868." 

2.  "  But  minor  children  of  such  parents  born  in  America  will  be 
recognized  as  retaining  their  American  citizenship  uninfluenced 
by  their  father's  renunciation  of  his  naturalization,  and  they 
cannot  be  made  to  perform  military  service  in  Germany,  but  their 
sojourn  in  Germany  may  be  refused,  under  the  principles  of 
international  law,  when  the  same  may  be  required  in  the  interest 
of  public  order." 

The  United  States  refused  to  admit  the  validity  of  either  ruling. 
As  expressed  by  Secretary  of  State  Frelinghuysen: 

The  average  American,  looking  on  the  surface  of  things,  cannot  see  why  the 
young  emigrant  is  not  allowed  to  go  and  come  as  he  pleases.  The  fact  is 
that  German  policy  in  that  respect  has  been  evolved  in  obedience  to  the 
instinct  of  national  self-preservation.  The  German  Empire,  the  greatest 
Continental  home  of  civilization,  is  an  open  camp,  perpetually  l:)esieged. 
Speaking  in  a  general  way,  it  has  no  natural  frontiers  of  any  sort — neither 
mountains  nor  wide  expanses  of  sea.  Eastward  are  one  hundred  and  thirty 
millions  of  people  fanatically  hostile  as  regards  race,  religion  and  imaginary 
interests;  westward  is  another  great  nation  of  fortj'  millions,  wth  a  hatred  on 
all  these  points  intensified  by  desire  for  revenge;  northward  is  a  vigorous  race 
estranged  by  old  quarrels;  and  south  is  a  power  which  is  largely  hostile  on 
racial,  religious  and  historic  grounds,  and  at  best  a  very  uncertain  reliance, 
lender  such  circumstances,  universal  military  service  in  Germany  is  a  condi- 
tion of  its  existence,  and  evasion  of  this  is  natfirally  looked  ui)on  as  a  sort  of 
treason.  The  real  wonder  is  that  Germany  has  l)een  so  moderate  in  her 
dealing  with  this  question.  The  yearly  'budgets  of  military  cases'  in  the 
archives  of  the  American  Emliassy  bear  ample  testimony  to  her  desire  to  be 
just  and  even  lenient." 

"  F.  R.,  '85,  p.  X.  20  Y.  R.,  '85,  p.  392. 

21  F.  R.,  '85,  p.  400. 


INCREASED   RESTRICTIONS  ON   FORMER   GERMAN  SUBJECTS      01 

"We  think  it  dear  that  the  treaty  cannot  of  itself  convert  an 
American  citizen  back  again  to  a  (lernian,  any  more  than  it  can 
make  a  German  a  citizen  of  tlie  Inited  States." 

"As  to  the  sons  of  sucli  fatliers,  who,  being  citizens  by  birtli, 
may  visit  the  land  of  their  fathers'  allegiance  the  decision  of  the 
German  Government  is  just.  They  are  original  citizens  in  their 
.own  right  and  the  treaty  does  not  relate  to  them.  In  all  respects 
they  stand  on  the  same  footing  as  native  Americans  of  American 
parentage.  This  being  so,  the  contention  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment that  such  sons  may  be  expelled  from  Germany  on  abrupt 
notice,  at  the  pleasure  of  the  authorities,  under  the  alternative 
of  becoming  German  subjects  is  tantamount  to  claiming  the 
right  to  expel  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  in  like  manner,  and 
with  the  like  alternative,  which  of  course  would  conflict  with 
pro^'isions  of  the  existing  treaty." 

Count  Hatzfeldt's  reply-^  asserted  that  it  was  a  view  universally 
adhered  to  by  nations  that  treaties  of  amity  and  commerce  did 
not  abolish  the  recognized  right  of  each  nation  to  expel  citizens 
considered  injurious  to  the  welfare  of  the  State.  He  pointed  out 
further  that  Germany  had  made  an  important  concession  to  the 
United  States  in  recognizing  the  American  nationality  of  the  sons 
in  question  of  the  former  Gennan  citizens,  since  under  the  German 
legal  \iew  such  sons  would  share  the  nationality  of  the  father.^-^ 
He  also  intimated  the  lenient  attitude  of  the  Government,  stating 
that: 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  may  rather  rest  assured 
that  the  German  authorities  .  .  .  will  as  heretofore  allow 
all  reasonable  consideration  to  prevail. "-■* 

The  stricter  interpretation  of  the  treaties  made  their  defects 
more  e\"ident  and  there  was  some  attempt  in  the  United  States 
to  have  them  abrogated.  During  1882  two  resolutions  were 
introduced  in  the  House  of  Representatives-^  providing  for  the 
termination  of  the  Bancroft  treaties.    These  were  referred  to  the 


=-  F.  R.,  '85,  p.  418. 

■'  V.  R.,  '85,  p.  418.  2^  F.  R.,  '85,  p.  417. 

2^  Congressional  Record,  47th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  XIII,  p.  428  (H.  R.  No. 
lOli)  and  47th  Cong.,  2nd  Se.s.s.,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  18. 


58  RIGHTS   OF    AMERICAN   CITIZENS   OF   GERMAN  BIRTH 

Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  which  reported-^  a  substitnte 
resohition.  This  provided  for  the  negotiation  of  a  new  naturaHz- 
ation  treaty  with  the  German  Empire  which  should  operate  as  a 
termination  of  the  old  treaties  with  the  several  German  States 
without  formal  notice  being  given  of  the  intention  to  abrogate 
them. 

Again,  in  1885,"  the  same  resolution  was  recommended  by  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  for  adoption.  In  the  report  accom- 
panying the  resolution  the  defects  and  virtues  of  the  Bancroft 
treaties  were  both  set  forth.  The  committee  considered  the 
treaties  to  have  been  of  great  value,  both  in  breaking  down  the 
old  feudal  principle  of  "once  a  subject,  always  a  subject,"  and  in 
granting  substantial  benefits  to  American  citizens.  ^Moreover, 
the  committee  considered  that  those  benefits  were  reciprocal  only 
in  name  and  that  they  were  actually  useful  only  to  the  United 
States,  because  the  native  American  naturaHzed  in  Germany  and 
returning  to  the  United  States  required  no  protection  from  prose- 
cution for  unauthorized  emigration  or  for  the  non-fulfilment  of 
militars"  duty.  There  was  therefore  no  doubt  that  a  simple  notice 
to  terminate  the  treaties  would  be  accepted  by  Germany.  But 
this  would  leave  the  citizens  concerned  without  regulated  pro- 
tection. Therefore  the  committee  did  not  recommend  that  notice 
be  given  to  terminate  the  Bancroft  treaties,  but  it  did  consider 
that  the  time  had  come  for  the  "conclusion  of  a  new  treaty  com- 
prising the  whole  German  Empire,  and  with  such  modification  as 
might  secure  a  more  full  and  satisfactory  protection  of  the  rights 
of  American  citizens  abroad." 

Apparently  these  movements  by  Congress  were  without  results, 

2«  House  Reports,  47th  Cong,  and  Sess.,  No.  1893. 

(To  accompany  H.  Res.  329.) 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  President  of  the  United 
States  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  requested  to  take  the  necessary  steps  toward 
negotiating  a  treaty  with  the  German  Empire  securing  more  liberal  and  just 
provisions  in  reference  to  the  respective  rights  of  citizens — native-born  or 
naturalized — of  the  United  States  and  the  German  Empire." 

"  House  Report  No.  2590,  4Sth  Cong.,  2nd  Sess. 


ATTEMPTS  TO   TERMINATE    BANCROFT  TREATIES  59 

published  correspondence  showing  no  record  of  negotiations  for 
a  new  treaty  at  this  time.  The  Bancroft  treaties  continued  to  he 
used  as  governing  tiie  riglits  of  naturalized  Americans  on  their 
return  to  Gennan\ . 

For  several  years  the  two  governments  continued  to  carry 
on  a  considerable  dii)lomatic  correspondence,  reprotesting  and 
reasserting  from  tlie  same  standpoint.-*^  President  Cleveland 
referred  to  this  in  his  message  to  Congress^^  but  described  the 
general  relations  of  the  two  countries  as  having  "lost  none  of  their 
accustomed  cordiality."  The  protests  of  the  United  States  were 
changed  gradually  from  the  basis  that  Germany's  policy  of  expul- 
sion was  in  violation  of  the  Bancroft  treaties  to  the  basis  that  it 
was  not  friendly.    As  expressed  by  Ambassador  Bayard:''" 

"While  thus  freely  admitting  the  right  of  expulsion  this  Depart- 
ment holds  that  its  arbitrary  exercise  cannot  be  regarded  as  con- 
sistent with  existing  relations  .  .  .  There  must  be  declara- 
tions or  acts  (showing  the  intent  not  to  return)  in  addition  to  the 
mere  fact  of  return  to  the  country  of  origin,  in  order  to  create  or 
justify  the  conclusion  that  naturalization  has  been  renounced. 

.  .  Although  it  is  not  a  question  arising  under  the  treaty, 
it  is  due  to  comity,  as  well  as  to  the  existence  of  the  treaty,  that 
reasonable  grounds  for  expulsion  should  exist  and  be  made  known." 

A  marked  decrease  in  the  number  of  cases  calUng  for  diplomatic  I 
inter\-ention   followed   fluring   the    next   few   years,    a   situation 
recorded  with  satisfaction  by  the  United  States  representatives.'*' 

In  1897  the  reversal  of  the  policy  of  the  German  Government  in 
regard  to  the  treatment  of  the  sons  of  German  parents  became 
evident  through  the  case  of  Alfred  IMeyer.^^  fjg  ^yj^g  j^^j^n  in  the 
United  States  of  Gennan  parents,  was  brought  to  Germany  at 
the  age  of  four,  and  on  reaching  military  age  was  impressed  into 
the  German  army.  In  intervening  in  his  behalf  the  Ignited  States 
Ambassador  brought  foru'ard  the  ruling  of  the  German  Govern- 

"  F.  R.,  '87,  p.  370.  ^a  F.  R.,  '86,  p.  iv. 

'«  F.  R.,  '88,  p.  420.  "  F  r^  >gg^  p  q^q 

'2  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  194. 


60  RIGHTS   OF   AMERICAN  CITIZENS   OF   GERMAN  BIRTH 

ment  in  1885,  which  declared  that  sons  by  reason  of  their  American 
birth  might  not  be  forced  to  serve.  The  reply  from  the  Imperial 
Foreign  Office^'*  was  that  ]Meyer  was,  under  the  laws  of  Prussia, 
a  Prussian  subject,  and  that  if  his  birth  on  American  soil  made 
him  an  American  citizen,  then  he  possessed  a  double  nationality 
and  must  fulfil  his  obhgations  to  both  countries.  As  it  turned  out, 
IMeyer  was  soon  dismissed  from  the  service^^  on  the  ground  of 
physical  disabihty;  therefore,  the  United  States  did  not  press  its 
protest  further  and  this  issue  remained  unsettled. 

Cases  continued  to  be  brought  to  the  notice  of  American  consuls 
during  the  next  few  years,  but  formal  protest  was  seldom  made  to 
the  German  Government  in  their  behalf,  as  they  seemed  to  indicate 
no  new  policy  of  treatment^^  and  it  w^as  stated  by  the  American 
ambassador  that  the  number  of  persons  molested  for  not  having 
performed  military  service  in  Germany  was  a  very  small  one 
compared  to  the  number  of  naturalized  Americans  who  each  year 
returned  to  Germany.  In  the  cases  of  fines  imposed  for  such 
non-performance  of  military  duty  the  money  was  nearly  always 
refunded  at  the  intervention  of  the  American  authorities.  To 
decrease  the  number  of  cases  of  expulsion  or  other  molestation  and 
reduce  to  a  minimum  any  resulting  friction  between  the  two 
countries,  the  United  States  published  a  notice^^  to  American 
citizens  formerly  subjects  of  Gemiany  explaining  their  liability 
under  the  military  and  expatriation  laws  of  their  native  country. 
It  was  made  evident  also  to  the  United  States  Government  by  its 
own  representative  in  Germany  that  there  was  no  intention  on  the 
part  of  the  Prussian  Government  to  discriminate  against  American 
citizens,  and  that  Germans  of  military  age  returning  after  natural- 
ization in  other  countries  received  similar  treatment.^" 

Efforts  of  the  Prussian  ^Minister  of  the  Interior  to  curtail  the 
sojourn  in  Prussia  of  former  German  subjects  of  military  age 
caused  the  United  States  again  to  protest  to  the  German  Foreign 
Office.    This  protest  set  forth^^  that  while  the  United  States  had 

»3  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  195.  '■<  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  200. 

35  F.  R.,  '01,  p.  159.  36  F.  R.^  '01,  p.  160. 

"  F.  R.,  '01,  p.  177.  38  F.  R.,  '02,  p.  441. 


Al'l'LUAniLlTY    OF   TREATIKS   TO    ALSACE-LORRAINE  <)! 

no  sympatliy  with  tlie  evaders  of  military  duty,  and  while  it  did 
not  eontest  the  riijjht  of  Prussia  to  ex])el  iindesirahles,  it  claimed  the 
right  to  know  ;<7///  any  given  American  citizen  should  he  so  con- 
sidered. Otherwise,  indiscriminate  expulsion  would  "operate  as  a 
deterrent  to  the  exercise  of  the  rights  of  expatriation  and  the 
acquisition  of  allegiance  granted  under  the  naturalization  treaties.' ' 
A  new  ])hase  of  the  subject  was  introduced  by  cases  of  the 
former  citizens  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  By  these  cases  it  became 
evident  that  the  Government  of  Germany  was  unwiUing  to  admit 
that  this  territory  was  to  be  included  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Bancroft  treaties,^^  which  were  signed  before  the  acquisition  of 
those  provinces.  The  United  States  refused  to  admit  this  non- 
applicability  of  the  naturalization  treaties  to  the  territory  ot 
Alsace-Lorraine.^*'  Germany  contended  that  the  United  States 
had  been  informed  of  this  stand  definitely  in  ISSl  and  had  accepted 
it  without  dispute  at  that  time.^^  It  is  true  that  the  subject  was 
brought  up  in  that  year,  but  Dr.  White,  then  American  Minister, 
bears  witness  in  his  autobiography^-  that  the  German  contention 

»9  F.  R.,  '03,  p.  443. 

«  F.  R.,  '04,  p.  319.  ^1  F.  R.,  '06,  p.  652. 

«  Autobiography  of  A.  D.  White,  Vol.  I,  pp.  592  ff . 

"I  immediatel}'  wrote  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  stating  the  man's 
case,  and  showing  that  it  came  under  the  Bancroft  treaties,  or  at  least  under 
the  construction  of  them  which  the  German  Government  up  to  that  time 
had  freely  allowed.  To  this  I  received  an  answer  that  the  Bancroft  treaties, 
having  been  made  before  Alsace-Lorraine  was  annexed  to  the  empire,  did 
not  apply  to  these  new  provinces,  and  that  the  youth  was  detained  as  a 
deserter.  To  this  I  replied  that,  although  the  minister's  statement  was 
strictly  true,  the  point  had  been  waived  long  before  in  our  favor;  that  in  no 
less  than  eight  cases  the  German  Government  had  extended  the  benefit  of 
the  Bancroft  treaties  over  Alsace-Lorraine;  and  that  in  one  of  these  cases  the 
acting  minister  of  foreign  affairs  had  declared  the  intention  of  the  government 
to  make  this  extension  permanent." 

The  German  authorities  still  refused  to  free  the  citizen  in  question,  and 
Dr.  White  perceived  that  Bismarck  himself  was  behind  the  refusal. 

"'The  matter  became  more  and  more  serious.  The  letter  of  the  law  was 
indeed  on  Bismarck's  side;  but  the  young  man  was  an  American  citizen  and 
the  idea  of  an  .\merican  citizen  being  held  in  })rison  was  anything  but  pleasant 
to  me,  and  I  knew  that  it  would  be  anything  but  j)leasant  to  my  fellow-citizens 
across  the  water.  .  .  .  My  position  was  especially  difficult  because  1 
dared  not  communicate  the  case  fully  to  the  American  State  Department  of 
that  period.  ...  I  therefore  stopped  short  with  my  first  notification  to 
the  State  Department — to  the  effect  that  a  naturalized  American  had  been 
imprisoned  for  desertion  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  that  the  legation  was  doing 


62  RIGHTS    OF    AMERICAN   CITIZENS    OF    GERMAN    BIRTH 

was  by  no  means  accepted  without  dispute  by  the  United  States. 
On  the  contrary  the  discussion  of  the  case  of  an  American  citizen 
who  was  arrested  by  the  German  mihtary  authorities  on  his  return 
to  his  native  province  of  Alsace,  threatened  to  become  a  serious 
diplomatic  incident  and  required  skilled  maneuvering  on  the  part 
of  the  American  ^Minister  before  the  matter  was  adjusted.  Dr. 
White  pointed  out  to  the  minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that  in  at 
least  eight  cases  the  German  Government  had  applied  the  Bancroft 
treaties  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  that  "in  one  of  these  cases  the 
acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  declared  the  intention  of 
the  government  to  make  this  extension  permanent."  After  much 
delay  the  German  Government  freed  the  American  citizen  in 
question.  It  did  not  \ield,  however,  its  declaration  that  the 
Bancroft  treaties  did  not  apply  to  the  annexed  provinces.  As  in 
several  other  cases,  the  incident  was  therefore  closed,  leaving  both 
countries  holding  opposite  vie^^'points. 

Thus  it  became  clear  to  both  nations  that  the  solution  of  the 
problem  lay  in  the  formation  of  a  new  treaty  which  should  def- 
initely place  "American  citizens  born  in  Alsace-Lorraine  on  the 
same  footing  as  other  American  citizens  of  German  origin. "  There- 
fore, instructions  were  given^^  to  the  American  Ambassador  to 
enter  into  negotiations  for  such  a  treaty  with  the  German  Govern- 

its  best  to  secure  his  release.  To  say  more  than  this  involved  danger  that 
the  affair  might  fall  into  the  hands  of  sensation-mongers  and  result  in  howls 
and  threats  against  the  German  Government  and  Bismarck;  and  I  knew 
well  that,  if  such  howls  and  threats  were  made,  Bismarck  would  never  let 
this  young  Israelite  out  of  prison  as  long  as  he  lived. 

It  seemed  hardly  the  proper  thing,  serious  as  the  case  was,  to  ask  for  mj' 
passports.  It  was  certain  that,  if  this  were  done,  there  would  come  a  chorus 
of  blame  from  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  .  .  .  I  secured  from  Washington 
by  cable  a  leave  of  absence,  but,  before  starting,  saw  some  of  my  diplomatic 
colleagues,  who  were  wont  to  circulate  freely  and  talk  much,  stated  the 
main  features  of  the  case  to  them,  and  said  that  I  was  'going  off  to  enjoy 
myself;'  that  there  seemed  little  use  for  an  American  minister  in  a  country 
where  precedents  and  agreements  were  so  easily  disregarded.  Next  day  I 
started  for  the  French  Riviera.  The  journey  was  taken  leisurely,  with 
interesting  halts  at  Cologne  and  Aix-la-Cliapelle;  and,  as  I  reached  the  hotel 
in  Paris,  a  telegram  was  handed  me — 'Your  man  in  Alsace-Lorraine  is  free.' 
It  was  evident  that  the  chancellor  had  felt  better  and  had  thought  more 
leniently  of  the  matter,  and  I  had  never  another  difficulty  of  the  sort  during 
the  remainder  of  my  stay." 

«F.  R.,  '07,  p.  511. 


ATIKMITS  TO  SKCUHE  NEW  TREATY  63 

iiH'iit  on  the  uTouiul  tliat  tlic  Bancroft  treaties  had  liad  "the 
jjreatest  inHuenee  in  (Irawin^  the  people  of  the  United  States  and 
of  (lennany  into  friendly  accord."  Throngh  the  following  year, 
n)l)S,  no  reply  was  received  from  the  German  Governments^  as  to 
the  negotiations  suggested,  although  the  German  Secretary  of 
Foreign  AfYairs  had  signified  the  willingness  of  his  government  to 
conclude  such  a  treaty.  The  United  States  Ambassador  was  again 
instructed  to  bring  the  matter  before  the  German  Government. 
With  these  instructions,  given  in  April,  1908,  the  whole  corre- 
spondence on  the  subject  ceased  to  be  published  in  the  United 
States  Government  diplomatic  correspondence.  It  is  therefore 
difficult  to  ascertain  what  the  further  developments  were  in  regard 
to  the  long-continued  jiroblem  of  the  rights  of  the  naturalized 
American  of  German  liirth  to  freedom  of  sojourn  in  Germany. 

Tracing  the  course  of  the  controversy  there  is  evident  an 
increasing  strictness  in  the  policy  of  the  German  Government 
(l)articularly  of  the  Prussian  military  authorities)  toward  the 
returning  former  Germans  of  military  age,  and  the  insistence  of 
that  government's  right  under  international  law  to  expel  any 
citizen  whom  it  considers  to  be  undesirable.  The  United  States 
policy  became  considerably  modified,  and  in  later  years  it  admitted 
the  rights  claimed  by  Germany  protesting  only  at  a  policy  of 
indiscriminate  expulsion.  Throughout  the  controversy  there  was 
evident  a  spirit  of  willingness  on  the  part  of  both  countries,  while 
maintaining  principles,  to  yield  in  individual  instances  as  a  diplo- 
matic favor  and  in  deference  to  the  friendly  relations  between  the 
two  countries. 

"  F.  R.,  '08,  p.  376.  "5  F.  R.,  '07,  p.  511. 


CHAPTER  IV 
CO:\BIERCIAL  RELATIONS 

The  commerce  of  the  United  States  and  the  German  Empire 
was  never  regulated  by  a  comprehensive  commercial  treaty. 
Temporary  agreements  were  concluded  from  time  to  time  deter- 
mining the  status  of  certain  products  of  one  country  under  the 
tariff  provisions  of  the  other,  but  the  principles  governing  such 
decisions  were  not  embodied  in  any  formal  treaty  made  since  the 
unification  of  the  empire.  In  the  absence  of  such  formal  agree- 
ment the  two  nations  used  as  a  working  basis  the  old  treaty  of 
1828  between  the  United  States  and  Prussia/  which  placed  the 
contracting  parties  on  the  basis  of  the  "most-favored-nation" 
in  all  matters  of  commerce  and  naxagation.  The  controversies 
which  developed  from  time  to  time  over  the  application  of  this 
treaty  to  the  commercial  legislation  of  the  two  countries,  centered 
in  a  contrasting  and,  in  the  case  of  Germany  varying  interpreta- 
tion of  the  "most-favored-nation"  principle.-  The  question  was 
whether  that  principle  required  the  extension  to  all  most-favored- 
natibns,  automatically,  of  any  privilege  granted  to  a  single  country 
or  whether  it  required  that  extension  only  in  return  for  compensa- 
tion.  The  policy  of  Germany^  was  a  changing  one  in  this  respect, 
the  Imperial  Government  holding  at  certain  periods  the  uncon- 
ditional, and  at  others  offering  only  the  conditional  concept.  The 
United  States  held  consistently  to  the  narrower  concept  of  recip- 

^  For  the  question  as  to  the  validity  of  this  treaty,  see  Chap.  II,  Treaty 
Relations. 

-  See  Sen.  Doc.  No.  29,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Session. 

Also  Fisk:  "  j\Iost-favored-nation  Relations:  German- American." — Journal 
of  Political  Economy,  March,  1903. 

Also  F.  R.,  1911,  p.  5. 

'  Calwer:    "Die  Meistbeguenstigung  der  Vereinigten  Staaten,"  p.  19  ff. 


ECONOMIC    BASIS   OF    HELATIONS  65 

rocity,  /.  c,  no  favors  granted  without  compensating  favors  receised. 
This,  as  has  been  shown  (Chapter  II),  was  expressly  provi<led  for 
hy  Article  IX  of  the  treaty  of  1S2S  with  Prussia. 

The  deterniining  factor  throughout  the  negotiations  over  ques- 
tions of  trade  has  been  the  tariff.  In  the  case  of  both  Germany  and 
the  United  States  the  individual  subjects  of  diplomatic  protest 
are  directly  or  indirectly  related  to  the  changing  legislation  of  the 
tariff  or  to  the  changing  application  of  existing  tariff  provisions. 
The  tariff  legislation,  though  affected  by  manifold  domestic  forces, 
political,  industrial  and  even  psychological,  has  been  in  general 
the  ])roduct  of  the  economic  character  of  the  countries  enacting  it. 
The  industrial  development  of  Germany^  combined  with  the  growth 
of  American  agriculture,  revoluntionized  the  economic  position 
of  Germany.  It  was  changed  from  a  food-exporting  to  a  food- 
importing  countrs'.  Before  the  first  decade  of  the  empire  the  agri- 
cultural sections  of  Germany  had  exported  considerable  quantities 
of  grain.  Later,  however,  the  development  of  the  American  north- 
west and  the  improvement  of  ocean  transportation  brought  Ameri- 
can cereals  into  the  European  markets  in  great  quantities,  so  that 
tile  German  farmers  lost  not  only  their  export  markets,  but  w-ere 
in  danger  of  losing  their  home  market  as  well.  The  natural  result 
was  the  development  of  an  agrarian  protective  policy.  This  was 
embodied  in  the  tariff'  law  of  1879.^  Protection  for  manufactured 
l)roducts  was  also  increased  especially  by  the  system  of  premiums 
and  subsidies.  Two  conflicting  interests  had  to  be  served — German 
farmers  must  be  protected  against  the  overwhelming  imports 
of  American  grain  and  livestock,  and  yet  German  industrials 
must  receive  raw  materials,  including  foodstuffs,  at  a  price  low 
enough  to  enable  them  to  compete  with  foreign  manufacturers 
in  the  final  selling  price  of  their  products.  Count  Caprivi  recog- 
nized that  Germany's  future  must  be  that  of  an  industrial  State 
and  initiated  a  new  tariff  policy  which  took  into  account  not  only 
the  agrarian  interests  but  also  the  interests  of  the  manufacturers, 
by  reducing  the  rates  of  duty  on  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs. 


*  Fisk,  U.  S.-Ger.  Com.,  Polit.  Rel.,  p.  139. 
5  Fisk,  U.  S.-Ger.  Com.,  Polit.  Rel.,  p.  141. 


66  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

The  economic  self-sufficiency  of  the  United  States,  of  the  British 
Empire,  and  to  a  certain  degree  even  of  Russia,  was  beginning 
to  create  an  economic  danger  for  Germany  and  other  ^Sliddle- 
European  states.  There  developed  therefore  the  movement'  toward 
a  union  of  the  nations  of  central  Europe  for  mutual  protection 
against  the  economic  advantages  of  the  other  powers,  particularly 
the  I'nited  States.  This  expressed  itself  in  a  series  of  commercial 
treaties  concluded  since  1892  by  Gennany  with  INIiddle-European 
countries — agreements  which  sought  to  abolish  commercial 
barriers  between  them  and  create  a  greater  economic  independence 
for  the  contracting  powers.  The^  treaties  included  reductions  of 
duties  on  agricultural  products,  shght  reductions  of  duties  on 
manufactured  products,  and  were  concluded  for  a  period  of  twelve 
years.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  immediate 
commercial  advantage  to  Germany  of  these  agreements  since  she 
proceeded  to  extend  the  advantages  expressed  in  them  to  the  many 
countries,  including  the  United  States,  with  whom  she  was  bound 
by  the  principle  of  the  "most-favored-nation."  The  treaties 
were,  however,  the  embodiment  of  an  idea  which  has  threatened 
at  various  recent  times  to  express  itself  much  more  effectively, 
that  is,  in  the  form  of  a  INIiddle-European  Tariff  Union. 

The  high  protecti\-e  policy  developed  by  the  United  States  at 
the  time  of  the  Civil  War  and  maintained  in  principle  ever  since, 
finds  its  counterpart  in  the  protective  poHcy  of  Germany,  which 
developed  a  little  later,  beginning  with  the  tariff  of  1879."  There 
is,  however  (up  to  within  very  recent  years)  the  important  differ- 
ence that  the  German  protective  system  has  been  dictated  by  the 
Agrarian  Party,  whereas  the  protectionists  of  the  United  States 
have  been  the  manufacturing  interests.  Owing  to  the  character 
of  the  exports  of  the  two  countries  this  worked  to  the  American 
benefit.  Throughout  the  diplomatic  protests  and  counter-protests 
that  follow  the  tariff  changes,  the  economic  advantage  is  constantly 
with  the  United  States.  Germany  could  hedge  in  her  manufactures 
with  protective  measures,  but  she  must  keep  low  or  admit  free 

« Fisk,  Mid.  Eur.  Tar.  Union,  p.  595. 

->  Fisk,  U.  S.-Ger.  Com.,  Polit.  Rel.,  p.  144. 


RESTRICTIONS   AGAINST  AMERICAN   PORK  67 

the  raw  prodiu-ts  reciiiirod  1)\'  tliose  industries.  These  raw  products 
she  obtained  in  hiri;e  measure  from  the  T'nited  States.  Even  in 
the  case  of  I'nited  States'  food  protlucts  against  which  she  could 
and  did  enact  restrictive  measures,  she  must  face  the  opposition 
of  a  large  and  growing  portion  of  her  own  people,  the  industrials 
who  were  demanding  the  chea])  and  abundant  articles  of  food 
furnished  by  America.  The  United  States  on  the  other  hand, 
in  its  strong  policy  of  industrial  protection,  enacted  tarifl'  measures 
which  opposed  almost  the  complete  range  of  German  exports, 
since  these  consisted  almost  exclusively  of  manufactured  goods. 

Such  was  in  general  the  economic  background  for  the  trade 
relations  between  the  two  countries.  Commercial  conflicts 
brought  before  the  diplomatic  departments  for  solution  related 
tJiemselves  in  complicated  and  often  very  indirect  fashion  to  the 
changing  tariff  enactments. 

One  of  the  earliest  and  most  enduring  subjects  of  controversy 
was  that  over  American  pork  and  the  prohibition  of  its  importa- 
tion into  Germany.  This  commercial  conflict  began  with  the 
imperial  decree  of  June  25,  1880,^  prohibiting  the  admission  into 
Germany  of  all  kinds  of  pork  except  hams  and  sides  of  bacon. 
The  reason  given  for  the  decree  was  an  epidemic  of  trichinosis  due 
to  the  eating  of  diseased  pork.  The  exemption  was  made  in  the 
case  of  hams  and  sides  of  bacon  because,  through  proper  inspection, 
the  trichina?  might  be  detected  in  these  and  the  infectcfl  meats 
condemned.  In  1882^  a  request  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
to  have  this  decree  modified  for  the  benefit  of  certain  prepared 
meat  products  of  two  important  meat  packing  companies  was 
refused.  In  188.3^"  a  measure  was  brought  before  the  Bundesrath 
jjrohibiting  the  importation  of  all  American  pork,  including  hams 
and  live  animals.  In  protesting^^  the  passage  of  this  measure  the 
United  States  stated  that  the  assumption  of  the  diseased  condition 
of  American  pork  was  unfounded  and  unjust,  that  German  trade 
interests  in  the  admission  of  the  pork  were  very  great,  that  its 
cheapness  made  it  an  important  food  product  for  the  poorer 

8  F.  R.,  '82,  p.  158.  '  F.  R.,  '82,  p.  158. 

'» F.  R.,  '8.3,  p.  320.  "  F.  R.,  '83,  p.  320. 


68  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

classes  in  Germany,  and  that  the  planned  reduction  of  United 
States'  import  charges  would  so  aid  German  manufactured  goods 
that  Germany  should  favor  the  products  of  the  United  States. 
That  the  innocuous  character  of  American  pork  might  be  demon- 
strated, President  Arthur  invited  Germany^-  to  "send  a  commission 
of  experts  to  the  United  States  to  examine  the  raising  and  packing 
of  hogs  and  hog  products  for  food."  This  invitation  was  declined. 
The  reason  given  was^^  that  the  prohibition  was  "a  measure  of 
internal  German  legislation  found  necessary  after  careful  investi- 
gation on  sanitary  grounds  and  closely  connected  with  the  internal 
institutions  of  the  country.  .  .  .  Germany  by  its  strict  and 
rigorously  enforced  legislation  afforded  the  same  protection  to  its 
people  at  home  against  all  danger  from  German  cattle  and  hogs, 
it  could  not  therefore  treat  the  foreign  producers  better  than  its 
own.  An  investigation  of  the  American  methods  of  raising  hogs 
and  preparing  hog  products  by  a  commission  of  German  experts 
in  the  United  States  could  not  effect  a  material  change  in  this 
respect."  It  is  difficult  to  follow  this  reasoning.  An  investigation 
by  a  German  commission  might  have  shown  the  American  methods 
to  be  as  careful  and  the  meat  as  healthful  as  the  German,  in  which 
case  there  would  be  no  better  treatment  of  the  foreign  producers. 
It  is  also  difficult  to  see  the  applicability  of  the  other  argimients 
used,  namely,  that  Germany  made  no  request  to  England  to  inves- 
tigate German  conditions  when  that  country  chose  to  impose 
restrictions  on  the  importation  of  German  cattle.  Xor  does  the 
further  argument  seem  conclusive  that  Austria-Hungary,  whose 
cattle  were  also  excluded  from  Germany,  had  not  suggested  an 
inquiry  of  German  officials.  The  most  justifiable  of  the  reasons 
assigned'^  was  that  while  a  commission  might  find  perfect  order  in 
the  establishments  it  might  visit,  there  was  no  law  guaranteeing 
uniformity  of  inspection  throughout  the  United  States. ^^ 

1-  F.  R.,  '83,  p.  335. 

"  Sen.  Report  No.  345,  4Sth  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  1-44  ff.       '^  Ibid.,  p.  153  ff. 

"  Senate  Report  No.  345,  48th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pp.  144  ff. 

Secretary  Frelinghuysen  summed  up  the  groimd  of  refusal  to  be  that 
"in  a  matter  concerning  domestic  sanitary  legislation,  the  German  Goveni- 
ment  could  not  enter  into  any  arrangement  which  might  imply  an  obligation 
on  its  i)art  to  accept  and  l)e  bound  by  a  state  of  facts  existing  outside  of  its 
jurisdiction."     Ibid.,  page  6. 


GERMAN'    rHOlIIIUTIOX   DECREE    OF    1883  09 

In  spite  of  these  protests  of  the  American  minister  and  others 
from  German  mercliants  interested  in  the  importation  of  American 
l)ork.  the  decree  of  prohibition  was  passed  by  the  Bundesrath/'"' 
In  tr\in,u-  to  obtain  a  suspension  of  the  prohibitory  onhnance,  the 
American  ambassador  expressed  the  warning  that  the  United 
States  might  resort  to  retahatory  measures  against  German 
products.^"    The  prohibition,  however,  went  into  effect. 

"  F.  R.,  '83,  p.  360. 

'"This  action  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Sargent  was  disapproved  by  Secretary 
FreHnghuysen  and  the  minister  was  instructed  to  make  ex{)lanation  of  this 
to  the  Gorman  Government.  See  tlie  following  extracts  from  the  correspond- 
ence. 

F.  R..  18S3,  p.  342.     (Inclosure  in  No.  111.) 

Mr.  Sargent  to  Count  Hatzfeldt. 

Legation  of  the  United  States, 

Berlin,  February  23,  1883. 


Inasmuch  as  the  United  States  are  a  large  and  growing  consumer  of 
German  manufactures,  and  the  food  they  export  to  Germany  is  a  principal 
article  of  exchange,  the  laws  of  trade  must  dictate  their  obtaining  the  goods 
they  import  elsewhere,  if  the  equivalent  which  they  furnish  is  refused.  This 
would  prol)ably  result  even  if  the  Congress  did  not  meet  the  issue  by  legisla- 
tion under  thebehef  that  another  motive  than  the  unsoundness  of  American 
pork  products  caused  this  exclusion.  Such  a  belief,  of  course,  could  not 
obtain  if  fair  investigation  on  the  spot  by  German  experts  showed  dangerous 
unsoundness  to  exist. 

A.  A.  Sargent." 
F.  R.,  1883,  p.  356,  No.  185. 

Mr.  FreUnghuysen  to  Mr.  Sargent. 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  March  14,  1883. 


So  far  as  your  intimation  touches  the  operation  of  the  laws  of  inter- 
national trade,  it  is  unexceptionable.  Those  laws  control  themselves,  and 
commerce  must  perforce  work  its  own  channels  in  the  most  natural  oirections; 
l)ut  when  you  go  further  and  indicate  the  possibility  that  this  Government 
may  resort  to  retaliation  if  its  views  be  not  assented  to  by  Germany,  you 
introduce  an  element  which  it  was  not  intended  to  present. 

The  action  taken  by  this  Government  was  unusual,  and  necessarily  pre- 
supiK)sed  that  the  direct  proposal  of  the  President  to  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment would  be  entertained  in  the  same  frank  spirit  in  which  it  was  protTered; 
and  no  doubt,  it  will  yet  receive  a  courteous  reply,  whether  favorable  or 
unfavorable. 

It  may  be  that  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  may  decline  to  send  hither  a 
commission  as  has  been  proposed,  through  unwillingness,  possibly,  that  the 
results  of  its  labors  should  have  a  liinding  ctTect  upon  his  Government,  such 
as  might  naturally  be  sujjposed  to  follow  from  a  commission  created  by 
imjicrial  order.  The  German  Government  has  an  undoubted  right  to  with- 
hold its  Cducurrence  in  the  suggestion  of  the  President  and  the  exercise  of  the 
right  would  give  no  occasion  for  offense.     It  is  the  duty  of  govermnents  to 


70  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

The  prohibition  was  not  confined  to  Germany.  Restrictive 
measures  of  varying  degrees  of  severity  had  been  enacted  against 
American  pork  products  since  1879  by  France,  Austria-Hungary, 
Italy,  Turkey  and  Greece  and,  for  a  short  time,  by  England. 
The  movement,  according  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Freling- 
huysen,^*  was  at  first  confined  to  hygienic  considerations,  but 
soon  became  subjected  to  the  pressure  of  the  local  pork  industries 
in  the  various  continental  countries,  the  general  tendency  of  the 
scientists  becoming  opposed  to  the  prohibitive  measures  as  unwise 
and  unnecessary. 

In  the  year  following  the  German  prohibition  decree  the  whole 
subject  of  the  restrictions  of  European  countries  against  American 

be  jealous  of  the  health  and  careful  of  the  interests  of  the  citizens  or  subjects, 
and  the  President  does  not  seek  to  support  an  appeal  to  German  sense  of 
equity  by  any  menace. 

In  this  view  of  the  matter,  therefore,  any  intimation,  such  as  is  contained 
in  your  note  to  Count  Hatzfeldt,  that  retaliation  might  ensue  in  the  event  of 
a  refusal,  was  out  of  place." 

Senate  Report  No.  345,  48th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  154,  No.  98. 
Mr.  von  Eisendecker  to  Mr.  Frelinghuysen. 

Imperial  German  Legation, 
Washington,  July  27,  1883. 


The  aforesaid  note  of  Mr.  Sargent  made  an  unpleasant  impression  in 
BerUn,  both  because  of  its  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  Germany, 
and  of  its  tone,  which  was  not  in  harmony  with  the  friendly  relations  existing 
between  the  two  governments.  The  German  Government  is  consequently 
much  gratified  to  find  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  does  not 
adopt  the  position  taken  by  its  representative  in  his  aforesaid  note." 

Mt.  Sargent's  severe  criticism  of  the  German  Government  and  his  impugn- 
ment of  ^ts  motives  in  issuing  and  maintaining  the  decree  of  prohibition 
against  American  pork,  led  finally  to  his  recall  "disguised  under  the  name 
of  transfer."  See  Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  Vol.  IV,  p.  722; 
Autobiography  of  Andrew  D.  White,  Vol.  I,  p.  594;  and  John  W.  Foster's 
"Practice  of  Diplomacy,"  pp.  116  and  117. 

18  Senate  Report  No.  345,  48th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  4. 

Also  President  Cleveland's  message  to  Congress,  December  8,  1885.  (F.  R., 
1885,  p.  X.) 

"I  regret  to  say  that  the  restrictions  upon  the  importation  of  our  pork  into 
France  continue,  notwithstanding  the  abundant  demonstration  of  the  absence 
of  sanitary  danger  in  its  use;  but  I  entertain  strong  hopes  that,  with  a  better 
understanding  of  the  matter,  this  vexatious  prohibition  will  l)e  removed.  It 
would  be  pleasing  to  be  able  to  say  as  much  with  respect  to  Germany,  Austria 
and  other  countries,  where  such  food  products  are  absolutely  excluded,  without 
present  prospect  of  change." 


AMEKICAX    MEAT    INSPECTION    LAW    OF    ISOO  71 

products  was  brought  before  the  United  States  Congress.  The 
Connnittee  on  Foreign  Rehitions,  acting  on  a  resohition  of  the 
Senate,  submitted  a  report  recommending  a  bill  which  provided 
for  measures  of  reprisal.'-*  The  President  was  to  be  authorized 
"at  his  discretion  to  exclude  from  the  United  States,  by  procla- 
mation, any  product  of  any  foreign  state  which,  by  unjust  discrimi- 
nation, prohibits  the  importation  into  such  foreign  state  of  any 
product  of  the  United  States."  Such  a  provision  was  not  passed 
at  this  time  but  was  finally  embodied  in  the  ]\Ieat  Inspection  Law 
of  August  30,  1890.'-'*  In  presenting  its  recommendation  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  had  based  its  conclusions  as  to  the 
general  healthfulness  of  American  pork  products  on  the  report  of  a 
commission  which  had  been  appointed  by  the  President  to  inves- 
tigate the  conditions  of  the  swine  industry  in  the  United  States 
and  had  testified  to  the  generally  healthful  condition  of  the 
pork.-^  -- 

1^  Senate  Report  Xo.  345,  48th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  2. 

2«  U.  S.  Statutes,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '89-'90,  No.  5. 

2'  House  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  106,  48th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  136. 

--  Senate  Report  345,  Part  2,  4Sth  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 

At  the  time  these  recommendations  were  submitted  by  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  a  minority  report  was  filed  by  Senator  Vance  of  North 
Carolina,  Democratic  member  of  the  Committee,  as  follows: 

"The  undersigned  is  not  able  to  concur  in  the  report  of  the  committee, 
and  is  constrained  by  the  importance  of  the  subject  to  present  the  reasons 
for  his  non-concurrence. 

The  matter  complained  of,  and  which  the  bill  is  designed  to  remedy,  is  the 
exclusion  of  our  hog  products  from  entering  Germany  for  sale  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  unwholesome.  In  my  opinion,  Germany  has  the  right  to  do 
tliis  if  she  deems  it  proper,  and  that  we  are  not  justified  in  impeaching  her 
motives  in  so  doing. 

If  it  be  true  that  our  pork  is  to  any  extent  unwholesome,  we  should  endeavor, 
by  a  rigid  system  of  inspection,  to  remove  the  cause  of  complaint. 

If  it  be  that  fear  of  trichinosis  is  only  a  pretext,  and  that  the  real  reason 
for  excluding  our  hog  products  is  the  desire  to  protect  their  own  producers, 
then  we  are  the  last  people  on  earth  who  ought  to  complain.  After  sur- 
rounding ourselves  for  more  than  twenty  years  with  a  protective  tariff  wall 
so  high  as  to  exclude  virtually  all  the  products  of  Germany  which  compete 
with  ours,  it  is  rather  late  for  us  to  advocate  retaliation  against  a  Government 
which  merely  follows  our  example.  In  fact  Germany's  action  is  retaliation, 
and  the  cry  of  'Stop  thief  cannot  change  the  true  condition  of  things.  We 
have  got  to  learn  that  we  are  not  so  great  and  independent  as  to  enable  us  to 
defy  the  laws  of  political  economy  and  the  amenities  of  international  trade 
with  imi)unity. 

We  have  been  told  again  and  again  that  our  true  policy  was  to  shut  up 


72  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

AYith  the  continuance  of  the  restrictions  the  president  in  a 
later  message  to  Congress  recommended-^  legislative  measures 
for  the  prevention  of  the  importation  of  swine  and  products  of 
swine  from  France  and  Germany  on  the  same  ground  of  the 
unhealthful  condition  of  the  meat.  Germany  regarded  this  recom- 
mendation as  purely  retaliatory  because  of  the  measures  in  Ger- 
many against  American  swine  products  and  declared  that  Ger- 
many's exportation  to  America  consisted  mainly  of  the  fine  types 
of  sausage  in  the  manufacture  of  which  especial  care  was  taken  in 
Germany.  It  was  also  stated  that  if  the  United  States  wished  the 
removal  of  the  German  prohibition,  the  way  to  secure  it  lay  not 
in  reprisals  but  in  reforming  her  slaughter-house  and  packing 
methods. 

In  1891  the  subject  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  prohibition  against 
American  pork  was  brought  before  the  Reichstag.-^  Those  favor- 
ing the  withdrawal  voiced  their  own  and  the  United  States'  con- 
tention that  the  meat  was  healthy,  that  it  was  eaten  in  the  United 
States,  England  and  elsewhere  without  injury,  that  the  German 
working  people  needed  it  as  a  cheap  and  nourishing  food,  that  the 
United  States  felt  keenly  this  discrimination  against  one  of  its 
staple  products,  that  the  decree  when  passed  in  1883  was  con- 
sidered to  be  merely  a  temporary  measure,  and  most  important 
of  all,  that  the  American  government  had  just  passed  a  law  pro- 
viding for  a  very  strict  inspection  of  the  hogs  and  hog  products 
which  should  guarantee  the  healthy  condition  of  the  meat.    The 

our  manufactures  from  the  competition  of  the  world,  and  that  all  the  nations 
thus  excluded  would  be  compelled,  nevertheless,  to  buy  our  breadstuff's  and 
provisions — that  they  could  not  do  without  them.  We  are  greatly  surprised 
and  indignant  when  one  im])ortant  customer  says  he  can  get  along  without 
our  hog  jiroducts,  and  for])ids  their  coming  in;  and  we  propose  to  retaliate! 
For  what  ?  For  simply  and  frankly  forbidding  them  to  l)e  imported.  Suiijiose, 
instead  of  doing  this,  Germany  had  imposed  a  duty  of  100  per  cent,  on  them, 
which  as  effectually  prohibited  their  importation,  what  then?  Where  would 
be  our  so-called  retaliation?  The  undersigned  can  see  no  difference  whatever 
in  the  two  methods  of  prohiliition,  so  far  as  results  are  concerned,  only  that 
one  is  manly  and  direct,  while  the  other  is  indirect  and  based  on  false  yre- 
tenses." 

23  F.  R.,  '88,  p.  629. 
2<  F.  R.,  '91,  p.  502. 


EFFORTS   TO    SEcrHF.    WITHDRAW  AI.    OF    C;ERMA\    l'R(  »IIIHrnON       73 

attitude  of  the  German  {rovernnuMit  was  throwing  more  lenient^'' 
and  it  implied  its  willingness  to  remove  the  prohibition  pro\ided 
that  fullest  measures  for  sanitary  meat  could  be  secured.  It 
declared,  howe^•er,  that  it  was  not  yet  satisfied  with  the  methods 
of  slaughtering  and  preparing  meat  in  America  and  that  the  new 
law  adopted  by  Congress  was  inadequate,  because  the  inspection 
pro\ided  for  was  not  compulsory,  and  was  made  on  the  meat  after 
it  had  been  boxed. 

Although  the  measure  did  not  pass  at  this  session  the  German 
minister  a  few  months  later  intimated  to  the  American  Secretary 
of  State'-*^  that  his  govermnent  was  ^^'illing  to  accept  the  inspection 
pro\'ided  for  by  the  new  and  more  stringent  law  enacted  by  Con- 
gress on  ^Nlarch  third  of  that  year.  By  the  new  act  inspection  was 
made  compulsory  and  universal  throughout  the  United  States. 
The  inspection  was  made  by  microscope  both  before  and  after 
the  slaughter  of  the  animal  and  the  examined  products  were 
clearly  labelled  and  identified  throughout  all  future  stages  of 
marketing. 

It  is  important  at  this  juncture  to  observe  the  role  of  the  tariflf 
and  its  use  by  both  countries  to  regulate  reciprocal  concessions. 
The  highly  protective  [NIcKinley  tariff  of  1890  had  just  been 
enacted.-"  It  had  removed  the  duty  on  sugar,  replacing  it  by 
bounties  paid  to  domestic  sugar  producers.  It  had,  however, 
provided  for  the  possibility  of  the  renewal  of  the  duty  by  a  recip- 
rocity clause  giving  the  president  power  to  impose  by  proclama- 
tion certain  duties  on  sugar,  molasses,  tea,  coffee  and  hides,  if  he 
considered  that  any  country'  exporting  these  commodities  "imposed 
fluties  on  other  products  of  the  United  States  which  .  .  . 
he  may  deem  to  be  reciprocally  unjust  or  unreasonable."  There- 
fore, in  the  same  inter\'iew-^  in  which  the  German  minister  inti- 
mated that  his  govennnent  might  be  willing  to  accept  the  new  meat 


25  F.  R.,  '91,  p.  502. 

2«F.  R.,  '91,  p.  511. 

"  Taussig,  Tariff  Hi.st.  of  U.  S.,  p.  276  fT. 

"F.  R.,  '91,  p.  511. 


74  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

inspection  law  of  the  United  States  as  satisfactory  and  admit  pork 
to  Germany,  he  also  sought  assurance  from  the  Secretary  of  State 
that  the  United  States'  Government  would  not,  through  the  new 
tariff  act  of  October  1,  1S90,  restore  the  duty  on  German  sugar 
imported  into  the  United  States.  The  President  justly  contended, 
however,  that  since  Germany  excluded  xlmerican  pork  on  the 
ground  of  unhealthfulness,  it  should  not  make  its  repeal  of  the 
prohibition  contingent  on  something  entirely  unrelated  to  this. 
Nevertheless,  the  President  declared  himself  "disposed  to  treat 
with  the  Gennan  Government  respecting  commercial  reciprocity 
.  .  .  with  the  greatest  spirit  of  Uberality,  and  the  prompt 
action  of  that  government  regarding  the  pork  inspection  will  have 
its  due  weight  in  detemiining  the  terms  of  the  reciprocity  arrange- 
ment." In  other  words  the  offer  to  enter  into  a  bargain  was 
accepted. 

This  offer  resulted  in  the  so-called  Saratoga  Agreement.-^  It 
took  the  form  of  an  exchange  of  declarations  between  ]Mr.  von 
Mimim,  then  Imperial  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Washington,  and  ]Mr. 
John  W.  Foster,  and  took  place  at  Saratoga,  New  York,  on  August 
22,  1891.^°  The  Imperial  Government  promised  to  admit  to 
Germany  American  pork  and  pork  products  and  to  extend  to  the 
agricultural  products  of  the  United  States  the  tariff  concessions 
about  to  be  granted  by  Germany  in  the  treaties  then  in  prepa- 
ration with  several  European  states.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States  promised  not  to  put  into  operation  against  Germany 
the  provision  of  the- meat  inspection  law  of  August  30,  1890,  which 
stipulatecP^  "that  whenever  the  President  shall  be  satisfied  that 
unjust  discriminations  are  made  by  or  under  the  authority  of  any 
foreign  state  against  the  importation  to  or  sale  in  such  foreign 
state  of  any  product  of  the  United  States,  he  may  direct  that  such 
products  of  such  foreign   states   so  discriminating   against   any 

23  V.  R.,  1891,  Anlagen  Xr.  571  (also  V.  R.,  1909,  vol.  2-12,  Anl.  p.  61). 
3»Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  119,  52nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '91-92,  p.  110. 
Also  Calwer,  "Die  Meistbeguenstigung  der  Vereinigten  Staaten,"  pp.  21  ff. 
'1  U.  S.  Stat.,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '89-'90,  p.  415,  No.  5. 


TIIK    SARATOGA    AGREEMENT  <0 

])ro(hict  of  tlie  United  States  as  lie  may  deem  proper  shall  he 
excluded  from  imjxtrtatioii  into  the  United  States." 

The  Saratoga  A<>;reement  was  not  imderstood^-  to  supplant  in 
any  way  the  old  Prussian  treaty,  but  merely  to  regulate  the  specific 
commercial  problems  of  that  time.  The  assurances  on  the  i)art 
of  the  United  States  that  it  would  not  impose  a  tax  on  Genuan 
sugar  confined  themselves  to  the  period  of  the  duration  of  the 
INIcKinley  tariff'.  The  German  concessions^^  were  also  operative 
only  for  the  duration  of  the  treaties  with  European  countries. 

The  relation  of  the  Saratoga  Agreement^*  to  the  principle  of  the 


'-  V.  R.,  1909,  Anl.  Vol.  242,  pp.  Gl  and  62. 
«  V.  R.,  '95-97,  213  Sitz.  3  Mai,  '97,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  5707. 
'*Sen.  Ex.  Doc,  52nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '91-'92,  Nr.  119,  p.  110  (also  Calwer, 
"Die  Meistbeguenstiguno;  der  V.  St.,"  p.  21  ff.). 

The  note  directed  l)y  the  German  representative  von  Mumm  to  Mr.  Foster 

read  as  follows: 

Saratoga,  August  22,  1891. 
"Mr.  Plenipotentiary: 

Inasmuch  as  the  insi)ection  of  meat  intended  for  interstate  commerce  in 
North  America  and  for  exportation  to  foreign  countries  has  l)een  made  com- 
pulsory l)y  the  act  of  March  third,  1891,  relative  to  the  execution  of  that  act, 
the  Imjierial  Government  is  happy  to  announce  that  there  is  no  longer  any 
cause  for  maintaining  in  force  the  prohiliition,  promulgated  on  sanitary 
grounds  in  the  year  1883,  of  the  importation  of  hogs,  pork,  and  sausages  of 
American  origin,  provided  that  they  are  officially  inspected  according  to  the 
regulations  of  March  twenty-fifth,"  1891,  and  accompanied  by  the  required 
certificate.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  is  able  officially  to  inform  the  Imperial  Government  when  the  act 
of  March  third,  1891,  will  actually  take  effect  in  the  manner  provided  l)y  the 
regulations  of  March  25,  1891,  so  that  the  guaranty  which  is  contemplated 
Vn-  the  aforesaid  act  shall  appear  confirmed,  viz.,  that  no  meat  dangerous  to 
health  shall  he  exported,  the  Imperial  Government  will  take  the  necessary 
prehminary  measures  to  abolish  the  German  proliibition  of  importation  which 
was  promulgated  May  sixth,  1883. 

The  Imperial  Government  in  making  this  declaration  bases  its  action  upon 
the  supposition  that,  after  the  abolition  of  the  aforesaid  prohibition  of  importa- 
tion, the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  will  no  longer  have  any 
occasion  for  the  exercise,  as  regards  the  German  Empire,  of  the  discretion- 
arv  powers  conferred  upon  him  bv  the  Fifty-first  Congress.  (See  Section  3  of 
the  Tariff  Act  of  October  first,  1890;  also  public  act  No.  2477.) 

The  Imperial  Government  thinks  that  it  has  the  greater  reason  for  this 
assumption,  since  it  is  jn-epared  to  grant  to  the  United  States  of  America  the 
same  reductions  in  customs  duties  on  agricultural  products  that  have  been 
granted  by  it  (or  still  are  so)  to  Austria-Hungary  and  other  states  during  the 
negotiations  for  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  commerce  that  are  now  lacing 
conducted  bj'  Germany. 

Begging  you  to  be  pleased  to  inform  me,  in  your  reply  to  this  note,  whether 
the  view  expressed  bv  the  Imperial  Government  as  regards  Section  3  of  the 
tariff  act  of  October  "first,  1890,  and  Section  5  of  the  act  providing  for  the 


76  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

"most-favored-nation"  has  been  viewed  in  radically  opposite 
ways  by  German  officials.    The  Imperial  Chancellor,  Prince  von 

inspection  of  meat  of  August  thirtieth,  1890,  is  correct,  I  await  information 
from  you  as  to  the  time  when  the  act  of  March  third,  1891,  is  to  be  fully 
enforced,  in  pursuance  of  the  regulations  of  March  twenty-fifth,  1891. 

I  avail,  etc., 

A.   VON   MUMM." 

The  German  Charge  d'Affaires  received  on  the  same  date  the  following 
reply  from  Mr.  Foster: 

Saratoga,  August  22,  1891. 
"Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  note  of  today  in 
which  you  inform  me  that,  when  the  Government  of  the  United  States  shall 
be  able  to  announce  to  the  German  Imperial  Government  that  the  provisions 
of  the  law  of  March  third  of  the  present  year  and  the  regulations  of  the  twenty- 
fifth  of  the  same  month,  respecting  the  inspection  of  meat  destined  for  inter- 
state and  foreign  commerce,  have  been  practically  put  in  operation,  the 
Imperial  Government  will  take  the  necessary  steps  for  abolishing  the  order 
of  March  sixth,  1883,  prohibiting  the  importation  into  Germany  of  hogs,  pork 
and  sausages  of  American  origin;  and  you  further  state  that,  in  view  of  this 
declaration  and  of  the  further  fact  that  the  Imperial  Government  is  wiUing 
to  grant  to  the  United  States  the  same  tariff  reductions  in  agricultural  pro- 
ducts which  have  been  granted  by  commercial  treaty  negotiations  with 
Austria-Hungary  or  which  may  be  granted  to  other  countries,  the  Imperial 
Government  entertains  the  expectation  that  no  cause  will  thereafter  exist 
for  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  make  use,  as  against  the  German 
Empire  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  him  by  the  Fifty-first  Congress  in  Sec- 
tion 3  of  the  tariff  law  of  October  first  and  section  5  of  the  meat  inspection  law 
of  August  thirtieth,  1890. 

It  gives  pleasure  to  announce  to  you  that  the  inspection  of  meat  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law  of  March  third  last  and  of  the  regulations  of  the  twenty-fifth 
of  the  same  month,  is  now  and  for  some  weeks  past  has  been  in  practical 
operation  under  the  direction  and  at  the  expense  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  meat  so  inspected  will  be  ready  for  exportation  to 
Germany  on  or  before  the  first  day  of  next  month.  It  is  also  very  gratifying 
to  me  to  give  the  assurance  by  direction  of  the  President,  that  the  contem- 
plated action  of  the  Imperial  Government  in  abolishing  the  order  of  March 
sixth,  1883,  prohibiting  the  im])ortation  of  hogs,  pork  and  sausages  of  Ameri- 
can origin  will  remove  the  occasion  for  the  exercise  by  the  President,  as 
against  the  German  Empire  of  the  power  conferred  upon  him  by  section  5 
of  the  meat  inspection  law  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  August 
thirtieth,  1890. 

I  am  further  directed  by  the  President  to  state  that  he  accepts  the  action 
of  the  Imperial  Government  in  ])roposing  to  grant  to  the  agricultural  products 
of  the  United  States  the  same  tariff  reductions,  on  their  imi)ortation  into 
Germany,  as  are  granted  to  the  similar  productions  of  Austria-Hungary 
embraced  in  the  commercial  treaty  recently  negotiated  with  that  government, 
or  which  may  be  granted  by  Germany  to  other  countries,  as  a  due  reciprocity 
for  the  action  of  the  Congress  of  the  t^nitetl  States  as  contained  in  section  3  of 
the  taritY  law  of  Octolier  first,  1890;  and  that  as  soon  as  he  shall  be  officially 
informed  that  the  Imperial  Government  is  prepared  to  decree  the  admission 
of  the  indicated  products  of  the  United  States  into  the  German  Empire  at  the 
reductions  of  the  general  tariff  proi)osed,  the  President  will  cause  the  necessary 
orders  to  be  given  to  secure  the  continued  free  admission  into  the  United 


SARATOGA  AGREEMENT  AND  MOST-FAVORED-NATION  PRINCIPLE      77 

BiR'low,  hold'"'  that  the  sweeping  achuission  of  all  Aniorican 
Products  to  the  lowest  rates  of  duty  granted  by  the  German  treaties 
with  European  countries  was  evidence  that  Germany  interpreted 
the  old  1828  treat>-  clause  at  this  time  in  the  broadest  sense; 
that  is,  that  she  admitted  the  United  States  to  the  full  status  of 
the  "most-favored-nation."     Richard   Calwer,  Social  Democrat, 

States  of  the  articles,  the  product  of  the  German  Empire  enumerated  in 
section  3  of  said  law  of  Octol)er  1,  1890. 

I  remain,  etc. 

John  W.  Foster, 
Special  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States." 

Mr.  Foster,  to  whom  had  been  assigned  the  task  of  conducting  all  the 
reciprocity  negotiations  arising  from  the  McKinley  tariff,  gives  in  his  Memoirs 
(Vol.  II,  p.  6)  an  account  of  the  negotiations  with  Von  Mumm  at  Saratoga. 
The  discussions  were  not  to  be  made  public  until  an  agreement  could  be 
reached  and  a  premature  annoimcement  gave  President  Harrison  some  tem- 
porary uneasiness.  On  September  10,  1891,  he  wrote  to  ]Mr.  Foster  (Vol. 
II,  p.  14). 

"My  dear  General: 

I  was  extremely  mystified  when  I  found  that  General  Rush  (Sec'y  of 
Agriculture)  had  talked  aljout  matters  that  I  had  explained  to  him  with  great 
care  were  confidential.  He  came  here  himself  directly  from  Chicago  to  ask 
me  on  behalf  of  Swift  and  other  packers  there  whether  it  would  be  safe  for 
them  to  start  a  cargo  of  sugar-cured  hams,  etc.,  for  German  ports  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  it  would  take  several  weeks  to  get  it  there.  I  felt  that  as  this 
matter  directly  touched  his  department,  it  was  proper  for  me  to  tell  him  that 
the  agreement  had  been  reached, — but  I  told  him  how  confidential  the  whole 
matter  was;  but  he  seems  to  have  understood,  that  when  the  announcement 
of  the  admission  of  our  pork  came  from  Germany,  the  whole  matter  was  open 
for  comment. 

I  have  written  to  Mr.  Wharton  to  say  to  Mr.  Von  Mumm  that  I  was  very 
much  mortified  at  this  mischance,  and  also  that  if  he  thought  it  desirable,  a 
statement  might  go  out  from  the  State  Department  or  from  you  to  the  effect 
that  the  reciprocity  ])art  of  the  negotiations  had  not  been  completed,  and 
that  there  would  be  further  correspondence  before  a  general  conclusion  would 
l)e  reached;  but  that  it  was  hoped  sonie  general  result  would  be  reached  in 
view  of  the  friendly  attitude  of  Germany.  This  would  be  more  nearlj'  true 
than  most  dii)lomatic  utterances  and  certainly  than  most  newspaper  inter- 
views; indeed  it  would  be  literally  true,  because  we  do  not  yet  know  the  articles 
that  are  to  be  included  and  do  not  know  the  rates,  and  indeed  do  not  certainly 
know  that  the  treaty  of  which  we  are  to  have  the  benefit  will  be  completed." 

Xo  harm  befell  the  negotiations,  however,  the  tarifT  privileges  of  the  German 
treaties  with  Austria-Hungary  and  other  European  countries  were  extended 
to  the  United  States  (F.  R.,  '97,  p.  176)  and  the  agreement  was  hailed  "as  a 
great  achievement  in  benefit  of  American  commerce."  (Foster,  Dipl.  Mem., 
Vol.  II,  p.  14.) 

«  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Xr.  391,  p.  62. 


78  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

member  of  the  Reichstag,  pointed  out,^"  on  the  other  hand,  that 

the  fact  that  the  Imperial  Government  used  the  removal  of  the 

.  prohibition  against  American  pork  as  a  means  of  buying  tariff 

concessions  from  the  United  States  demonstrated  a  status  of  mere 

reciprocity  betweeli  the  two  nations."    Certainly  the  bargaining 

character  of  the  Saratoga  Agreement  was  unmistakable  and  as 

such  was  contrary  to  an  unrestricted  most-favored-nation  policy. 

On  September  3, 1891,  the  decree  repealing  the  decree  excluding 

American  pork  was  signed.^^     Proclamation   was   therefore   not 

made  imposing  a  tax  on  German  sugar. 

/    Four  years  later  the  Wilson  tariff    (1894)   changed  the  basis 

1  completely.^'-'     The  reciprocity  provisions  were  removed.*"     The 

new  law  reimposed  the  tax  on  sugar.*^     Raw  sugar  was  placed 

under  an  ad  valorem  duty  of  40  per  cent,  and  refined  sugar  under 

an  additional  specific  duty  of  one-eighth  of  a  cent  a  pound.    The 

'*  Calwer,  "Die  Meistbeguenstigung  der  Ver.  St.,"  p.  20. 
"  Sen.  Doc.  No.  29,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 

Also  G.   M.   Fisk,   "Most-favored-nation    Relations — German-American," 
in  Journal  Political  Economy,  March,  1903. 
F.  R.,  1911,  p.  5. 
'8F.  R.,  '91,  p.  577. 

"The  decree  respecting  the  prohiliition  of  the  importation  of  swine,  swine's 

.  fiesh,  and  sausages  of  American  origin,  of  March  6,  1SS3     .     .     .     ceases  to 

be  in  force  for  living  swine  as  well  as  for  such  ])roducts  as  are  provided  with  an 

official  certificate  stating  the  flesh  has,  in  the  land  of  origin  been  examined 

pursuant  to  the  rules  in  force  there,  and  has  l^een  found  free  from  qualities 

,    injurious  to  health." 

39  Taussig,  Tariff  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  313 

40  Mclvinley,  The  Tariff,  pp.  204  and  205. 

In  introducing  his  l)ill,  Mr.  Wilson,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Ways 
and  Means,  set  forth  the  objections  to  these  provisions  of  the  McKinley 
Tariff. 

"This  section,"  he  said,"  has  ])rought  no  appreciable  advantage  to  American 
exporters;  it  is  not  in  intention  or  effect  a  {:)rovision  for  reciprocity  but  for 
retaliation.  It  inflicts  penalties  upon  the  American  people  by  making  them 
pay  higher  prices  for  these  articles  if  the  fiscal  necessities  of  other  nations 
coiniiel  them  to  levy  duties  upon  the  products  of  the  United  States  which,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  President,  are  reciprocally  unequal  and  unreasonal)le.  .  .  . 
Moreover,  we  do  not  believe  that  Congress  can  rightly  vest  in  the  President 
of  the  United  States  any  authority  or  jiower  to  impose  or  release  taxes  on 
our  people  l)y  proclamation  or  otherwise,  or  to  suspend  or  disjiense  with  the 
operation  of  a  law  of  Congress." 

«  Taussig,  TarilT  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  313. 


SUGAR  SURTAX  OF  WILSON  TARIFF  79 

bounty  to  domestic  producers  was  abolished,  but  to  offset  this, 
an  extra  duty  of  one-tentli  of  a  cent  a  pound  was  placed  on  the 
refined  sugar  from  those  countries  which  paid  an  export  bounty 
to  their  sugar  producers. 

This  measure  affected  Gennany  especially.  She  protested'*-  on 
the  ground  that  such  a  duty  was  in  contravention  of  Article  5^^  of 
the  commercial  treaty  of  1828  between  the  United  States  and 
Prussia. 

Within  two  months  after  the  Wilson  Tariff  Act,  Germany  noti- 
ficd^^  the  I'nited  States  of  her  intention  to  prohibit  the  importa- 
tion of  American  cattle  and  fresh  meats  owing  to  the  discovery 
of  Texas  fever  in  two  recent  shi]3ments  of  cattle  from  the  United 
States.  The  protest  of  the  United  States  stated  that  this  measure 
would  needlessly  create  great  injury,  that  the  cattle  affected  by 
the  Texas  fever  came  from  only  a  certain  district  of  Texas,  that 
export  from  this  district  had  been  prohibited  and  that  the  enforce- 
ment of  such  a  measure  woidd  l)e  considered  in  the  United  States 
to  he  imfriendly  and  merely  retaliatory  in  return  for  the  imposi- 
tion of  the  surtax  on  German  sugar.  The  protest  also  explained 
that  the  President  intended  to  advise  Congress  to  repeal  the  sugar 
tax  and  that  this  action  of  Gennany 's  in  regard  to  American  cattle 
would  defeat  his  effort. 

President  Cleveland  carried  out  this  intention  and  recommended 
to  Congress,'*^  "in  the  interest  of  the  commerce  of  both  countries, 
and  to  avoid  even  the  accusation  of  treaty  violation,"  the  repeal 
of  that  portion  of  the  tariff  law  which  laid  the  extra  duty  on  sugar. 
The  United  States'  Secretary-  of  State  (Gresham)  also  agreed  with 
Gennany  that  the  duty  was  a  discrimination  against  a  product 
of  Germany^*^  and  was  "an  attempt  to  offset  a  domestic  favor  or 


«  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  236. 
«  F.  R.,  '83,  p.  369. 


Article  V.  "Nor  shall  any  prohibition  be  imposed  on  the  importation  of 
any  article  the  produre  or  iiianufacture  of  the  United  States  or  of  I'rassia, 
to  or  from  the  ports  of  the  United  States,  or  to  and  from  the  ports  of  Prussia, 
which  shall  not  equally  extend  to  all  other  nations." 

"  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  230.  15  McKinley,  The  Tariff,  j).  236. 

«  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  239. 
6 


80  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

encouragement  of  a  certain  industry  by  the  very  means  forbidden 
by  the  treaty." 

Protest  was  also  made  by  Germany^^  against  the  imposition  by 
the  new  tariff  act  of  a  duty  on  salt  imported  from  a  country  which 
places  a  duty  on  salt  imported  from  the  United  States.  This  was 
also  held  to  be  in  contravention  of  the  "most-favored-nation" 
clause  of  the  Prussian  treaty,  and  it  was  further  explained  that  the 
duties  on  imported  salt  in  Germany  were  only  internal  state  taxes, 
not  protecting  the  German  domestic  salt  industry,  and  hence 
could  not  be  considered  as  a  duty  on  American  salt. 

Further  protests  were  made  by  both  countries^*  and  while  each 
denied  that  its  measures  were  enacted  for  purposes  of  retaliation,^* 
the  danger  of  drifting  into  a  tariff  war  became  evident.  A  warning 
of  this  was  expressed  by  the  United  States'  ambassador  to  Germany 
who  denied  at  the  same  time,  however,  any  unfriendly  attitude 
on  the  part  of  the  German  Government  toward  the  United  States. 

The  House  of  Representatives,  early  in  the  year  1895,°''  passed 
a  bill  repealing  the  surtax  on  sugar.  The  bilP^  did  not,  however, 
pass  the  Senate.  The  tax  on  salt  also  was  maintained^-  as  falling 
within  the  province  of  the  tariff  act.  On  the  German  side  the  pro- 
hibition of  the  importation  of  American  cattle  and  fresh  beef  was 
maintained,^^  the  German  defense  being  that  the  increasing  pre- 
cautions against  it  taken  by  other  districts  of  the  United  States 
were  proof  of  its  diseased  condition.  The  German  Government 
insisted^^  that  the  prohibition  was  purely  from  sanitary  considera- 
tions, was  not  retaliatory  and  had  no  connection  with  the  German 
complaint  against  the  sugar  surtax. 

In  1897  the  adoption  of  the  Dinglev  tariff'  created  a  new  set  of 

I 

*'  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  240.  *«  F.  R.,  '95,  p.  498. 

"  F.  R.,  '95,  p.  570.  =°  F.  R.,  '95,  p.  5U. 

"V.  R.,  '95-'97,  213  Sitz.,  3  Mai,  '97,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  5708. 

B2  F.  R.,  '96,  p.  208. 

The  United  States'  Secretary  of  State  took  the  occasion  to  renew  the  never 
settled  question  as  to  whether  the  provisions  of  the  old  1828  treaty  with 
Prussia  were  to  be  considered  elTective  in  other  portions  of  the  German 
Empire.     (See  also  Chap.  II,  Treaty  Relations.) 

53  F.  R.,  '96,  p.  165  "  F.  R.,  '95,  Vol.  I,  p.  511. 


TIIK    DIXULKV    TARIFF  81 

problems  for  the  diploniatic  (lei)artments.  The  poHcy  of  recipro- 
city was  revived."  The  President  was  empowered'''^  to  negotiate 
with  other  countries  for  concessions  in  return  for  which  the  United 
States  would  reduce  certain  duties  of  the  new  act.  The  articles 
upon  which  the  United  States  offered  to  reduce  its  tariff  were 
argols  (crude  tartar),  wine  lees,  brandies,  champagne,  wines, 
paintings  and  statuary — a  list  which  Dr.  Taussig  declares  was 
aimed  to  placate  France^'  since  the  new  schedule  fixed  consider- 
ably higher  duties  on  silk.    Section  3  then  stated  that — ^^ 

"Whenever  the  government  of  any  country  .  .  .  producing 
and  exporting  to  the  United  States  the  above  mentioned  articles, 
or  any  of  them,  shall  enter  into  a  commercial  agreement  with 
the  United  States,  or  make  concessions  in  favor  of  the  products 
or  manufactures  thereof  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  President, 
shall  be  reciprocal  and  equivalent,  he  is  hereby  authorized  .  .  . 
to  suspend  .  .  .  by  proclamation  to  that  effect,  the  impo- 
sition and  collection  of  the  duties  mentioned  in  this  act,  on  such 
articles." 

after  which  proclamation  the  duties  on  those  articles  coming 
from  the  specified  country  might  be  reduced  by  20  per  cent. 
of  their  maximum  duties  for  a  period  of  five  years.  Any  treaties 
arranging  for  such  concessions  must  be  concluded  within  two  years 
after  the  passage  of  the  act. 

The  sugar  tariff  was  also  renewed^^  and  given  a  still  more  retalia- 
tory aspect  by  the  provision  that  on  articles  from  bounty-paying 
countries  an  additional  duty  should  be  imposed  "equal  to  the  net 
amount  of  such  bounty  or  grant"  paid  by  the  foreign  country  to 
its  domestic  exporting  industry.  The  net  amount  of  such  bounties 
was  to  be  ascertained  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  who  should 
then  regulate  the  assessment  accordingly.     In  Germany's  case''" 

^  Taussig,  Tariff  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  "352 

56  U.  S.  Stat.,  55th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '97,  p.  203,  Sec.  3. 

"  Taussig,  Tariff  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  353. 

"  U.  S.  Stat.,  55th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  204. 

"  U.  S.  Stat.,  55th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '97,  p.  205. 

6"  F.  R., '97,  p.  175. 


82  COMMERCIAL    RELATIONS 

this  provision  meant  a  higher  sugar  duty  than  the  ^Yilson  tariff 
surtax  imposed. 

The  Dingley  tariff  created  considerable  hostile  sentiment  in 
Germany  toward  the  United  States.  By  the  provision  that  all 
sugar  from  bounty-paying  countries  should  be  subject  to  an  extra 
tax  equal  to  the  net  bounty  paid  by  the  exporting  country,  Ger- 
many was  seriously  affected  and  also  felt  it  to  be  a  discrimination 
against  her  product.  In  fact  certain  United  States  officials  had 
so  admitted  in  the  case  of  the  Wilson  Tariff  of  1894  which  embodied 
the  same  principle.  Secretary  Gresham  at  that  time  stated  that 
its  effect^'  "would  fall  on  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  alone" 
and  that  the  measure  was  a  "discrimination  against  the  produce 
or  manufacture  of  such  countries."  President  Cleveland  in  his 
message  to  Congress  had  emphatically  recommended^'^  the  repeal 
of  the  tax  and  the  House  of  Representatives  had  voted  for  its 
repeal  the  folloAving  year  (1895).  The  Attorney-General,  however, 
in  the  similar  controversy  over  the  tariff*  on  German  salt,  had 
rendered  the  opposite  decision^^  and  declared  the  tax  on  sugar  to 
be  perfectly  consistent  with  the  "most-favored-nation"  clause, 
in  the  light  of  the  longstanding  American  interpretation  of  that 
principle.  He  also  pointed  out  that  Germany  had  accepted  such 
an  interpretation  in  an  international  sugar  conference  of  1888 
when  the  "representatives  of  both  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
expressly  declared^^  .  .  .  that  the  export  sugar  bounty  of  one 
country  might  be  counteracted  by  the  import  sugar  duty  of 
another  without  causing  any  discrimination  which  could  be 
deemed  a  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  most-fa^'ored-nation 
clause."  The  official  opinions  in  the  United  States  were  therefore 
conflicting  at  this  time^"  and  the  policies  contradictory.  What 
one  house  of  Congress  had  repealed  another  Congress  two  years 
later  had  reenacted  in  more  severe  form.  Although  as,  ]\Ir.  Olney 
had  pointed  out,  Germany  had  agreed  to  such  a  principle  in  the 
Brussels  conference  of  1888,  the  effect  was  nevertheless  to  increase 

61  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  239.  «=  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  x. 

«  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  178.  "  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  179. 

65  White,  Autobiography,  \'ol.  II,  p.  134. 


EFFECT   OF   DIN(iLEY   TARIFF   IN   GERMANY  S3 

resentment  in  Germany,  especially  anions  those  industrial  classes 
directly  att'ected  by  the  measure.  In  addition  to  i)r()tcstins 
on  the  irround  of  the  treaty  of  1828,  the  German  ambassador  also 
referred  to  the  provisions  of  the  Saratoga  Agreement  of  1891,^'' 
stating  that  it  was  the  general  belief  that  the  United  States  thereby 
guaranteed  exemption  to  Germany  from  the  duty  on  sugar.  The 
United  States,  however,  considered  that  "the. said  agreement'^'' 
was  no  longer  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  act  of  July 
24,  1897  (Dingley  tariff),  inasmuch  as  the  Act  of  August  28, 
1894  (Wilson  tariff")  repealed  section  3  of  the  act  of  October  1, 
1890  (McKinley  tariff')  under  which  the  agreement  was  made." 

Strong  opposition  was  expressed  in  the  Reichstag'^'^  to  the  pro- 
\-isions  and  increased  schedule  of  the  Dingley  bill  and  an  inter- 
pellation was  addressed  to  the  government  inquiring  whether  the 
go\"ernnient,  in  the  face  of  these  new  American  terms,  would  con- 
tinue to  grant  to  the  United  States  the  privileges  of  the  treaty 
tariff".  The  reply  of  the  German  government  was  emphatically 
affirmative.  Baron  von  Marschall,  ^linister  of  State  and  Secretary 
of  the  Foreign  office,  stated  that — '^'■' 

"The  Confederated  Governments,  when  they  concluded  the 
commercial  treaty  wnth  Austria-Hungary  could  have  no  doubt 
that  they  were  obliged  to  extend  without  further  question  to  the 
Uniterl  States  the  tariff"  reductions  granted  to  Austria-Hungary. 
It  would  have  been  an  off'ense  against  good  faith  if,  after  having 
repeatedly  claimed  from  the  United  States  rights  in  our  favor, 
we  had  then  denied  our  concept  of  those  rights  when  our  own 
obligations  were  in  question." 

Under  the  German  concept  of  the  unrestricted  status  of  the 
"most-favored-nation,"  therefore,  admission  to  the  reduced  rates 
of  the  treaties  was  still  due  to  the  United  States. 

In  1898  Germany  issued  a  decree^"  prohibiting  the  importation 
of  American  fresh  fruits  and  later  extended  this  to  dried  fruits 

8«  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  234.  "  F.  R.,  '97,  p.  179. 

"  V.  R.,  '95-'97i  213  Sitz.,  3  Mai,  '97,  pp.  5701  ff.  «'■'  Ibid.,  p.  5709. 

"  R.  Gbl.,  '98,  Nr.  3,  p.  5. 


84  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

also,  the  reason  given  being  the  danger  of  the  dissemination  of  the 
San  Jose  scale, '^^  the  prevalence  of  which  in  America  the  German 
Government  held  to  be  indicated  by  the  strict  measures  enacted 
against  it  by  several  American  states. '^^  Dp  Andrew  D.  White, 
American  Ambassador  to  Germany  at  this  time,  acknowledged 
that  the  publications  of  warning  against  the  scale,  issued  by  the 
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  at  this  period  were 
sufficient  excuse  for  alarm. '^^  He  directed  his  efforts,  however,  to 
demonstrating  to  the  German  Governments^  that  the  sweeping 
character  of  the  prohibition  was  unnecessary  and  unfair,  that 

"1  F.  R.,  '98,  p.  Ixxvii. 
"2  Sen.  Doc.  131,  55th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess. 

The  Cahfornia  State  Board  of  Horticulture,  adopted  Augast  15,  1894,  a 
regulation  ruling  that 

"Fruit  of  any  kind  .  .  .  found  infected  with  any  insect  or  insects,  or 
with  any  fungi,  blight  or  other  disease  ...  is  hereby  prohibited  from 
being  offered  for  sale,  gift  or  distribution  within  the  State." 

Agricultural  Bulletin  No.  3,  New  Series,  1898,  pp.  72-74.  "The  San  Jose 
Scale." 

"We  have  already  shown  that  the  San  Jose  scale  maj'  be  spread  through 
the  scattering  of  fruit  parings  at  certain  seasons  of  the  year,  and  any  legisla- 
tion which  is  drafted  with  this  insect  in  view  should  contain  some  such  rule 
as  the  one  just  quoted." 

"  F.  R.,  1898,  p.  322. 

"^  Dr.  Andrew  D.  White,  Autobiography ,  Vol.  II,  p.  159. 

Dr.  White  refers  to  the  fruit  situation  in  his  autobiography: 

"One  morning  came  a  storm  of  telegrams  and  letters  stating  that  cargoes 
of  American  fruits  had  been  stopped  in  the  German  harbors  under  the  charge 
that  they  contained  injurious  insects.  The  German  authorities  were,  of 
course,  honest  in  this  procedure  though  they  were  doubtless  stimulated  to  it 
by  sundry  representatives  of  the  land-owning  class.  Our  beautiful  fruits, 
especially  those  of  California,  had  come  to  be  very  extensively  used  through- 
out the  Emj)ire,  and  the  German  consumers  had  been  growing  more  and  more 
happy  and  the  German  producers  more  and  more  unhappy  over  this  fact^ 
when  there  came  from  the  American  side  accounts  of  the  scale  insect  dis- 
covered on  pears  in  California,  and  of  severe  measures  taken  by  sundry  other 
states  of  our  Union  to  prohibit  their  importation.  The  result  was  the  pro- 
hibition of  oiu-  fruits  in  Germany,  and  this  was  carried  so  far  that  not  only 
pears  from  California,  l)ut  all  other  fruits  from  all  other  parts  of  the  country 
were  at  first  i)ut  under  the  ban,  and  not  only  fresh  but  dried  and  preserved 
fruits.  .  .  .  We  took  pains  to  show  the  facts  in  tlie  case  dealing  fairly 
and  o])enly  with  the  German  Government,  allowing  that  the  imi>ortation  of 
scale-infected  trees  and  shrubs  might  l)e  dangerous,  and  making  no  objection 
to  any  fair  measures  regarding  these.  The  Foreign  Office  was  reasonable 
and  gradually  the  most  vexatious  of  these  prohibitions  were  removed." 


.\i:cil)TI.\TU)XS    FDLLOWINt;    DINGLEY   TAKll-K  85 

wliile  tliere  inisjjht  I)e  (lan.u;er  of  infection  from  the  importation  of 
li\e  shrnl)s  and  plants,  this  did  not  extend  to  the  fresh  and  dried 
fruits.  I'l^on  ])resentation  of  the  evidence,  the  German  Foreign 
Office  >icldc(l  in  certain  respects^^  and  removed  the  restrictions 
iii^^ainst  (h-ied  fruits,  a^uainst  fresh  fruits  in  lots  found  uninfected, 
and  removed  also  the  reciuirement  of  inspection  of  American  fruits 
passinii  throuijh  Germany  in  l)()nd.  The  prohibition  was  main- 
tained against  the  importation  of  live  trees,  shrubs  and  plants 
from  the  United  States. 

In  response  to  the  offer  of  the  Dingley  Tariff,  France,  Portugal 
and  Italy  made  application  to  the  United  States^"  for  admission 
to  the  reduced  tarifli"  schedule  on  the  designated  articles  which 
formed  an  important  part  of  their  exports.  Agreements  were 
therefore  concluded  by  the  United  States  with  these  countries, 
each  one  granting  certain  reciprocal  concessions"  to  American 
products.  Germany  then  made  her  application  for  the  extension 
of  the  same  tariff  concessions  to  her  own  exporters  on  the  basis  of 
the  "  most-favored-nation  r  clause  of  the  Prussian  treaty  of  1828. 

The  I'nited  States  replied  that  it  could  extend  these  reduced 
rates  only  in  return  for  reciprocal  concessions  from  Germany. 
Taking  as  its  basis  article  IX  of  the  Prussian  treaty,  which  read:^* 

"If  either  party  shall  hereafter  grant  to  any  other  nation  any 
particular  favor  in  navigation  or  commerce,  it  shall  immediately 
become  common  to  the  other  party,  freely,  where  it  is  freely 
granted,  to  such  other  nation,  or  on  yielding  the  same  compen- 
sation, when  the  grant  is  conditional." 

The  American  Government  showed  that  the  status  of  the  relations^^ 
between  the  United  States  and  the  German  Empire  was  not  one 
of  the  unqualified  "most-favored-nation,"  but  one  of  reciprocity, 
as  was  expressly  provided  for  in  the  above  article. 


«  Sen.  Doc.  131,  55th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  pp.  2  ff.     Also  F.  R.,  1898,  pp.  340  ff. 

'« V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  p.  62. 

"  M.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  542  and  987.     M.,  Vol.  II,  p.  1463. 

^8  M.,  Vol.  II,  p.  1498.  "  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  p.  62. 


86  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

In  asserting  this  interpretation  the  United  States  could  demon- 
strate a  consistent  line  of  policy  held  by  the  Union  since  its  begin- 
ning,*" and  could  cite  numerous  declarations  by  its  leading  states- 
men from  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Prussian  treaty  forward, 
to  show  that  it  had  maintained  the  principle  of  reciprocity  as  the 
basis  of  and  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  its  most-favored-nation 
agreements.  There  was  one  notable  exception  to  this  American 
policy  in  the  treaty  concluded  with  Switzerland  in  1850.*^  Articles 
VIII  to  XII  of  this  treaty,  as  well  as  the  correspondence  conducted 
at  the  time  of  its  conclusion,  placed  the  two  nations  on  the  broad 
basis  of  "most-favored-nation"  in  so  unqualified  a  manner  that 
the  United  States  admitted  the  treaty  to  be  an  exception*-  to  its 
otherwise  uniform  policy.  It  constituted,  therefore,  in  reality  a 
violation  of  the  reciprocity  treaties  with  Germany  and  other 
countries  in  that  it  obliged  the  United  States  to  extend  gratui- 
tously to  Switzerland  favors  in  tariff  and  commerce  which  it  ex- 
tended to  other  nations  only  in  return  for  compensation.  Realizing 
this  fact  the  American  Government  annulled  at  this  time  the  clauses 
concerned  and  renewed  the  Swiss  treaty  on  the  narrower  basis. 
By  so  doing  the  United  States  emphasized  anew  its  standpoint 
that  under  all  such  treaties  it  was  bound  to  extend  privileges  only 
in  return  for  what  it  agreed  to  consider  equivalent  compensation. 

8"  Sen.  Doc.  No.  29,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 

Article  IX  is  a  typically  worded  "equivalence  clause,"  and  similar  clauses 
modifying  the  basic  "most-favored-nation"  clauses  (cf.  Article  V)  are  included 
in  twenty-one  out  of  twenty-eight  American  commercial  treaties.  (Ibid., 
page  4.)  Even  in  the  case  of  treaties  not  containing  this  equivalence  clause 
the  interpretation  by  the  United  States  was  the  same  as  if  they  had  con- 
tained the  clause.  (Ibid.,  page  13.)  For  a  compilation  of  precedents  of  the 
above  interpretation  as  rendered  by  the  United  States  State  Department  and 
by  the  Supreme  Court,  see  the  above  Senate  Document.  For  early  inter- 
pretations at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Prussian  treaty,  see  the  following : 

American  State  Papers:  Class  I,  Foreign  Relations,  Second  Series,  Vol.  V, 
No.  423,  18th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  pp.  641  and  669. 

Ibid.,  Vol.  v.,  No.  404,  p.  883. 

Ibid.,  Vol.  VI,  No.  438,  p.  208. 

Sen.  Doc,  20th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  V,  Serial  No.  167,  Doc.  No.  196. 

81  Malloy,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1766  ff.  ''  F.  R.,  1899,  pp.  746  ff. 


INTEHri{ETAT10N.S   OF   MOST-FAVOKED-NATION    CLAUSE  S? 

The  Gennaii  Government  ajjreed  to  accept  the  I'nited  States' 
interpretatioai  of  the  Prussian  treaty  chiuse,  and  in  a  note  to  the 
American  Government  formally  placed  the  commercial  relations 
of  the  two  countries  on  a  reciprocity  basis  as  follows :*^'^ 

"  If  two  contractinti;  i)arties  are  of  a  ditt'erent  opinion  concernin*^ 
their  treaty  obligations,  the  one  interpreting  the  same  in  a  narrower 
the  other  in  a  broader  sense,  then  the  latter  must  sufi'er  a  dis- 
advantage. As  long  as  the  difference  of  concept  did  not  lead  to 
an  actual  diti'erentiation  of  Germany  in  the  United  States,  the 
Imperial  Government  was  in  the  position  on  the  basis  of  the 
broader  interpretation  of  the  treaty  to  grant  to  the  Ignited  States 
the  complete  rights  of  the  "most-favored-nation."  But  after 
the  Union  recently  had  concluded  with  several  countries  special 
agreements  which  granted  these  tariti'  favors,  while  the  latter  were 
withheld  from  Germany,  then  there  was  actually  no  longer  allotted 
to  Germany  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  the  rights  of  the 
"most-favored-nation. "  In  order  that  the  actual  injury  accruing 
to  the  German  Empire  from  the  treaty  relationship  in  conse- 
quence of  the  difference  of  opinion  over  the  mutual  duties,  may  not 
be  allowed  to  become  a  permanent  one,  the  Imperial  Government 
makes  its  own  the  narrower  interpretation  of  the  treaty  adopted  by 
America.  Accordingly,  however,  just  as  Germany  can  lay  claim 
to  the  favors  granted  by  the  Union  to  third  countries,  only 
in  exchange  for  equivalent  concessions,  so  the  United  States  of 
America  can  without  corresponding  compensation  have  no  title 
to  the  German  treaty  clauses  which  Germany  has  granted  to  no 
state  without  compensation  but  only  in  return  for  particular 
treaty  obligations  or  in  return  for  the  granting  of  the  uncon- 
ditional status  of  the  "most-favored-nation." 

The  United  States  agreed  to  the  new  basis'^^for  the  commercial 
relations  between  herself  and  Germany  and  accepted  the  privilege 

«  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  p.  (iS  (transl.  by  author). 

8*  F.  R.,  1878,  pp.  382,  403  and  405. 

Though  Germany  presented  this  as  a  new  basis,  and  appears  to  have  so 
considered  it,  it  was  really  not  new  but  had  been  adopted  as  early  as  1878 
when  Germany  acquiesced  in  the  special  reciprocity  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  Hawaii.  The  Hawaiian  representative,  Mr.  Carter, 
reported  June  25,  1878,  following  his  mission  to  Europe,  the  following  account 
of  these  negotiations  in  Berlin  (j).  403). 

"My  negotiations  with  that  (German)  government  were  retarded  by  its 
reluctance  to  make  a  commercial  treaty  without  providing  for  the  fullest 


88  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

of  access  to  the  German  treaty  tariff  as  a  satisfactory  return 
measure  for  the  concessions  provided  for  by  the  Dingley  tariff. 
In  acknowledging  the  right  of  Germany  to  adopt  the  same  construc- 
tion as  the  United  States  of  its  obHgations  under  the  treaty  of 
1828,  Secretary  Hay  pointed  out^^  that  this  construction  must 
be  then  appHed  by  Germany  to  all  governments  whose  interests 
were  protected  by  like  treaty  clauses.  If  Germany  should  apply 
one  construction  to  the  treaty  clause  when  it  concerned  the  United 
States  and  another  broader  construction  when  it  concerned  another 
country,  then  that  fact  would  in  itself  violate  the  treaty  as  one 
nation  would  be  receiving  favors  gratuitously  and  the  United 
States  only  in  return  for  compensation.  In  other  words,  it  would 
be  a  similar  situation  to  that  of  the  United  States  and  the  Swiss 
treaty,  a  condition  which  had  caused  the  United  States  to  annul 
parts  of  that  treaty.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  situation  was  such  as 
Secretary  Hay  set  forth.  By  the  treaty  of  Frankfurt,  of  1871,^'' 
Germany  was  placed  on  an  unrestricted  most-favored-nation 
basis  with  France  and  was  obliged  to  extend  to  France  gratui- 
tously any  commercial  favor  granted  to  any  other  nation.  This 
was  therefore  contradictory  to  the  new  construction  adopted,  by 
Germany  in  order  to  place  itself  on  a  reciprocal  basis  with  the 
United  States.    Whether  the  existence  and  purport  of  the  Frankfurt 

equality  in  respect  to  import  duties.  They,  however,  finally  acknowledged 
that  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  our  position  justified  them  in  so  doing,  and 
an  article  was  framed  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  the  special  advantages 
granted  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  consideration  of  equivalent 
advantages  should  not  in  any  case  be  invoked  in  favor  of  Germany." 

'^^  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  301. 

^^  Calwer,  "Meistbeguenstigung  der  Vereinigten  Staaten,"  p.  IS  (transla- 
tion by  author). 

"Now,  we  stand,  on  the  other  hand,  with  France,  on  an  actually  unrestricted 
most-favored-nation  basis.  We  nuist,  according  to  provisions  of  the  Frank- 
furt peace,  extend  to  France  at  once  (ohne  weiteres)  each  tariff  concession 
granted  to  England,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland,  Austria  and 
Russia.  In  connection  with  this  relationship  to  France,  Article  IX  of  the 
Prussian-American  Treaty  loses  all  meaning;  from  the  construction  of  the 
princii)le  of  reciprocity  there  follows  indirectly  the  just  claim  of  the  United 
States  to  the  unrestricted  most-favored-nation  treatment.  Since  all  favors 
are  granted  to  France  without  any  compensation,  so  all  compensations  cease 
to  be  due  from  the  United  States."  ("So  kommen  audi  fuer  die  Vereinigten 
Staaten  solche  Gegenleistungen  ueberhaupt  nicht  mehr  in  Betracht.") 


CO.MMKHCIAL    ACREEMENT   OF    1900  89 

treaty  were  realized  by  the  Tnited  States  or  not,  no  direct  protest 
against  it  was  made. 

The  understanding  as  to  their  treaty  relation  by  the  two  nations 
was  embodied  in  the  reciprocal  commercial  agreemenf^^  concluded 
Juh-  10.  1900.  By  this  agreement  the  United  States  reduced  the 
tariti'  rates  on  the  following  German  products:  argols,  crude  tartar, 
crude  wine  lees,  brandies,  spirits,  wines,  vermuth,  also  upon  oil 
and  water-color  paintings,  drawings  and  statuary.  The  German 
Government  in  return  reextended  to  the  products  of  the  United 
States  the  low  rates  conceded  by  the  treaties  of  1891  to  1894  to 
Belgium,  Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  Rumania,  Russia,  Switzerland 
and  Serbia.  It  also  removed  the  inspection  requirements  from 
dried  and  evaporated  fruits  imported  into  Germany  from  the 
United  States. 

The  United  States  did  not  gain  by  the  agreement  of  1900  any 
new  ])rivileges  in  relation  to  the  German  tariff.  Under  the  status 
of  the  "most-favored-nation"  and  also  through  the  Saratoga 
Agreement  she  had  had  extended  to  her  since  the  formation  of  the 
German  commercial  treaties  their  tariff  reductions.  Germany 
also  did  not  gain  actually  any  great  advantage  from  the  concessions 
offered  by  the  United  States  since  the  articles  enumerated  consti- 
tuted less  than  2  per  cent,  of  her  exports  and  were  much  more 
important  to  the  other  countries,  France,  Italy  and  Portugal, 
than  to  Germany.  (I'.  S.  Tariff'  Commission  Report,  "Recipro- 
city and  Commercial  Treaties,"  1919,  Pt  5,  p.  238.)  The  agree- 
ment, however,  formally  assured  to  the  I'nited  States  the  privileges 
she  already'  enjoyed  and  exi:ended  to  Germany  the  most  favorable 
terms  permitted  by  the  Dingley  Tariff'.  Actually  she  was,  therefore, 
a  "most-favored-nation"  even  though  the  United  States  denied 
that  the  relations  were  maintained  on  that  unqualified  principle, 
(Germany,  in  admitting  the  United  States  to  the  advantages  regu- 
lated by  the  treaties  then  in  operation  with  European  states,**  did 
not  agree  to  extend  to  her  any  further  advantages  which  might  be 
made  to  the  same  or  other  nations  in  future  treaties.     On  the 


8'  M.,  Vol.  I,  p.  558.  88  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  p.  64. 


90  _  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

whole  the  agreement  did  not  cover  the  most  important  factors  of 
commercial  controversy  between  the  two  countries. 

It  was  now  Germany's  turn  to  overthrow  the  commercial  diplo- 
matic proceedings  with  a  new  tariff.  This  did  not  happen  suddenly, 
however.  The  proposed  act  was  given  careful  and  elaborate 
consideration*'^  for  three  years  and  was  then  published  before  being 
presented  to  either  the  Bundesrath  or  the  Reichstag  for  discussion 
and  enactment.  The  period  was  one  of  "scant  harvests  and 
extreme  industrial  and  commercial  depression."  This  had  caused 
an  increase  in  the  imports  of  grain  and  foodstuffs  from  the  United 
States  and  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  hostility  of  the  Agrarian 
Party  toward  the  Union.'"'  The  trade  balance  in  favor  of  the 
United  States  was  creating  anxiety  throughout  Germany'-'^  and  in 
other  European  countries.  There  were  academic  discussions  on 
the  economic  situation.  Baron  von  Waltershausen,  Professor  of 
Political  Economy  at  the  Univeristy  of  Strasburg,  pointed  out  in 
an  elaborate  essay  that  "the  American  trade  balances  of  the  three 

8»  U.  S.  Commer.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  262. 

»°  V.  R.,  '98-'00,  Bd.  I,  .30  Sitz.,  11  Feb.,  1899,  S.  783  ff. 

Count  von  Kanitz,  leader  of  the  agrarians,  voiced  the  attitude  of  the  party 
before  the  Reichstag.  Having  set  forth  the  important  development  of  Ameri- 
can commerce  and  its  penetration  of  European  countries,  he  continued  as 
follows  (transl.  by  author): 

"Everything  points  to  the  fact  that  if  this  course  of  development  is  not 
interrupted  the  United  States  will  gain  in  a  short  time  a  serious  advantage 
(Uebergewicht)  over  the  old  culture-lands  (Kultur-laender)  of  Europe,  not 
only  in  industrial  and  commercial  relations  but  also  in  the  consideration  of 
their  status  as  a  political  power.  If  we  seek  the  causes  of  this  rapidly  advanc- 
ing alteration,  the  answer  is  not  difficult  to  find.  It  is  not  the  greater  inteUi- 
gence,  not  the  better  developed  spirit  of  enterprise  or  industrial  diligence  of 
the  American  population,  which  creates  this  headstart  for  them,  but  it  is  a 
deliberate  (zielbewusst),  I  might  almost  say,  reckless  tariff  policy,  which 
has  led  to  these  conditions.     .     .     ." 

Concering  the  Dingley  tariff  in  particular  he  continued: 

"That  is  no  longer  the  principle  of  the  protection  of  national  labor  for 
which  we  German  protectionists  strive — here  (in  the  Dingley  Tariff")  it  is 
not  a  question  of  keeping  domestic  production  in  a  condition  to  meet  the 
competition  for  foreign  countries,  but  this  policy  aims  at  the  displacement  of 
foreign  products  and  thereby  arc  necessarily  created  conditions  which  must 
sooner  or  later  prove  to  be  unbearable  to  the  nations  engaged  in  world  com- 
merce." 

"'  U.  S.  Com.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  261. 


GERMAN   TAHIFF   OF    1002  91 

fiscal  years.  1898,  1899  and  190(1  had  reached  the  ainazinji  total  of 
Sl,6-2,()()0,0()() — almost  the  war  indemnity  paid  l)y  France  to 
Germany  (1870)  and  had  reversed  the  position  of  the  Union  and 
made  it  the  creditor  instead  of  the  debtor  of  Europe."  Councils 
were  held  and  plans  formulated  for  defensive  measures^^  in  the 
creation  of  a  Middle  European  Tariff  Union.  This  did  not  mate- 
rialize, partly  owing  to  the  trade  rivalries  between  the  separate 
continental  powers,  but  the  opposition  to  the  United  States  was 
strong.^^  The  new  German  tariff,  therefore,  increased  protection 
both  to  the  manufacturing  and  agrarian  classes.  The  American 
Consul-General  at  Berlin  reported^"*  that  "it  roughly  doubles  the 
imj)ort  duties  on  cereals,  meats  and  other  food  products,  and, 
while  generally  favoring  raw  materials,  increases  the  duties  on 
practically  all  manufactured  merchandise  which  is  or  can  be  pro- 
duced in  Germany."  Important  to  the  country's  foreign  relations 
were  its  reciprocity  provisions.  In  the  opening  article  of  the  law^^ 
the  reservation  is  expressed  that  the  pro\'isions  of  the  tariff  shall 

9-  Fiske,  Mid.  Eur.  Tar.  Union,  p.  595  {et  al). 

«  V.  R.,  1S9S-1900,  Bd.  V,  157  Sitz.,  1  INlaerz,  1900,  p.  4384. 

Evidence  of  this  hostility  was  produced  in  the  Reichstag  In-  Kunert,  a 
Social  Democrat,  who  in  opposing  the  anti-American  policy  of  the  Agrarians, 
made  public  an  instruction  issued  by  a  Prussian  official,  Baron  von  Rhein- 
baben,  to  the  Councillors  (Landraethe)  and  Over-mayors  of  Duesseldorf  on 
July  24,  1899.  It  concerned  the  treatment  of  foreign  consuls  and  gave  instruc- 
tions that  all  properly  delegated  foreign  consuls  should  be  allowed  to  ask  all 
questions  within  the  bounds  of  their  official  duties  and  should  receive  direct 
repUes  so  long  as  they  should  not  be  questions  of  general  import  (allgemeiner 
Bedeutung).  But  in  the  case  of  American  consuls,  any  information  which 
might  injure  German  interests  was  to  be  withheld.  Under  the  information 
which  was  under  no  circumstances  to  "be  given  to  American  consuls  were 
classed  statistical  statements  concerning  infringements  of  the  food-law,  espe- 
cialh'  concerning  the  production  and  sale  of  unwholesome  food  and  other 
products  (including  toys)  dangerous  to  health,  or  concerning  the  discoveries 
of  trichina  in  domestic  meat,  and  concerning  human  and  animal  diseases. 

As  brought  out  by  the  Reichstag  member  him.self,  this  instruction  was 
not  only  unfair  and  hostile  to  the  United  States  but  was  a  confession  f)f  guilt 
on  the  part  of  Prussian  officials.  How  extensive  was  the  scope  of  the  order 
was  not  stated,  but  the  discussion  was  closed  after  Kunert's  speech  and  the 
validity-  of  the  instruction  was  left  undenied. 

9*  U.  S.  Com.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  202.  «  R.  Gbl.,  1902,  p.  303. 


92  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

hold  "in  so  far  as  the  miports  from  particular  countries  are  not 
regulated  by  other  stipulations."  Definite  provision  is  then  made 
for  retaliatory  tariff  measures.     Section  10  states  :^^ 

"Dutiable  products,  which  come  from  countries  in  which 
German  ships  or  German  products  are  treated  less  favorably  than 
those  of  other  countries,  may  be  subjected  in  addition  to  the  tariff 
duty,  to  a  surtax  up  to  double  the  amount  of  this  law,  or  to  the  full 
value  (of  the  products) .  Duty-free  products  may,  under  the  same 
supposition,  be  subjected  to  a  duty  amounting  to  half  of  their 
value. 

The  measures  here  provided  for  shall  be  put  into  operation  by 
Imperial  order  after  securing  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrath.  The 
orders  in  question  are  to  be  imparted  to  the  Reichstag  at  once,  or, 
if  it  is  not  in  session,  at  its  next  convening.  They  are  to  become 
inoperative  if  the  Reichstag  does  not  give  its  consent." 

The  tariff'  law  was  enacted  December  25,  1902."  Its  general 
application  to  most  nations  could  not  be  made  until  190-i,  because 
the  commercial  treaties  concluded  from  1S92  to  1S94  under  the 
Caprivi  Chancellorship  did  not  expire  until  the  close  of  1903.^^ 
This  left  a  period  of  two  years  in  which  other  nations  could  nego- 
tiate either  for  separate  commercial  treaties,  or  for  admission  to 
the  privileges  of  any  treaties  Germany  might  conclude. 

Germany  did  conclude  in  1904  several  important  treaties  of 
commerce^^  with  continental  countries,  namely,  Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium,  Italy,  Rumania,  Russia,  Serbia,  and  Switzerland,  by 
means  of  which  the  products  of  those  countries  secured  important 
tariff  reductions  upon  importation  into  Germany.  It  then  became 
very  important  to  the  United  States  to  know  what  the  effect  of 
these  treaties  would  be  upon  the  standing  of  the  United  States 
under  the  Prussian  treaty  of  1S28.  By  the  "most-favored-nation" 
, clause  of  this  treaty ^°o  American  wheat,  corn  and  other  dutiable 
merchandise  had  for  three-cjuarters  of  a  century  been  admitted 
to  Germany  at  the  lowest  rates  of  duty  which  had  been  granted  to 

»8  R.  Gbl.,  1902,  p.  .308  (transl.  by  author). 

»■  R.  Gbl.,  1902,  p.  303.  »» U.  S.  Com.  Rel.,  1901,  p.  2C2. 

»» F.  R.,  '05,  p.  456.  ")» F.  R.,  '05,  p.  457. 


NEGOTIATIONS   FOLLOWING   GERMAN  TARIFF   OF   1902  93 

Russia,  Austria,  or  any  other  nation.  The  eomniereial  reciprocity 
arraufjement  of  1900  was  also  involved  in  the  concluding  of  these 
new  European  treaties.  This  latter  agreement  was  therefore 
formally  terminated  by  Germany^"!  the  following  year  (1905). 
The  notification  of  its  termination  was  accompanied,  however, 
with  the  proposal  that  negotiations  be  undertaken  for  the  con- 
clusion of  a  new  treaty. 

In  reporting  to  the  Reichstag  the  course  of  the  negotiations  for 
the  new  agreement,^°2  the  German  Chancellor,  Prince  von  Buelow, 
explained  that  the  Imperial  Government  was  well  aware  of  the 
fact  that  the  privileges  secured  from  the  United  States  by  the 
agreement  of  1900  in  no  way  compensated  Germany  for  the  favors 
conceded  to  the  United  States  but  that  it  was  not  considered 
advisable  at  that  time  to  demand  further  concessions  from  the 
United  States,  because  of  the  provisory  character  of  the  agreement, 
as  a  method  of  tiding  over  the  commercial  relations  between 
the  two  countries  until  the  new  German  tariff  should  become 
operative  at  the  close  of  1903.  He  referred  also  to  the  new  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  Cuba,  concluded  in  1902,  which 
gave  preferential  treatment  to  Cuban  sugar,  and  declared  it 
incompatible  with  the  provisions  of  the  United  States-Prussian 
treaty  of  1828.io3 

101  F.  R.,  '06,  p.  640. 

•o-^  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Nr.  391,  p.  64. 

103  M.,  Vol.  I,  p.  355. 

Article  VIII  of  United  States-Cuban  Treaty  reads : 

"The  rates  of  duty  herein  granted  by  the  United  States  to  the  Republic  of 
Cuba  are  and  shall  continue  during  the  term  of  this  convention  preferential 
in  resjject  to  all  like  imports  from  other  countries,  and,  in  return  for  said 
preferential  rates  of  duty  granted  to  the  Repubhc  of  Cuba  by  the  United 
States,  it  is  agreed  that  the  concession  herein  granted  on  the  part  of  the  said 
Repubhc  of  Cuba  to  the  products  of  the  United  States  shall  likewise  be,  and 
shall  continue,  during  the  term  of  this  convention,  preferential  in  respect  to 
all  like  imports  from  other  coimtrics.  Provided,  That  while  this  convention 
is  in  force,  no  sugar  imported  from  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  and  being  the 
product  of  the  soil  or  industry  of  the  Repubhc  of  Cuba,  shall  be  admitted 
into  the  United  States  at  a  reduction  of  duty  greater  than  twenty  per  centum 
of  the  rates  of  duty  thereon  as  provided  by  the  tariff  act  of  the  United  States 
approved  July  24,  1897,  and  no  sugar,  the  product  of  any  other  foreign  country, 
shall  be  admitted  by  treaty  or  convention  into  the  United  States,  while  this 
convention  is  in  force,  at  a  lower  rate  of  duty  than  that  provided  by  the  tariff 
act  of  the  United  States  approved  July  24,  1897." 


94  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

As  will  be  seen  this  was  merely  a  reassertion  of  the  former 
standpoint  on  the  part  of  the  German  Government.  The  American- 
Cuban  treaty  was  thoroughly  reciprocal  in  nature,  the  preferential 
treatment  of  Cuban  sugar  being  granted  in  return  for  preferential 
treatment  by  Cuba  of  a  series  of  products  of  the  United  States. 
The  treaty  was  therefore  merely  another  example  of  the  oft- 
expressed  viewpoint  of  the  United  States  that  reciprocity  treaties 
were  in  no  May  conflicting  with  most-favored-nation  clauses,  and 
were  moreover  expressly  p^o^'ided  for  in  the  "equivalence  clauses" 
such  as  article  IX  of  the  Prussian  treaty. 

Ha\ing  definitely  agreed,^°^  however,  to  a  reciprocity  basis  for 
the  commercial  relations  of  the  two  countries,  the  German  Govern- 
ment realized^''^  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  enter  into  new  nego- 
tiations— and  probably  further  bargaining — in  order  to  secure  for 
German  sugar  the  favorable  terms  granted  to  the  Cuban  sugar- 
growers.  This  did  not  seem  advisable  at  the  time  so  the  matter 
was  left. until  after  the  formal  abrogation  in  1905  of  the  1900 
agreement. 

What  was  urgently  needed  was  clear  to  representatives  of  both 
countries,  namely,  a  comprehensive  commercial  treaty.  The 
American  Consul-General  at  Berlin  had  written  in  1900,  at  the 
close  of  his  report, ^°^ 

"The  time  is  ripe  for  a  calm,  deliberate,  and  scientific  revision 
of  the  present  obsolete  and  imperfect  treaties  between  the  Republic 
and  the  Emi)ire — a  broad,  intelligent  adaptation  of  their  relations 
in  all  that  pertains  to  reciprocal  trade,  naturalized  citizenship,  and 
other  vexed  and  irritating  questions,  to  the  new  and  vastly  enlarged 
positions  which  both  countries  have  won  since  the  present  treaties 
were  framed." 

During  the  summer  of  1905  the  German  Ambassador  in  Wash- 
ington took  up  the  matter  informally  with  President  Roosevelt. 
According  to  the  account  given  by  Chancellor  ^'on  Buelow,^*'' 
the  President  had  declared  himself  "in  principle  agreed  to  the 

iM  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  p.  63.  "^  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Nr.  391,  p.  64. 

i»«  U.  S.  Com.  Rel.,  1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  268. 

10"  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Nr.  391,  p.  65  (transl.  l)y  author). 


EFFORTS  TO   CONCLUDE   COMMERCIAL   THEATV  95 

German  proposition,  and  that  ho  had  in  mind  the  sending  of  a 
commission  of  experts  to  Berhn  for  the  introduction  of  the  nego- 
tiations. Later,  however,  the  President  reached  the  decision  that 
the  conclusion  of  a  tariff  treaty,  with  the  sentiment  then  prevailing 
in  the  Senate,  was  not  obtainable  and  he  then  gave  up  the  dis- 
patching of  a  tariff  commission." 

The  German  Government  nevertheless  decided  to  put  the  ques- 
tion formally  before  the  American  Government/^*  and  therefore 
presented  in  Xoveml)er  of  1905  through  its  ambassador  in  Wash- 
ington a  note  containing  proposals  for  the  conclusion  of  a  compre- 
hensi\'e  commercial  treaty.  The  treaty  proposals  sought  to  gain 
some  modification  of  the  rates  of  the  Dingley  tariff,  and  also  altera- 
tions in  the  customs  collection  procedure,  in  return  for  which 
certain  of  the  jirivileges  provided  for  in  the  new  German  treaties 
should  be  extended  to  the  United  States.  The  American  Govern- 
ment made  no  formal  reply  to  the  German  note  but  President 
Roosevelt  and  Secretary  Root  stated  to  the  German  ambassador 
that  a  reduction  in  the  tariff  would  not  be  possible  at  the  time. 
They  proposed,  however,  that  Germany,  in  return  for  concessions 
in  the  matter  of  customs  procedure,  should  extend  to  the  United 
States  in  advance  the  new  German  treaty  tariff,  so  that  through 
such  a  temporary  regulation  of  commercial  relations  both  govern- 
ments would  be  given  the  opportunity  for  proceeding  with  nego- 
tiations for  the  commercial  treaty.  To  this  the  German  Govern- 
ment agreed.  Accordingly,  on  INIarch  1,  1900,  Germany  independ- 
ently extended  to  the  United  States^"^  (until  further  notice,  but 
not  for  longer  than  until  the  30th  of  June,  1907)  those  tariff  con- 
cessions embodied  in  the  treaties  of  1904  and  1905  concluded  with 
the  seven  states  mentioned  in  the  1900  agreement.  The  United 
States  also  independently  extended  to  Germany  once  more  the 
tariff  reductions  on  argols,  wines,  brandies,  art  works,  etc.,  pro- 
vided for  in  section  3  of  the  Dingley  tariff.  It  also  put  in  opera- 
tion certain  changes  in  the  customs  procedure  which  tended  to 

^"8  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Xr.  .391,  p.  65  (these  proposals  are  not  jjublished  in 
the  United  States  Foreign  Relations  Series), 
los  R.  Gbl.,  1906,  p.  355. 
7 


96  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

relax  the  regulations  objected  to  by  Germany.  More  radical 
alterations  in  the  customs  administration  requiring  congressional 
action  were  recommended  to  Congress  but  did  not  secure  enactment. 
Negotiations  were  continued  and  resulted  in  the  sending  of  a 
tariff  commission  to  Germany  in  November,  1906."°  The  Amer- 
ican commissioners  were  not  given  treaty-making  powers  by  their 
home  government;  therefore  the  conferences  which  took  place 
could  be  only  discussions  not  binding  to  either  country — of  the 
basis  and  details  of  such  a  commercial  treaty  as  might  be  possible 
for  the  two  countries  to  conclude.  It  was  found  that  a  compre- 
hensive commercial  treaty  was  not  possible  at  that  time.  Only 
such  American  concessions  could  be  obtained  as  could  be  granted 
by  the  President  without  action  by  Congress. "^     Therefore  the 

"0  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Nr.  391,  p.  66. 

I'l  House  Journal,  59th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  1903-1907. 

An  indication  that  certain  members  of  Congress  feared  that  the  Executive 
would  overstep  its  authority  in  these  negotiations  with  Germany  is  contained 
in  a  resolution  introduced  into  the  House  by  Mr.  Randall,  of  Texas,  March 
2,  1907  (H.  Res.  829). 

"Whereas  it  is  currently  reported  that  negotiations  have  been  entered  into 
by  the  executive  department  of  the  United  States,  and  under  its  direction, 
with  the  Government  of  the  German  Empire  affecting  commerce  between 
Germany  and  the  United  States  and  the  tariffs  and  regulations  on  and  con- 
cerning the  same,  thereby  changing  the  condition  of  trade  between  the  coun- 
tries and  affecting  the  revenues  of  this  Government  received  from  the  import 
duties  without  the  action  of  Congress:     Therefore  be  it 

Resolved,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  hereby  requested,  if 
not  incompatible  with  the  public  interest,  to^direct  the  Secretary 
of  State  to  report  to  him  for  the  inforn;ation  of  the  House 
First:     What  agreement  or  agreements,  if  any,  have  been  entered  into 
between  the  authorities  of  the  Unitecl  States  and  the  German 
Government,  or  their  agents  or  rej:)  resent  a  tives,  affecting  the 
tariff  of  the  two  countries  in  reference  to  imports,  or  the 
tariff  on,  or  regulations  thereof,  which  directly  or  indirectly 
affect  the  revenues  or  import  duties  of  this  Government. 
Second:  What  propositions,  if  any,  have  l)een  made  by  either  party 
or  its  agents  looking  to  any  change  in  the  tariff  charges  or 
trade  regulations  lietween  Germany  and  the  United  States 
affecting  either  directly  or  indirectly  the  revenues  of  this 
Government  or  its  trade  relations  with  Germany. 
Third:     That  all  pai)ers  and  documents,  correspondence,  or  regulations 
on  the  matter  herein  inquired  about,  in  the  possession  of 
the  State  Dejjartmcnt  be  furnished  for  the  information  of 
the  House." 

Mr.  Watson  made  the  point  of  order  that  the  resolution  was  not  privileged. 
The  Speaker  sustained  the  point  of  order.  The  resolution  was  referred  to  the 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  reported  adversely  and  tabled. 


COMMERCIAL  AGREEMENT   OF   1907  97 

representatives  decided  that  an  ai::reement  might  be  formed  on  the 
basis  of  tlie  provisional  measnres  enacted  by  both  conntries  in 
Jnne  of  tliat  year.  The  conference,  tlierefore,  resnlted  in  an  exten- 
sion of  that  agreement.  The  German  decree,  when  finally  passed 
h>-  the  Reichstag  and  Bundesrath/^^  admitted  the  United  States' 
jjroducts  to  the  greater  part  of  the  reduced  rates  granted  to  the 
continental  conntries,  without  any  statement  as  to  date  of  ter- 
mination of  this  agreement,  which  was  to  be  valid  "until  further 
change."  The  United  States  responded  immediately  by  a  procla- 
mation issued  by  President  Roosevelt,  which  extended  to  Germany, 
"tluring  the  continuance  in  force  of  the  said  concessions  by  the 
(jovernment  of  Germany"  the  reduced  rates  on  the  German 
products,  as  provided  by  the  Dingley  Tariff,  and  also  certain 
favorable  changes  in  customs  administration,  such  as  could  be 
made  without  action  by  Congress.  A  formal  agreement, ^^'^  cover- 
ing these  reciprocal  concessions  was  signed  at  Washington,  April 
22,  1907,"^  and  at  Levico,  May  2,  1907.  It  was  expressly  stated 
in  the  introduction  that  the  agreement  was  a  temporary  one  for 
the  purpose  of  adjusting  the  commercial  relations  between  the 
two  countries  until  a  comprehensive  commercial  treaty  could  be 
agreed  upon.  The  agreement  was  accompanied  by  a  promise  on 
the  part  of  the  President"'^  that  he  would  recommend  to  Congress 
the  enactment  of  an  amendment  to  the  customs  administra- 
tion act  which  should  alter  certain  of  the  customs  collection 
regulations'"^  complained  of  by  Germany.  The  recommendation 
was  made  but  did  not  secure  passage. 

The  1907  agreement  expressed  the  relations  between  the  two 
conntries  more  definitely  as  those  of  pure  reciprocity  than  any  of 
the  former  agreements.  The  United  States  presented  a  list  of 
articles  on  which  it  was  w^illing  to  reduce  its  tariff'  rate  in  Germany's 
favor — it  also  made  less  exacting  certain  of  the  regulations  in  the 
procedure  of  customs  collection.    Germany  in  return  extended  to 

"2  F.  R.,  '06,  p.  645  ff.  "'  F.  R.,  '07,  p.  477. 

i»M.,  Vol.  I,  p.  564. 

See  also  Sen.  Doc,  1907-1908,  Vol.  VII,  No.  185,  60th  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 

"» V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Nr.  403,  p.  2309.  "«  M.,  Vol.  I.,  p.  575. 


98  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

the  United  States  most  of  the  tariff  concessions  provided  for  in 
her  tariff"  treaties  with  Eiiro|>ean  countries.  Dr.  Delbriieck. 
Prussian  Minister  of  State,  and  Secretary  of  the  Interior,""  stated 
that  Germany  had  withheld  from  the  United  States  the  tariff' 
concessions  on  goods  forming  only  3^  per  cent,  of  the  total 
imports,"^  whereas  the  concessions  made  by  the  United  States 
were  of  little  value  to  Germany,  except  in  the  case  of  the  modifi- 
cations of  the  customs  regulation,  which  were  not  to  be  under- 
estimated. 

The  reciprocity  agreement  of  1907  was  not  long  in  operation. 
Within  two  years  came  the  enactment  of  the  Payne  tariff"  (August 
5,  1909),  changing  once  more  the  basis  of  the  commercial  relations 
of  the  United  States  with  other  countries.  The  law  of  1909 
established  a  maximum  and  minimum  tariff".  The  schedule  as  pub- 
lished constituted  the  minimum  tariff — ^that  same  schedule  plus  a 
duty  of  25  per  cent,  ad  valorem  constituted  the  maximum  tariff. 
The  maximum  tariff  was  to  go  into  effect  for  all  countries  (except 
Cuba)  on  INIarch  31,  1910,  unless  other  countries  should  prove 
themselves  entitled  to  the  minimum  rates  by  evidence  of  no  dis- 
crimination against  the  products  of  the  United  States.  The 
minimum  tariff  was  to  be  granted — "^ 

"  Whenever  .  .  .  the  President  shall  be  satisfied  .  .  . 
that  the  government  of  any  foreign  country  imposes  no  terms  or 
restrictions,  either  in  the  way  of  tariff'  rates,  or  provisions,  trade 
or  other  regulations,  charges,  exactions,  or  in  any  other  manner, 
directly  or  indirectly,  upon  the  importation  into  or  the  sale  in 
such  .  .  .  foreign  country  of  any  .  .  .  product  of  the 
United  States,  which  unduly  discriminates  against  the  United 
States  or  the  products  thereof,  and  that  such  foreign  country  pays 
no  export  })ounty  or  imposes  no  export  duty  or  prohibition  upon 
the  exportation  of  any  article  to  the  United  States  which  unduly 
discriminates  against  the  I'nited  States  or  the  products  thereof, 
and  that  such  foreign  country  accords  to  the  .  .  .  products 
of  the  I'nited  States  treatment  which  is  reciprocal  and  equivalent." 

117  V.  R.,  Vol.  259,  31  Sitz.,  5.  Feb.,  1910,  p.  1081. 

118  V.  R.,  Vol.  273,  Anl.,  '09-' 11,  Nr.  213. 

113  U.  S.  Stat.,  61st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1909,  p.  82 


THE    PAVXE-ALDRICII    TARIFF  99 

111  addition  to  the  inaxinuini  tariff,  especial  provision  was  made 
to  offset  export  bounties  paid  by  producing  countries,  Section  (i 
jirovides:'-'' 

"That  whenever  any  country  .  .  .  shall  pay  or  bestow, 
directly  or  indirectly  any  bounty  or  grant  upon  the  exportation 
of  any  article  .  .  .  and  such  article  ...  is  dutiable 
under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  then,  upon  the  importation  of 
any  such  article  .  .  .  into  the  United  States  .  .  .  there 
shall  be  levied  and  paid  ...  in  addition  to  the  duties  other- 
wise imposed  by  this  act,  an  additional  duty  equal  to  the  net 
amount  of  such  bounty  or  grant." 

The  reciprocity  arrangements  provided  for  in  the  Dingley 
tariff  were  thus  repealed^-^  and  the  President  was  given  authority 
to  terminate  all  agreements  made  under  them.  It  became  the 
immediate  duty  of  the  foreign  ambassadors  in  Washington  to  bid 
for  the  admission  of  their  countries  to  the  minimum  tariff.  During 
November  of  1909  Ambassador  von  Bernstorft'  conducted  nego- 
tiations^-- with  Secretary  Knox  concerning  the  new"  regulation  of 
the  commercial  relations  between  the  two  countries.  The  law 
left  open  only  the  one  alternative;  therefore  Germany's  objective, 
so  far  as  the  law  itself  was  concerned,  could  be  only  that  of  the 
admission  of  German  products  to  the  rates  of  the  minimum  tariff'. 
Germany  also  sought,  however,  to  have  continued  in  force  those 
alterations  in  the  customs  regulations  secured  by  the  past  agree- 
ment, with  the  exception  of  the  first  of  the  provisions  concerning 
the  place  of  valuation  of  certain  articles  which  was  definitely 
established  by  the  new  law  to  be  based  on  the  market  value  in 
America.  Germany  also  sought  to  have  established  separate 
provisions  (Einzelbestimmungen)  concerning  the  labelling  of 
goods. ^-^  This  was  refused  in  theory  though  an  approach  to  it  in 
practice  was  declared  probable. 

'20  U.  S.  Stat.,  61st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1909,  p.  82. 

•2>  F.  R.,  1909,  p.  270  ff. 

'--V.  R.,  1911,  Vol.  273,  Anl.  Xr.  213,  p.  1557  ff. 

'23  V.  R.,  1911,  Vol.  273,  Anl.  Xr.  213,  p.  6  (of  Denkschrift). 


100  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

The  American  demands  as  finally  formulated  were^^* 

"1.  The  granting  of  all  the  German  treaty  tariff  reductions,  or 
equivalent  compensations  through  the  granting  of  tariff  reductions 
over  and  beyond  the  treaty  tariff  clauses  up  to  date. 

2.  The  admission  of  American  pork  according  to  the  proceedings 
of  the  official  trichina  inspection  in  Germany,  but  without  the 
accompaniment  of  the  certificate  (still  required)  demonstrating 
the  completion  of  microscopic  trichina  inspection  in  the  United 
States. 

3.  The  admission  of  American  cattle  for  immediate  slaughter." 

Concerning  the  last  two  demands,  Germany  declared  that  they 
were  sanitary  measures  determined  by  the  health  conditions  in 
the  separate  countries.  Similar  regulations  existed  in  all  countries, 
not  the  least  of  these  being  the  United  States,  by  whose  import 
prohibitions  Germany  especially  was  affected.  Among  other 
things  the  importation  of  live  cattle  from  Germany  was  forbidden 
whereas  that  from  other  countries  was  admitted.  The  Imperial 
Government  could  not  (therefore)  treat  concerning  (auf — eingehen) 
the  two  above  mentioned  demands  within  the  scope  of  tariff'  nego- 
tiations. But  in  order  to  give  proof  of  her  friendly  intentions 
(Gesinnungen)  toward  America,  the  Imperial  Government  was 
ready  in  case  the  Union  should  bring  up  the  dispensing  of  the 
trichina  test  for  separate  discussion,  to  work  toward  the  disposal 
of  this  subject  according  to  the  sense  of  the  American  wishes. ^^^ 
Concerning  the  importation  of  American  cattle,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Imperial  Government  could  neither  give  any  prospect  of  con- 
cessions, nor  enter  into  any  negotiations. 

Dr.  Delbrueck  reported  to  the  Reichstag  the  result  of  the 
negotiations,  as  follows  i^-" 

"The  American  Government  declared  that  in  case  that  the 
German  treaty  tariff"  should  be  extended  unrestrictedly  to  the 
United  States,  that  the  cattle  question  was  to  be  wholly  eliminated 
from  the  negotiations ;  that  the  benefits  of  the  American  minimum 


i2<  V.  R.,  1911,  Vol.  273,  Anl.  Nr.  213,  p.  6  (of  Denkschrift)  transl.  by  author. 

125  V.  R.,  Vol.  273,  Anl.  Nr.  213,  p.  1557  ff. 

126  V.  R.,  Vol.  273,  Anl.  Nr.  226,  p.  1560  (transl  by  author.). 


NEGOTIATIONS    FOLLOWING   TIIK    PAYNE   TAHIFF  101 

tarirt'  woiv  to  be  extended  to  Germany  after  tlie  thirty-first  of 
March,  and  that  tlie  enstonis  re,ii;uhition  provisions  of  the  11)07 
connnercial  agreement  (with  the  exception  of  the  first,  providin*^ 
for  the  valuation  of  goods  at  their  export  price)  were  to  remain  in 
force;  that  this  extension  of  the  minimum  tariff  to  Germany 
assured  the  hitter  the  treatment  accorded  to  the  "most-favored- 
nation;"  that  the  customs  administration  provisions  of  the  Tnited 
States  wouUl  be  appHed  to  German  goods  in  a  friendly  and  con- 
ciliatory spirit." 

In  framing  the  Payne-Aldrich  tariff  on  which  the  above  agree- 
ment was  based,  the  effect  of  the  anti-trust  agitation  and  the  anti- 
protection  movement  was  clearly  felt.^-^  The  principle  by  which 
those  preparing  the  schedule  were  guided  was  that  of  adjusting 
the  duties  merely  to  equal  the  differences  between  the  cost  of 
production  at  home  and  abroad,  and  give  a  reasonable  profit  to 
American  industries.  Sincere  efforts  were  made  on  the  part  of 
the  Committee  of  Ways  and  IVIeans  to  obtain  reliable  information 
as  to  these  productions  costs.  Detailed  instructions  were  sent 
out^-^  to  the  principal  American  consular  officers  throughout  the 
world  to  return  full  reports  concerning  industries,  labor  conditions, 
cost  of  production,  prices,  exports  to  the  United  States  and  foreign 
tariffs.  Since  the  petitioners  for  higher  duties  were  at  this  time 
holding  up  the  Germans  rather  than  the  Enghsh  as  rivals,^-^  the 
reports  concerning  conditions  in  Germany  became  especially 
important.  As  the  American  Consul-General  at  Berlin  reported 
that  the  information  sought  by  the  ^Yays  and  Means  Committee 
could  best  be  obtained  through  diplomatic  channels,  the  matter 
was  presented  directly  to  the  German  Government  through  the 
American  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  The  German  Government 
responded  favorably,  and  through  the  German  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce it  obtained  voluminous  information  \\hich  it  sent  to  the 
United  States^*"  with  the  understanding  that  the  names  of  the 
indiA-idual  establishments  furnishing  the  data,  would  not  be  dis- 


»"  Taussig,  Tariff  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  370. 

'28  Sen.  Doc.  99,  61st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.     (German  Manufactures.) 

»"  Taussig,  Tariff  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  370. 

"0  Sen.  Doc.  99,  61st  Cong.,  1st  Scss.,  p.  2. 


102  COMMERCIAL    RELATIONS 

closed,  and  that  the  information  would  not  be  used  for  adminis- 
trative purposes  but  purely  as  a  basis  for  the  proposed  legislation.^^^ 

Feehng  that  fresh  and  rehable  information  as  to  production 
costs  in  Germany  would  defeat  the  efforts  of  those  seeking  to  raise 
the  tariff  schedule  in  America,  the  Geiman  Government  put  forth 
special  effort  in  the  matter,  furnished  additional  copies  of  the 
documents  so  that  the  needs  of  both  the  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  and  of  the  Committee  of  Finance  of  the  Senate  were  sup- 
plied. Due  appreciation  of  the  courtesy  was  expressed  by  the 
State  Department  but  after  the  information  was  handed  over  to 
the  Finance  Committee  of  the  Senate  nothing  further  was  heard 
of  it^^- — it  was  neither  printed  nor  published  until  August  after 
the  adjournment  of  Congress. 

The  final  regulating  of  the  relations  consequent  to  the  Payne 
tariff  was  formulated  in  a  German  law  as  follows  :^'^^ 

1"  Sen.  Doc.  99,  61st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  2. 

In  forwarding  the  information,  Baron  von  Schoen,  Imperial  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  protested  against  what  he  alleged  were  the  mis- 
statements made  in  the  hearings  before  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means 
relative  to  the  costs  of  production  in  Germany.     He  declared  that 

"In  the  comparative  tables  on  wages  in  the  United  States  of  America  and 
Germany  data  concerning  the  German  conditions  have  in  many  cases  been 
utilized  which  cover  conditions  of  many  years  ago,  and  no  longer  have  any 
significance  for  the  present  day.  In  calculating  American  wages  the  highest 
rates  have  been  taken  as  a  basis  while  in  computing  German  wages  the  lowest 
rates  have  been  taken;  the  increase  in  cost  of  German  production  by  social 
burdens  has  been  left  out  of  consideration;  the  comparison  of  absolute  earn- 
ings gives  an  inaccurate  impression,  because  the  work  accomphshed  by 
American  laborers  is  perceptibly  greater  than  that  of  the  German  laborers, 
partly  in  itself  and  partly  through  the  more  comprehensive  employment  of 
machine  work.  If  wages  for  piecework  and  for  the  manufacture  of  the  sepa- 
rate articles  are  calculated  the  difference  between  the  German  and  American 
wages  is  perceptibly  less  than  would  appear  from  the  statements  concerning 
wages  on  time.  ...  A  number  of  firms  which  complained  of  insufficient 
tariff  protection  l)efore  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  underbid  German 
manufacturers  in  the  interior  market  of  Germany,  as  well  as  in  the  American 
market.  ...  In  many  cases  inaccurate  statements  have  been  made 
concerning  the  extent  and  duration  of  female  and  child  labor,  in  contradiction 
to  regulations  now  in  force  in  Germany." 

'^-  Taussig,  Tariff  His.  of  U.  S.,  p.  371. 

Professor  Taussig  considered  that  the  information  was  too  damaging  to 
the  arguments  of  the  high  protection  advocates  for  them  to  seek  to  place  it 
at  the  disposal  of  their  opponents. 

"'V.  R.,  Vol.  273,  Anl.  Nr.  213,  p.  1557  (3  Feb.,  1910). 


COMMERCIAL   AGREEMENT   OF    1910  103 

"  The  Biindesrath  is  enipcnvercd,  upon  the  importation  of  prochicts 
of  the  United  States  of  America  into  the  (German  customs  territory, 
to  grant  in  suitable  measure,  the  appHcation  of  the  tariti'  pro- 
visions ccmceded  by  the  commercial  treaties  now  in  force  (geltend). 

This  ])rovisi()n  shall  remain  in  force  as  long  as  the  products  of 
the  (lerman  Em})ire  and  of  the  countries  or  divisions  belonging 
to  the  same  customs  territory  shall  not  be  subjected  to  higher 
tarifi'  duties  than  are  provided  for  in  article  1  of  the  American 
Tariti'  Law  of  August  5th,  1909  {i.  e.,  the  minimum  tarifl"). 

If  on  the  part  of  the  I'nited  States  of  America,  the  principles 
of  the  customs  procedure  (as  provided  for  under  B  to  F  of  the 
note  to  the  Commercial  Agreement  of  1907)  should  not  be  main- 
tained, or  should  the  United  States  of  America  through  laws, 
treaties  with  third  countries,  or  in  any  other  way  connected  with 
the  exchange  of  goods  between  the  German  Empire  anfl  the 
United  States  permit  changes  to  aft'ect  the  present  situation  to  the 
detriment  of  Germany,  then  the  Bundesrath  shall,  according  to 
its  judgment,  withdraw  entire  or  in  part,  the  privileges  granted 
to  the  products  of  the  United  States." 

In  the  United  States  the  agreement  was  embodied  in  a  procla- 
mation'^-* declaring  the  rates  of  the  minimum  tariff  to  be  in  force 
for  German  products  so  long  as  the  German  Empire  imposed  no 
terms  or  restrictions  which  should  unduly  discriminate  against  the 
United  States. 

The  relations  between  the  two  countries  were  thus  adjusted  once 
more  on  a  definitely  provisional  basis.  Any  alteration  of  policy 
or  any  concession  to  a  third  nati(m  (m  the  part  of  either  Germany 
or  the  I'nited  States,  might  be  construed  by  the  other  country 
as  a  discrimination,  sufficient  to  overthrow  the  entire  agreement. 
Germany  carefully  preserved  for  herself  the  possibility,  through 
decision  of  the  Bundesrath,  of  withdrawing  her  concessions  should 
any  change  in  the  situation  be  made  which  she  considered  detri- 
mental to  her  interests.  The  United  States  armed  itself  with  the 
wea]3on  of  the  maximum  tariff"  to  be  used,  after  ninety  days'  notice, 
against  any  nation  considered  to  be  discriminating  unduly  against 
United  States'  products  or  industries.  The  power  to  use  this 
weai)on  was  placed  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  President.     Thus 

1"  Stat,  of  U.  S.,  1909-1910,  Pt.  II,  61st  Cong.,  2nd  Sess..  Proclamation,  p.  33. 


104  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

each  nation  was  equipped  for  a  tariff  war  sliould  it  decide  to  enter 
upon  such  a  contest.  Neither  the  United  States  nor  Germany 
sought  such  an  outcome  and  both  countries  gave  e^'idence  of 
sincere  desire  to  avoid  it.  President  Taft  emphasized  his  Uberal 
poHcy  in  regard  to  the  maximum  and  minimum  clause  in  the 
tariff  act  in  his  message  to  Congress  (December  7,  1909).^^^  Speak- 
ing of  the  general  possibilities  of  these  provisions,  he  declared: 

"Fear  has  been  expressed  that  this  power  conferred  and  duty 
imposed  on  the  Executive  is  likely  to  lead  to  a  tariff  war.  I  beg 
to  express  the  hope  and  belief  that  no  such  result  need  be  antici- 
pated. The  discretion  granted  to  the  Executive  by  the  terms 
'  unduly  discriminatory'  is  wide.  In  order  that  the  maximum  duty 
shall  be  charged  against  the  imports  from  a  country,  it  is  necessary 
that  he  shall  find  on  the  part  of  that  country  not  only  discrimi- 
nation in  its  laws,  or  the  practice  under  them,  against  the  trade  of 
the  United  States,  but  that  the  discriminations  found  shall  be 
undue;  that  is,  without  good  and  fair  reason.  I  conceive  that  this 
power  was  reposed  in  the  President  with  the  hope  that  the  maxi- 
mum duties  might  never  be  applied  in  any  case,  but  that  the 
power  to  apply  them  would  enable  the  President  and  the  State 
Department  through  friendly  negotiations  to  secure  the  elimin- 
ation from  the  laws  and  the  practice  under  them  of  any  foreign 
country  of  that  which  is  unduly  discriminatory.  Xo  one  is  seeking 
a  tariff  war  or  a  condition  in  which  the  spirit  of  retaliation  shall  be 
aroused." 

President  Taft  demonstrated  the  sincerity  of  his  words  by 
issuing  one  hundred  and  thirty-four  proclamations, ^^"^  extending 
the  rates  of  the  minimum  tariff  to  practically  the  whole  commercial 
world.  Germany  in  turn  interpreted  her  law  in  liberal  fashion,'^^ 
and  granted  to  the  United  States  the  benefit  of  her  complete  treaty 
tariff.  She  also,  after  securing  the  agreement  to  discuss  the  subject 
apart  from  the  tariff  negotiations, ^^^  acceded  to  the  American 
demand  in  the  matter  of  the  requirements  for  the  trichina  inspec- 
tion of  American  pork.  In  concluding  his  account  of  the  negotia- 
tions with  the  United  States,  Dr.  Delbrueck,  Prussian  Minister 

"» F.  R.,  1909,  p.  xxvi.  "«  F.  R.,  1910,  p.  xvi. 

»"  V.  R.,  Vol.  259,  31  Sitz.,  5  Feb,  1910,  p.  1083. 
»='8  V.  R.,  Vol.  273,  Anl.,  1909-1911,  Nr.  213. 


RECIPROCAL   APPLICATION   OF   MINIMUM  TARIFFS  105 

of  State,  speaking  for   the   Imperial   Chancellor,  stated   to   the 
Reichstag, ^^'■' 

"  I  do  not  believe  that  we  shall  be  obliged  to  make  use  of  this 
jxnver  {i.  e.  of  withdrawing  the  treaty  tarifi"  privileges  from  the 
United  States);  for  1  am  inclined  to  the  firm  hope  that,  since  we 
after  stubborn,  lengthy,  and  difficult  negotiations,  have  come  to 
an  agreement,  that  the  United  States  of  American  will  carry  out  in 
tlie  s])irit  of  conciliation  and  liberal  approach  (Entgegenkommen) 
the  concessions  made  to  us,  as  accords  with  the  excellent  relations 
which  obtain  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
friendl\'   related    (dem   diesem    befreundeten)  German   Empire." 

The  Payne-Aldrich  Tariff'  left  no  room  for  bargaining  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  concessions  oflFered  by  one  nation  were  equivalent 
to  those  oflFered  by  the  other.  The  United  States  extended  to 
Germany  the  lowest  rates  of  duty  provided  for  in  its  legislation, 
(lermany  ex-tended  to  the  United  States  the  lowest  rates  provided 
for  in  its  commercial  treaties.  The  TariflF  Act  of  1909  left  a'^' 
"high  scheme  of  rates"  and  showed  an  "extremely  intolerant 
attitude  on  foreign  trade"  yet  as  a  whole,  it  was  "less  aggressively 
'protectionist'  than  previous  Republican  measures,"  and  it  was 
executed  by  the  administration  w^th  the  greatest  moderation 
])ermitted  under  its  provisions. 

The  following  year  the  United  States  entered  upon  the  nego- 
tiations for  reciprocity  with  Canada,  looking  to  sweeping  reduc- 
tions in  import  duties  on  the  part  of  both  countries  to  the  extent, 
almost,  of  the  development  of  a  tariff'  union  of  English-speaking 
North  America.  Germany  kept  close  watch  over  the  proceedings, 
l)reparing,  should  the  agreement  be  consummated,  to  make  a 
vigorous  protest  against  these  concessions  to  Canada''*'  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  an  infringement  of  the  principle  of  the 
"most-favored-nation"  which  regulated  the  relations  between 
the  German  Empire  and  the  United  States.  The  comprehensive 
character  of  the  reductions  proposed  is  shown  in  the  summary  of 


139  V.  R.,  Vol.  273,  AnI.,  1909-1911,  Nr.  213  (transl.  by  tiuthor). 

"0  Taussig,  Tariff  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  p.  407. 

'"  V.  R.,  Vol.  283,  19  Sitz.  4  Maerz,  1912,  p.  445  D. 


106  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

the  effect  of  the  schedules  as  submitted  to  Congress. ^^■-  Ninety 
per  cent,  of  the  total  imports  into  the  United  States  from  Canada 
were  to  be  affected  by  the  agreement,  14  per  cent,  to  have  import 
duties  reduced,  and  76  per  cent,  to  be  admitted  entirely  free.  On 
the  Canadian  side  the  proportion  of  reduction  was  not  so  great. 
Thirty-six  per  cent,  of  the  total  import  into  Canada  from  the 
United  States  was  to  be  affected,  19  per  cent,  to  have  duties 
reduced,  and  16  per  cent,  to  be  admitted  free.  That  the  terms  to 
Canada  were  to  be  most  liberal  was  emphasized  by  President  Taft 
in  his  message  to  CongKess,  January  26,  1911,  recommending  the 
ratification  of  the  agreement.^^^ 

"While  equivalency  should  be  sought  in  an  arrangement  of 
this  character,"  he  declared,  "an  exact  balance  of  financial  gain 
is  neither  imperative  nor  attainable.  No  yardstick  can  measure 
the  benefits  to  the  two  peoples  of  this  freer  commercial  inter- 
course and  no  agreement  should  be  judged  wholly  by  custom  house 
statistics." 

His  desire  to  create  a  very  special  relationship  with  Canada  is 
still  more  strongly  emphasized  latisr  in  the  same  speech,  in  which 
he  declares,^'" 

"Our  common  boundary  line  of  three  thousand  miles  in  itself 
must  make  a  radical  distinction  between  our  commercial  treat- 
ment of  Canada  and  of  any  other  country." 

Germany  therefore  considered  that  the  agreement  would  con- 
stitute a  diftlerentiation  against  her  products,  and  that  she  would 
be  entitled  under  the  status  of  "most-favored-nation"  to  claim 
her  share  in  the  concessions.  It  was  not  considered  expedient, 
however,  to  make  formal  protest  until  the  agreement  should  have 
been  consummated  by  action  of  Congress  and  the  Canadian  Par- 
liament. The  Canadian  reciprocity  measure  was  again  the  Cuban 
situation  reproduced  on  a  large  scale.    Had  it  passed  there  would 

1^5  House  Doc,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  90  and  91. 

'«  House  Doc,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  IX,  p.  11. 

1"  House  Doc,  62nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  90  and  91. 


CANADIAN'   RECIPROCITY  MEASURE  107 

have  heen  sweepinir  concessions  exchanged.  Under  the  United 
States'  long-practiced  construction  of  tlie  princij)le  definitely 
asserted  in  the  Prussian  treat\-  this  constituted  no  violation  of  its 
niost-favored-nation  relations  with  other  countries.  (lennany 
had,  at  the  time  of  the  agreement  of  1900,  definitely  accepted  this 
reciprocity  basis;  it  was  therefore  a  reversal  of  policy  for  her  to 
claim  a  share  in  the  privileges  which  the  United  States  was  prepar- 
ing to  extend  to  Canada,  unless  she  were  prepared  to  offer  to  the 
United  States  some  equivalence.  Since  the  measure  was  finally 
blocked  by  the  Canadian  Parliament,  no  action  was  taken  by 
Germany  at  that  time.  Later,  however,  finding  that  the  United 
States  had  put  into  operation  a  part  of  the  agreement  relating  to 
wood-pulp  and  paper,^"*^  she  made  protest.  The  negotiations  did 
not  lead  to  any  overturning  of  the  status  quo,  or  to  the  removal 
of  the  United  States  from  the  benefit  of  the  German  treaty  tariff, 
l)ut  the  result  was  seen  in  the  two  new  commercial  treaties  formed 
liy  Germany  at  this  time  with  Sweden  and  Japan,  granting  to 
these  countries  special  commercial  concessions.  The  new  con- 
cessions were  not  extended  on  the  "most-favored-nation"  principle 
to  the  United  States. 

The  commercial  relations  of  the  two  countries  at  the  close  of 
1910  were  therefore  admitted  by  both  to  be  on  the  strict  basis  of 
reciprocity.  In  spite  of  tariffs  the  quantity  of  trade  was  enormous. 
Next  to  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany  constituted  the  best 
customer  of  the  United  States, '""^  and,  next  to  the  United  Kingdom, 
the  United  States  constituted  the  best  customer  of  Gennany. 
The  formal  agreements  were  of  a  very  temporars"  character.  Dr. 
Delbrueck,  Secretary  of  State  for  Internal  Affairs,  summed  up 
the  relationship  before  the  Reichstag  as  follows  i^"*^ 

"  I  will  refer  here  to  the  commercial-political  relations  in  which 
we  stand  toward  the  United  States  of  America.  Between  the 
two  countries  there  exists  no  treaty.     The  commercial-political 

i«  V.  R.,  Vol.  283,  19  Sitz.,  4  Maerz,  1912,  p.  445  D. 

i«  U.  S.  Com.  Rel.,  1909,  p.  91. 

1*"  V.  R.,  Vol.  283,  19  Sitz.,  4  Maerz,  1912,  p.  445  D  (transl.). 


108  COMMERCIAL  RELATIONS 

relations  are  regulated  independently  (autonom)  by  each  side  on 
the  basis  of  diplomatic  agreements;  the  regulation  is  not  for  long 
periods,  but  can  be  altered  at  short  notice.  The  United  States 
of  America  have  on  their  part  given  us  that  which  they  at  the 
time  {i.  e.,  agreement  of  1910)  considered  to  be  their  "most- 
favored-nation"  privilege,  that  is,  their  so-called  minimum  tariff; 
and  we  on  our  part  gave  to  the  United  States  our  entire  treaty 
tariff',  which  at  that  time  meant  our  "most-favored-nation" 
privilege." 

The  need  for  a  comprehensive  commercial  treaty  had  been 

acknowledged  by  representatives  of  both  nations,^^^  and  attempts 

had  been  made  to  arrange  such  a  treaty;  but  without  success."* 

It  seems  to  have  been  the  opinion  that  the  treaty  involved  tariff* 

reductions,  and  this  the  prevailing  protection  sentiment  of  both 

countries  made  impossible.    The  tendency  in  each  case  was  a  firm 

maintenance  of  the  existing  protective  legislation,  coupled  with  a 

willingness  to  make  such  concessions  as  were  possible  outside  the 

boundary'  of  that  legislation.    The  presidents  of  the  United  States 

frequently  extended  to  Gennany  concessions  both  in  tariff  duties, 

and  in  customs  administration,  up  to  the  point  where  action  by 

Congress  was  required,  and  there  all  German  demands  were 
blocked. ^50 

On  the  other  hand  the  United  States  Congress  was  no  more 
determined  and  unyielding  in  its  protection  policy  than  was  the 

"8  U.  S.  Com.  Rel.,  1900,  Vol.  II,  p.  268.  Also,  Senate  Journal,  59th  Cong., 
2nd  Sess.,  1906-1907.     Petitions  and  Memorials,  December  13,  1906. 

"A  petition  of  the  New  York  Branch  of  the  National  League  of  Commission 
Merchants  praying  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  between  Germany  and  the 
United  States  looking  to  the  establishment  of  better  trade  relations,  etc.; 
referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations." 

1^9  V.  R.,  Vol.  242,  Anl.  Nr.  391,  p.  65  ff. 
i^»  V.  R.,  Vol.  260,  58  Sitz.,  15  Mai.,  1910  (transl.  by  author). 
Count  von  Kanitz  (Conservative)  gave  before  the  Reichstag  the  situation 
from  the  viewpoint  of  the  German  Conservatives. 

"First,"  he  stated,  "the  Americans  set  up  a  tariff  with  unduly  high  rates, 
sharpen  up  their  customs  administration  regulations,  and  then  say  afterward, 
'Now,  that  is  our  law,  that  we  can't  alter,  we  can't  dejiart  from  that.'  That 
is  an  extraordinarily  comfortatile  method  of  obtaining  a  favorable  exchange 
of  goods  with  other  countries,  antl  I  should  think  it  might  be  recommended 
that  we  make  use  of  this  procedure  ourselves." 


NEED   OF  CX-)MPREHENS1VE   COMMERCIAL  TREATY  101) 

German  Govornnu'nt  in  its  corresponding  measures.  The  (leman<ls 
of  the  Social  Democrats  for  lowering  of  the  tariff  rates  on  food- 
stufl's  were  met  with  flat  refusal.  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  announced  to  the  Reichstag,'^^ 

"These  attacks  against  our  economic  policy  the  (iovernment 
will  meet  with  determined  opposition  as  heretofore.  As  I  have 
repeatedly  declared  from  this  place,  the  stubborn  and  determined 
maintaining  of  our  econojnic  policy  is  matter  of  well-fonnded  con- 
viction on  the  part  of  the  Confederated  Governments." 

Yet  once  outside  the  bounds  of  the  German  law^  the  Imperial 
Government  like  that  of  the  Ignited  States,  showed  willingness  to 
make  concessions  through  diplomatic  channels.  Special  com- 
mercial tfeaties  had  been  concluded  with  the  neighboring  states  for 
mutual  economic  advantage,  yet  the  tariff  reductions  provided 
for  in  those  treaties  were  (except  in  the  agreement  of  1907  when  a 
part  of  the  reductions  was  withheld)  uniformly  extended  to  the 
United  States.  This  was  done  too,  in  the  face  of  considerable 
protest  from  German  Conservatives,^^-  who  were  wont  to  give 
vehement  expression  in  the  Reichstag  to  their  views  on  what  they 
termed  American  tariff  chicanery. 

The  prohibition  of  American  products  on  sanitary  ground  was 
a  constant  subject  of  diplomatic  negotiations.  In  this  the  German 
Government  was  espei'ially  unyielding,  and  while  the  American 
Government  always  acquiesced  in  Germany's  right  to  exclude  any 
products  which  were  found  to  be  injurious  to  the  health  of  the 
community,  it  often  protested  on  the  ground  that  the  fact  of 
luiwholesomeness  did  not  exist,  and  was  unjustly  so  determined 
by  the  German  authorities.  It  took  eight  years  to  secure  the 
removal  of  the  prohibition  against  the  importation  of  American 
pork,  and,  while  Germany  consistently  waited^^'^  until  the  United 
States  had  enacted  a  strict  meat  inspection  law  before  the  pro- 
hibition was  withdrawn,  she  then  destroyed  her  argument,  based 
on  sanitary  grounds,  by  making  the  removal  of  the  prohibition 


'"  V.  R.,  Vol.  268,  195  Sitz.,  October  2.5,  1911,  p.  7511  (transl.  by  author). 
'^2  V.  R.,  Vol.  260,  58  Sitz.,  15  Maerz,  1910,  p.  2132. 
»"F.  R.,  '91,  p.  511. 


/ 


110  COMMERCIAL   RELATIONS 

contingent  upon  certain  reciprocal  concessions  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Saratoga  Agreement.  Later,  in  1894,  a  pro- 
hibition was  enacted  against  the  importation  of  American  cattle 
on  the  ground  of  the  prevalence  of  Texas  fever,  and  this  restriction 
still  existed  in  1910.  In  answer  to  the  Social-Democrats'  clamor 
for  the  removal  of  such  restrictions,  the  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  reiterated  that  the  exclusion  of  the  cattle  and  the  rigid 
meat  inspection  law  complained  of  were  sanitary  measures  that 
could  not  possibly  be  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of  cheaper  meat.  He 
then  proceeded  to  undermine  the  argument  derived  from  health 
considerations  by  setting  forth  the  advantages  accruing  to  the 
cattle  industry  from  the  Imperial  Government's  policy.^^"* 

"Gentlemen,"  he  continued,  "you  are  always  compkining  of 
an  undue  protection  of  our  cattle  industry.  Please  consider  at 
the  same  time,  that  German  agriculture  under  this  protection  has 
succeeded  in  satisfying  from  within  the  country  95  per  cent,  of 
the  entire  meat  needs.  Moreover,  in  the  last  decade,  the  meat 
consumption  in  Germany  has  so  increased  that  we  scarcely  lag 
behind  that  of  England  .  .  .  This  comparison  does  not 
encourage  me  to  make  experiments  which  would  injure  our  cattle 
industry,  and  gradually  bring  us  to  a  great  dependency  on  foreign 
countries." 

Such  prohibitions  were  the  chief  ground  of  American  protests 
to  Germany  in  the  commereiAl  field.    Such  statements  as  the  Chan- 
cellor's, as  well  as  the  terms  of  the  Saratoga  Agreement  show  that 
v<     sanitary  reasons  were  at  least  not  the  only  grounds  for  restrictive 
measures.    The  chief  grounds  of  German  protests  to  the  United 
States  were  the  extra  duties  laid  on  sugar  to  offset  German  domestic 
bounties,  and  the  special  concessions  made  by  the  United  States 
to  Cuba  and  later  to  Canada,  both  of  which  Germany  incorrectly 
considered  contrary  to  the  Treaty  of  1828.     What  caused  most 
I     hostility  toward  the  I'nited  States,  however,  throughout  Germany 
*    was  not  a  grievance  that  could  be  handled  by  diplomacy.    It  was, 
\/'    namely,  the  growing  preponderance  of  the  American  trade  balance 
against  Germany,  the  penetration  of  certain  x\merican  industries 

1"  V.  R.,  Vol.  268,  195  Sitz.,  October  23,  1911,  p.  7514  (transl.  by  author). 


CHIEF   CArsp:s   OF   COMMERCIAL   CONTKOVERSY  111 

into  the  German  Empire,  and  the  agsr"«*"^''itin,u'  reaUzatii)n  of  the 
inereasinj;  economic  dependence  of  Germany  upon  certain  raw 
j)ro(kicts  of  the  United  States.  Dr.  Stresemann,  advocating  a 
Hlieral  policy  before  the  Reichstaj;,  pictures  the  helplessness  of  the 
situation. '^^ 

"  That  is  the  colossal  strength  of  the  United  States,  which  they 
l)ractice  .  .  .  against  us.  They  say  'Now  what  can  you 
really  do?  If  you  want  to  lay  duties  on  our  cotton,  then  do  it, 
then  you  only  make  dearer  the  raw  material  which  you  need; 
and  if  you  wish  to  lay  duties  on  our  copper  and  petroleum,  then 
do  it.  then  you  have  only  to  pay  more  for  the  articles  of  your 
household  and  of  the  electric  industry.'  In  these  facts  we  can  at 
present  alter  nothing,  they  lie  in  the  conditions  of  nature,  and  so 
alst)  in  economic  affairs  one  is  reminded  of  the  Goethe  saying: 

'America,  thou  hast  it  better 
Than  our  continent,  the  ancient.'  " 

Apart  from  this  natural  economic  situation  it  has  thus  been 
shown  that  the  chief  basis  of  controversy  over  the  regulation  of  the 
commercial  relations  between  the  two  countries  lay  in  their  con- 
trasting interpretations  of  the  "most-favored-nation"  principle. 
The  United  States  was  correct  in  its  stand  that  the  Prussian  treaty 
on  which  the  relations  were  based,  stipulated  clearly  in  Article  IX 
for  a  principle  of  reciprocity;  it  was  also  consistent  in  its  applica- 
tion of  that  principle.  Germany's  standpoint  that  the  two  nations 
stood  on  a  basis  of  unconditional  most-favored-nation  treatment 
therefore  ignored  the  existence  of  the  equivalence  clause.  It  is 
true  that  the  German  Government  for  the  most  part  during  this 
l)eriod  practiced  that  standpoint  in  favor  of  the  United  States  as 
well  as  using  it  as  a  basis  of  claims  for  its  own  benefit.  Neverthe- 
less, the  unconditional  principle  was  not  consonant  with  the  treaty, 
was  departed  from  at  times,  as  in  the  Saratoga  Agreement  by  Ger- 
many, and  was,  as  we  have  seen,  finally  abandoned  by  the  Imperial 
Government,  which  agreed  to  recognize  the  interpretation  of  the 
United  States. 

155  V.  R.,  Vol.  264,  125  Sitz.,  February  11,  1911,  p.  4579  D  (transl.  by  author). 

"Amerika,  du  hast  es  besser 
Als  unser  Kontincnt,  der  Ahe." 


CHAPTER   V 

SAMOA:  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GERMANY  IN 
THE  PACIFIC 

The  single  instance  in  the  course  of  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  German  Empire  in  which  citizens  of  one 
nation  came  into  conflict  with  the  citizens  of  the  other  on  a  common 
territory  is  that  of  the  Samoan  Islands.^  Here  no  Monroe  Doctrine 
operated  to  determine  the  policy  of  the  United  States.  But  the 
conflict  between  individual  commercial  interests,  and  between 
radically  opposite  government  policies,  together  with  the  presence 
of  an  excitable  and  irresponsible  native  population,  created  a 
situation  provoking  controversy  for  over  twenty  years.  It  is  also 
exceptional  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  as  an 
instance  in  which  the  country  departed  from  its  traditions  and 
united  with  other  nations  in  a  joint  administration  over  a  neutral 
territory  outside  the  western  hemisphere. 

The  Samoan  Islands  are  situated  in  the  southwest  Pacific- 
directly  on  the  route  taken  by  steamers  plying  between  the  United 
States'  Pacific  ports  and  the  British  Australasian  colonies.  The 
island  of  Tutuila  contains  in  Pago-Pago  one  of  the  most  perfectly 
land-locked  harbors  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  1600  miles  from  Auck- 
land, New  Zealand,  in  the  steamer  lanes  between  Australia  and 
San  Francisco  or  Vancouver  via  Hawaii.^  The  three  main  islands, 
Savaii,  Upolu  and  Tutuila,  comprise  together  an  area  of  a  little  over 

1  The  term  Navigators'  Islands  has  been  frequently  applied  to  this  group, 
but  the  native  name  Samoa  is  now  almost  universally  adopted. 

2  The  Islands  are  located  between  latitude  13°  30'  and  14°  30'  south,  and 
and  between  longitude  168°  and  173°  west.  (Report  of  A.  B.  Steinberger, 
Special  Commissioner  to  the  Samoan  Islands,  1S73,  House  Ex.  Doc,  No.  161, 
44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  No.  3.) 

'  Extract  of  Report  upon  the  Condition  of  the  Samoan  Islands,  by  John 
B.  Thurston,  Acting  High  Commissioner  of  the  Western  Pacific,  Inclosure 
in  No.  96.  Correspondence  respecting  the  affairs  of  Samoa,  1885-1889, 
A.  &  P.  LXXXVI  (C-5629). 


THE   SAMOAN   ISLANDS  113 

1000  square  miles/  tho  first  two  1hmii<;-  much  the  largest  of  the  group 
but  lackiug  good  harbors.  Apia  and  Sahiafata,  both  on  the  Ishmd 
of  Upohi,  are  merely  anchorages  giving  shelter  from  the  easterly 
trade  winds  but  open  to  the  full  force  of  the  severe  hurricanes  to 
which  the  islands  are  subject.  The  latter  physical  factor  was 
destined  at  one  time  to  play  an  important  diplomatic  role.  Com- 
mercially the  most  important  product  of  the  islands  is  copra, ^ 
the  dried  meat  of  the  cocoanut,  which  is  gathered  by  the  natives, 
shij^ped  in  large  quantities  to  Europe  and  the  oil  then  extracted 
and  used  in  the  manufacture  of  the  best  grade  of  candles,"  and  the 
residue  made  into  oil-cakes  as  food  for  cattle.  The  real  com- 
mercial development  of  the  island  may  be  considered  to  have  begun 
about  the  year  1S57,  when  the  powerful  firm  of  Godeflfroy,  of 
Hamburg,  established  at  Apia  the  headquarters  for  their  large 
trade  in  the  tropical  products  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. ^  The  success- 
ful enterprises  of  this  firm  on  the  hitherto  unclaimed  islands  be- 
came the  basis  for  the  interest  claims  of  the  German  Government 
throughout  the  history  of  the  Samoan  controversy.  That  con- 
troversy was,  through  its  entire  duration,  a  three-sided  one, 
involving  continuously  the  German  Empire,  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  The  interests  of  the  first  two  were  commercial 
and  strategic,  of  the  third  almost  entirely  strategic,  for  the  pro- 
tection of  trade  routes. 

*  Ibid.,  Savaii,  the  largest  island  of  the  group,  contains  approximately 
325,000  acres,  a  large  part  of  which,  however,  is  unfit  for  cultivation  and  the 
rest  has  fertile  but  stony  soil.  It  contains  no  harbors.  Parts  of  the  island 
reach  an  altitude  of  .5000  feet.  Upolu,  containing  approximately  170,000 
acres,  has  a  large  area  of  fertile  soil  and  has  been  most  highly  developed 
commercially.  It  contains  the  harbors,  so-called,  of  Saluafata  and  Apia,  the 
latter  being  the  trade  entrepot  for  the  islands,  the  headquarters  of  native 
government  and  foreign  representatives,  and  the  scene  of  most  of  the  political 
Conflicts  between  the  powers. 

^Steinberger  Report,  p.  41.  House  Ex.  Doc,  No.  161,  44th  Cong.,  1st 
Sess.,  No.  3. 

« A  little  cotton  is  also  exported,  and  the  islands,  especially  Upolu,  abound 
in  tropical  foodstuffs,  breadfruit,  bananas,  coffee,  oranges,  limes,  sugar-cane, 
pine-apples,  and  other  of  the  tyjjical  south  sea  island  products.  (Wakeman 
Report,  included  in  Steinljerger  Report,  pp.  7  ff.) 

'Thurston  report:  A.  &  P.  LXXXVI  (C-5629)  p.  63. 


114      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN  THE    PACIFIC 

The  diplomatic  history  of  the  Samoan  question  covers  nearly 
thirty  years,  from  about  1S72  to  1899.  It  divides  itself  readily 
into  three  main  periods,  that  of  the  conclusion  of  the  treaties 
between  the  Samoan  Government  and  each  of  the  three  powers 
about  187*9;  the  period  of  the  General  Act  of  Berlin  concluded  by 
the  three  powers  in  18S9;  and  the  period  closing  with  the  division 
of  the  islands  between  the  German  Empire  and  the  United  States 
in  1899. 

The  diplomacy  connected  with  the  islands  may  be  considered  to 
have  begun  in  the  year  1872,  when  Commander  R.  W.  Meade,  of 
the  U.  S.  S.  "Narragansett,"  anchored  at  Pago-Pago,  on  the 
island  of  Tutuila,*^  and  on  his  own  initiative  concluded  with  the 
native  chief  of  the  bay  an  agreement^  by  which  the  exclusive 

^  This  action  was  taken  under  orders  of  Rear-Admiral  John  A.  Winslow, 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Pacific  station,  then  at  Honohilu.  On  January 
21,  1872,  Meade  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy: 

"As  important  American  interests  are  at  stake  at  Tutuila  in  the  Navigators', 
Islands,  (I)  shall,  in  obedience  to  the  Admiral's  orders,  proceed  thither,  survey 
the  harlior  of  Pago-Pago,  and  locate  a  coal  depot  for  the  American  steamers. 
I  think  some  kind  of  treaty  with  the  native  chiefs  will  be  necessary  to  frustrate 
foreign  influence  which  is  at  present  very  active  in  this  matter,  seeking  to 
secure  the  harbor." 

(From  Commanders'  Letters,  January-April,  1872,  No.  51,  as  quoted  by 
C.  O.  Paullin  in  "Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  American  Naval  Officers,  1778- 
1883,"  p.  350.) 

8  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  161,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  G. 

"  Agreement  between  Maunga,  Great  Chief  of  the  Bay  of  Pagopago,  of  the 
Island  of  Tutuila,  residing  at  Pagopago,  and  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  represented  by  Richard  W.  Meade,  Esquire,  Commander 
of  the  United  States  ship  of  war,  Narragansett,  now  lying  at  anchor  in  the 
harbor  of  Pagopago,  witnesseth:  That  I,  Maunga,  Great  Chief  of  the  Bay 
of  Pagopago,  of  the  Island  of  Tutuila,  l)eing  desirous  for  the  interest  and 
welfare  of  myself,  my  successors,  and  people,  to  have  the  friendship  and 
protection  of  the  great  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  do,  by 
virtue  of  the  power  vested  in  me,  hereby  freely  and  voluntarily  grant  to  the 
United  States  of  America,  now  represented  by  Richard  W.  Meade,  Esquire, 
commanding  the  United  States  ship  of  war  Narragansett,  at  present  lying 
at  anchor  in  the  harbor  of  Pagopago,  the  exclusive  privilege  of  estabhshing  in 
the  said  harbor  of  Pagopago,  Island  of  Tutuila,  a  naval  station,  for  the  use  and 
convenience  of  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  Government.  And  I  hereby 
further  agree  that  I  will  not  grant  the  like  privilege  to  any  other  power  or 
potentate. 

Signed  and  sealed  this  17th  day  of  February,  a.  d.,  1872  at  Pagopago, 
Island  of  Tutuila. 

Oau  O  Maga. 

Richard  W.  Meade,  Commander,  United  States  Navy." 


MEADE    ACJREEMEXT    OF    1872  115 

privilege  of  establishing  a  naval  station  in  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago 
was  granted  to  the  United  States.  A  letter  registering  indirect 
protest  was  sent  to  the  Chief  of  Tutuila  by  the  German  Consnl 
Weber,  who  claimed  that  certain  of  the  land  on  Tutuila  had  already 
been  sold  to  a  German  subject,  that  he  would  protect  that  claim 
and  that  he  could  not  at  present  recognize  the  new  port  regulations 
of  Pago-Pago  (instituted  by  ]\Ieade).  iVIeade's  agreement  having 
been  made  without  authorization  by  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, was  not  valid,  but  President  Grant  considered  that  the 
advantages  held  forth  in  the  concession  were  so  great  that  the  sub- 
ject shoujd  be  placed  before  the  Senate  for  consideration.  He 
wished,  however,  to  avoid  the  obligations  involved  in  a  protectorate 
over  the  islands.  He  therefore  suggested  that  the  Senate  devise 
some  modification  of  the  obligation  of  protection  after  which  he 
could  recommend  the  agreement  for  favorable  consideration.  His 
message  and  its  accompanying  documents  were  presented  in 
Executive  Session  of  the  Senate  and  ordered  to  be  printed  in 
confidence  for  its  use.^'^    The  Senate  seems  to  have  taken  no  action 

''  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  101,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  6. 

"(Confidential.)  Executive,  I.  Forty-second  Congress,  Second  Session. 
Message  from  the  President  oi  the  United  States,  transmitting  an  agreement 
between  the  great  chief  of  the  Island  of  Tutuila  and  Commander  Richard  W. 
Meade,  of  the  United  States  Xavy,  conferring  upon  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  the  exclusive  privilege  of  estabhshing  a  naval  station  in  the 
dominions  of  that  chief,  for  the  equivalent  of  protecting  those  dominions. 

May  22nd,  1872,  Read:  Agreement  read  the  first  time,  and  together  with 
the  message  and  accompanying  documents,  ordered  to  be  printed  in  confi- 
dence for  the  use  of  the  Senate. 
To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

I  transmit  to  the  Senate  for  its  consideration  an  agreement  between  the 
great  chief  of  the  island  of  Tutuila,  one  of  the  Samoan  group  in  the  South 
Pacific  and  Commander  R.  W.  Meade,  commanding  the  United  States  steamer 
Narragansett,  bearing  the  date  of  Fcljruary  last.  This  instrument  i)ropo,ses  to 
confer  upon  this  Government  the  exclusive  privilege  of  estabhshing  a  naval 
station  in  the  dominions  of  that  chief  for  the  equivalent  of  protecting  those 
dominions. 

A  copy  of  a  letter  of  the  loth  instant,  and  of  its  accompaniment,  addressed 
t)y  the  Secretary  of  the  Xavy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  descriptive  of  Tutuila 
and  of  other  islands  of  the  group,  and  of  a  letter  in  the  nature  of  a  prf)test  from 
a  person  claiming  to  be  consul  of  the  North  German  Confederation  in  that 
quarter,  are  also  herewith  transmitted.  No  report  has  yet  been  received  from 
Commander  Meade  on  the  subject.  Although  he  was  without  special  instruc- 
tions or  authority  to  enter  into  such  an  agreement,  the  advantages  of  the  con- 
cessions which  it  proposes  to  make  are  so  great,  in  view  of  the  advantageous 
position  of  Tutuila,  especially  as  a  coaling  station  for  steamers  between  San 


116      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY    IN   THE    PACIFIC 

on  the  agreement,"  but  in  the  following  year,  at  the  suggestion 
of  certain  "highly  respectable  commercial  persons,"  the  State 
Department  despatched  Colonel  H.  B.  Steinberger  as  special 
commissioner  to  investigate  the  general  conditions  of  the  islands. 
He  was  informed  in  confidence  of  the  agreement  made  by  Com- 
mander Meade  and  its  submission  to  the  Senate,  and  was  instructed 
to  secure  information  as  to  the  conditions  offered  by  the  islands, 
for  such  a  naval  station.  His  instructions  emphasized  the  private 
informal  character  of  his  mission  and  the  necessity  of  avoiding  all 
discussion  in  regard  to  it.^-  He  was  also  instructed  to  caution  the 
natives  against  granting  their  lands  away  to  foreigners. 

Francisco  and  Australia,  that  I  should  not  hesitate  to  recommend  its  approval 
but  for  the  protection  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  which  it  seems  to  imply. 
With  some  modification  of  the  obhgation  of  protection  which  the  agreement 
imports,  it  is  recommended  to  the  favorable  consideration  of  the  Senate. 

U.  S.  Grant. 
Washington,  May  22nd,  1872." 
"F.  R.,.1894,  p.  505. 
1^  House  E.\.  Doc.  No.  161,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  5. 

No.  4.     Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Steinberger. 

Department  of  St.\te, 
Washington,  March  29,  1873. 


"The  points  to  which  you  will  especially  direct  your  attention  are: 

1.  The  number  of  islands  constituting  "the  group  and  the  extent  of  each. 

2.  The  number  of  inhal)itants,  l)oth  aboriginal  and  from  abroad. 

3.  The  nature  and  quantity  of  the  agricultural  and  other  production. 

4.  The  harbors  suital)le  for  vessels  engaged  in  long  voyages  by  sea. 

On  the  17th  of  February,  1872,  Commander  Richard  W.  Meade  of  the  Navy 
concluded  and  signed  with  Oau  O  Maga,  the  great  chief  of  the  Bay  of  Pagopago, 
an  agreement  granting  this  Government  the  privilege  of  estal^lishing  a  naval 
station  in  the  harbor  of  Pagopago,  Island  of  Tutuila.  Though  Commander 
Meade  had  no  authoritj'  to  enter  into  this  agreement,  the  President  thought 
proper  to  sul)mit  the  instrument  to  the  Senate.  A  cop.y  of  the  confidential 
document  containing  it  is  herewith  communicated  in  confidence  for  your 
information.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  perhaps  in  the  not  distant  future  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  may  require  not  only  a  naval  station  in  the 
Samoan  group,  l)ut  a  har))or  where  their  steam  and  other  vessels  also  may 
freely  and  securely  frequent.  Full  and  accurate  information  in  regard  to  the 
islands  will  l)e  necessary  to  enable  the  Government  here  to  determine  as  to  the 
measures  which  may  be  advisable  toward  ol)taining  that  object. 

In  the  course  of  your  communications  with  the  chiefs  in  the  islands,  you 
will  caution  them  against  making  grants  of  their  land  to  individual  foreigners. 

The  European  nations,  who  colonized  this  hemisphere,  have  usually  regarded 
such  grants  from  the  aborigines  as  invalid,  and  in  all  prol)ability  the  rule  will 
be  held  to  apply  to  the  Samoan  grouj).  It  is  expected  that  you  will  be  speci- 
ally cautious  to  avoid  conversation,  official-  or  otherwsie,  with  any  persons 
respecting  the  relations  between  this  and  any  other  country.  You  are  to 
bear  in  mind  that  you  are  not  a  regular  diiilotnatic  agent,  formally  accredited 


STEINHKHCIKk's    first    mission   to    SAMOA  117 

Colonel  Steinl)or<;er  spent  several  months  in  Samoa,  made  a 
thoron<;h  investigation  of  the  islands  and  held  conferences  with  the 
leading  chiefs.  His  emphasis  of  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
Government  did  not  want  their  lands/^  and  his  reiterated  caution 
against  selling  their  lands  to  individual  foreigners,  won  the  con- 
fidence of  the  Samoans,  who  accorded  him  signal  honors.  The 
nati\e  leaders  were  at  that  time  engaged  in  forming  a  government 
for  the  islands,  and  the  laws  being  then  drawn  up  were  presented 
to  Steinberger,  who  consulted  with  the  English  and  German 
consuls  and  returned  the  laws  in  modified  form  to  the  chiefs.  The 
Samoan  flag  was  then  raised  at  INIulinuu  and  was  officially  recog- 
nized by  the  foreign  consuls."  It  was  a  source  of  gratification  to 
Steinberger  to  have  the  German  Consul  join  with  the  others  in 
this  action  because,  knowing  his  control  of  a  great  commercial 
monopoly  in  Samoa,  Steinberger  had  doubted  his  willingness  to 
recognize  the  native  government  and  its  laws.  Steinberger  after- 
ward claimed  to  be  mainly  instrumental  in  creating  that  govern- 
ment.^^ The  impression  made  by  Steinberger  on  the  leaders  of  the 
islands  was  so  favorable  that  they  sent  through  him  an  appeal  to 
the  "Principal  Chief  of  the  American  Government"'''  to  annex 
Samoa  to  the  United  States.  It  was  their  full  belief  that  he  had 
been  sent  for  this  purpose.  Their  appeal  was  seconded  by  letters 
from  a  niunber  of  the  foreign  residents  of  Samoa,  and  Steinberger, 
himself  in  favor  of  extending  protection  to  the  islands,  promised 
to  convey  their  petitions  to  the  President.  It  was  evidently  the 
conviction  of  at  least  one  of  the  chiefs,  INIalietoa,  that  the  union 
had  already  taken  place. ^^ 

to  another  government,  hut  an  informal  one,  of  a  special  and  confidential 
character,  appointed  for  the  sole  purpose  of  obtaining  full  and  accurate  infor- 
mation in  regard  to  the  Navigators'  Islands.  Even  regular  diplomatic  agents 
are  required  to  l)e  reticent  in  regard  to  the  affairs  of  their  own  government 
and  are  by  law,  forbidden  to  correspond  in  regard  to  the  jniblic  affairs  of  any 
foreign  government  with  any  private  person,  with  any  newspaper  or  other 
periodical,  or  othermse  than  with  the  proper  officers  of  the  United  States. 
This  interdict  will  be  particularly  observed  by  you." 

'^  Steinberger  Report.     Inclosure  A  2,  p.  54  '*  Il)id.,  p.  49. 

'5  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  161,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  No.  12,  p.  71 

^^  Steinberger  Report.     Inclosure  D  1,  p.  56  '^  Ibid.,  Inclosure  E. 


118      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY    IN   THE   PACIFIC 

Steinberger's  report  was  praised  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  Fish, 
as  being  "replete  with  novel  and  valuable  information,"  showing 
the  commissioner  to  have  been  a  "  diligent  and  judicious  observer. ^^ 
Steinberger  set  forth  his  personal  interest  in  the  Samoan  people, 
asserting  that  it  would  mean  much  for  their  welfare  to  have 
extended  to  them  the  American  protection  which  they  sought. 
If  the  Government  did  not  deem  it  advisable  at  this  moment  to 
establish  a  protectorate  over  the  islands,  it  should  at  least  send  a 
minister  or  commissioner  with  power  to  treat  with  their  new 
government  as  that  of  an  independent  people.^^  He  himself 
wished  to  be  that  commissioner,  owing  to  his  personal  interest  in 
the  Samoans,  and  the  fact  that  they  had  petitioned  the  President 
for  his  return.  He  also  wrote  a  letter  of  guidance  and  counsel  to 
the  Samoans,  assuring  them  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  had  received  their  gifts  (considered  by  them  to  be  sjTnbols 
of  their  country  itself),  and  was  then  considering  their  petition.-" 
This  letter  he  requested  ]Mr.  Fish  to  have  endorsed  by  the  State 
Department,  but  the  Secretary  of  State  declined  on  the  ground 
that  such  an  act  would  be  "contrary  to  the  usual  practice  of  the 
Department.  "21  The  petitions  for  annexation,  it  was  felt,  could 
not  be  granted  at  this  time.  The  Government  was  sensible  of  the 
value  of  Samoa  strategically  and  commercially,  but  public  senti- 
ment in  the  United  States  was  strongly  opposed  to  annexing 
further  territory,  especially  at  so  great  a  distance  and  inliabited 
by  a  different  race  as  contrary  to  American  tradition.  Neverthe- 
less, it  was  considered  important  to  retain  the  good-will  of  the 
Samoans,  and  Steinberger  was  authorized  to  return  to  the  islands, 
bearing  to  the  chiefs  gifts  and  the  assurances  of  the  interest  which 

the  United  States  held  in  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  the  islands.-- 

— — — 1 . 

18  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  161,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  No.  10,  p.  69. 

'9  Ibid.,  No.  12,  p.  71  ="  Ibid.,  No.  14,  Inclosure  2,  p.  73. 

21  Ibid.,  No.  15,  p.  74. 
2abid.,  No.  17,  p.  76. 

Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Steinberger. 

Department  of  St.^te, 
Washington,  December  11,  1874. 
"Sir: 

The  President  having  determined  to  authorize  you  again  to  proceed  to 
the  Samoan  grouj)  in  the  character  of  a  special  agent  of  the  United  States, 


steinbergek's  second  mission  119 

Mr.  Steiiibertror's  interest  in  the  natives  of  Samoa  led  liim  to 
enter  into  relations  with  them  whieh  involved  the  United  States 

you  will  embark  for  those  islands  at  San  Francisco  in  a  man  of  war,  on  hoard 
of  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  been  recjuested  to  direct  you  to  be 
provided  with  a  passage.  The  expense  attending  this  and  of  your  mission 
generally  must  be  borne  by  yourself,  and  will  in  no  event  be  recognized  as  a 
proper  charge  against  the  Government.  Pursuant  to  the  suggestion  con- 
tained in  your  letter  from  Baltimore  of  the  nineteenth  of  November  last,  the 
President  has  addressed  the  accompanying  sealed  commvmication  to  the 
Taimua  or  Pule  of  Samoa,  a  copy  of  which  is  also  furnished  for  your  informa- 
tion.    You  will  make  proper  arrangements  for  presenting  the  original. 

The  special  passport  with  which  you  are  also  herewith  provided  describes 
your  official  character. 

I  annex  here  a  list  of  articles  which  have  been  furnished  by  several  of  the 
Deiiartments,  which  will  l)e  entrusted  to  you  as  presents  as  suggested  by  you. 

There  is  no  dou])t  from  your  report  and  from  the  information  received 
from  other  sources,  that  the  Samoan  group  is  naturally  fertile  and  has  many 
resources.  Its  position,  too,  in  the  Pacific  is  commanding,  and  particularly 
important  to  us.  It  is  more  than  doubtful,  however,  whether  these  consider- 
ations would  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  our  people  that  the  annexation  of  those 
islands  to  the  United  States  is  essential  to  our  safety  and  prosperity.  In 
any  event,  supposing  that  the  general  sentiment  should  be  favorable  to  such 
a  measure,  I  am  not  aware  that  it  has  received  such  an  expression  as  would 
require  an  acknowledgement  by  the  Government,  and  warrant  measures  on 
our  part  accordingly.  It  is  deemed  inexjiedient  without  such  a  call  from 
the  public  to  originate  such  a  measure  adverse  to  the  usual  traditions  of  the 
Government,  and  which  therefore,  probably  would  not  receive  such  a  sanction 
as  would  be  likely  to  secure  its  success.  Under  these  circumstances,  your 
functions  will  be  limited  to  observing  and  reporting  upon  Samoan  affairs,  and 
to  impressing  those  in  authority  there  with  the  lively  interest  which  we  take 
in  their  happiness  and  welfare. 

Hamilton  Fish." 
(Inclosure) 


Ulysses  S.  Grant,  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  to  their  High- 
nesses, the  Taimua  and  Pule,  or  Principal  Chiefs  of  Samoa. 
"Great  and  Good  Friends: 

I  have  received  through  Col.  A.  B.  Steinberger,  whom  I  sent  to  your 
islands  as  a  special  agent  of  the  United  States,  the  interesting  letter  of  the 
third  of  October,  1873,  which  you  were  pleased  to  address  to  me.  I  am 
gratified  to  learn  from  that  connnunication  that  ])eace  prevailed  in  your 
country.  This  is  among  the  greatest  blessings  vouchsafed  to  nations,  and 
I  hope  that  your  enjoyment  of  it  may  be  without  interruption.  You  also 
inform  me  that  the  Samoan  Government  hail  adoi)ted  a  flag.  This  is  an 
interesting  event  in  your  history.  My  prayer  is  that,  as  it  is  an  emblem  of 
your  unity  and  indepenilence,  these  may  ever  remain  inviolable  except  l)y  the 
consent  of  your  people. 

Your  course  generally,  as  rei)orted  to  me  by  Colonel  Steinberger,  deserves 
my  cordial  approval  and  encouragement,  which  I  offer  you.  I  trust  that 
you  will  persevere  in  well-doing.  Although  the  chief  city  of  the  United 
States,  whence  I  am  writing  to  you,  is  far  away  from  your  islands,  being 
near  the  coast  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  our  territory  extends  to  the  shores  of 
the  othc  ocean  in  which  your  islands  lie,  at  not  a  much  greater  distance  from 
San  Francisco  than  is  the  city  of  Washington,  which  is  our  caj)ital.  Being 
then,  as  you  are,  much  nearer  to  us  than  to  any  European  nation,  on  this 


120      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN  THE    PACIFIC 

to  a  degree  not  intended  by  the  Government.  Reports  began  to 
be  circulated  that  the  Samoans  considered  that  he  had  promised 
them  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  He  was  also  said  to  have 
assumed  the  right  to  levy  tonnage  dues  and  to  have  given  a  native 
chief  the  right  to  examine  ship  registers — without  consulting  any 
foreign  consul  on  the  subject.^^  These  accusations  Steinberger 
denied  and  furnished  evidence  refuting  them.^*  Nevertheless,  he 
wrote  that  he  had  accepted  the  position  of  premier  of  the  kingdom, 
that  he  had  the  entire  confidence  of  the  native  population  and 
asked  for  the  passage  of  a  bill  by  Congress  authorizing  him,  as  an 
American  citizen,  to  hold  office  under  a  foreign  government.-^  He 
was  throughout  his  stay  in  Samoa  in  open  conflict  with  the  Ameri- 
can Consul  i\Ir.  S.  S.  Foster,  who  finally  addressed  a  note-*^  to  the 
Government,  at  the  request  of  certain  British  residents,  inquiring 
as  to  Steinberger 's  status,  whether  he  had  been  authorized  to  form 
a  government  in  the  islands  and  whether  the  United  States 
Government  sustained  him  in  his  acts.  Shortly  after  this  Stein- 
berger tendered  his  resignation.  The  Department  of  State 
notified  the  American  Consul  that  Colonel  Steinberger's  visits  had 
no  diplomatic  or  political  significance  whatever,  that  he  had  not 
been  authorized  by  the  United  States  to  form  a  govermnent  in 
Samoa  or  to  pledge  the  United  States  to  sustain  any  government 
he  might  be  instrumental  in  forming.'" 

account  alone  it  would  be  natural,  were  there  no  other  reasons,  that  we  should 
take  a  lively  interest  in  your  welfare  and  in  all  that  concerns  you. 

The  'staff,'  the  'fly-flap,'  and  the  'sacred  mat'  which  you  entrusted  to 
Colonel  Steinberger,  were  safely  delivered  by  him,  and  were  duly  received 
l\v  me  in  the  spirit  with  which  thej-  were  offered.  You  may  be  assured  that 
I  am  duly  sensible  of  the  significance  of  these  gifts. 

Colonel  Steinberger's  course  during  his  first  mission  has  so  far  met  my 
approval  and  he  seems  to  have  made  himself  so  acceptable  to  you  that  1  have 
authorized  him  again  to  visit  you,  for  the  purpose  of  informing  me  of  the 
progress  of  your  affairs  since  he  left  you.  I  pray  you  therefore  to  receive  him 
kindly,  and  to  continue  to  him  the  good-will  which  you  showed  on  the  former 
occasion.  1  pray  God  to  have  you  in  His  safe  and  holy  keeping.  Written  at 
Washington,  this  11th  day  of  December,  1874. 

Ulysses  S.  Grant." 

"  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  IGl,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Xo.  21,  p.  78. 
2^  Ibid.,  No.  22,  p.  80.  25  iijid.,  Xo.  23,  p.  81. 

-•"■  Ibid.,  No.  26,  p.  124.      '  2'  Ibid.,  No.  27,  p.  125. 


STEINBERGER's    KECa.ME    IN    SAMOA  121 

It  is  quite  evident  from  the  reports  submitted  by  Steinl)erj,a'r 
that  the  annexation  of  the  ishmds  by  the  United  States  would  have 
been  acceptable  to  the  natives  at  this  time.  The  increase  of  the 
German  and  British  commercial  interests,  the  exploitation  of  \ 
Samoan  lands  and  hibor  at  the  hands  of  German  and  British 
monopolist  companies  had  led  the  Samoans  to  look  for  the  pro-' 
tection  of  some  strong  power,  and  the  United  States,  with  its 
small  trade  in  the  islands,  seemed  to  them  at  once  innocuous  and 
yet  strong  enough  to  afford  })rotection.  It  was  also  quite  evident 
that  in  spite  of  an  executive  and  a  navy  department  in  favor  of 
annexation,  the  public  opinion  of  the  United  States  would  refuse 
tt)  tolerate  the  idea.  When  rumors  began  to  be  circulated  con- 
cerning Steinberger's  activities  in  Samoa,  Congress  at  once  took 
notice  and  the  House  of  Representatives  passed  a  resolution^* 
instructing  fhe  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  to  inquire  into  the 
extent  and  character  of  the  power  conferred  on  Steinberger  by  the 
Go\ernment.  It  was  in  execution  of  this  inquiry  that  the  reports 
and  correspondence  concerning  the  Steinberger  missions  were 
published,  which  showed  that  Steinberger  himself  was  no  longer  in 
the  service  and  which  demonstrated  to  Congress  that  the  State 
Department  had  effectively  disavowed  any  of  his  acts  which 
pledged  the  United  States  to  the  support  of  any  government  he 
might  assist  in  forming  in  Samoa. 

The  Steinberger  regime  in  Samoa  had  the  result  of  antagoniz- 
ing the  natives  against  other  foreign  residents,  creating  hostility    ' 
against  himself  as  a  usurper  of  power  and  opponent  of  the  interests    ' 
of  the  white  residents,  and  there  also  arose  an  opposition  party 
among  the  native  Samoans.    The  Taimua  party  based  its  claims 
on  the  Constitution  established  by  Steinberger;  the  Puletua  re-    1 
fused  to  recognize  that  Constitution  as  having  any  binding  power 
over  them.-'-*     The  dissension  between  the   native  factions  was    , 
considered  l)y  the  Germans  to  endanger  the  persons  and  property 
of  their  subjects  on  the  islands  and  attempts  were  made  by  them 
to  reconcile  the  two  factions.     The  failure  of  these  efforts  they 

28  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  161,  54th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  No.  21,  p.  1. 

29  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  53. 


122      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

assigned  to  the  fact  that  the  Taimua  party,  in  spite  of  the  resig- 
nation of  Steinberger  and  the  disavowal  of  his  poKtical  activities 
by  the  United  States,  still  believed  that  the  United  States  would 
give  them  material  support.  Such  a  belief  is  explainable  by  the 
fact  that  the  presents  taken  back  to  the  Samoans  by  Steinberger 
from  the  United  States  Government  consisted  of  a  small  supply  of 
arms  and  ammunition  and  a  few  small  cannon.^"  The  Imperial 
German  Government,  therefore,  instructed  its  consul  at  Apia  to 
invite  the  opposing  parties  to  come  to  an  arrangement  and  to 
request  the  American  and  British  consuls  to  lend  their  assistance 
in  the  reconstruction.  It  was  distinctly  stated  in  this  request^^ 
that  the  German  Government  did  not  intend  to  interfere  with  the 
independence  of  Samoa,  but  that  it  wished  only  to  see  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  stable  government  as  necessary  to  the  large  German 
interests  at  stake  in  the  islands.  The  British  acting  consul  agreed 
to  cooperate  in  this  cause,  which  he  deemed  also  to  the  interest  of 
British  subjects.^-  Mr.  Griffin,  the  United  States  Consul,  however, 
refused  on  the  ground  that  he  had  no  authority  from  his  govern- 
ment to  unite  with  his  colleagues  or  any  other  persons  for  the 
purpose  indicated,  that  he  would,  nevertheless,  make  known  to 
the  President  the  wishes  of  the  German  Consul  and  await  instruc- 
tions.■'•''  This  refusal,  though  in  accord  with  the  long-standing 
American  policy  against  joint  action,  the  Germans  declared 
strengthened  the  confidence  of  the  Taimua  party  and  made  the 
settlement  of  hostilities  more  difficult.  Griffin's  general  attitude 
in  Samoa,  however,  and  especially  his  leanings  toward  annexation, 
were  found  to  be  purely  personal  and  not  expressive  of  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  Government.-^^  The  Taimua  party  now  turned 
for  support  to  both  the  United  States  and  England,  sending  almost 
simultaneously  to  the  President  and  to  the  Queen  petitions  to 
extend  to  the  islands  the  protection  of  their  governments.^^  The 
German  Government  became  alarmed  and  instituted  proceedings 

•^«  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  161,  44th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  No.  17,  p.  76. 
31  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  37  ^2  ibid.,  p.  43. 

33  Ibid.,  p.  44.    "  3^  Ibid.,  p.  51. 

35  Ibid.,  Denkschrift,  p.  xv. 


GEKMAX    ACiKEE.MEJJT    OF    1S77    WITH    SVMOAN   CHIEFS  123 

ill  Washino'ton  and  London  and  also  in  Samoa  itself  looking  to 
tlu'  inaintt'iiance  of  equal  treatment  of  German  interests  in  the 
islands.  In  Samoa  it  concluded  with  each  of  the  warring  factions, 
the  Taimua  and  the  Puletua,  agreements  providing  against  injury 
to  German  possessions  in  case  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  and 
l)romising  on  the  part  of  the  leading  chiefs  not  to  give  to  any  other 
go\ernment  privileges  not  extended  also  to  that  of  Germany.^''  To 
make  this  more  emphatic  a  letter  was  framed  by  the  Imperial 
German  Consul,  Theodore  Weber,  and  Gaptain  Hassenpflug,  of 
S.  M.  S.  "Augusta,"  confirming  in  detail  the  German  rights 
in  Samoa  and  guaranteeing  them  against  any  possible  infringe- 
ment.*'   The  letter  ignored  any  soverign  rights  of  the  natives  and 

•^«  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  pp.  67  and  68. 


4.  "Wir  werden  in  keiner  Weise  die  deutsche  Regierung  zuruecksetzen 
oder  irgend  einer  anderen  fremden  Regierung  Vorrechte  vor  der  deutschen 
gewaehren. 

Wir  l)eharren  gaenzlich  bei  allem,  was  wir  den  deutschen  Vertretern  in 
jener  Beziehung  geschriehen  hahen,  in  Uebereinstimmung  mit  den  uns  in 
ihrem  (den  deutschen  Vertretern)  Briefe  an  uns  voin  24  Mai  angezeigten 
Punkten." 

The  above  article  was  included  in  both  agreements  which  were  signed 
on  July  3rd  and  5th  respectively  (1877)  for  the  Taimua  by  twenty-eight 
chiefs  and  for  the  Puletua  by  Malietoa. 

^'  A.  &  P.,  1889  (C-5629),  No.  96.     Thurston  Report.     Inclosure  2,  p.  76. 

Captain  Hassenpflug  and  Mr.  Weber  to  the  Taimua  and  Faipule  of  Samoa 
(Translation  by  source.) 

Apia,  May  24th,  1878  (?  1877). 
"Chieft.\ixs: 

We  have  received  your  various  written  and  verbal  declarations  that 
you  intend  to  grant  no  privileges  whatever  in  these  islands  to  any  foreign 
nation  in  preference  to  ours  but  that  j-ou  mean  to  put  all  foreign  governments 
on  the  same  footing  and  in  nowise  slight  the  German  Government;  moreover, 
that  you  will  give  no  foreigner  a  privileged  position  in  a  Government  of  these 
islands. 

We  have  received  the  same  promises,  namely,  to  put  the  foreign  nations 
represented  here  in  Samoa  on  an  equal  footing,  from  the  Chieftains  of  the 
Puletua. 

Furthermore,  on  the  occasion  of  our  conference  with  you  on  the  15th  of  this 
month,  we  told  you  why  the  Germans  and  their  interests  in  Samoa  must  not 
be  regarded  as  on  sufferance,  but  as  po.ssessing  rights,  and  that  a  one-sided 
political  arrangement  of  affairs  in  Samoa  without  seeking  counsel  of  the 
German  Government   was  therefore  untenable. 

We  now  inform  you  that  we  shall  hold  j-ou  to  the  promises  given  to  us,  and 
that  we  shall  insist  upon  our  rights. 

For  these  reasons  we  now  protest  hereby  in  the  most  decisive  and  solemn 
manner,  against  any  steps  whatever  wherebyone  or  more  foreign  governments, 


124      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES    AND    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

dictated  that  they  should  make  no  one-sided  poHtical  arrange- 
ment with  another  power  without  seeking  counsel  of  the  German 
Government.  Agreement  to  the  terms  stated  in  the  letter  was 
embodied  in  the  general  agreement  with  the  chiefs. 

In  both  London^^  and  Washington  the  German  representatives 
secured  expression  of  the  denial  of  any  policy  of  annexation  and 
the  promise  that  the  consuls  of  each  nation  in  Samoa  should  be 
instructed  to  cooperate  with  the  German  representatives  in  their 
efforts  to  establish  peace  and  order  in  the  islands.  In  the  United 
States  the  annexation  proposition  was  presented  both  by  Consul 
Griffin  who  returned  to  the  United  States  in  the  summer  of  1S77 
and  by  a  special  native  commissioner  Le  Mamea,  sent  over  for  the 
purpose  by  the  Taimua  party  of  Samoa.     Both  were  unsuccessful. 

excluding  the  German  Government,  may  be  called  to  the  Protectorate  of  these 
islands,  or  whereby  an  annexation  of  these  islands  may  be  brought  al)out,  as 
well  as  against  any  other  such  steps  whatever  whereby  German  interests  might 
in  any  way  whatever  be  injured  or  prejudiced,  whether  by  arrangement  of 
Samoa  poHtical  relations  without  asking  advice  of  the  Consular  and  Maritime 
Representatives  of  Germany,  or  by  granting  a  privileged  position  to  the 
Representatives  of  other  governments  or  to  other  foreigners,  or  in  any  other 
way  whatever. 

We  protest  against  all  such  steps  in  virtue  of  our  instructions  from  the 
Imperial  Government  for  so  long  as  until  the  said  Government  intimates  its 
concurrence  in  such  steps. 

The  Consular  and  Maritime  Representatives  of  the 
Imperial  German  Government  in  Samoa, 

Hassenpflug,  Captain  of  Corvette,  Commander  of 
H.M.S.  "Augusta." 

Th.  Weder,  Imperial  German  Consul. 

^s  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  69.  Lord  Derby  assured  the  German 
Ambassador  that  if  the  English  representative  of  his  own  accord  carried  on 
annexation  policy  in  Samoa,  or  gave  the  impression  of  so  doing,  that  such 
action  did  not  conform  to  the  instructions  sent  him  from  London.  .  .  .  This 
probably  referred  to  the  action  of  Mr.  Liardet,  British  consul  in  Samoa  who, 
following  a  collision  between  the  Taimua  and  some  of  the  sailors  of  H.M.S. 
"Barracouta"  proceeded  to  levy  heavy  damage  claims  and  who  asserted  that 
as  surety  for  those  claims  he  held  the  islands  in  the  name  of  Her  Majesty  (p. 
73  also  p.  76).  Lord  Derby  promised  that  the  British  consul  would  be 
instructed  to  act  in  concert  with  his  German  colleague  and  assist  him  as  far 
as  possible  in  his  undertaking.  In  Washington  von  Thielmann  received 
assurance  that  Secretary  Evarts  had  already  sent  similar  instructions  to  the 
American  consul,  Mr.  Griffin,  namely,  that  in  case  of  intervention  to  establish 
order  in  Samoa  he  shouM  lend  his  assistance  to  the  German  and  British 
representatives  (Ibid.,  p.  57). 


AMERICAN    REJECTION   OF    ANNEXATION    PROPOSALS  125 

Secretary  of  State  Evarts  assured  Baron  von  Thielmainv*-'  that  tlie 
I'liited  States  policy  in  regard  to  Samoa  was  one  of  a  strict  non- 
interference with  tiie  domestic  politics  of  the  Islands,  desiring 
()nl\'  that  peace  and  order  be  restored  by  the  establishment  of  a 
stable,  independent  native  government.  In  reference  to  the 
mission  of  Le  MamejW  Assistant  Secretary  Seward  informed  the 
German  Ambassador  von  Schloezer  that  the  United  States  was  con- 
sidering concluding  a  commercial  treaty  with  Samoa  but  that  the 
proposal  to  take  over  the  islands  as  a  protectorate  could  under  no 
circumstances  be  accepted — the  United  States  wanted  trade  but 
not  dominion^'^  and  that  if  there  were  people  in  Apia  who  believed 

'**  Ibid.,  No.  9,  Anl.  I,  p.  53.     To  Baron  von  Thielmann,  His  Imperial  Ger- 
man Majesty's  Charge  d' Affaires: 

Department  of  State,  Washington, 
15  June,  1877. 


"In  reply  to  your  note  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  your  assumption 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  as  desirous  as  your  own  to  pro- 
mote commerce  in  the  South  Sea  Islands,  is  correct.  The  comparatively 
short  distance  from  our  shores  to  the  most  productive  of  those  islands,  would 
justif}-  our  Government  in  taking  an  even  deeper  interest  in  their  development 
than  any  European  Government,  and  that  interest  is  felt.  You  are  also 
correct  in  your  belief  that  expectation  of  receiving  aid  from  the  United  State?, 
which  you  allege  is  entertained  by  one  party  of  the  Islands,  is  without  founda- 
tion. 

The  course  which  has  been  pursued  by  the  United  States  in  its  dealings 
with  these  islands  has  been  to  constantly  and  consistently  advise  their  consuls 
to  pursue  a  policy  of  absolute  non-interference  with  the  domestic  politics  and 
government  of  the  Samoan  Islands.  The  United  States — the  same  as  Ger- 
many and  Great  Britain — do  not  desire  the  triumph  of  any  particular  party, 
but  the  restorati^on  of  peace  and  order;  and  this  Government  further  desires 
that  peace  and  order  be  restored  by  the  establishment  of  a  firm,  stable,  inde- 
pendent native  government  that  will  command  the  respect  and  support  of 
natives  and  foreigners.  There  is  nothing  in  any  of  the  instructions  of  the 
Department  to  our  Consuls  at  Apia  to  warrant  any  one  party  on  the  Island? 
more  than  another,  to  believe  that  the  Government  was  favorable  to  their 
cause;  and  the  Department  would  regret  to  have  such  an  impression  prevail. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  course  pursued  by  this  Government,  which 
is  in  accordance  with  its  long-established  policy  of  strict  non-interferen(!e 
with  the  pohtical  affairs  of  other  nations  and  peoples,  will  convince  the 
Imperial  Government  that  so  far  as  it  could  consistently  do  so,  the  United 
States  had  anticipated  the  de.sires  of  that  Government  in  reference  to  affairs 
in  the  Samoan  Islands. 

W.M.  M.  Evarts." 

^«V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Xr.  239,  p.  77 

No.  19.     Der  Kaiserliche  Gesandte  an  das  Auswaertige  Amt. 

Washington,  den  3.  Januar,  1878. 
"Aus  Eurer  Excellenz  hohen  Erlassen  vom  15.  November  und  7.  Dezember 


126      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES    AND    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

that  the  United  States  would  ever  take  the  islands  under  its  jiu-is- 

diction,  or  even  under  its  protection,  those  people  were  mistaken. 

Mr.  Seward  gives  in  his  "Reminiscences"  an  interesting  account^' 

of  the  mission  of  Le  Mamea  and  the  reception  of  his  proposal  by 

I  .  the  United  States.     Although  the  President,  Secretary  Evarts  and 

[    the  Navy  Department  were  in  favor  of  accepting  the  proposal, 

^    they  realized  that  the  sentiment  of  Congress  and  of  the  people  at 

large  would  oppose  it  vigorously.    The  Alaska  purchase  was  still 

the  object  of  criticism  and  ridicule,  the  Panama  canal  had  been 

allowed  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  France,  and  the  proposals  to 

acquire  Santo  Domingo  and  the  Danish  West  Indies  had  been 

decisively  rejected.    As  Seward  himself  expressed  it,  "  It  seemed 

to  be  considered  a  mark  of  patriotism  to  oppose  any  addition  to 

I    our  own  country."     The  Samoan  ambassador  was   gravely  dis- 

I    appointed,  but  finally  agreed  to  let  Seward  draw  up  the  treaty  as 

he  thought  best,  asking  in  return  for  Pago-Pago,  the  best  harbor 

in  Samoa,  only  the  assurances  of  the  peace  and  friendship  of  the 

United  States.     This  Seward  agreed  to  do,  as  it  seemed  to  him  that 

V.  J.  l)etreffend  die  Samoa-Inseln,  habe  ich  dem  Unterstaatssekretaer  Seward 
die  geeigneten  Mittheilungen  gemacht. 

Inz\\ischen  ist  hier  Le  Mamea,  der  Abgesandte  der  Samoa  Taimua,  ein- 
getroffen  und  hat  durch  seine  schoene  imposante  Erscheinung  und  durch 
sein  dezentes  Auftreten  einen  vorteilhaften  Eindruck  im  Staatsdepartment 
gemacht.  Zu  der  Neujahrskour  im  "Weissen  Hause"  war  Le  Mamea  mit 
dem  diplomatischen  Korps  eingeladen. 

Heute  sagte  mir  Herr  Seward  Folgendes: 

'Le  Mamea  wuenscht  mit  uns  einen  Freundschafts-  und  Handelsvertrag 
abzuschUessen,  und  wir  sind  jetzt  nicht  mehr  abgeneigt  auf  diesen  Vorschlag 
einzugehen  da  ein  solcher  Vertrag  unserem  Handel  nur  nuetzen  nicht  schaden 
kann 

Die  Taimua  wuenscht  aber  auch,  dass  wir  das  Protektorat  ueber  die  Samoa 
Inseln  uebernehmen  soUen,  und  auf  diesen  Antrag  werden  vnr  uns  keinenfalls 
einlassen. 

Die  Vereinigten  Staaten  befinden  sich  jenen  Inseln  gegenueber  in  einer 
ganz  gleichen  Lage  wie  Deutschland.  Wir  woUen  ebensowenig  wie  die 
deutsche  Regierung  dort  ein  Protektorat  ausueben,  wir  wollen  keine  Kolonien 
haben,  wir  wuenschen  nur  Handel  zu  treiben;  we  want  onh'  trade  no  dominion. 
Wenn  es  Leute  in  Ajjia  giel)t  die  glauben,  dass  wir  jemals  die  Inseln  unter 
vmsere  Botmaessigkeit  oder  auch  nur  unter  unseren  Schutz  nehmen  wuerden, 
so  irren  sie  sich.     Der  Sinn  des  Amerikas  geht  nicht  auf  solche  Erwerbungen.' 

(gez.) 

SCHLOEZER." 

"Seward,  Frederick  W.,  "Reminiscences  of  a  War-Time  Statesman  and 
Diplomat,  1830-1915,"  p.  437  ff.     (See  Appendix.) 


AMKHICAN   THKATY    WITH    SAMOA,    1S7.S  127 

he  might  persuade  the  Senate  to  accept  a  harbor  provided  the 
country  did  not  have  to  pay  an^i:hing  for  it  nor  to  promise  to 
protect  it.  After  several  revisions  the  treaty  was  finally  concluded 
Jaiuiary  l(i,  l.STS.^'-'  Provision  was  made  in  the  treaty  for  the 
I'nited  States  to  establish  a  naval  station  in  the  harbor  of  Pago- 
I'ago.  Article  \'l  placed  the  United  States  on  "the  most-favored- 
nation"  basis  in  relation  to  Samoa.  The  only  article  which  in  any 
way  recognized  or  embodied  the  desire  of  the  Samoans  for  the 
l)rotection  of  the  United  States  was  Article  V,  which  read: 

"  If.  inihappily,  any  difi'erences  should  have  arisen  or  shall 
hereafter  arise,  between  the  Samoan  Government  and  a'ny  other 
other  government  in  amity  with  the  I  nited  States,  the  government 
of  the  latter  will  employ  its  good  offices  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting 
those  dirt'erences  upon  a  satisfactory  and  solid  foundation." 

This  article  was  apparently  included  in  the  treaty  as  a  matter  of 
courtesy  and  evidence  of  the  friendly  attitude  of  the  United  States 
in  return  for  the  favors  granted  by  the  Samoans.  It  was  not  looked 
u])()n  as  a  serious  obligation  entered  into  by  the  United  States; 
nor  was  much  public  interest  shown  in  the  treaty  as  a  whole. 
Secretary  of  State  Gresham,  writing  in  1894*'^  of  the  Samoan 
Treaty  says: 

"The  impression  produced  by  a  discriminating  examination  of 
them  {i.  c,  Articles  II  and  V)  is  that  they  were  in.spired  rather  by 
an  amiable  desire  on  the  part  of  our  Government,  not  to  appear  to 
be  wholly  insensible  to  the  friendly  advances  of  the  Samoans  than 
by  any  supposition  that  the  character  of  our  relations  to  Samoa 
greatly  concerned  us.  Indeed  it  is  quite  clear  that  in  the  five  years 
that  had  elapsed  since  Steinberger  was  first  sent  out  to  gather 
information  in  regard  to  the  islands,  the  Government  and  people 
of  the  United  States  had  made  such  small  progress  toward  a  con- 
ception of  the  importance  of  the  group  that,  if  the  Samoans  had 
not  been  incited  by  our  local  representatives  to  send  an  ambas- 
sador to  Washington  to  obtain  a  treaty,  none  would  have  been 
made." 

«  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  45th  Cong.,  1S77-1S79,  Vol.  XX,  p.  204.     (See 
Appendix.) 

«  F.  R.,  1894,  Appendix  I,  p.  50G. 
9 


128      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY    IN   THE    PACIFIC 

The  attitude  of  Germany  toward  the  islands  was  not  similarly 
indifferent.  Protection  of  German  commercial  interests  in  the 
great  archipelago  of  the  south  seas  had  admittedly  become  the 
subject  of  increased  solicitude  on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment.''*' In  view  of  the  development  of  German  trade  with  the 
islands  of  the  South-Pacific — a  trade  which  was  acknowledged  at 
various  times  by  both  British  and  American  authorities  to  be 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  nation'*^ — the  German  Government 
considered  it  a  duty  not  to  leave  the  German  enterprises  in  the 
Pacific  entirely  to  their  fate  and  had  entered  upon  the  practice  of 
maintaining  one  or  more  German  war-vessels  continuously  in  that 
region.*"^  Therefore,  when  news  reached  the  islands  that  a  treaty 
had  been  formed  between  Samoa  and  the  United  States  granting 
to  the  latter  special  privileges  in  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago,  the 
German  representatives  considered  that  the  moment  had  coine^'^ 
for  them  to  lay  claim  to  the  promises  accorded  to  them  in  their 
agreement  made  in  1877  with  the  assembled  chiefs  of  Samoa/' 
and  to  demand  equal  or  compensating  privileges  through  a  com- 
mercial treaty.  Their  claim  met  with  a  policy  of  delay  amounting 
to  virtual  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Taimua  and  Faipule,  constitut- 
ing the  principal  native  government  of  Samoa,  as  the  chiefs  were 
anxiously  waiting  for  the  return  of  their  ambassador  Le  Mamea 
from  the  United  States  to  see  to  what  extent  he  had  pledged 
their  country  to  America  before  they  should  conclude  any  further 
agreement  with  Germany.  The  German  Consul  Weber  finally 
considered  that  the  agreement  was  being  refused  recognition  by 
the  Samoans  and  ordered  the  seizure  of  the  ports  of  Saluafata^* 
and  Falealii  to  be  held  as  security  until  the  Samoans  should  decide 
to  abide  by  their  agreement  of  1877  and  grant  to  Germany  equiva- 
lent privileges  to  those  extended  to  the  United  States.    Notice  was 

»  V.  R.,  1S79,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Nr.  239.     Denkschrift,  p.  xiii. 
^5  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.   161,  44th  Con^.,   1st  Sess.,  p.  So;  also  Thurston 
Report,  A.  &  P.,  1889  (C-5629),  p.  72  (especially  p.  Ui8). 
^»V.  R.,  1879,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Nr.  239.     Denkschrift,  p.  xiii. 
4'  V.  R.,  1879,  Ap.\.  Vol.  VI,  Nr.  239.     Denkschrift,  p.  xvii. 
*^  Ibid.,  p.  67  (see  Appendix). 
"  Ibid.,  pp.  121  and  122;  also  pp.  137  and  138. 


luuTisii  AM)  (;khma\  MEAsruKs  TO  sEC'iHK  tk?:aties    129 

sent  to  both  the  American  and  British  Consuls  of  the  reason  for 
the  action  and  declaration  was  made  that  there  would  be  no 
interference  with  private  property  and  foreign  interests  and  that 
for  the  sake  of  avoidiuii;  such  interference  the  harbor  of  Apia  had 
not  been  inclndcd  in  these  measures. 

Precedina;  this  event  there  had  been  considerable  friction 
between  the  foreign  consuls  on  the  islands,  especially  between  the 
American  and  German  representatives.  At  the  request  of  the 
British  consul,  Sir  Arthur  Gordon,  the  German  consul,  Mr.  Weber, 
had  agreed  to  unite  with  him  in  seeking  to  conclude  with  the 
Samoan  Government,  a  convention^"  which  should  obtain  from  the 
Taimua  certain  concessions  with  regard  to  the  local  government 
of  the  town  of  Apia.  The  concessions  planned  by  the  convention 
were  considered  by  the  British  consul  to  be  in  the  interest  of  all  the 
foreign  residents  in  the  islands.  On  being  recjuested  to  join  in  this 
action,  the  American  consul,  ]\Ir.  Griffin,  had  refused,  stating  that 
he  had  been  instructed  by  his  Government  "not  to  take  part  with 
the  re])resentatives  of  other  nations  nor  to  interfere  in  any  way  with 
the  governmental  affairs  of  Samoa.  "^^  This  seems  somewhat  at 
variance  with  the  instructions  which  Secretary  Evarts  declareci 
to  the  German  representative  at  Washington  he  had  given  to 
Griffin  on  his  return  to  Samoa ,'^'-  namely,  that  he  should  assist  his 
colleagues  in  any  undertakings  making  for  the  establishment  of 
peace  and  order  in  the  islands.  It  is  quite  possible,  however,  that 
the  American  consul  did  not  consider  the  convention  as  an  under- 
taking making  for  peace  and  order.  In  his  assertion,  of  the  policy 
of  non-interference  with  the  native  Samoan  Government,  he  was 
correctly  carrying  out  the  United  States'  oft-expressed  policy. 
The  British  consul  having  met  with  delay  and  refusal  in  the  pro- 
jected convention  with  the  Samoan  Government,  presented  it 
once  more  modified  in  certain  respects  to  the  Taimua  with  the 
threat  that  within  twenty-four  hours  force  would  be  used  to 
exact  such  guarantees  as  might  be  considered  necessary.'^  There- 
upon the  Samoan  Government  appealed   to  the  United  States 

=»Ibicl.,  p.  89.  'nhid.,  p.  92. 

"  Ibid.,  p.  57,  also  p.  113.  5'  Ibid.,  p.  110. 


130    s.\moa:  the  united  states  and  Germany  in  the  pacific 

I  Consul  and  INIr.  Griffin  hoisted  the  American  flag  at  INIuHnuu  over 
that  of  the  Samoan  Government.  Upon  the  German  consul's 
request  for  an  explanation,  he  stated^^  that  he  had  taken  that  action 
to  protect  the  Governments  both  of  the  United  States  and  of 
Samoa  from  further  indignities  at  the  hands  of  the  British  repre- 
sentatives, that  Sir  Arthur  Gordon's  attempt  to  force  upon  the 
people  of  Samoa  a  treaty  obnoxious  to  them  was  sirfficient  justi- 
fication for  his  act.  He  added  that,  while  he  had  been  instructed 
not  to  interfere  in  the  governmental  affairs  of  Samoa,  he  had  not 
been  instructed  to  refuse  to  take  the  islands  under  the  protection  of 
the  United  States  under  such  conditions  as  now  prevailed,  and  that 
the  American  flag  was  raised  at  the  unanimous  request  of  the 
Taimua  and  Faipule  (upper  and  lower  houses  of  the  native  Samoan 
Government).  This  action,  though  technically  contradictory  to 
the  consul's  instructions  and  disavowed  by  the  American  Govern- 
ment, was  in  general  character  consonant  with  the  American 
policy  of  prevention  of  encroachments  upon  the  rights  of  the  natives. 
Such  was  the  state  of  afi"airs  when  the  German  Consul  seized 
the  ports  of  Saluafata  and  Falealii  for  the  purpose  of  claiming 
most-favored-nation  treatment  as  -guaranteed  by  its  agreement  of 
1877.  The  American  Consul  Griffin  protested  against  the  seizure 
of  the  ports  as  without  justification  and  as  contrary  to  inter- 
national usage.^5  The  German  agreement  with  the  chiefs,  on  which 
the  seizure  was  based  Griffin  declared  to  have  been  "only  a  tem- 
porary matter  made  during  the  time  of  war  for  the  protection  of 
foreign  proi^erty  in  Samoa."""  The  British  acting  consul,  Robert 
Swanston,  took  a  difl'erent  stand  requesting  to  be  pro^■ided  with  a 
copy  of  the  agreement^''  and  afterward  testifying  to  its  validity  as 
an  instrument.    In  several  instances  at  this  time  it  is  noticeable 

5^  Ibid.,  pp.  104  and  107.  "  11,1^1    p   124. 

•'^'^  There  is  nothing  in  the  agreement  to  indicate  its  temporary  character 
and  the  conditions  of  signing  seem  to  have  been  formal  and  regular  (Ibid, 
p.  136).  Yet  it  is  strange  that  it  seemed  to  be  unfamiHar  a  year  later  both 
to  the  British  Acting  Consul  in  Samoa  (Ibid.,  p.  125)  and  to  Lord  Salisbury 
himself  (Ibid.,  p.  136),  each  having  requested  to  be  furnished  with  a  copy  of 
the  agreement. 

='  Ibid.,  pp.  125  and  133,  also  p.  S7. 


COOPERATION    OF   GREAT   BRITAIN    AND   GEHMAXV  1^1 

that  tlie  British  and  German  pohcies  coincidod  in  rejiard  to  their  ^ 
procednre   in    the   protection    of   their   interests   in    the   ishmds.'^ 
Especially  in  the  German  ertorts  to  obtain  a  commercial  treaty  with     • 
Samoa  was  the  British  support  evident,  Lord  Salisbury  instructing    ) 
the  British  consul  to  lend  his  whole  influence  to  the  support  ("mit 
seinem  ^anzen  Einfluss  zu  unterstuetzen ")  of  the  German  efforts 
to   conclude   a    treaty   with   Samoa.^^     The   German   consul  was 
instructed    reciprocally    to    assist    the    British    representative    to 
obtain  a  similar  treaty  for  Great  Britain.     There  seems  to  have      i 
been  little  compunction  on  the  part  of  either  of  the  two  nations 
against  using  force  against  the  natives  to  obtain  the  conventions 
desired. 

Meanwhile  the  Samoan  ambassador  Le  [Nlamea  had  returned 
to  the  islands  bearing  with  him  the  eagerly  sought  treaty  with 
the  United  States.  He  was  brought  back  to  Samoa  on  the  U.  S.  S. 
"Adams"  and  was  accompanied  by  a  special  commissioner  from 
the  United  States,  ^Ir.  Gustavus  Goward,*'"  who  attended  the 
ceremonies  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Taimua  and 
Faipule,  addressed  the  assembled  chiefs,  and  later  superintended 
the  transfer  of  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago  to  the  United  States 
according  to  the  pro\'isions  of  the  treaty.  As  e\idence  of  the 
transfer,  he  erected  the  American  flag  on  Goat  Island  commanding 
the  harbor. 


"  Ibid.,  p.  89. 

Sir  Arthur  Gordon  to  His  Imperial  German  Majesty's  Consul  for  Samoa. 

Api.\,  16th  February,  1878. 


"Xot  only  does  it  appear  to  me  that  the  interest  of  all  foreign  residents 
in  Samoa  are,  in  substance  identical,  but  1  am  aware  that  the  Government  of 
Her  Britannic  Majesty  are  entirely  in  accord  as  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued 
with  regard  to  those  interests.  Whatever,  therefore,  be  your  deci.sion  as  to 
this  rerjuest,  I  shall  at  least  have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  in  any  case 
we  have  the  same  object  in  view." 

(See  also  Ibid.,  p.  93  (Anl.  D),  p.  112,  No.  25,  p.  87). 

"Ibid.,  p.  142. 

*"  For  Mr.  Goward's  report  on  his  mission  to  Samoa  see  Senate  Executive 
Documents  No.  2,  46th  Congress,  1st  Session.  A  resolution  calling  for  the 
report  was  adopted  by  the  Senate,  March  3rd,  1879,  the  Senate  immediately 
thereafter  entered  into  Executive  Session.  (See  Senate  Journal,  46th 
Congress,  .3rd  Session,  1878-1879,  p.  487.) 


132      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES    AND   GERMANY  IN   THE    PACIFIC 

Mr.  Goward  was  enthusiastically  received  by  the  Samoans, 
whose  delight  over  the  treaty  seems  to  have  been  quite  spon- 
taneous.*^^ In  return  he  set  forth  to  them  the  good-will  of  the 
United  States,  the  first  nation  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  Samoa, 
which  it  thereby  recognized  to  be  an  independent  nation.  He 
drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  treaty  had  been  ratified  by 
the  Samoan  Government,  free  from  influence  or  force  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States.  In  case  of  trouble  the  United  States — as 
stipulated  by  the  treaty — stood  ready  to  extend  its  good  offices, 
Samoa  having  the  honor  to  be  the  first  place  so  far  distant  which 
had  induced  the  United  States  to  so  extend  its  active  influence. 
The  Samoans  were  apparently  entirely  satisfied  with  the  treaty 
and  seemed  to  consider  that  Le  Mamea  had  gained  for  them  what 
they  had  sought.''^    Mr.  Griffin  announced  to  them  that  they  no^^• 

"1  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  2,  46th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  2. 

^2  Goward  Report,  No.  1.  "The  Reception  of  the  Treaty  with  Samoa." 
(Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  2,  46th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  3.) 

"On  receiving  the  ratified  treaty,  I  repUed  as  follows: 

"'Great  is  the  love  which  America  bears  to  Samoa  strengthened  by  j-our 
action  this  da.y  in  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  I  hold  in  my  hand.  The  first 
instrument  of  the  kind  in  your  histor}',  it  is  a  living  testimony  of  the  love  and 
high  respect  in  which  you  hold  the  guardian  of  your  choice.  Of  America's 
vast  extent  of  country,  power,  wealth,  resources,  and  population  your  late 
ambassador,  Mamea,  will  tell  you.  After  many  years  of  petition,  at  last 
America,  in  her  faith  in  the  l^rotherhood  of  mankind,  has  heard  your  pathetic 
appeals,  and  seven  thousand  miles  away  has  stretched  forth  her  powerful 
hand  to  your  aid.  She  recognizes  your  assembled  rulers  and  chiefs,  the  Taimua, 
and  Faipule,  as  the  Samoan  Government,  and  Samoa  itself  as  an  independent 
nation  among  other  nations  of  the  earth  such  as  England,  Germany,  and 
France,  entitled  with  them  to  the  courtesies  and  rights  known  to  international 
law.  Other  i)eople  like  yourselves,  struggling  for  independence  and  national 
position,  have  in  vain  sought  for  her  powerful  aid  and  recognition.  You 
have  the  honor  to  be  the  first  to  induce  her  to  extend  her  good  offices  and 
active  influence  to  islands  so  far  distant.  She  does  this  in  the  hope  that 
the  faith  she  has  in  you  has  not  been  misplaced,  and  that  you  prove  yourselves 
as  worthy  of  confidence  in  the  future  as  today  you  make  manifest.  By 
such  treaties  nations  with  each  other  bind  more  closely  the  ties  of  friendship 
and  increase  their  conunercial  intercourse.  So  it  will  be  in  this  case,  creating 
public  ])r()S]:)erity  and  advancing  your  progress.  The  voluntary  readiness 
and  unanimity  witii  which  you  have  ratified  this  treat}-,  free  from  influence 
or  force  on  our  part,  will  l)e  a  most  pleasing  duty  for  me  to  report  to  the 
tTnited  States  Government.  For  the  welcome  and  expressions  of  gratitude 
to  which  you  have  given  utterance,  l)e  pleased  to  accept  thanks.' 

"Consul  Griflin  remarked,  in  closing  the  interview,  that  they  now  had  what 
they  had  asked  for,  and  that  everything  had  come  to  pass  as  he  had  foretold 
them;  they  coukl  always  rely  on  the  American  Government  as  sure  to  keep 
its  promise  and  as  bearing  good  will  towards  them." 


RECEPTION  OF   AMERICAN  TREATY  l^V.i 

hail  what  they  had  wished  for,  which  was  misleading  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  they  had  asked  for  annexation.  Just  what  their 
understanding  was  of  their  relationship  to  the  United  States 
through  the  treaty  is  not  clear  hut  it  was  at  least  feared  by  the 
German  Consul''*  that  they  considered  themselves  to  l>e  under 
American  protection,  although  the  treaty  did  not  provide  for  such 
a  status.  The  fear  as  to  just  how  the  Samoan  enthusiasm  for  the 
United  States  might  afi'ect  commercial  interests  of  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  in  the  islands  expressed  itself  in  an  attitude  of 
coolness  on  the  part  of  the  German  and  British  Consuls  toward 
the  American  connnissioner.  They  absented  themselves  from  the 
celebrations  in  honor  of  the  treaty  and  the  criticisms  of  their  press 
were  adverse.  ]\Ir.  Goward  expressed  satisfaction  that  he  had  been 
able  to  secure  prompt  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Samoan 
Go^'ernment,  thus  pre^'enting  active  interference  by  other  foreign] 
officials.''^  Urom  the  viewpoint  of  the  German  Consul,  INIr.  Gow-' 
ard's  attitude  seemed  high-handed  and  unfriendly  to  German 
interests.  In  an  inter^^ew'^■^  Mr.  Goward  had  told  Herr  Weber 
that  he  considered  the  German  agreement  of  1877  to  be  terminated 
(erledigt);  that  Article  IV  (/.  e.,  granting  to  Germany  most-fa vored- 

"  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  88. 

Der  Kaiserliche  Konsiil  an  das  Auswaertige  Amt. 


"Heute  kani  mir  seine  (Mr.  Maudslay,  British  Consular  Superintendent) 
Korrespondenz  mit  Herrn  Griffin  zu  Gesicht,  woraus  hervorgeht,  dass  die 
Taimua  sich  unter  amcrikanischen  Schutz  stellen  und  anscheinend  nur  durch 
\'ermittelung  des  Mr.  Griffin  mit  dem  englischen  Vertreter  verhandeln  woUten 
indem  Herr  Griffin  auf  Grund  des  abgeschlossenen  Traktats  das  Recht  der 
Intervention,  heansprucht  und  den  englischen  Vertretern  quasi  das  Recht 
abspricht,  direkt  mit  den  samoanischen  Autoritaeten  zu  verhandeln,  tjezie- 
hungsweise  Repressalien  anzuwenden.  Der  enghsche  Vertreter  wird  selbst- 
redend  heirvon  keine  Notiz  nehmen. 

Es  wuerde  fuer  alle  Besitzenden  auf  Samoa  hoechst  unheilvoU  sein  wenn 
der  Traktat  Amerikas  eine  solche  Interpretation  zulassen  und  dieselbe  von 
anderen  Staaten  anerkannt  werden  soUte. 

.\us  den  bisher  bekannt  gewordenen  Inhalt  jenes  Traktats  ist  solches 
indess  nicht  herauszulesen,  und  waere  ja  ein  solcher  Anspruch  auch  nicht 
denkbar,  wenn  die  Amerikanische  Regicrung  nicht  ausdruecklicli  eine  Pro- 
tektorat  ueber  Samoa  erwirbt."     (gez.)  Th.  Weber. 

"  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  2,  46th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  10. 
«5  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  2.39,  p.  115. 


134      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

nation  privileges  in  Samoa)  could  only  be  considered  as  polite 
phraseology;  it  was  not  at  all  necessary  for  Samoa  to  conclude 
treaties  with  the  other  nations  represented  there.  The  German 
Consul  replied  that  the  German  inhabitants  of  the  island  had 
earned  for  themselves  the  right  to  a  voice  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Samoan  Islands  and  that,  while  they  never  claimed  anything 
which  could  be  considered  to  be  a  restriction  of  the  treaty  rights 
of  other  nations,  nevertheless,  equahty  of  treatment  in  Samoa  had 
become  Germany's  unquestioned  right.  After  inquiring  into  the 
conditions  of  the  treaty  which  the  Germans  proposed  to  conclude 
with  Samoa,  ]Mr.  Goward  offered  to  act  as  intermediary.  This 
Herr  Weber  promptly  refused  as  incompatible  with  the  dignity  of 
the  Imperial  Government  and  of  the  status  of  German  interests 
in  the  islands.  ^leanwhile  the  German  warships  continued  to  hold 
possession  of  the  harbors  of  Saluafata  and  Falealii  until  the  German 
treaty  could  be  consummated. 

The  actions  of  the  American  Consul  and  of  Mr.  Goward  were 
only  examples  of  that  overzealousness  on  the  part  of  local  officials 
(of  each  of  the  three  nations)  which  became  a  typical  cause  of 
international  troubles  in  Samoa.^^  The  hoisting  of  the  American 
flag  over  the  Samoan  flag  at  IMulinuu  by  j\Ir.  Griffin  was  dis- 
avowed by  the  Govermnent  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Griffin 
himself  was  transferred  to  the  Fiji  Islands  and  Secretary  Seward 
gave  the  German  ambassador  at  Washington  to  understand  that 
the  instructions  given  to  the  new  consul,  Mr.  Dawson  would 
prevent  the  repetition  of  such  occurrences.^^ 

On  his  return  to  the  United  States,  Mr.  Goward  presented  a 
report  of  his  mission  and  included  in  it  a  review  of  the  commercial 
developments  in  Samoa  and  his  impressions  as  to  the  value  of  the 
islands.  He  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  harbor  at  Pago- 
Pago,  which  had  just  come  into  the  possession  of  the  United  States. 
He  pronounced  it  the  most  important  harbor  in  the  south  seas,*** 
being  large  enough  to  hold  the  fleets  of  several  nations,  and  at  the 

6«  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  507. 

"V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  1-il;  also  p.  xviii  of  Denkschrift. 

«8Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  2,  40th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  15. 


(JOWAUl)    HEl>OHT  135 

same  lime,  so  land-locked  as  to  be  secure  from  hurricanes  and 
storm  and  easy  of  tlefense  from  land  or  sea  attacks.  As  a  con- 
clusion to  the  whole  report  of  his  mission  to  Samoa,  he  repeats  his 
convictions  of  the  importance  of  Pago-Pago  to  the  United  States 
in  the  following  terms  :'''•' 

"To  Pago-Pago  harbor  in  itself  attention  has  been  called^with 
reference  to  its  topographical  features,  its  capacity,  its  internal 
fitness  for  a  naval  station  and  its  possession  by  the  United  States. 
Additit)nal  allusion  should  be  made  to  its  general  importance.  In 
a  naval  point  of  view  it  is  the  key  position  to  the  Samoan  Group, 
and  likewise  to  Central  Polynesia,  admirably  located  for  the  pro- 
tection of  American  commerce,  upon  the  increase  in  those  waters. 
The  Samoan  Archipelago  is  now,  by  reason  of  its  geographical 
position  in  the  center  of  Polynesia,  lying  in  the  course  of  vessels 
from  San  Francisco  to  Auckland,  from  Panama  to  Sydney,  and 
from  ^'alparaiso  to  China  and  Japan,  and  from  the  fact  of  being 
outside  the  hurricane  track,  the  most  valuable  group  in  the  South 
Pacific.  Situated  half  way  between  Honolulu  and  Auckland, 
Pago-Pago  would  be  a  most  convenient  stopping  place  or  coaling 
station  for  vessels  or  steamers  either  for  supplies  or  the  exchange 
of  commodities.  Should  a  naval  station  and  the  adjuncts  that 
accompany  be  established,  and  the  Pacific  mail  steamers  make  it  a 
port  of  call,  it  would  necessarily  become  the  controlling  commercial 
point  in  that  part  of  Polynesia.  These  are  ends  most  worthy  of 
accomplishment,  from  the  results  that  would  follow,  in  the  civil- 
ization of  the  natives,  in  the  starting  of  profitable  industries,  and 
the  establishment  of  factories  and  plantations  on  the  difterent 
islands.  With  trade  connections  throughout  the  south  seas,  this 
wealth  of  products  would  be  augmented  aufl  naturally  fall  into 
the  hands  of  Americans  interesting  themselves,  who  would  find  a 
market  for  their  commodities  in  the  nearest  American  port  of 
San  Francisco.  This  is  a  commercial  matter  of  such  paramount 
im])ortance  to  the  merchants  of  the  Pacific  States  as  to  call  for 
their  immediate  attention  and  action." 

«»  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  Nc.  2,  46th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  29. 


136      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY  IN   THE    PACIFIC 

Goward's  testimony  was  endorsed  shortly  afterward  by  the 
German  minister  in  Washington,  who,  in  announcing  to  Seward 
the  consummation  of  the  German  treaty,  admitted  that  the 
United  States  had  secured  the  best  harbor  in  Samoa. ^^  In  spite  of 
such  praise,  however,  the  pubUc  in  the  United  States  took  httle 
interest  in  the  new  harbor,  the  House  of  Representatives  refused 

I  to  vote  it  a  coalyard  and  it  remained  deserted  and  undeveloped  for 
a  number  of  years. 

After  considerable  difficulty  and  delay — which  were  declared 
due  to  the  opposition  of  rival  influences  in  the  islands — the  German 
Consul  and  the  commander  of  the  German  warship  "Ariadne" 
succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the  Samoans  the  long-sought  treaty.'^ 
Immediately  on  its  signature  they  raised  the  siege  of  the  harbors 
and  saluted  the  Samoan  Government. 
^       The  German  treaty  with  Samoa ^-  had  as  its  underlying  motive 

1'  the  securing  for  the  German  Empire  of  all  the  privileges  of  the 
most-favored-nation  in  relations  with  the  island  group.  It  was 
therefore  openly  admitted  that  it  had  been  modelled  to  a  consider- 
able extent  on  the  recent  treaty  between  Samoa  and  the  United 
States. ^^  The  latter  country  having  been  granted  the  harbor  of 
Pago-Pago,  the  Germans  chose  for  themselves  that  of  Saluafata, 
obtaining  in  that  harbor  the  exclusive  right  to  establish  a  na^'al 
or  coaling  station  for  German  ships. ''^     It  was  expressly  stipulated. 

'"'  F.  W.  Seward,  "Reminiscences  of  a  Wartime  Statesman  and  Diplomat,'' 
p.  440.     (See  also  Appendix.) 

"  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  179. 

'2  Ibid.,  p.  1.  "  Ibid.,  p.  1S5. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  1. 

Artikel  V 

"Es  soil  den  deutschen  Kriegschitfen  freistehen,  in  den  Hafen  von  Saluafata 
einzulaufen,  dasellist  zu  ankern,  zu  verweilen,  Bedarf  einzunehmen  und 
tiuszubessern,  und  der  deutschen  Regierung  soil  es  ferner  freistehen,  in  jenem 
Hafen  nach  cigenem  Ermessen  alle  fuer  die  deutschen  Kriegsschiffe  und  deren 
Besatzungen  nuetzlichen  Einrichtungen  und  Anordnungen  zu  treffen. 

Die  Samoa  Regierung  ist  ferner  damit  einver.standen,  class  die  deutsche 
Regierung  an  den  l^fern  jenes  Hafens  Gebaude  Zwecks  Lagerung  von  Kohlen 
und  irgend  anderen  Bedarfsgegenstaende  fuer  die  deutschen  Kriegsschiffe  und 
deren  Besatzungen  errichtet.  Es  soil  der  deutschen  Regierung  auch  freistehen, 
auf  deni  Lande  wo  die  Stationsgehaeude  errichtet  werden  ihre  Flagge  aufzu- 
ziehen,  jedoch  soil  die  Oherhoheit  der  Samoa  Regierung  ueher  den  Hafen  von 
Saluafata  dadurch  in  keiner  Weisc  geschmaelert  oder  beeintraechtigt  werden. 


CiEH.MAX-y.VMOAX   THKATY,    1879  137 

however,  tliat  the  sovereignty  of  tlie  Sjuiioan  Government  over  the 
harbor  should  be  in  no  wise  diminished  or  afi'ected  by  the  con- 
cession.^" Sahiafata  was  chosen  because  it  offered  protection  to 
^essels  througliout  the  whole  year,  whereas  Apia  lay  open  to  the 
full  force  of  the  hurricanes  during  the  stormy  season.  But,  Apia 
being  the  conunercial  center  of  the  islands,  it  was  considered 
necessary  to  guarantee  that  place  a  free  and  independent  develop- 
ment, so  that  a  special  clause  was  inserted  providing  against  any 
future  curtailment  of  German  rights  in  Apia  harbor.  Other 
clauses  of  the  treaty  provided  for  mutual  freedom  of  intercourse, 
or  guaranteed  to  Germany  equal  commercial  treatment  with  all 
other  nations  in  Samoa.  Article  VIII, '"^  however,  involved  a 
principle  somewhat  different  from  any  contained  in  the  American 
treaty.  It  provided  that  all  laws,  regulations  and  taxes  to  which 
Germans  on  the  islands  might  be  subjected  were  to  be  submitted  \ 

andererseits  aber  verpflichtet  diese  auch  nichts  zu  thun,  wodurch  die  der 
deutschen  Regierung  in  diesem  Artikel  gewaehrten  Rechte  irgendwie  werthlos 
gemacht  oder  heeintraechtigt  werden  koennten.  Auch  soil  durch  die  in  diesem 
Artikel  der  deutschen  Regierung  gewaehrten  Rechte  der  Hafen  von  Saluafata 
den  Kriegs-  oder  HandelsschiiTen  derjenigen  Nationen  welchen  der  Samoa 
Regierung  ihre  Haefen  offenhaelt  nicht  verschlossen  werden,  jedoch  darf  die 
Regierung  von  Samoa  in  Bezug  auf  diesen  Hafen  und  seine  Ufer  keiner  anderen 
Nation  gleiche  Rechte,  wie  die  der  deutschen  Regierung  gewaehrten,  bewilligen. 
Es  soli  den  deutschen  Kriegsschiffen  ferner  freistehen,  auch  in  alle  anderen 
Plaetze,  Haefen,  und  Gewaesser  Samoas  einzulaufen  daselhst  zu  ankern,  zu 
verweilen,  Bedarf  einzunehmen  und  auszubessern,  nach  Massgabe  etwaiger, 
zwischen  den  l)eiderseitigen  Regierungen  zu  vereinbarenden  Gesetze,  und 
verspricht  die  Samoa  Regierung  hier  ferner,  dass  sie  keiner  anderen  Nation  in 
irgend  einer  Weise  irgendwelche  Vorrechte  vor  der  deutschen  Regierung  in 
Bezug  auf  den  Hafen  von  Apia  luid  dessen  Ufer  bewilligen  will,  sondern 
dass  die  deutsche  RegK-rung  auch  in  dicser  Bezichung  mit  anderen  Nationen 
immer  gleichberechtigt  sein  soil." 

^•^  Consul  Weber  stated  that  this  stipulation  was  inserted  because  of  instruc- 
tions from  his  government  (V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  187). 
There  is  no  corresponding  reservation  in  the  article  governing  the  transfer  of 
Pago-Pago  to  the  United  States.  (See  Appendix,  or  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large, 
45th  Congre.ss,  1877-1S79,  Vol.  xx,  p.  704.) 

'«  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  .\nl.  Nr.  239,  p.  vii. 

Article  VIII 

"Alle  Gesetze  und  N'erordnungen,  welchen  die  in  Samoa  sich  aufhaltenden 
deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  und  Schutzgenossen  sich  zu  unterwerfen,  sowie 
alle  Steuern  und  .\bgaben,  welche  dieselben  demgemaess  der  Samoa  Regierimg 
zu  entrichten  haben,  sollen  von  dem  deutschen  Konsul  oder  anderen  zu  dem 
Zwecke  von  der  deutschen    Regierung    ernannten    Personen  zusammen  mit 


138      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

to  the  German  Consul  or  other  German  representative,  who  should 
discuss  them  with  the  Samoan  official,  and  after  this  had  taken 
place,  those  laws  were  to  become  valid  only  after  they  had  received 
the  sanction  of  the  German  Government.  This  Consul  Weber 
considered  to  be  a  necessary  measure^''  to  assure  to  the  Imperial 
Government  the  right  to  exert  over  the  regulation  of  affairs  in 
Samoa  an  influence  which  he  held  to  be  justified  by  the  condition 
of  affairs  there.  The  Imperial  Government,  he  considered,  could 
not  reject  such  a  limited  participation  without  laying  the  present 
German  interests  there  open  to  foreign  influence.  The  pre- 
dominance of  German  developments  in  Samoa,  resulting  in  the 
great  proportion  of  taxes  being  paid  by  German  subjects,  made  it, 
he  said,  fitting  and  necessary  that  the  Germans  should  have  a  voice 
in  questions  of  taxation.  The  clause  seems  to  have  met  with  no 
great  objection  from  the  Samoans  or  from  the  other  foreign  nations 
interested,  yet  it  distinctly  compromises  the  autonomy  of  the 
Samoan  Government.  Another  clause  of  the  treaty  (Article  VI)" 
secured  for  the  Germans  living  in  Samoa  definite  title  to  all  their 
lands  purchased  up  to  that  date  and  stipulated  against  any  further 
question  as  to  the  validity  of  their  possession.  The  treaty  was 
considered  by  the  German  Government"^  to  be  well  suited  to  the 
protection  of  German  interests  in  the  immediate  Samoan  group, 
but  that  it  would  have  little  effect  unless  completed  by  other 
treaties  or  agreements  with  the  other  island  groups,  for  the  com- 
merce of  which  Samoa  served  as  a  point  of  distribution.  The  labor 
supply  for  the  plantations  on  Samoa  had  to  be  secured  from  the 
other  islands  of  Polynesia,^"  consequently  there  was  keen  rivalry 
between  the  competing  companies-^especially  between  the  Ger- 
man and  English  firms — in  securing  and  importing  workers.  In 
the  case  of  islands  which  had  become  definitely  protectorates  of 


Beamten  der  Samoa-Regicning  berathen  werden,  ebenso  alle  zweckdienstlichen 
Massregeln,  um  die  Beobachtung  solcher  Gesetze  und  Verordnungen  diirch 
die  Deutschen  in  Samoa  hcrbeizufuehren,  jedoeh  sollen  alle  solche  gemein- 
schaftlich  von  den  Beamten  der  beiderseitigen  Regierungen  berathenen  und 
vereinbarten  Gesetze  und  Massnahmen  erst  nach  erlangter  Bestaetigung 
derselben  durch  die  deutsche  Rcgierung  in  Kraft  treten." 

"  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anl.  Nr.  239,  p.  188.  '^  Ibid.,  p.  vi. 

"  Ibid.,  Denkschrift,  p.  xx.  «» Ibid.,  p.  209. 


GERMAN  TREATIES   WITH    POLYNESIAN   CHIEFS  139 

Great  Britain,  the  inhabitants  were  not  i)ermitted  to  emigrate  to 
an>-  but  British  possessions  and  Great  Britain  secured  there})y  a 
niono})ol\-  of  the  hd)or  supply  in  those  regions. ^^  It  was  therefore 
held  important  to  keep  open  to  German  firms  the  sources  of 
plantation  labor  in  the  Pacific  and  Consul  Weber  was  sent  on  a 
cruise  throughout  Pol^^lesia,  forming  with  the  chiefs  treaties  or 
agreements,  the  main  tenor  of  which  was  to  prevent  any  other 
nations  from  securing  a  monopoh'  and  to  assure  for  Germany 
most-favored-nation  treatment  in  all  respects.  Where  the  inhabi- 
tants were  not  sufficiently  civilized  to  make  a  written  agreement 
possible,  the  site  for  a  coaling  station  was  jmrchased.  The  policy, 
however,  as  expressly  stipulated  in  the  instructions  of  the  foreign 
office*-  was  to  avoid  the  actual  purchasing  of  harbors  and  to  secure 
merel>'  the  use  of  them  for  German  naval  vessels;  to  secure  equal 
treatment  of  German  interests,  but  nowhere  to  conclude  agree- 
ments ^\hich  should  interfere  with  the  freedom  of  intercourse 
of  other  nations  in  those  islands.  In  summing  up  the  German 
policy  in  the  Pacific  at  this  time,  the  Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office 
declared*^  before  the  Reichstag  that  all  the  agreements  concluded 

«'  Ibid.,  p.  174,  also  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  73,  par.  183. 

*-  Ibid.,  Denkschrift,!?.  xix. 

«  V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  II,  58  Sitz.,  13  Juni,  1S79,  p.  1602. 

Von    Biielow   (Bevollmaechtigter  zum    Bundesrath,  Staatssekretaer    des 
Auswaertigen  Amts,  Staatsminister). 


"Es  wuerden  aber  diese  Vertraege  auf  nichts  anderes  hinauslaufen,  als  auf 
ein  gleiche.s  Recht  fuer  alle;  wir  wollten  kein  Monopol,  keine  Ausschliessung 
anderer.  8omit  naehmen  wir  fuer  diese  Niederlassungen  einfach  das  Recht 
in  Ansjjruch,  dass  dasjenige,  was  durch  die  treue  deutsche  Arbeit,  durch 
den  ehrenwerthen  tueohtigen  Unternehmungsgeist  dort  gegruendet  und  in 
erfreulicher  Weise  entwickelt  sei,  auch  das  Recht  behalte,  was  es  durch  seineu 
I'rsprung  erworljen  und  in  der  .Stille  entwickelt  habe,  naemlich,  das  gleiche 
Recht  mit  Allen,  8chutz  gegen  unberechtigte  Konkurrenten,  die  zum  Nach- 
theil  des  deutschen  Handels  und  der  deutschen  Niederlassungen  gcreichten: 
Das  ist  in  jedem  der  Schriftstuecke,  die  abgedruckt  und  beigefuegt  sind,  als 
leitender  Gedanke  mehr  oder  weniger  zum  Ausdruck  gebracht,  uns  ist  dies  der 
leitende   Gedanke   geblieben. 


Ich  betrachte  es  als  ein  glueckliches  Anzeichen  fuer  das  Gelingen  der  sich 
daran  knuepfcnden  Bestrebungen  fuer  die  Aufrechterhaltung  dieses  Vertrages, . 
dass  wir  gleichzeitig  mit  dem  Aljschluss  dessell)en  von  Seiten  der  beiden 
grossen  befreundeten  Seemaechte,  welche  gleichfalls  Interessen  in  Samoa  haben 
imd  vertreten,  die  Anerkennung  und  freundliche  Anerkennimg  l)ekonnnen 
haben,  dass  Vertraege  dieser  Art  der  rechte  ^^'eg  seien,  um  der  Unsicherheit 


140      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

aimed  at  nothing  further  than  an  equal  right  for  all — that  Germany 
wished  to  found  no  colonies  and  to  establish  no  monopolies  but  only 
to  make  certain  that  German  commerce  should  enjoy  good  and 
equal  rights  with  that  of  any  other  nation.  ^Moreover,  he  con- 
sidered it  as  a  happy  evidence  of  the  success  of  the  treaty  that  he 
had  received  from  both  of  the  other  interested  powers,  friendly 
recognition  that  treaties  of  this  sort  were  the  right  way  to  end 
uncertainties  and  solve  the  problems  involved. 

Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  German  treaty  with  Samoa,  Herr 
Weber,  the  German  Consul,  following  his  instructions,  set  about 
assisting  the  British  Consul  to  obtain  a  treaty  for  Great  Britain.** 
While  the  negotiations  were  in  progress  an  event  occurred  which 
revealed  rather  clearly  the  contrasting  attitudes  of  the  foreign 
representatives  toward  the  Government  of  Samoa.  ^^  The  Taimua 
and  Faipule  sent  out  an  invitation  to  the  three  consuls  to  meet 
them  in  conference  concerning  the  making  of  certain  laws  and 
especially  to  ask  the  consuls  for  their  opinion  as  to  the  ad\isability 
of  taking  into  the  government  as  adviser  a  certain  American 
gentleman  then  residing  in  Apia.  Herr  W^eber  stated  that  he  was 
opposed  to  the  Samoans  taking  any  foreigner  into  their  govern- 
ment as  adviser,  believing  that  it  would  give  rise  to  difficulties  as 
in  the  time  of  Steinberger.  ^Moreover,  such  an  adviser  should  have 
the  endorsement  of  the  three  governments,  Germany,  England 
and  America,  which  could  not  well  be  done  imtil  the  Samoan 

ein  Ende  zu  machen.  Ich  bin  ueberzeugt,  dass  gerade  die  freie  Gleichberecht- 
igung,  die  sich  nicht  weiter  in  die  inneren  Verhaeltnisse  einmischt  als  zur 
Aufrechterhrtltung  iind  Durchfuehrung  des  Vertrags,  zur  Sicherstellung  der 
erworbenen  Privatreehte,  der  freien  Ein-  und  Ausfuhr  noethig  ist  der  einzige 
Weg  ist,  die  grosse  Konkurrenz  der  Nationen  wie  ich  sohon  erwaehnte,  gerade 
an  diesem  Punkte  der  Suedsee  mehr  und  mehr  friedlich  auszugleichen. 


So  viel  ueber  diesen  Vertrag,  meine  Herren.  Was  aber  im  uebrigen  die 
weiteren  Entwuerfe  und  Vorbereitungen  zu  Vcrtraegen  oder  wie  man  sie 
nennen  will,  niit  den  umliegenden  kleinen  Inseln  angeht,  die  Sie  in  der  sehr 
interessanten  Kundfahrt  des  Herrn  Ka])itaen  von  Werner  lieschrieben  finden, 
so  glaube  ieh,  darauf  verweisen  zu  duerfen  dass  die  Sache  noch  nicht  abge- 
schlossen  ist,  dass  alier  dieselben  Gnnidsaetze,  welche  fuer  diesen  heutigen 
Vertrag  leitend  gewesen  sind,  auch  da  geltend  bleiben:  wir  wollen  keine 
Kolonien  dort  gruenden,  wir  wollen  kein  Monopol  gegen  andere  haben,  wir 
wollen  nur  feststellen,  soweit  man  es  feststellen  kann,  dass  deutsche  Schifffahrt 
und  Handel  dort  gutes  Recht  und  gleiches  Recht  haben." 

84  Ibid.,  p.  190.  «5  11,1(1^  p   191. 


liHlTISU-SA.MOAN    TREATY,    lS7i)  141 

Govornniont  had  made  some  form  of  ajireemeiit  witli  E]iij;laii(l. 
In  the  meantime  the  eonsnls  of  the  three  powers  \vonld  he  j;lad  to 
lend  their  assistance  and  advice  to  the  Samoan  Government  in 
framing  new  laws  or  regnlations  for  the  islands.  The  British 
acting  consul,**^  Mr.  Swanson,  expressed  a  similar  opinion,  stating 
that  while  his  conntry  had  nt)  defined  relations  with  the  Samoan 
Government,  which  ha<l  the  right  to  appoint  what  officials  it  chose, 
nevertheless,  he  thonght  that  the  service  of  foreigners  in  the 
government  was  not  needed  and  wonld  probably  create  jealonsy 
and  tronble.  The  United  States  Consnl,  Mr.  Dawson,  however, 
was  emphatic  in  his  assertion  of  their  right  to  do  as  they  pleased. 
The  United  States  had  recognized  the  Samoans  as  a  free  and 
independent  nation — as  snch  they  had  the  right  to  avail  them- 
selves of  any  assistance  they  wished  or  to  take  fifty  foreigners  into 
their  service  if  they  saw  fit  to  do  so.  On  the  expediency  of  so 
doing,  however,  he  refused  to  commit  himself  or  to  give  any 
advice. 

The  British  treaty  with  Samoa  was  finally  consummated  toward 
the  end  of  the  same  year.*^''  This  was  also  based  on  the  general 
principle  of  secnrhig  for  British  subjects  and  their  interests  equal 
rights  and  privileges  with  subjects  of  all  other  foreign  nations  in 
Samoa.  The  British  also  secured  for  themselves  the  right  to 
establish  a  naval  and  coaling  station  in  the  islands  in  any  harbor 
except  that  of  Apia,  Saluafata,  or  "  that  part  of  the  harbor  of  Pago- 
Pago  which  may  be  hereafter  selected  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  as  a  station."  Great  Britain  was  also  guaranteed 
the  peaceable  possession  of  all  lands  purchased  by  her  subjects 
from  the  Samoans  in  regular  manner — but  the  possibility  of  <li^- 
pute  was  admitted  and  its  settlement  provided  for  by  a  mixed 
commission  of  wSamoan  and  British  (officials.  This  differed  radically 
from  the  German  clause  which  practically  prevented  all  investi- 
gation of  disputed  titles  up  to  the  date  of  the  treaty^"^  and  estab- 
lished the  firm  of  Goddefroy  in  full  possession  of  all  the  lands 


»«  Ibid.,  p.  192. 

*'  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XV,  p.  i-i-i  ff.     (See  Ai)i)oii(lix.) 

8«  A.  &  P.,  18S9,  LXXXVI  (C-.5(J29),  p.  63. 


142      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANS'   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

claimed  by  them  and  disputed  by  other  nationals.  Like  the 
Germans,  the  British  insisted  on  a  determining  voice  in  the 
municipal  laws  and  police  regulations  as  they  affected  British 
subjects,  Article  VII  stipulating  that  British  subjects  would  be 
instructed  to  observe  "such  of  the  existing  municipal  laws  and 
police  regulations  of  Samoa  as  may  be  hereafter  agreed  upon  by 
agreement  between  the  Government  of  Her  Britannic  ^Majesty 
and  that  of  the  Samoan  State."  Like  the  corresponding  German 
clause,  this  was  a  limitation  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Samoan 
Government. 

The  British-Samoan  Treaty  was  concluded  with  King  INIalietoa, 
lately  restored  to  power  and  recognized  by  the  three  Treaty  Powers 
as  de  facto  ruler.  The  German  treaty  had  been  concluded  with  two 
houses  of  Samoa,  the  Taimua  and  Faipule,  who  had  for  two  years 
without  a  king  held  the  reins  of  government. 

There  is  nothing  in  either  the  British  or  German  treaties  which 
parallels  the  clause  in  the  American  treaty  providing  for  the 
friendly  intervention  or  the  exercise  of  good  offices  in  case  of 
troubles  arising  between  Samoa  and  a  third  nation.  This  clause 
placed  the  United  States  in  the  unique  position  of  a  kind  of  volun- 
tary protector  of  the  independence  of  Samoa. 

Very  shortly  after  the  signing  of  the  British  Treaty  a  general 
conventions^  was  drawn  up  between  the  Go\'ernment  of  Samoa 
and  the  Consuls  of  the  Powers,  providing  for  the  neutralization  of 
the  district  of  Apia,  the  town  and  harbor  being  placed  under  the 
government  of  a  municipal  board  consisting  of  the  consuls  of  those 


**»  House  Ex.  Doc,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1887-18S8,  Vol.  XXVIII,  No.  238, 
p.  132.  Convention  of  September  2nd,  1879,  also  Ibid.,  pp.  9  and  10.  Secre- 
tary Bayard,  in  1885,  defended  the  Municipal  Convention  in  his  instructions 
to  Consul  Greenebaum  (House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  10). 

"The  municipality  of  Apia,"  he  wrote,  "is  not  such  a  protectorate;  it  is  a 
compact  for  the  adniiui.stration  of  a  settlement  largely  jjeopled  by  aliens, 
whose  estal)lished  interests  there  are  entitled  to  the  security  which  such  an 
arrangement  affords.  \\'hile  it  is  true  that  the  Municipality  Convention  was 
intended  to  exert  a  moral  influence  in  favor  of  stable  and  good  government 
in  the  islands,  you  must,  as  the  American  consul,  be  careful  to  distinguish 
between  its  special  and  local  aims,  and  any  idea  of  a  tripartite  protectorate  to 
which  this  Government  may  be  deemed  a  party." 

(See  also  House  Ex.  Doc'  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  30.) 


APIA   MUXKIPAL   CONVENTION  143 

nations  having  treaty  relations  with  Samoa.  The  nmnicipal 
board  was  given  power  to  make  and  enforee  reguhitions  concerning 
peace  and  order,  pubUc  works,  sanitation,  taxation  and  other 
subjects  of  pubUc  concern  within  the  territory  designated,  and  such 
reguhitions  were  to  be  binchng  on  all  persons  within  the  distri(!t. 
In  time  of  war  this  district  was  to  be  held  as  neutral  territory  l:»e- 
tween  the  warring  factions  and  the  municipal  coimcil  was  empow- 
ered to  take  what  measure  it  considered  necessary  to  protect  that 
neutrality.  Having  thus  taken  into  their  own  hands  the  govern- 
ment of  the  principal  port  of  the  islands,  the  representatives  pro- 
ceeded to  give  better  appearance  to  their  act  by  p^o^•iding  that  the 
Samoan  flag  should  wave  over  the  building  where  the  municipal 
council  held  its  meetings  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  Samoa 
was  to  be  considered  in  no  way  prejudiced.  The  convention  was 
drawn  between  Samoa  and  Great  Britain,  the  other  two  nations 
acceding  to  the  articles  of  the  convention  through  separate  articles 
to  that  effect.  The  American  representatives  (Consul  Dawson  and 
Captain  Chandler  of  the  U.  S.  S.  "  Lackawanna  ")  acceded  to  the 
agreement  merely  provisionally,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
I'nited  States  Government.  The  convention  was  never  ratified 
by  the  United  States  Government.  In  practice,  however,  the 
American  consuls  took  their  due  part  in  the  administration  of  the 
flistrict  of  Apia  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  convention,  so 
that  it  was  tacitly  accepted  by  all. 

This  convention  may  be  considered  to  conclude  the  early  period 
of  Samoan  diplomacy — the  period  of  the  treaties.  Each  of  the 
three  great  nations  having  commercial  or  strategic  interests  in  the 
islands  had  placed  itself  by  formal  agreement  with  the  inhabitants 
on  a  basis  of  equality  of  treatment  with  the  other  powers  repre- 
sented there.  Each  nation  had  formally  acknowledged  the  inde- 
pendence of  Samoa.  Yet  Great  Britain  and  Germany  in  the  same 
treaties  in  which  they  announced  that  independence,  had  compro- 
mised it  through  the  clauses  ])roviding  for  their  control  over  the 
Samoan  legislation  affecting  British  and  German  subjects.  The 
United  States'  treaty  containal  no  provision  for  American  over- 
sight or  control  over  domestic  legislation  in  Samoa  even  where 
American  citizens  might  be  affected.    The  Convention  establishing 

10 


144    s.\:moa:  the  united  states  and  geemant  in  the  pacific 

the  Municipality  of  Apia  placed  the  administration  of  that  locality 
entirely  in  control  of  the  representatives  of  the  three  powers,  and 
constituted  therefore  a  curtailment  of  Samoan  native  rule  within 
the  prescribed  area,  The  United  States,  by  taking  part  in  this 
consular  government  of  Apia,  shared  in  the  foreign  control  over 
this  part  of  the  island,  but  never  became  formally  a  signatory  to 
the  convention. 

The  following  period  is  marked  by  increased  disorder  throughout 
the  islands.  The  frequent  conflicts  between  the  native  chiefs 
were  now^  increased  in  importance  by  the  support  given  to  one  side 
or  another  by  the  foreign  firms  established  there.  What  M-ould 
have  been  a  petty  war  between  one  Samoan  chieftain  and  another 
became  much  more  serious  when  one  of  those  chieftains  was  con- 
sidered to  be  the  champion  of  German  interests  and  his  opponent 
the  champion  of  American  or  British  interests — then  the  strife 
became  an  affair  of  the  consuls  and  finally  of  the  home  govern- 
ments. The  treaties  having  definitely  granted  equal  treatment  to 
each  of  those  governments,  there  was  the  increased  tendency  on  the 
part  of  foreign  residents  to  work  the  native  factions  for  national 
ends,  or  at  least  to  consider  national  interests  to  be  involved  in  the 
ordinary  commercial  rivalries.^" 

^^  According  to  Robert  Louis  Stevenson,  the  celebrated  chronicler  of  events 
in  Samoa,  this  was  especially  true  of  the  great  German  firm  of  Goddefroy  ct 
Co.,  now  bearing  the  title  of  "Deutsche  Handels-  und  Plantagengesellschaft 
fuer  Sued  See  Inseln  zu  Hamburg."  ("A  Footnote  to  History — Eight  Years 
of  Trouble  in  Samoa,"  in  "Letters  and  jVIiscellanies  of  Robert  Louis  Steven- 
son, Vol.  XIX,  p.  396.) 

"The  firm  is  GuUiver  among  the  Lilliputs;  and  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  while  the  small,  independent  traders  are  fighting  for  their  own  hand  and 
inflamed  with  the  usual  jealousy  against  corporations,  the  Germans  are  inspired 
with  a  sense  of  the  greatness  of  their  affairs  and  interests.  The  thought  of 
the  money  sunk,  the  sight  of  these  costly  and  beautiful  plantations  menaced 
j^early  by  the  returning  forest,  and  the  responsibihty  of  administering  with 
one  hand  so  many  conjimct  fortunes,  might  well  nerve  the  manager  of  such 
a  company  for  desperate  and  questionable  deeds.  I'pon  this  scale,  commer- 
cial sharpness  has  an  air  of  patriotism,  and  I  can  imagine  the  man,  so  far 
from  higgling  over  the  scourge  for  a  few  Solomon  Islanders,  prepared  to  oppress 
rival  firms,  overthrow  inconvenient  monarchs,  and  let  loose  the  dogs  of  war. 
"VMiatever  he  may  decide,  he  will  not  want  for  backing.  Every  clerk  will  be 
eager  to  be  up  and  strike  a  blow;  and  most  Germans  in  the  group,  whatever 
they  may  babble  of  the  firm  over  the  walnuts  and  the  wine,  will  rally  around 
the  national  concern  at  the  approach  of  difficulty.  They  are  so  few — I  am 
ashamed  to  give  their  number,  it  were  to  challenge  contradiction — thej'  are 


FOREIGN  EXECUTIVE   COUNCIL  145 


< 


Tlie  chiof  crtiise  of  native  (listurl)ance  was  rivalry  over  the 
kingship  of  Samoa.  There  seems  to  have  been  ahiiost  never  a 
king  who  had  the  sanetion  of  all  Samoa.  There  were  always  on 
liand  one  or  more  chiefs  aspiring  to  make  themselves  king  and  only 
looking  for  a  snfficient  following  or  sufficient  ammunition  to  start 
a  revolution.  So  that,  when  a  foreign  commercial  firm  considered 
that  the  monarch  then  in  power  was  opposing  its  interests,  it  had 
no  trouble  in  finding  rival  candidates  to  oppose  him  and  his 
measures. 

In  1879,  by  the  action  of  the  German  Captain  Deinhard  in 
agreement  with  the  American  and  British  representatives,  the 
chiefs  of  the  rival  factions  were  induced  to  meet  on  board  the 
"Bismarck."  then  at  anchor  at  Apia,  and  sign  an  agreement^^ 
to  end  hostilities.  They  also  reaffirmed  the  ratification  of  the 
American,  German  and  British  treaties  with  Samoa,  together  with 
the  municipal  convention,  and  appointed  as  king  (for  his  lifetime) 
]\Ialietoa  Talavou,  with  his  nephew  Malietoa  Laupepa  as  regent. 
A  new  flag  was  adopted  which  should  belong  to  no  particular  king 
but  should  show  the  unity  of  all  Samoa.  The  opposing  party, 
though  having  signed  the  agreement,  was  not  long  in  repudiating 
it,  and  civil  war  again  threatened  and  the  consuls  of  the  three 
nations  deemed  it  advisable  to  give  active  support  to  the  ruler 
whom  they  had  recognized.  They  therefore  concluded  with  the 
king  an  agreement^-  to  support  him  during  his  lifetime  as  head  of 
the  Samoan  Government,  to  agree  upon  his  successor  and  to 
establish  immediately  an  executive  council  for  the  king.  This 
executive  council  was  to  consist  of  an  American  citizen,  a  German 
and  a  British  subject,  who  should  be  nominated  by  the  three 
consuls  from  among  the  residents  of  Samoa  and  who  should  hold 

so  few,  and  the  amount  of  national  capital  buried  at  their  feet  is  so  vast, 
that  we  must  not  wonder  if  they  seem  oppressed  with  greatness  and  the  sense 
of  empire.  Other  whites  take  part  in  our  babbles  while  temper  holds  out, 
with  a  certain  schoolboj'  entertainment.  In  the  Germans  alone,  no  trace  of 
humor  is  to  be  observed,  and  their  solemnity  is  accomi)anied  by  a  touchiness 
often  beyond  beUef.  Patriotism  flies  in  arms  about  a  hen;  and  if  you  com- 
ment upon  the  color  of  a  Dutch  umlirella,  you  have  cast  a  stone  against  the 
German  Emperor." 

^'  House  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  201  ff. 
92  Ibid.,  p.  207  f. 


146      SAMOA:  THE  UNITED  STATES   AND  GERMANY  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

respectively  the  offices  of  minister  of  justice,  minister  of  finance 
and  mi^iister  of  public  works.  The  three  nations  were  explicitly 
referred  to  as  "the  three  protecting  powers."  The  agreement  was 
formed  at  the  proposal  of  the  German  Goverrmient  and  the  consuls 
of  the  other  two  nations  received  instructions  to  unite  with  their 
colleagues  in  an  agreement  to  protect  the  government  of  Malietoa. 
However,  when  completed  the  agreement  was  not  formally  con- 
firmed by  the  Treaty  Powers. ^^  The  British  Government  con- 
sidered that  such  an  arrangement  would  practically  give  over  the 
administration  of  the  islands  to  the  three  governments  represented 
by  the  Executive  Council.  Nevertheless  the  agreement  was  put 
into  effect  as  a  working  arrangement,  the  British  and  American 
governments  reserving  the  right^^  to  withdraw  from  it  at  any  time. 
The  stand  taken  by  the  United  States  was  that  the  agreement  was 
to  be  looked  upon,  not  as  a  treaty  "but  simply  as  a  scheme  of 
arrangement  between  the  consular  body  and  the  government  of 
the  islands  for  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  foreigners." 
"The  tliree  advisers"  were  selected,  and  assisted  the  legislative 
body  to  pass  certain  laws  regulating  quarantine,  prohibiting  the 
sale  of  ammunition,  intoxicants,  etc.,  after  which  they  withdrew 
temporarily  and  seem  never  to  have  resumed  their  functions  in 
relation  to  the  native  government.  As  salaried  ministers  of  the 
Samoan  Government  and  at  the  same  time,  citizens  of  foreign 
nations,  the  three  advisers  constituted  an  anomaly  in  what  had 
been  declared  to  be  an  autonomous  government. 

Another  outbreak  of  the  insurgent  party  resulted  in  a  second 
reconciliation  through  the  efforts  of  the  foreign  consuls  and  another 
agreement  was  signed, '■*■'  this  time  on  board  a  United  States  vessel, 
the  "Lackawanna,"  and  was  known  as  the  Lackawanna  peace. 
By  it  the  chiefs  of  both  parties  and  the  consuls  of  all  three  nations 
declared  ]\Ialietoa  Laupepa  to  be  King  of  Samoa  and  his  rival 
Tupua  Tamasese  to  be  \'ice-King'-'*^ — a  compromise  created  to  make 

93  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5029),  p.  65. 

^*  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  149.      »5  ibid.,  p.  208. 

96  R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  375. 

"By  the  Lackawanna  treatj',  Laupepa  was  confirmed  king  and  Tamasese 
set  by  his  side  in  the  nondescript  office  of  vice-king.     The  compromise  was, 


NEW   ZEALAND   ANNEXATION  MOVEMENTS  147 

the  peace  but  not  likely  to  preserve  it.  The  arranfjjement,  never- 
theless, served  to  maintain  outward  tranquillity  in  the  islands  for 
several  years. 

Forces  were  at  work  in  Samoa,  however,  which  made  future 
conflict  unavoidable.  These  were  the  activities  of  individuals 
workinfj  either  secretly  or  openly  for  the  annexation  of  the  island 
ii'roup  to  their  own  governments.  One  of  the  earliest  of  these 
agitators"  to  take  definite  part  in  such  a  project  was  a  certain  Mr. 
Lundon,  former  representative  of  the  New  Zealand  Assembly, 
who  visited  the  islands  in  1883  and  sent  home  reports  setting  forth 
the  unsatisfactorv  condition  of  the  Samoan  Government,  and  urg- 
ing the  annexation  of  the  islands  to  New  Zealand.  While  in  Samoa 
he  sought  to  influence  the  native  chiefs  in  favor  of  this  scheme 
and  advised  them  several  times  at  meetings  of  their  parliament  to 
secure  for  themselves  annexation  to  New  Zealand.  King  Malietoa 
thereupon  addressed  an  appeal  to  Queen  Victoria  to  unite  the 
islands  to  the  British  Empire.  Mr.  Lundon  was  not  alone  in  his 
policy  but  represented  a  movement  prevailing  in  his  home  country 
for  drawing  into  the  system  of  British  Pacific  colonies  the  scattered 
groups  of  small  islands  not  yet  definitely  claimed  by  any  other 
European  power.  In  1883  the  Assembly  of  New  Zealand  passed 
what  is  called  the  "permissive  annexation  act"  to  provide  for  this 
expansion  of  the  rule  of  the  larger  colonies  over  the  archipelago 
of  the  Southern  Pacific.  Such  a  measure,  however,  required  the 
sanction  of  the  British  Government,  and  negotiations  between 
New  Zealand  and  the  Foreign  Office  on  this  subject  extended 
tliroughout  the  year  1884.^''    The  propaganda  among  the  Samoan 

I  am  told,  not  without  precedent ;  but  it  lacked  all  appearance  of  success.  To 
the  constitution  of  Samoa,  which  was  already  all  wheels  and  no  horses  the 
consuls  had  added  a  fifth  wheel.  In  addition  to  the  old  conundrum  'Who 
is  King?'  they  had  supplied  a  new  one,  'What  is  the  Vice-king?"' 

"  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  158  ff. 

^*  Ibid.,  p.  159.  Governor  Jervois  of  New  Zealand  in  forwarding  the 
annexation  bill  then  under  consideration,  wrote  to  the  British  Secretary 
recommending : 

"That  the  British  Government  should,  under  existing  circumstances  take 
steps  for  the  establishment  of  its  rule  over  such  islands  in  the  Pacific  as  are 
not  already  occujjied  by  or  imder  the  protection  of  a  foreign  power,  and  the 
occupation  of  which  by  any  foreign  power  woukl  be  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  Australasia." 


148    sajvioa:  the  united  states  and  ger^iaxy  in  the  pacific 

natives  was  not  without  effect  and  a  second  appeal  was  sent  out 
by  ]Malietoa  to  Queen  Victoria  to  take  the  islands  under  her 
sovereignty  and  save  them  from  other  governments,  which  they 
feared  desired  to  take  possession  of  the  country.^^ 

Meanwhile    Germany   was   still   more    active.     The    German 

,  Government  had  advanced  to  even  more  positive  support  of 
\  its  interests  overseas,  and  had  caused  to  be  introduced  in  the 
Reichstag^°°  a  measure  for  the  rescue  of  the  business  of  the  firm 
of  Goddefroy  and  Company,  which  dominated  the  commercial 
developments  in  Samoa  and  which  had  fallen  heavily  in  debt. 
The  bill  provided  for  the  guarantee  of  a  certain  amount  of  interest 
on  the  bonds  of  a  new  company  which  was  to  take  over  the  business 
of  the  Goddefroys,  to  maintain  and  to  extend  it.  Those  in  favor 
of  the  measure  stated  that  its  object  was  to  protect  German  com- 
mercial enterprise  against  American  and  British  competition.  It 
finally  came  out  that  the  measure  had  the  strong  backing  of  the 
government.  In  spite  of  this  it  was  defeated,  the  members  of  the 
Reichstag  offering  determined  opposition  to  what  they  sensed  to  be 
a  step  leading  toward  the  development  of  a  navy,  whereas  they 
felt  already  overburdened  with  taxes  for  the  support  of  the  army. 
The  effort  meeting  defeat  had  therefore  no  effect  in  Samoa,  but  is 
significant  as  indicating  the  beginning  of  a  government  expansion 
policy. 

Further  efforts  in  this  same  direction  were  shown  by  the  vigor 
with  which  the  Germans  were  pushing  their  interests  in  the  islands. 
The  rule  of  Malietoa  was  characterized  by  the  customary  laxness 
of  the  native  kings  when  questions  of  law  and  order  were  con- 
cerned, and  there  had  been  a  long  line  of  depredations  and  petty 
crimes  which  had  gone  unpunished  and  under  which  the  German 
residents  on  their  great  plantations  were  the  chief  sufferers.  There- 
fore these  grievances,  though  there  was  nothing  new  in  principle 

•    about  them,  were  made  the  basis  of  vigorous  protest  on  the  part 
of  Dr.  Stuebel,  the  German  Consul. ^"^    It  is  quite  probable  that 


^^  Ibid.,  p.  209.     (Inclosure  D.)     Malietoa  had  received  no  reply  to  the 
appeal  sent  to  the  Queen  the  year  before. 
i""  F.  R.,  1880,  pp.  427  and  428. 
'«'  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  113  flf,  also  p.  210. 


GERMAN-SAMOAN  COUNCIL  OF  STATE  149 

the  Now  Zoaland  annexation  movement  may  have  determined  his 
a<::gressi\e  action. ^'^-  At  any  rate  he  summed  up  his  grievances 
against  Malietoa — particularly  the  latter 's  refusal,  or  continued 
neglect,  to  punish  some  native  Samoans  who  had  been  guilty  of 
certain  crimes  against  the  persons  and  property  of  German 
subjects.  He  stated  that  through  these  crimes  and  the  neglect 
to  punish  them  the  Samoan  Government  had  been  for  many 
months  violating  the  regulations  of  the  German-Samoan  treaty 
of  1879.  It  Avas,  therefore,  necessary  that  they  obey  those  regu- 
lations and,  as  provided  for  in  the  treaty  (Article  A  II),  conclude  a 
special  agreement  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  punishment  of 
offenders.  The  continued  refusal  to  conclude  such  an  agreement 
he  held  to  be  also  a  A'iolation  of  the  treaty.  The  presence  of  two 
German  warships  in  the  harbor  had  its  intended  effect  and  Malietoa 
and  the  \'ice-King  Tamasese  signed  the  agreement  which  had 
been  prepared  for  them.  This  took  place  on  November  10,  1884, 
luider  extraordinary  procedure.  The  agreement  was  read  once 
to  Malietoa  by  an  interpreter,  but  the  German  Consul  refused  to 
leave  the  king  a  copy  of  the  instrument  for  consideration  either 
before  or  after  his  signing  it.^"^  The  treaty  provided^"^  for  the 
establishment  of  a  German-Samoan  Council  of  State  which  should 
consist  of  the  German  Consul  (or  his  representative),  two  Samoans 
to  be  chosen  respectively  by  the  king  and  vice-king  in  cooperation 
with  the  Taimua  and  Faipule.  and  two  Germans  to  be  appointed 
by  the  German  Consul.  This  German-Samoan  Council  was  to 
deliberate  and  decide  upon  all  laws  and  regulations  relating  to  the 

^'^  V.  R.,  1885,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck  Nr.  167,  p.  702.  In  a  letter  to 
Bismarck,  August  8,  1883,  he  referred  to  the  annexation  of  the  islands  l)y 
New  Zealand  as  a  danger  threatening  very  seriously  the  German  interests  in 
the  .South  Pacific.  He  admitted  that  the  danger  would  prol)ably  l)e  deferred 
until  the  British  commercial  hold  was  stronger  on  the  islands,  and  that  the 
probable  policy  of  the  British  Government  would  be  to  put  a  restraining  hand 
on  Australian  chauvinism  until  that  time. 

»«■••  House  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  238,  .50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  113  ff.,  also  p.  210. 

'"^  The  treaty  was  forwarded  to  the  British  Government  in  January,  1885, 
by  Bismarck  at  the  request  of  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin  (V.  R.,  1885, 
Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  167,  p.  726  f.),  and  in  February,  1885,  was  sent 
to  the  U.  S.  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Frelinghuj'sen  (House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238, 
50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  5.). 


150    sajvioa:  the  united  states  and  Germany  in  the  pacific 

common  interests  of  the  Samoan  Government  and  the  German 
subjects  residing  in  Samoa.  The  Council  was  to  draw  up  especially 
legal  provisions  pertaining  to  the  punishable  acts  of  Samoans  which 
affected  the  persons,  employees  or  property  of  German  subjects. 
These  provisions  were  then  to  be  issued  as  laws  after  being  signed 
by  the  king  and  vice-king,  and  it  was  to  be  stated  in  the  preamble 
that  the  law  was  decreed  after  receiving  the  endorsement  of  the 
German-Samoan  State  Council.  The  king  was  to  appoint,  in 
agreement  with  the  German  Consul  a  German  official  of  the 
Samoan  Government  who  was  to  be  the  secretary  and  adviser  of 
the  king  in  all  affairs  which  concerned  the  Germans  living  in  Samoa. 
He  was  also  to  have  supervision  over  the  imprisonment  of  offenders 
and  a  new  prison  was  to  be  built  for  the  purpose — the  necessary 
police  officers  were  under  his  command.  The  expenses  entailed  in 
carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  agreement  were  to  be  met 
from  the  income  from  the  labor  of  prisoners  and  from  taxes  paid 
by  the  German  subjects.  The  Imperial  Government  was  given 
the  right  of  cancelling  the  treaty  after  six  months'  notice — no 
provision  was  made  for  annulment  by  the  Government  of  Samoa. 
It  is  quite  evident  that  under  this  treaty  there  would  have 
been  little  left  to  the  native  goverimient  that  was  Samoan.  It  is 
also  evident  that  it  destroyed  temporarily  the  equality  of  status  of 
the  three  powers  established  for  them  by  the  three  treaties  of  1878 
to  1879.  In  order  to  restore  the  United  States  and  Britain  to  an 
equal  status  in  the  island,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  establish 
similar  American-Samoan  and  British-Samoan  Councils — some- 
thing which  was  possible  so  far  as  the  treaty  was  concerned. 
King  Malietoa  was  well  aware  that  vigorous  protests  would  be 
made  by  the  British  and  American  Governments.  Immediately 
after  signing  the  treaty  he  renewed  his  urgent  petition  to  the 
British  Government  for  annexation,^"^  explaining  that  he  was  not 
responsible  for  the  agreement,  that  he  had  signed  it  only  through 
fear  of  the  Germans  and  that  he  would  end  it  as  soon  as  Her 
Majesty  should  take  over  the  islands.  He  also  sent  to  the  United 
States  Consul  a  similar  apology  for  the  treaty,  declaring  that  it 

i»5  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  210. 


EFFORTS   TO   SECURE   ANNEXATION    TO    GREAT    BRITAIN       151 

was  made  against  his  will  and  shonld  not  he  held  a<jainst  him.  He 
appealed  to  the  American  Consul  for  aid,  as  the  (rerman  Consul 
had  been  threateniufi;  him  because  of  his  petition  to  the  Queen  of 
England  for  annexation. 

In  response  to  the  inquiry  of  Lord  Granville  the  German 
Ambassador  in  London  declared'"''  in  defense  of  the  agreement  that 
its  stipulations  were  all  within  the  provisions  of  the  German 
Samoan  treaty  of  1879  and  infringed  neither  the  independence  of 
the  island  group  nor  the  rights  of  other  nations  there.  The 
benefits  of  better  order  in  the  islands,  which  it  was  the  aim  of  the 
treaty  to  secure,  the  Ambassador  said,  would  be  shared  by  citizens 
of  the  other  treaty  powers,  while  the  costs  of  the  enactment  of  its 
provisions  were  to  be  borne  by  Germans  only.  The  German 
Government,  therefore,  trusted  that  its  efforts  to  secure 
better  order  in  the  islands  would  not  be  opposed  frcm  other 
quarters. 

^lalietoa,  still  hoping  for  British  protection,  proceeded  to  dis- 
regard the  German  treaty,  which  he  declared  he  had  signed  only 
to  keep  the  peace,  and  taking  a  bolder  stand,  passed  an  act  through 
the  native  parliament^ "''  announcing  the  annexation  of  the  Samoan 
group  of  islands  to  the  colony  of  New  Zealand.  The  German 
Consul,  Dr.  Stuebel,  hereupon  took  things  into  his  (nvn  hands. 
Publishing  a  list  of  his  complaints  against  the  actions  of  the  king — 
his  continued  refusal  to  deliver  certain  escaped  Samoan  convicts, 
his  expressed  insults  against  Germany,  and  his  generally  hostile 
attitude.  Dr.  Stuebel  proceeded  to  take  possession  of  the  muni- 
cipality of  Apia — so  far  as  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  King 
Malietoa  were  concerned — and,  as  evidence  thereof,  he  hoisted  the 
German  flag  at  ]\Iulinuu  point.'"-^  The  British  and  American 
consuls  at  once  protested  against  Dr.  Stuebel's  action  as  a  violation 
of  the  Municipal  Convention  of  1879,  which  had  placed  the  admin- 
istration of  the  municipality  of  Apia  in  the  hands  of  the  municipal 
council   acting  under  the  sovereignty  and  flag   of  the  Samoan 

"«V.  R.,  1885,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  167,  p.  726;  also  House  Ex. 
Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  5. 

1"  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  2.3S,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  211. 

i«8  Ibid.,  p.  212,  also  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  I. 


152    sa:moa:  the  united  states  and  Germany  in  the  pacific 

Government.    The  situation  had  now  become  acute  and  was  refer- 
red to  the  home  governments. 

]\Ieanwhile  negotiations  were  taking  place  between  the  British 
and  German  Foreign  Offices  in  regard  to  the  whole  subject  of  their 
colonial  interests,  both  in  Africa  and  in  the  Pacific. ^"^  The  system 
of  recruiting  laborers  from  the  small  islands  to  work  on  the  culti- 
vated plantations  of  the  Samoan,  Tonga  and  other  groups  had 
caused  sharp  rivalry  between  the  large  firms  controlling  the  trade 
in  those  regions,  rivalry  which  now  and  then  developed  into  open 
physical  conflict-^^"  Moreover,  Germany  had  definitely  entered 
upon  the  policy  (which  Bismarck  denied  to  be  a  colonial  one  in 
the  sense  of  the  French  system) — of  giving  government  protection 
to  German  commercial  enterprise  wherever  that  had  definitely 
established   itself  through  the  diligence   of   German   subjects.^^^ 

109  Pqj.  accounts  of  the  development  of  German  interests  in  various  islands 
of  the  South  Pacific.  See  V.  R.,  1885,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Xr.  63, 
"Deutsche  Interessen  in  der  Suedsee  I;"  or  Weissbuch,  ErJster  Theil,  1885; 
also  V.  R.,  1885,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  167,  "Deutsche  Interessen 
in  der  Suedsee  II." 

"0  V.  R.,  1885,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  No.  167,  p.  693  ff. 

Case  of  British  laborer  ship  "Stanley"  and  the  destruction  of  the  Hernsheim 
station  by  its  crew. 

1"  V.  R.,  1884,  Vol.  II,  p.  1061  ff. 

Bismarck,  Imperial  Chancellor,  before  the  Reichstag,  June  26,  1SS4: 

"Ich  wiederhole,  dass  ich  gegen  Kolonien  .  .  .  ich  will  sagen 
nach  dem  System,  wie  die  Meisten  im  vorigen  Jahrhundert  waren,  was  man 
jetzt  das  franzoesische  System  nennen  koennte, — gegcn  Kolonien,  die  als 
Unterlage  ein  Stueck  Land  schaffen  und  dann  Auswanderer  herlicizuzieheu 
suchen,  Beamte  anstellen  und  Garnisonen  errichten, — dass  ich  meine  fruehere 
Abneigung  gegen  diese  Art  Kolonization,  die  fuer  andere  Laender  nuetzlich 
sein  mag,  fuer  uns  aber  nicht  ausfuehrbar  ist,  heute  noch  nicht  aufgegeben 
habe.     Ich  glaube,  dass  man  Kolonial  projekte  nicht  kuenstlich  schaffen  kann. 

Etwas  ganz  anderes  ist  die  Frage,  ob  es  zweckmaessig,  und  zweitens,  ob  es 
die  Pflicht  des  deutschen  Reiches  ist,  denjenigeu  seiner  L  nterthanen  die  solchen 
Unternehmungen  im  Vertrauen  auf  des  Reiches  Schutz  -sich  hingeben,  diesen 
Reichsschutz  zu  gcwaehron  luid  ihnen  gewisse  Beihilfen  in  ihren  Kolonial- 
bestrebungen  zu  leisten  um  denjenigen  Gel>ilden,  die  aus  den  I'eberschues- 
sigen  Saeften  des  gesammten  deutschen  Koerpers  naturgemaess  heraus- 
wachsen,  in  fremden  Laendern  Pflege  imd  Schutz  angedeihen  zu  lassen.  Und 
das  bejahe  ich,  allerdings  mit  weniger  Sicherhcit  vom  Standpunkt  der  Zweck- 
maessigkeit  .  .  .  ich  nicht  voraussehen  was  daraus  wird  .  .  .,  aber 
mit  unbcdingter  Sicherheit  vom  Standpunkte  der  staat lichen  Pflicht. 


Meine  von  Seiner  Majestaet  dem  Kaiser  gebilligte  Absicht  ist,  die  Verant- 
worthchkeit  fuer  die  materielle  Entwickelung  der  Kolonie  ebenso  wae  ihr 
Entstehen  der  Thaetigkeit  und  dem  Unternehmungsgeiste  unserer  seefalu-en- 


UniSlOX    OF    BKITISIl-GEKMAX    COLONIAL   SPHERES,    18SG       153 

l^he  expansion  projects  of  tlie  Xew  Zealanders  increased  the  ten- 
sion. It  Avas  soon  seen  by  l)otli  governments  that  in  order  to 
prevent  further  friction  it  would  be  necessary  to  come  to  some 
definite  agreement  defining  the  status  of  each  nation  in  certain 
specific  groups  of  islands,  and  also  to  determine  on  some  geographic 
cliN'ision  of  the  South  Pacific  which  should  regulate  the  future 
developments  of  British  and  German  commerce  there."'-  The 
oi)ening  proposal  for  such  an  understanding  was  made  by  Germany 
to  England  and  was  received  cordially  by  Lord  Granville,  who 
declared"^  emphatically  that  England  cherished  no  jealousy 
toward  German  colonization  enterprises  and  was  in  no  way 
unappreciative  of  the  important  position  which  Germany  held  on 
some  of  the  South  Sea  islands.  The  British  Government  woidd 
therefore  be  very  glad  to  define  in  which  parts  the  influence  of  the 
one  country  and  in  which  parts  that  of  the  other  predominated. 

den  und  handeltreibenden  Mitbuerger  zu  ueberlassen  und  weniger  in  der 
Form  der  Annektierung  von  ueberseeischen  Pro\'inzen  an  das  deutsche 
Reich  vorzugehen  als  in  der  Form  von  Gewaehrung  von  P>eibriefen  nach 
Gestalt  der  englischen  Royal-charters  im  Anschhiss  an  die  ruhmreiche  Lauf- 
bahn,  welclie  die  englische  Kaufmannschaft  l)ei  Gruendung  der  ostindischen 
Kompagnie  zurueckgelegt  hat,  und  (hoert!  hoert!  rechts)  den  Interessenten  der 
Kolonie  zugleich  das  Regieren  dersell^en  im  wesentUchen  zu  ueberlassen  und 
ihnen  nur  die  Moeglichkeit  europaeischer  Jurisdiktion  fuer  Europaeer  und 
desjenigen  Schutzes  zu  gewaehren,  den  wir  ohne  stehende  Garnison  dort 
leisten  koennen. 


Unsere  Absicht  ist  nicht  Pro\inzen  zu  gruenden,  sondern  kaufmaennische 
Unternehmungen,  aber  in  der  hoechsten  Entwickelung  auch  solche  die  sich 
eine  Souveraenitaet,  eine  schUesslich  dem  deutschen  Reich  lehnbar  Ijleibende, 
unter  seiner  Protektion  stehende  kaufmaennische  Souveraenitaet  erwerben, 
zu  schuetzen  in  ihrer  freien  Entwickelung,  sowohl  gegen  die  Angriffe  aus  der 
unmittelljaren  Xachbarschaft  als  auch  gegen  Bedrueckung  und  Schaediguug 
von  Seiten  anderer  europaeischen  Maechte.  Im  uebrigen  hoffen  wir  class  der 
Baum  durch  die  Thaetigkeit  der  Gaertner,  die  ihn  pflanzen,  auch  im  Ganzen 
gedeihen  wird,  und  wenn  er  es  nicht  thut,  so  ist  tlie  Pflanze  eine  Verfehlte, 
und  es  trifft  der  Schade  weniger  das  Reich  denn  die  Kosten  sind  nicht  bedeu- 
tend,  die  wir  verlangen,  sondern  die  Unternehmer,  die  sich  in  ihren  Fnterneh- 
mungen  vergritTen  haben.  Das  ist  der  I'ntcrschied:  bei  dem  System  welches 
ich  das  Franzoesische  nannte,  will  die  Staatsregierung  jedesmal  bcurtheilen, 
ob  das  Unternehmen  ein  Richtiges  ist,  und  ein  Gedeihen  in  Aussicht  stellt; 
bei  diesera  System  ueberlassen  wir  dem  Handel,  dem  Privatmann  die  Wahl, 
und  wenn  wir  sehen,  dass  der  Baum  Wurzel  schlaegt  anwaechst  und  gedeiht, 
und  den  Schutz  des  Reiches  anruft  so  stehen  wir  ihm  bei,  und  ich  sehe  auch 
nicht  ein,  wie  wir  ihm  das  rechtmaessig  versagen  koennen." 

»2V.  R.,  1885,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  167,  p.  711. 
»"  Ibid.,  p.  712,  No.  23;  also  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
p.  162. 


154    saivioa:  the  united  states  and  Germany  in  the  pacific 

As  to  Samoa,  the  two  governments  exchanged  assurances  that  each 
had  no  interest  to  annex  this  group  and  the  activities  of  New- 
Zealand  toward  acquiring  the  islands  were  halted  by  word  from 
the  British  Foreign  Office  stating  that  the  German  GoAernment 
had  given  and  received  assurance  that  the  independence  of  Samoa 
would  be  maintained.  Negotiations  on  the  general  subject  of 
Pacific  possessions  extended  throughout  two  years  (1884-1886). 
During  this  time  a  series  of  flag-hoistings  took  place  in  the  South 
Pacific.  England,  led  by  the  demands  of  Australia,  occupied  the 
south  coast  of  New  Guinea  and  Germany  immediately  took 
possession  of  the  north  coast"^ — up  to  the  already  established 
Dutch  possessions."^  Spain,  after  a  controversy  with  Germany,"'' 
gained  acknowledged  sovereignty  over  the  Carolines  and  Pelew 
group,  France  gained  the  New  Hebrides  and  finally  the  British- 
German  negotiations  were  consummated  in  the  agreement  of 
April  G,  1886,"^  dividing  between  them  the  Western  Pacific.  A' 
line  of  demarcation  was  established,  running  irregularly  from  lo'^ 
north  latitude  to  .30°  south  latitude.  Germany  agreed  "not  to 
make  acquisitions  of  territory,  accept  protectorates,  or  interfere 
with  the  extension  of  British  influence  to  the  East,  Southeast, 
or  South  of  the  said  conventional  line"  and  to  give  up  any  acquisi- 
tions already  estabhshed  there.  Great  Britain  reciprocally  made 
the  same  promises  for  the  region  West,  Northwest  and  North  of 
the  demarcation  Hne.  As  the  part  of  the  Pacific  so  partitioned 
included  the  Samoan  Islands,  these,  together  with  the  Tonga 
Islands  and  the  Island  of  Nine  (Savage  Island),  were  exempted 
from  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  and  were  to  be  continued  as  a 

"4  V.  R.,  1885,  Anal.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  167,  p.  718.  The  corres- 
pondence over  the  seizure  of  the  New  Guinea  coasts  shows  a  more  aggressive 
colonial  policy  than  that  outlined  by  Bismarck  to  the  Reichstag  the  preceding 
year.     Bismarck  at  this  time  declares: 

"Wir  beabsichtigen  nunmehr,  wie  in  Westafrika  so  auch  in  der  Suedsee, 
diejenigen  Gebiete  welche  durch  vorherrschende  Ausbreitung  des  deutschen 
Handels  oder  in  Folge  der  Vorbereitungeh  zu  dieser  als  geeignet  dazu 
erscheinen,  unter  den  direkten  Schutz  des  Reichs  zu  stellen." 

"5  Ibid.,  p.  716,  No.  36. 

'"5  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  112. 

117  V.  R.,  1885-'86,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  291,  p.  1570. 


AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  NORTH   PACIFIC  155 

neutral  repon.  Any  other  islands  within  the  designated  area 
were  also  exemj^ted  if  tliey  were  at  this  time  under  the  protection 
or  sovereignty  of  any  other  civilized  power  than  Germany  or  Great 
Britain.  Following  the  provisions  of  the  treaty,"^  Great  Britain 
took  possession  of  the  Kemadec  Islands  and  Germany  annexed 
the  ^larshall,  Brown  and  Providence  groups. ^^^ 

While  these  events  were  taking  place  in  the  South  Pacific,  the 
United  States  was  establishing  its  trade  control  in  the  North.  In 
18S4  it  concluded  with  Hawaii  a  supplementary  conventions-*^ 
renewing  for  seven  years  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1875,  which  had 
made  those  islands  commercially  a  part  of  what  might  be  called 
an  American  tariff  union  and  established  Hawaii  as  the  sugar 
plantation  of  the  Pacific  coast.  Three  years  previous  to  the 
treaty  renewal,  an  attempt  of  Great  Britain  to  secure  with  the 
native  government  of  Hawaii  a  con\'enti()n  granting  to  the  Hindu 
coolie  laborers  the  right  of  British  consular  jurisdiction  in  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  met  with  determined  opposition  from  the 
Government  of  the  United  States.  In  the  negotiations  concerning 
this  subject  the  Secretarj^  of  State,  Blaine,  stated  emphatically 
tliat  the  United  States  considered  the  Hawaiian  Islands  as  "a 
member  of  the  American  system  of  states,  "^^i     Having  gained 

"8V.  R.,  1885-86,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  291,  p.  1572.  This 
agreement  was  complemented  by  a  second  providing  for  reciprocal  freedom 
of  trade  and  commerce  in  the  German  and  British  possessions  and  protector- 
ates in  the  Western  Pacific.  All  past  land  claims  of  the  sut)jects  of  either 
nation  when  living  in  a  protectorate  of  the  other  nation,  were  to  be  referred 
to  a  mi.xed  German-British  Commission.  Both  governments  agreed  not  to 
establish  any  penal  settlements  in  or  transport  convicts  to  the  Western  Pacific. 

1"  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  112  f. 

>2»F.  R.,  1894,  p.  170. 

'21  F.  R.,  1881,  p.  636  f. 


No.  401.     Mr.  Blaine  to  Mr.  Comly. 


Department  of  St.\te, 

Washington,  December  1,  1881. 


"I  have  spoken  of  the  Pacific  Coast  line  given  to  the  American  Union  by  the 
cession  of  California  in  1848,  as  little  inferior  in  extent  and  superior  in  natural 
wealth,  to  the  Atlantic  sea-board  of  the  original  l^nion.  Since  that  time  our 
domain  on  the  Pacific  has  been  vastly  increased  l)y  the  purchase  of  Alaska. 
Taking  San  Francisco  as  the  commercial  center  on  the  western  slope,  a  line 


156    sa^ioa:  the  united  states  and  germ  ant  in  the  pacific 

a  "legitimately  dominant  influence  in  the  North  Pacific,"  he 
declared,  the  United  States  would  not  allow  that  influence  to  be 
decreased  by  any  hostile  element.  The  Hawaiian  Islands  were  so 
situated  that  they  held  strategic  control  of  the  North  Pacific  and 
therefore  the  possession  of  them  became  a  question  of  policy 
strictly  American.  The  Secretary  outlined  what  he  considered  to 
be  the  commercial  domain  of  the  Western  coast.  It  was  included 
between  a  line  drawn  northwest  from  San  Francisco  to  the  Aleutian 
Islands  and  a  line  southwest  from  that  city  to  Honolulu.  The 
Hawaiian  Islands,  therefore,  he  considered  to  be  the  key  to  the 
maritime  dominion  of  the  Pacific  states,  just  as  Cuba  was  the  key 
to  the  Gulf  trade,  and  the  extension  of  commercial  empire  westward 
from  the  Pacific  states  was  as  important  to  their  development  as 
would  be  their  connection  with  the  eastern  seaboard  by  an  isthmian 
canal. 
From  such  e\'idence  of  a  definitely  formed  Pacific  policy  on  the 

drawn  northwestwardly  to  the  Aleutian  group,  marks  our  Pacific  border 
almost  to  the  confines  of  Asia.  A  corresponding  line  drawn  southwestwardly 
from  San  Francisco  to  Honolulu  marks  the  natural  hmit  of  the  ocean  belt 
within  which  our  trade  with  the  oriental  countries  must  flow,  and  is,  more- 
over, the  direct  line  of  commimication  between  the  United  States  and  Aus- 
tralasia.    Within  this  belt  hes  the  commercial  domain  of  our  western  coast. 

I  have  had  recent  occasion  to  set  forth  the  vitally  integral  importance  of  our 
Pacific  possessions,  in  a  circular  letter  addressed  on  the  twenty-fourth  of  June 
last,  to  our  representatives  in  Europe,  touching  the  necessary  guarantees  of 
the  proposed  Panama  Canal  as  a  purely  American  waterway  to  be  treated  as 
part  of  our  own  coast  fine.  The  extension  of  commercial  empire  westward 
from  those  states  is  no  less  vitally  important  to  their  development  than  is 
their  communication  with  the  Eastern  coast  by  the  Isthmian  channel.  And 
when  we  survey  the  stupendous  progress  made  by  the  western  coast  during 
the  thirty  years  of  its  national  life  as  a  part  of  our  dominion,  its  enormous 
increase  of  population,  its  vast  resources  of  agriculture  and  mines,  and  its 
boundless  enterprise  it  is  not  easy  to  set  a  limit  to  its  commercial  activity 
or  forsee  a  check  to  its  maritime  supremacy  in  the  waters  of  the  Orient,  so 
long  as  those  waters  afford,  as  now,  a  free  and  neutral  scope  for  our  Pacific 
trade. 

In  thirty  years  the  United  States  has  acquired  a  legitimately  dominant 
influence  in  the  North  Pacific,  which  it  can  never  consent  to  see  decreased 
by  the  intrusion  therein  of  any  element  of  influence  hostile  to  its  own.  The 
situation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  giving  them  the  strategic  control  of  the 
North  Pacific,  brings  their  possession  within  the  range  of  questions  of  purely 
American  policy,  as  much  so  as  that  of  the  Isthmus  itself.  Hence  the  neces- 
sity as  recognized  in  our  existing  treaty  relations,  of  drawing  the  ties  of  inti- 
mate relationshij)  between  us  anfl  the  Hawaiian  Islands  so  as  to  make  them 
practically  a  part  of  the  American  system  without  derogation  of  their  absolute 
independence." 

J.\MES  G.  Blaixe. 


DISTURBANCES   IN   TIIK    ISLANDS,    1886  157 

part  of  all  three  govorninonts^-'-  it  is  clear  that  the  Samoan  Islands, 
heiiiij  ()iu>  i)f  the  few  remaining  unelaimed  groups  of  inii)ortance  in 
the  raeifie,  were  bound  to  become  the  object  of  conflicting  com- 
mercial and  ])olitical  aspirations,  and  the  subject  of  considerable 
diplomatic  controversy. 

The  events  in  the  islands  during  1885  and  188()  were  such  as  to 
require  adjustment  by  the  home  governments.  The  action  of  the 
German  Consul,  Dr.  Stuebel,  in  hoisting  the  German  flag  over 
Apia  was  i)romptly  disavowed  by  Bismarck,^'-^  who  declared  that 
the  German  Government  was  wholly  ignorant  of  the  action,  had 
no  intention  of  violating  the  agreement  with  the  United  States  and 
England  nor  of  establishing  a  protectorate  over  the  islands,  but 
on  the  contrary,  would  maintain  that  agreement  and  adhere  to  the 
status  quo.  In  spite  of  this  disavowal  by  the  home  govern- 
ment the  German  corporation,  dominating  the  trade  of  the  islands, 
continued  its  controversy  with  ]Malietoa  and  ordered  the  king  to 
remove  his  seat  of  government  from  ]Mulinuu  point,  which  Mr. 
Weber  claimed  to  be  land  belonging  to  the  German  Company. 
On  the  king's  refusal  the  German  Consul,  Dr.  Stuebel,  with  an 
armed  force  from  the  German  naval  vessel  "Albatrgss,"  proceeded 
to  Mulinuu  and  removed  the  Samoan  flag.  Protests  against  this 
act  were  made  by  the  American  and  British  consuls  and  it  was  again 
disavowed^--*  by  the  German  Government,  which  gave  assurance 
that  it  was  without  information  on  the  matter,  but  that  it  would 
"maintain  all  previous  agreements  and  would  adhere  to  the 
status  quo/'^-'^    ^leantime  the  former  Vice-king,  Tamasese,  had 

'22  The  views  of  the  Reichstag  at  this  time  did  not  keep  pace  with  the  policy 
of  colonization  as  outlined  by  the  Chancellor.  In  considering  the  Imperial 
Budget  for  the  year  188o-'86,  the  Reichstag  twice  voted  down  measures  to 
increase  the  appropriation  for  government  officials  in  the  South  Seas — even 
though  it  was  declared  by  supporters  of  the  measure  that  such  failure  to 
support  the  Government  policy  would  seriously  affect  the  negotiations  then 
taking  place  in  London  on  the  subject  of  German  and  British  colonization 
spheres.  (See  Reichstag  discussion,  V.  R.,  1885,  Vol.  I,  pp.  395-405,  16. 
Dezember,  1884;  and  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  1539-1587,  4.  Maerz,  1885.) 

1-3  House  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Se.ss.,  p.  4. 

'2^  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  II. 

123  House  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  16.  INlr.  Pendleton, 
American  Minister  at  Berlin,  reported  to  Secretary  Bayard  an  interview  with 


158    SA:kiOA:  the  united  states  and  germant  in  the  pacific 

broken  away  from  the  government  and,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
German  subjects  in  the  islands,  had  become  again  a  formidable 
rival  of  ]\IaHetoa  and  a  new  war  was  imminent.  ^Nlalietoa  now 
appealed  to  the  American  Consul  for  protection, ^-^  basing  his  plea 
on  Article  V  of  the  Samoan- American  treaty  of  1878,  which 
promised  that  in  case  of  trouble  between  Samoa  and  another 
power,  the  United  States  would  use  its  good  offices  to  obtain 
settlement.  Mr.  Greenebaume  without  instructions  accepted 
INIalietoa's  request  and  hoisted  the  American  flag  over  that  of 
Samoa  at  Apia.  A  protest  was  made  by  the  German  Consul  and 
the  act  of  its  consul  was  in  turn  disavowed  by  the  American 
Government.^-^ 

It  was  now  reahzed  that  some  definite  plan  should  be  agreed 
upon  by  the  three  governments  for  restoring  order  in  the  islands. 
Secretary  Bayard  suggested,  therefore,  that  the  German  and 
British  ministers  at  Washington  be  authorized  to  confer  with  him 
on  the  subject — that  in  the  meantime  three  new  consuls  should  be 
appointed  and  sent  to  Samoa,  and  a  war  vessel  of  each  nation  be 
maintained  at  the  islands  for  two  years.  He  also  suggested  that 
there  should  be  a  joint  declaration  made  by  the  three  Powers 
declaring  against  annexation  or  establishment  of  a  protectorate 
by  any  of  the  three  Powers. 

The  suggestion^^s  resulted  in  the  sending  of  three  commissioners 

Count  Herbert  Bismarck  concerning  occurrences  in  Samoa.  The  latter  stated 
to  Mr.  Pendleton: 

"^^^lile,  therefore,  I  can  give  you  no  information  as  to  the  facts,  only 
conjectures,  which  may  perhaps  be  entirely  without  foundation,  I  can  say 
to  you,  as  I  said  already  a  week  ago  to  the  British  Ambassador,  that,  what- 
ever may  have  occurred,  we  intend  to  maintain  the  status  as  it  has  heretofore 
existed.  We  have  been  satisfied  with  that;  it  has  been  satisfactorj'  to  the 
three  Governments;  we  have  neither  interest  nor  desire  to  change  it;  but  if  we 
had,  we  would  take  no  stepj  make  no  movement,  without  frankly  consulting 
in  advance  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  If  any  wrong  has  been 
done  it  shall  be  righted,  and  reparation  shall  be  made;  and  nothing  shall  be 
allowed  to  change  the  relative  positions  of  these  governments." 

'2«  Ibid.,  pp.  25  and  26.  '-'  Ibid.,  p.  19. 

1"  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  18  ff.  Two  months  before  Sec- 
retary Bayard  made  his  suggestion  that  the  three  powers  hold  a  conference 
on  the  Samoan  question,  Germany  and  Great  Britain  at  the  invitation  of  the 
Earl  of  Rosebery  had  already  made  arrangements  for  an  Anglo-German 


COMMISSIONS  TO   SAMOA,    1SS6  159 

to  the  islands  to  rej^ort  to  their  home  governments  the  actual 
conditions  there,  preparatory  to  a  conference  of  the  three  govern- 
ments on  plans  for  the  administration  of  Samoa.  The  basis  of 
this  nKiuiry  as  set  forth  by  Secretary  Bayard^-"  was  to  l)e  "a 
thorough  examination  into  the  condition  of  the  group  and  the 
(a uses  of  the  recent  disorders  and  discontent  there,  with  a  view  to 
finding  a  permanent  remedy;  a  report  to  be  drawn  uj)  by  each 
c(^nnnissioner  for  his  respective  government;  and  a  status  of  neu- 
trality to  be  maintained  by  the  joint  counsel  and  influence  of  the 
three  Powers,  excluding  annexation  or  predominance  by  any  one 
power,  and  promoting  the  autonomy  and  peaceful  government  of 
the  group  by  the  native  authority."  The  inquiry,  according  to 
Secretary  Bayard's  view,  was  to  be  conducted  jointly.  The  British 
Government  accepted  this  basis  unquaHfiedly,^^''  the  German 
Go^■ernment  "agreed  generally,"  but  did  not  approve  of  providing 
the  commissi(Miers  with  joint  instructions.  Also  it  did  not  contem- 
])late  that  the  three  commissioners  should  hold  joint  sittings  and 
furnish  a  joint  report,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  each  should 
examine  the  situation  for  himself  and  report  separately  to  his 
own  government.  The  German  commissioner  was,  however, 
instructed  to  communicate  freely  and  frankly  with  the  other 
commissioners.     It  was  arranged   that  all   three  consuls  should 

inquiry  into  conditions  in  Samoa.  ( At  Bismarck's  suggestion  the  Commis-  . 
sioners  selected  for  the  enterprise  were  Mr.  John  B.  Thurston,  British  High 
Commissioner  of  the  Western  Pajcjfic,  and  Mr.  Travers,  His  Imperial  Majesty's 
Consul-General  in  Australia^  When  the  invitation  came  from  the  United 
States  it  was  decided  to  adhere  to  the  proposed  inquiry  by  Commissioners 
already  selected  and  to  invite  the  American  Government  to  send  a  Commis- 
sioner also.  Count  Hatzfeldt  in  agreeing  to  this  suggested  to  the  Earl  of 
Rosebery  that  it  would  l)e  "desirable  that  Messrs.  Thurston  and  Travers 
should  exchange  views  confidentially,  with  regard  to  their  course  in  the 
matter"  (Ibid.,  p.  27). 

>"  Ibid.,  p.  35,  No.  49. 

""  Ibid.,  pp.  36  and  37,  also  p.  39,  No.  58.  For  instructions  on  this  basis 
to  the  British  Consul  see  Ibid.,  p.  41.  The  American  Commissioner  Mr. 
Bates,  of  Delaware,  was  selected  by  Secretary  Bayard  because  his  personal 
acquaintance  with  the  man  enabled  the  Secretary  to  place  implicit  confidence 
in  him.  Mr.  Bates  had  never  taken  any  public  part  in  politics  in  the  ITnited 
States  nor  had  he  held  any  diplomatic  or  consular  post. 
11 


160      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AXD    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

leave  Samoa^^^  after  the  arrival  of  the  commissioners.^^-  ]\Ir. 
Bates,  the  American  commissioner,  was  authorized  to  disavow^^^ 
the  action  of  Consul  Greenebaume  in  assuming  a  protectorate 
over  Samoa,  and  Secretary  Bayard  set  forth  in  his  instructions 
that  the  Government  of    the  United   States  was  unwilling  to 

'^^  Ibid.,  p.  44  ff.  Inclosure  in  No.  76.  Extract  from  the  Xew  York  Herald 
of  August  20,  1886.  Our  Representative  in  Samoa.  Consul  Greenebaum's 
Explanation  not  satisfactory'.     (From   our  Regular  Correspondent.) 

Washington,  August  19,  1886. 
"A  few  weeks  ago  ]Mr.  Bates,  of  Wilmington,  Delaware,  was  appointed  by 
Secretary  Bayard  as  a  Special  Agent  of  the  State  Department  to  proceed  to 
the  Samoan  Islands  and  endeavor  to  restore  the  character  of  the  Consulate 
to  its  former  position  of  neutral  relations  with  the  Samoan  Chiefs.  Yesterday 
Mr.  Greenebaum,  of  San  Francisco,  who  has  been  the  consul  there  for  some 
time,  arrived  in  Washington  as  it  appears,  under  the  orders  of  the  State 
Department,  to  explain,  if  possible,  the  allegations  made  against  him  of 
having  ignored  his  instructions  not  to  take  part  in  any  local  strife  which  was 
known  to  exist  among  the  hostile  chiefs  on  that  island.  He  left  today  for 
San  Francisco,  and  "will  not,  it  is  said,  return  to  Samoa,  his  explanation  not 
being  satisfactory  to  the  Secretary.  It  is  alleged  that,  almost  immechately  upon 
arriving  at  Samoa,  he  began  to  take  sides  with  one  of  the  factions,  and  carried 
his  interference  so  far  as  to  provoke  the  opposition  of  the  consuls  of  other 
nations.  He  will  be  permitted  to  resign  and  his  resignation  is  expected  to  be 
forwarded  on  his  arrival  in  San  Francisco." 

Mr.  Bayard  later  told  the  British  Ambassador  that  Mr.  Greenebaum  had 
not  been  dismissed  but  that  his  commission  had  expired  and  the  President 
had  not  seen  fit  to  renew  it  (Ibid.,  p.  47).  F.  R.,  1886,  p.  ix.  President 
Cleveland  stated  in  his  Message  to  Congress,  December  6,  1886: 

"Civil  perturbations  in  the  Samcan  Islands  have,  during  the  past  few 
years  been  a  source  of  considerable  embarrassment  to  the  three  governments, 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States,  whose  relations  and  extra- 
territorial rights  in  that  important  group  are  guaranteed  by  treaties.  The 
weakness  of  the  native  administration  and  the  conflict  of  opposing  interests 
in  the  islands  have  led  King  INlalietoa  to  seek  alhance  or  protection  in  some 
one  quarter  regardless  of  the  distinct  engagements  whereby  no  one  of  the 
three  treaty  powers  may  acquire  any  paramount  or  exclusive  interest.  In 
May  last  Malietoa  offered  to  place  Samoa  under  the  protection  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  late  Consul  without  authority  assumed  to  grant  it.  The 
proceeding  was  promptly  disavowed  and  the  overzealous  official  recalled. 
Special  agents  of  the  three  governments  have  been  deputed  to  examine  the 
situation  in  the  Islands.  With  a  change  in  the  representatives  of  all  three 
powers,  and  a  harmonious  understanding  between  them,  the  peace  prosperity, 
autonomous  administration,  and  neutrahty  of  Samoa  can  hardly  fail  to  be 
secured." 

"2  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  104,  No.  97.  The  American  and 
German  Consuls  left  the  islands  before  the  arrival  of  the  American  and  British 
Commissioners.  The  fact  was  deprecated  by  Mr.  Thurston,  British  Com-, 
missioner  because  it  gave  no  opportunity  of  acquiring  direct  information 
from  Mr.  Greenebaum  and  Dr.  Stuebel  whom  Mr.  Thurston  considered  to 
be  almost  entirely  responsible  for  the  recent  state  of  affairs  in  Samoa. 

"3  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  oOth  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  31. 


INSTHITTIONS  TO   AMERICAN  COMMISSIONER  161 

assume  such  a  protectorate  "either  for  itseU'  alone  or  under  any 
joint  arrangement  whereby  the  native  authority'  of  Samoa  would 
he  replaced  by  a  permanent  tripartite  government  of  the  powers." 
He  admitted  that  it  would  probably  be  necessary  temporarily 
to  undertake  some  joint  arrangement  to  preserve  order,  for  which 
the  continued  presence  at  Apia  of  a  naval  vessel  of  each  of  the 
powers  in  turn  would  suffice.  In  respect  to  the  foreign  interests 
throughout  the  whole  group  of  islands,  the  secretary  considered 
that  the  municipal  arrangement  at  Apia,  by  which  the  presidency 
of  the  board  was  held  in  turn  by  each  of  the  three  consuls,  might 
constitute  the  best  solution  for  the  administration  of  the  islands. 
Beyond  this  no  one  of  the  powers  should  have  "the  slightest 
concern  in  the  personality  at  the  head  of  the  Samoan  native 
government." 

The  three  commissioners  soon  found  imj^ortant  differences  in 
their  understanding  of  their  instructions.^^*    ]\Ir.  Thurston  and  ^Ir. 

1'^  I])id.,  p.  139  (Appendix  A). 

"Mr.  Thurston's  sta\'  in  Samoa  was  of  less  than  two  weeks'  duration.  As 
his  position  in  Fiji  is  such  that  under  the  consular  system  of  his  Government 
the  correspondence  of  the  Apia  consulate  had  passed  under  his  eye,  he  was 
doubtless  famihar  with  the  general  course  of  events  in  Samoa,  and  felt  it 
imnccessary  to  spend  more  time  there.  Nevertheless  I  regretted  very  much 
his  earl  J'  departure.  There  were  some  points  on  which  further  and  frequent 
conferences  between  Mr.  Travers  and  myself  led  often  to  modification  and,  in 
some  instances,  coincidence  of  views.  I  am  convinced  also  that  Mr.  Travers' 
views  upon  which  our  original  difference  rested  did  undergo  considerable 
change.  Toward  the  end  of  my  stay  he  discussed  with  me  the  possible 
details  of  a  native  Government  to  an  extent  necessarily  involving  the  idea 
of  autonomy,  which  at  first  he  considered  impracticable.  It  was,  it  is  true, 
such  a  government  as  would  depend  for  its  inspiration  and  strength  upon 
the  {iresence  in  it  of  white  men. 

Mr.  Travers  also  modified  his  previously  expressed  view  by  assenting 
that  our  conferences  and  expressions  of  views  to  each  other  might  be  com- 
municated to  our  respective  Governments.  This  permission,  however,  was 
of  less  value,  since  these  conferences  were  under  his  determination,  mere 
informal  conversations;  and  any  view  which  he  expressed  to  me  he  did  not 
feel  bound  to  adhere  to,  but  considered  them  liable  to  change  on  further 
reflection. 


Before  leaving  this  subject,  I  desire  to  express  the  satisfaction  which  I 
derived  from  my  intercourse  with  both  of  the  commissioners.  I  was  deei)ly 
impressed  with  the  ability  and  fidelity  with  which  these  gentlemen  api)roached 
the  consideration  of  the  subject  referred  to  us.  Our  relations  were  of  the 
most  agreeable  character,  and  resulted  in  sentiments  of  resjject  and  friendly 
regard  on  my  part  which  I  am  glad  to  believe  were  reciprf)cated.  With  the 
exception  of  Mr.  Thurston's  brief  sojourn  at  Apia,  and  the  difficulty  exper- 
ienced bj'  Mr.  Travers,  under  his  instructions,  of  fully  coinciding  with  our 
\'iews  as  to  the  investigation,  I  could  have  desired  nothing  more  with  respect 
to  either  of  them." 


162      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AXD    GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

Bates  considered  that  their  very  presence  there  simultaneously 
implied  that  their  investigations  were  to  be  undertaken  jointly 
even  though  their  reports  were  to  be  separate.  Mr.  Travers, 
however,  considered  that  their  investigations  also  were  to  be 
entirely  independent  and  that  they  had  no  official  relations  with 
each  other.  The  British  and  American  commissioners  also  consid- 
ered that  they  were  there  to  plan  the  establishment  of  an  auto- 
nomous native  government  to  be  supported  by  the  joint  influence 
of  the  three  powers;  the  German  commissioner  did  not  state  his 
instructions  in  this  regard,  but  was  emphatic  in  declaring  his 
own  view  that  "no  autonomous  native  government  was  at  all 
practicable."  Mr.  Bates  relates,  however,  that  during  their  stay 
on  the  islands  and  as  a  result  of  frequent  conference  the  German 
commissioner  considerably  modified  his  views. 

Each  commissioner  presented  to  his  home  government  a  plan  of 
his  own  for  the  administration  of  Samoa.  The  German  Commis- 
sioner, !Mr.  Travers,  framed  his  plan^^^  on  the  principle  that  the 
government  of  the  country  must  be  "placed  in  the  hands  of  but 
one  of  the  treaty  powers,  by  the  consent  of  the  others."  In  view 
of  the  predominance  of  German  interests,  of  the  service  rendered 
by  Germany  in  developing  the  islands  and  of  the  fact  that  German 
subjects  paid  half  of  the  taxes  in  Samoa,  the  control  of  the  country 
belonged  properly  to  Germany.  He  therefore  drew  up  a  plan 
placing  the  administration  of  the  islands  in  the  hands  of  a  chief 
officer  or  administrator  to  be  appointed  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment. His  three  chief  assistants,  a  chief  justice,  director  of  finance 
and  a  judge  of  first  instance,  were  also  to  be  appointed  by  the  Ger- 
man Government.  The  duties  of  the  native  king  were  to  be  purely 
representative  and  the  native  assembly  was  to  be  permitted  to 
meet  for  public  discussion  of  matters  of  general  interest  according 
to  old  Samoan  custom,  but  it  was  not  to  have  a  deciding  vote, 
and  its  resolutions  were  to  receive  such  consideration  as  might  be 
practicable.  The  INIunicipal  Council  was  to  be  abolished.  jNIr. 
Travers 's  plan  was  in  brief  that  of  placing  Samoa  under  Germany 
as  a  mandatory,  but  he  considered  that  such  a  plan  would  not 

I's  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  2G3  ff. 


COM.MISSIONKHS'    PLAN'S    FOR    SOMOAN    ADMINISTRATION       163 

"exclude  either  the  Kngli  li  or  the  American  Governments  from 
active  parti(  ipation  in  tlie  remix leUnii;  of  tlie  j)oliticaI  aflairs  of 
Sam(>a  or  from  a  decisive  infiuence  in  the  subsequent  control  of  the 
Government  itself." 
y^  The  British  Gommissioner,  ]Mr.  Thurston,  considered^*'  that 
altlioui^h  the  interests  of  Europeans  in  Samoa  could  not  as  yet  be 
entrusted  to  a  native  government,  that  "an  earnest  attempt  to 
estabHsh  the  j)resent  natixe  government  on  an  improved  footing 
was  at  least  worthy  of  trial."  Such  a  government,  however,  would 
require  the  active  participation  of  representatives  of  the  three 
powers,  and  Mr.  Thurston  elaborated  a  plan  for  an  administration 
by  a  council  consisting  of  a  king,  a  vice-king,  chiefs  from  several 
districts,  and  three  foreign  officials  to  be  appointed,  respectively, 
by  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  the  United  States.  These  officials 
were  also  to  have  seats  in  the  lower  house,  or  legislative  body. 
The  Municipal  Gouncil  was  to  be  retained  and  to  consist  of  nine 
members,  of  whom  the  consuls  of  the  Treaty  Powers  were  each  to 
appoint  three.  In  general  the  right  of  foreign  subjects  to  juris- 
diction of  their  own  consuls  was  to  be  continued.  ]\Ir.  Thurston's 
plan"^  thus  maintained  the  idea  of  equality  of  representation  of  the 

"6  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  74,  also  p.  102. 
"'Ibid.,  p.  75.     (Mr.  Thurston's  Report.) 

"224.  In  closing  this  Report  I  cannot  but  express  regret  that  the  recom- 
mendations I  have  the  honor  of  submitting  for  the  consideration  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government  should  not  have  met  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
German  Commissioner. 

22.5.  The  task  of  devising  a  scheme  of  government  for  a  native  community, 
distracted  by  internal  jealousies,  and  bewildered  by  foreign  influences  ancl 
intervention  of  long  duration,  could  not  at  the  outset  promise  any  higher 
degree  of  success. 

226.  But  the  difhculties  inseparal)le  from  such  a  problem  were  not  lessened 
when,  of  the  three  Commissioners  a])pointed  to  visit  Samoa  and  report  to  their 
respective  Governments  upon  its  conditions  and  requirements,  one  was  indis- 
posed to  join  in  a  task  he  regarded  as  futile,  and,  moreover,  not  within  the 
scope  of  his  instructions;  and  another,  though  a])proaching  the  subject  with 
a  lively  and  earnest  interest,  was  unable  to  make  any  substantive  proposals 
owing  to  inexperience  of  "native  character  and  capabilities. 

227.  ^^'ith  the  assistance  of  three  foreign  members  of  Government  and  a 
Magistrate,  for  whose  services  the  revenue  of  the  native  Government  should 
without  difficulty  be  able  to  pay,  I  think  it  possiljle  that  a  native  Government 
might  in  time  l>e  established  on  a  satisfactory  footing. 

228.  It  would,  however,  })e  necessary  for  the  Powers  interested  in  Samoa 
to  continue  an  executive  support  to  the  native  Government  through  their 
naval  authorities,  for  in  the  beginning  every  Chief  who  fancied  himself  slighted 
would  proclaim  that  he  had  'left  the  king'  ami  then  proceed  to  hoist  a  flag  of 
his  own."' 


164      SAMOA:  THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY  IN  THE   PACIFIC 

powers  in  Samoa — it  also  gave  more  semblance  of  autonomy  to 
the  native  government,  but  it  was  semblance  merely,  as  the  pres- 
ence of  three  foreigners  with  A'oting  power,  in  the  highest  executive 
council  of  the  countn-  was  hardly  compatible  Anth  the  idea  of  an 
independent  government.  ^Moreover,  Mr.  Thurston  stated 
emphatically^^*  that  without  assistance  the  natives  of  Polynesia 
were  "neither  capable  of  forming  nor  maintaining  any  form  of 
government  worthy  of  the  name." 

]Mr.  Bates,  the  American  Commissioner,  feeling  bound  by  his 
instructions  to  frame  some  scheme  for  triangular  control  of  the 
native  government,  drew  up  a  plan  not^^^  unlike  that  of  Mr. 
Thurston  in  that  it  established  a  nominee  of  each  of  the  three 
powers  as  member  of  a  council  which  was  to  constitute  the  real 
executive  power  in  the  islands.  The  foreign  officers  were  also  to 
have  a  voice  in  the  lower  legislative  body.  Unlike  Mr.  Thurston, 
Air.  Bates  considered  it  better  to  abolish  the  present  municipal 
government  of  Apia.  IMr.  Bates,  however,  felt  considerably 
restricted  by  his  instructions  and  expressed  his  conviction  that  the 
extent  of  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  powders  must  be  more 
systematic  and  comprehensive  than  seemed  to  have  been  contem- 
plated by  his  instructions,  which  looked  toward  the  establishment 
of  a  native  government  of  some  force  with  oversight  rather  than 
administration  by  the  three  powers.  Mr.  Bates,  however,  realized 
that  the  real  function  of  the  powers  would  necessarily  be  that  of 
actual  administration  of  the  government  of  Samoa.  Moreover, 
Mr.  Bates,  having  obeyed  his  instructions  and  outlined  his  plan 
for  participation  of  the  three  governments,  proceeded  to  confess 
his  lack  of  faith  in  the  plan.  He  stated  that  he  shared  Mr.  Travers' 
apprehension  of  the  dangers  of  tripartite  control,  that  it  would 
create  constant  international  dissensions,  as  was  evidenced  by 
the  failure  of  the  former  attempt  at  government  by  the  three 
consuls.  He  therefore  agreed  with  the  German  Commissioner 
that  administration  by  one  power  would  be  the  best  plan,  but 
disagreed  with  him  in  concluding  that  that  power  should  be  Ger- 

"8  Ibid.,  p.  68. 

"3  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  186  ff. 


VIEWS  OF   .VMEHICAN  COMMISSIONER  165 

many.  The  concentration  of  German  interests  almost  entirely 
in  one  cc^mjiany  made  it  possible  for  that  firm  to  dominate  German 
local  ofHcials  in  Samoa  and  sway  measures  to  their  own  interest. 
Then,  too,  the  use  of  the  German  language  in  the  Government 
would  make  it  very  difficult  for  the  British  and  American  residents 
who  did  not  understand  German,  whereas  most  of  the  Germans 
understood  English,  which  would  therefore  not  create  the  same 
hardshij).  Moreover,  if  it  were  true,  as  Mr.  Travers  emphasized 
and  Mr.  Thurston  questioned,  that  German  interests  so  greatly 
predominated  in  the  islands,  that,  according  to  Mr.  Bates,  was 
an  additional  reason  why  Germany  should  not  be  allowed  to 
control  the  government.  Moreover  there  were  also  reasons  in 
the  American  Commissioner's  opinion  why  this  control  should 
not  be  given  over  to  Great  Britain.  Chief  among  these  was  that 
Great  Britain,  like  Germany,  was  pursuing  a  policy  of  annexation 
in  the  South  Pacific;  therefore,  even  under  the  most  guarded  treaty, 
the  I'nited  States  should  not  allow  the  absolute  control  of  the 
Samoan  Government  to  pass  into  the  hands  of  either  of  these 
powers.  The  final  conclusion  therefore  of  Mr.  Bates  was  that  the 
only  real  solution  of  the  problem  lay  in  assigning  the  administra- 
tion of  the  islands  to  the  United  States.  The  recognized  absence 
of  any  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  American  Government  to 
acquire  territory  in  that  region,  and  its  national  policy  of  abstain- 
ing from  intervention  he  considered  to  be  reasons  justifying  the 
choice  of  the  United  States  for  that  function,  a  choice  which  he 
believed  would  best  satisfy  the  native  population. 

While  the  three  governments  were  thus  equipping  themselves 
with  information  on  Samoa  and  otherwise  preparing  for  the  con- 
ference in  Washington,  which  should  solve  the  Samoan  problem, 
events  were  taking  place  on  the  islands  which  were  destined  to 
affect  the  coming  negotiations  directly  and  indirectly.  Malietoa 
was  still  the  recognized  native  king,  but  the  revolutionary  forces 
under  the  rival  chief,  Tamasese,  the  former  vice-king,  were  gaining 
in  strength  through  the  assistance,  as  was  declared  by  Malietoa, 
of  the  Germans,^^''  especiall}'  j\Ir.  Weber,  director  of  the  great 

"» Ibid.,  p.  24.  Report  of  Commander  B.  F..  Day,  U.S.S.  Mohican,  May 
28,  1886,  also  p.  48  and  p.  229. 


166      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

German  company.  There  appeared  also  at  this  time  as  assistant  or 
advisor  to  the  rebel  chief  Tamasese,  a  certain  Captain  Brandeis,"' 
former  Captain  of  Bavarian  artillery,  who  was  reported  to  be 
lately  connected  with  the  German  consulate  and  to  be  now  giving 
military  instruction  to  the  insurgents.  To  Malietoa's  protest 
against  the  activities  of  Brandeis,  the  new  German  Consul  replied 
that  Captain  Brandeis  had  no  appointment  of  a  military  character, 
but  was,  as  a  private  individual,  peaceably  assisting  the  govern- 
ment of  Leulumoega  {i.  e.,  the  Tamasese  government),  and  the 
Consul  trusted  that  his  labors  would  be  for  the  blessing  of  Samoa. ^*^ 

1"  R.  L.  S.,  p.  410.     (Letters  and  Miscellanies  of  R.  L.  S..  Vol.  XIX.) 
i«  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  119. 
M.  Becker  to  the  King  of  Samoa. 

German  Consulate,  Apia,  February  10,  18S7. 
(Translation  by  source.) 
"Your  Majesty: 

I  am  in  receipt  of  the  letter  stamped  with  your  Government  seal,  dated 
the  31st  January,  from  Mr.  William  Coe,  complaining  about  Brandeis,  a 
German  gentleman  gone  to  Leulumoega  in  a  miHtary  character,  now  in  sedi- 
tious relations  to  the  Samoan  Government,  and  attempting  insurrections, 
requesting  me  to  do  something  to  Brandeis. 

The  contents  of  a  letter  delivered  to  you  on  the  12th  November,  1886,  I 
have  informed  Your  Majesty  that  my  Government  has  instructed  me  that 
when  I  assumed  my  duties  in  the  German  Consulate  to  write  similar  letters 
to  Tuiaana  Tamasese,  the  same  as  to  you. 

Be  it  well  known  by  your  Majesty  in  relation  to  the  above  letter,  that  the 
Government  of  the  Emperor  of  Germany  is  in  friendly  relations  with  the 
Leulumoega  Government  as  it  is  with  your  Government.  The  letter  with 
the  seal  sent  to  the  German  Consulate  greatly  surprises  me  in  calling  the 
Government  of  Leulumoega  'rebels.'  In  the  future,  I  therefore  request  your 
Majesty  to  prohibit  Mr.  William  Coe  to  say  no  more  bad  words  like  that; 
for  again  if  he  says  any  more  bad  words  like  that  in  the  future,  it  will  be  my 
duty  to  inform  my  Government,  and  the  letters  which  you  will  receive  from 
my  Government,   you  will  not  like  their  contents. 

1  assure  you  that  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  gentleman  Brandeis,  for 
I  am  not  instructed  by  the  German  laws  to  prohibit  any  German  gentleman 
coming  here  on  his  own  business,  and  fincl  an  appointment  among  some 
gentlemen  who  are  in  friendly  relations  with  the  German  Government. 

I  have  therefore  to  inform  your  Majesty. that  I  will  always  he  ready  to 
attend  to  those  subjects  that  you  may  write  to  me  upon.  I  shall  at  once 
dispatch  the  ^'ice-consul  to  Leulumoega  to  get  information  in  relation  to  the 
doings  of  the  gentleman  Brandeis;  should  he  find  the  work  of  the  above 
gentleman  unsatisfactory,  then  shall  the  Vice-consul  speak  to  him. 

Again,  be  it  well  known  that  the  gentleman  Brandeis  has  no  appointment 
in  a  military  character,  but  resides  peaceably  assisting  the  Government  of 
Leulumoega"  in  their  work,  for  Brandeis  is  a  quiet  sensible  gentleman,  and  I 
trust  his  labor  at  Leulumoega  will  do  a  great  deal  of  good  for  the  blessings  of 
Samoa,  and  remain  in  peace 

May  you  live, 

I  am,  &c., 

(Signed)  Becker,  German  Consul. 


ACTIVITIES    OF   CAPTAIN    BRAXDEIS  107 

In  installing  the  new  consul,  the  German  Government  gave  him 
instructions  to  write  similar  letters  to  ]\ralietoa  and  Tamasese. 
To  this  eciual  recognition  of  both  and  to  the  reports  of  the  activities 
of  Brandeis,  Secretary  Bayard  made  vigorous  protest,"''  and 
received  the  reply  that  the  German  Go^•ernment  was  not  aware  of 
j\Ir.  Brandeis's  relations  with  the  German  consulate  or  with 
Tamasese  and  had  received  no  information  from  Malietoa  con- 
cerning his  activities."^    As  to  the  chief  Tamasese,  however,  the 

'«  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  43. 
•    No.  36.     Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  von  Alvensleben. 

Department  of  State. 

Washington,  March  2,  1SS7. 
"Sir: 

It  is  proper  I  should  acquaint  you  with  the  purport  of  a  dispatch  just 
received  at  the  Deirartment  and  dated  January  31,  1887,  from  the  American 
\'ice-consul  at  Apia.  It  is  stated  in  substance  that  a  Mr.  Brandeis,  lately 
connected  with  the  German  consulate  at  Apia,  has  been  s^ent  under  pay  and 
with  the  title  of  General  to  give  mihtary  instruction  to  Tamasese  in  promo- 
tion of  his  rebellion  against  the  Government  of  Malietoa.  The  ^'ice-consul 
further  states  that  this  action  has  Ijeen  made  the  subject  of  earnest  remon- 
strance bj'  Mahetoa  to  the  Imperial  Government. 

I  trust  that  the  just  and  benevolent  plan  of  cooperation  by  the  three 
pQwers  will  not  be  allowed  to  be  impeded  by  any  such  inconsistent  and  male- 
ficent action  as  has  been  so  reported,  and  if  any  such  steps  have  been  taken 
that  your  Government  will  promptly  check  such  actions  by  its  officials,  or 
under  color  of  their  approval. 

Accept  Sir,  &c., 

T.    F.    B.\YARD." 

•"  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

Xo.  39.     Mr.  von  Alvensleben  to  Mr.  Bayard. 

(Translation  by  source.) 

Imperial  German  Leg.\tion, 

Washingto.n,  April  Uth,  1887. 
(Received  .\pril  15.) 

"The  undersigned  Imperial  German  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  has  brought  the  polite  note  of  the  Hon.  Thomas  F.  Bayard, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  l)earing  the  date  of  March  2,  1887, 
and  relating  to  Samoa,  to  the  notice  of  his  high  Government,  and  has  been 
authorized  to  make  the  following  rej)!}'  thereto: 

The  Imperial  Government  is  not  aware  that  a  certain  Mr.  Brandeis  at 
Apia  sustains  or  has  sustained  relations  with  the  German  consulate  at  that 
place,  or  that  he  has  become  as.sociated  with  Ghief  Tamasese.  .  The  Imi)erial 
Government,  moreover,  has  received  no  information  concerning  any  rejjre- 
sentation  made  by  Chief  Malietoa  on  account  of  what  has  been  tlone  by  Mr. 
Brandeis. 

The  reference  made  in  the  note  of  the  honorable  Mr.  Bayard  to  a  rebellion 
of  Tamasese  against  Malietoa's  Government  furnishes  occasion  for  the  remark 
that  a  formal  agreement  was  signed  at  the  instance  and  in  the  i)resence  of 
the  German.  American  and  British  consuls,  on  the  8th  of  June  last,  on  board 


168      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMAXY   IX   THE   PACIFIC 

German  Government  replied  that  the  strength  of  his  support 
in  Samoa  warranted  its  recognition  of  his  government  as  of  equal 
status  with  that  of  Malietoa  and  that  that  recognition  had  prac- 
tically been  accorded  him  by  the  American  and  British  Consuls 
the  preceding  June  when  they  had  influenced  Tamasese  and  Mal- 
ietoa  to  come  on  board  the  U.  S.  S.  "Mohican"  and  sign  a  formal 
agreement  of  peace  and  friendship.  Yet  it  agreed  that  the  ques- 
tion of  sovereignty  in  Samoa  should  be  reserved  for  the  coming 
conference  to  decide  and  that  in  the  meantime  there  was  no  occa- 
sion for  any  one  of  the  powers  to  interfere  in  Samoan  party  ques- 
tions.^^=  It  was  agreed  upon  by  all  three  powers  that  their  consuls 
on  the  islands  should  be  instructed  to  maintain  the  status  quo 
during  the  sessions  of  the  conference. 

A  movement  from  another  quarter  at  this  juncture  complicated 
the  situation  on  the  islands.    King  Kalakaua,  of  Hawaii,  sponta- 

of  the  U.S.S.  "Mohican,"  by  the  representatives  of  the  opposing  parties  in 
Samoa,  viz.,  that  of  MaUetoa  and  that  of  Tamasese  to  the  effect  that  both 
parties  should  thenceforth  hve  on  terms  of  friendship  with  each  other.  The 
de  facto  existence  and  the  equaUty  of  Tamasese's  party  was  consequently 
considered,  both  by  the  native  and  the  foreign  population  of  the  Samoan 
Islands,  as  having  "Haen  recogniz^.  so>i1Jhat  tile  term  "rebellion"  does  seem 
approi)riate  in  the  case  to  either  party.  It  appears,  however,  from  a  tabular 
statement  prepared  by  Mr.  Travers,  the  Imperial  Consul  General,  while  he 
was  in  Samoa  that  Tamasese's  adherents  are,  at  the  present  time,  nearly 
four  times  as  numerous  as  those  of  Mahetoa. 

The  Imperial  Government  shares  the  view  that  all  propositions  looking 
to  a  settlement  of  the  question  of  sovereignty  in  Samoa  should  be  reserved  for 
the  consideration  of  the  conference  of  the  three  treaty  powers  which  is  to 
meet  at  Washington,  and  that  there  is  no  occasion  for  any  one  of  the  treaty 
powers  to  interfere,  without  the  cooperation  of  the  others,  in  existing  party 
questions. 

The  undersigned  avails,  etc., 

H.  v.  Alvexsleben." 

(See  also  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  X15  f.) 

>«  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  13-4. 

No.  133.1.  Count  Hat^feldt  to  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury.     (Translation  by 

ourcer)  » 

German  Embassy,  June  20,  1887. 


"The  Imperial  Government,  who  are  equally  desirous  \\-ith  Her  Majesty's 
Government  to  preserve  the  status  quo  in  Samoa,  will,  accordingly,  again 
instruct  their  consul  at  Apia  in  the  sense  desired  by  Lord  Salisbury  and  they 
hope  that  analogous  instructions  will  be^sent  to  the  British  Representative." 

(Sec  also  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pp.  56  and  57.) 


HAWAIIAN    EXPEDITION  169 

iieoiisly  outfitted  and  sent  an  expedition  of  his  own  to  Samoa, '^''' 
seeking  to  form  with  King  Malietoa  an  alliance  which  should  be 
the  starting-point  of  a  confederation  of  the  still  in<lependent 
Polynesian  communities  and  should  assist  in  establishing  their 
permanent  autonomy.  The  mission,  headed  by  a  Mr.  John  E. 
Bush,  a  half-caste  Hawaiian,  former  member  of  the  Hawaiian 
cabinet,  was  received  with  much  cordiality  and  display  by  King 
IMalietoa,  and  preparations  were  made  for  maintaining  permanent 
relations  between  the  two  island  monarchs.  In  presenting  plans 
for  establishing  definite  treaty  relations  with  Samoa,  Mr.  Bush 
stated  to  King  IMalietoa  that  he  "  believed  the  British  Government 
to  be  aware  of  his  mission,  and  that  he  had  the  support  of  the 
I'nited  States."  The  Convention  was  thereafter  signed  and  rati- 
fied by  the  two  kings/^^  binding  each  other  "  to  enter  into  a  political 
confederation"  and  to  conform  to  such  measures  as  might  be 
agreed  upon  to  carry  such  a  confederation  into  effect.  Shortly 
after  this  Mr.  Carter,  the  Hawaiian  minister  at  Washington, 
requested  to  be  allowed  to  represent  the  interests  of  Samoa  as  well 
as  those  of  his  own  country,^^^  and  presented  proper  credentials 
from  King  Malietoa  for  this  purpose.  Previous  to  this  the 
Hawaiian  Government,  anxious  to  pursue  a^^^  policy  in  accord 
with  that  of  the  United  States,  had  appointed  as  its  Vice-Consul 
at  Apia,  INIr.  Greenebaume,  the  former  American  Consul,  who 
had  returned  to  the  islands  privately  after  his  former  commission 
ex-pired,  and  whom  the  Hawaiian  Government  believed  to  be  still 
the  American  consular  representative  there.  All  of  these  events 
worked  together  to  create  the  impression  in  the  minds  of  the 
German  rei)resentatives  that  the  Hawaiian  mission  had  behind  it 
the  support,  or  at  least  the  approval,  of  the  United  States.'^" 
At  the  request  of  the  German  Government  the  British  minister 

'^«  House  Ex.  Doc.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  39  ff.,  also  A.  and  P.,  1889, 
LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  117  ff. 

'"■  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  125. 

•«  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  40  f. 

'"  Il)id.,  p.  38.  Secretary  Bayard  assured  the  Hawaiian  Government  that 
Mr.  Greenebaum  was  no  longer  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  and  Malietoa 
refused  to  receive  him  as  the  Hawaiian  Vice-consul. 

15°  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  126. 


170      SAMOA:   THE  UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY  IN  THE   PACIFIC 

at  Washington  was  directed  to  unite  with  his  German  colleague, 
requesting  the  United  States  to  join  with  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many in  opposing  the  action  of  Havvaii  in  Samoa.  The  apprehen- 
sion in  regard  to  the  United  States'  policy  on  this  subject  was 
relieved  by  Secretary  Bayard,  who  showed  that  he  had  been  con- 
sistently opposing  the  Hawaiian  interference  all  along.^^^  He  had 
told  ]Mr.  Carter,  the  Hawaiian  minister,  that  the  President  was 
not  prepared  to  receive  him  as  the  accredited  representative  of 
the  King  of  Samoa  and  urged  him  to  prevent  King  Kalakaua 
from  intervening  in  Samoan  affairs,  a  course  which  he  asserted 
would  be  injudicious  and  involve  Hawaii  in  questions  whose  origin 
was  beyond  Hawaiian  control.^^-  As  a  result  of  the  opposition 
encountered,  King  Kalakaua  recalled  unconditionally  his  mission 
to  Samoa  and  thus  terminated  the  Hawaiian-Polynesian  policy. 

Such  was  in  general  the  situation  in  the  islands  when  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  three  powers  entered  into  formal  conference  on 
the  subject  in  Washington  in  the  summer  of  1887.  The  British 
and  German  ministers.  Sir  Lionel  Sackville-West  and  Baron  von 
Alvensleben,  represented  their  respective  countries  in  a  series  of 
conferences  with  ]Mr.  Bayard,  Secretary  of  State,  as  the  represen- 
tative of  the  United  States. ^^^  At  the  first  meeting  of  the  Confer- 
ence, each  representative  read  a  memorandum^^^  presenting  the 

151  A.  &  p.;  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-o629),  p.  135. 

'5^  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pp.  51  to  54,  inclusive. 

15^  The  Protocols  of  the  six  conferences  held  were,  by  agreement,  kept 
confidential  for  two  years  and  finally  published  in  February,  1SS9  (Sen. 
Ex.  Doc.  No.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.),  after  a  resolution  passed  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  requested  their  transmission,  if  not  incompatible 
with  the  public  interest.  (House  Misc.  Doc.  No.  lOS,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.) 
The  Secretary  of  State  had  previously  requested  the  British  and  German 
Governments  for  permission  to  pulilish  the  protocols  but  the  permission  had 
been  refuged. 

^°*  Secretary  Bayard's  plan  had  been  previously  submitted  to  the  two 
ministers  and  was  embodied  in  the  protocol  as  if  read  at  the  conference.  He 
suggested  that  the  plans  of  the  other  two  representatives  be  handed  to  him 
in  the  same  way.  Mr.  von  Alvensleben,  however,  objected,  stating  that  his 
Government  had  sent  him  general  instructions  before  knowing  Mr.  Bayard's 
suggestions,  that  "those  instructions,  therefore,  did  not  cover  all  the  differ- 
ent points  suggested,"  that  he  would  read  his  memorandum  but  could  not 


WASIIINGTOX  CONFERENCE,    1887  17l 

l)lan  of  his  government  for  the  administration  of  Samoa.  The  plan 
l)resente<l  by  Secretary  Bayard  proceeded  from  the  J)asis  of  the 
inde])endence  and  autonomy  of  the  island  kingdom  "free  from  the 
control  or  preponderating  influence  of  any  foreign  Go\'ennnent." 
His  arrangement  therefore  jjlaccfl  the  executive  power  in  Samoa  in 
the  hands  of  a  mixed  council  of  Samcans  and  foreign  representa- 
ti\es.  There  should  be  a  king  and  a  vice-king,  Malietoa  and 
Tamasese  to  be  recognized  in  these  offices  (as  heretofore) ,  and  these, 
together  with  chiefs  from  several  districts  and  a  minister  from 
each  of  the  Treaty  powers  should  constitute  the  executive  body 
of  the  government.  The  three  ministers  niientioned  were  to  be 
ap})ointed  by  the  king  upon  nomination, by  the  powers  and  were 
to  have  seats  also  in  the  lower  legislative  body  of  the  government. 
Another  essential  feature  of  the  plan  was  the  organization  of  a  land 
commission  before  ^^•hom  all  claims  of  title  to  land  were  to  be 
])resented  and  whose  decision  was  to  be  final.  This  land  commis- 
sion was  to  consist  of  five  members  appointed  by  the  King,  three 
of  these  to  be  nominated,  one  each,  by  the  treaty  powers,  and  the 
remaining  two  to  be  chosen  by  the  king.  In  general  Bayard's 
plan,  except  for  the  establishment  of  the  Land  Commission, 
offered  little  that  was  new  in  ])rinoiple  from  the  system  attempted 
in  1S79,  when  a  representative  of  each  power  was  made  an  official 
of  the  Samban  Government. ^^^ 

Mr.  von  Alvensleben  then  presented  the  plan  of  Germany, ^^'^ 
whose  view  as  stated  in  the  preamble  was  also  based  on  the  under- 
standing " that  the  independence  of  Samoa  under  a  nati\e  govern- 
ment was  to  be  maintained,  and  that  no  monopolies  should  be 
created  there  by  any  foreign  power."  His  first  stipulation  was  for  a 
new  election  in  Samoa.  Claiming  that  ]\Ialietoa  had  notoriously 
violated  his  treaties  with  Germany,  and  that  "  a  completely  organ- 
ized  counter-go venmient "   hafl    been    formed    under    Tamasese, 

give  it  out  of  his  hand.  The  British  Minister  also  dechned  to  give  a  copy 
of  the  memorandum  he  had  prepared.  Both  agreed,  however,  that  steno- 
graphic accounts  of  their  statements  as  read  should  be  embodied  in  the  ])ro- 
tocols  of  the  conference.     (Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Scss.,  p.  5.) 

'55  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  208. 

'5«  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  7. 


172      S,\iIOA:  THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   GERMANY  IN  THE   PACIFIC 

von  Alvensleben  asserted  that  a  new  election  of  king  would  have 
to  take  place  "according  to  the  customs  of  the  country" — this 
election  to  be  "freely  made  by  the  chiefs  and  people  of  Samoa." 
After  this  election  purely  Samoan  affairs  were  to  be  conducted 
as  hitherto  by  the  king  and  his  native  consul  whose  powers  were 
to  be  defined  by  special  agreement.  The  significant  element  of  the 
German  plan,  however,  lay  in  the  arrangement  for  the  exercise  of 
control  of  this  native  government  by  one  of  the  treaty  powers. 
This  was  to  be  secured  through  an  official  called  "  adviser  to  the 
king,"  who  should  act  as  the  mandatory  of  the  three  treaty  powers 
and  have  control  over  all  measures  concerning  public  order  and  the 
security  of  the  property  of  foreign  residents.  This  adviser  or  prime 
minister,  was  "to  be  nominated  by  the  treaty  power  having  for  the 
time  being  the  preponderating  interests  in  Samoa,"  but  his  nomi- 
nation should  have  the  approval  of  the  other  two  powers.  The 
first  adviser  so  appointed  was  to  serve  for  five  years,  when 
there  should  be  a  new  appointment  made  upon  the  same  condi- 
tions. As  the  German  interests  in  Samoa  outweighed  at  present 
those  of  the  other  two  powers,  the  first  "adviser  to  the  king" 
should  be  nominated  by  Germany.  In  order,  however,  to  avoid 
any  misapprehension  which  might  arise  because  of  this  placing 
of  the  representative  of  one  of  the  powers  in  the  most  prominent 
position  of  the  Samoan  Government,  it  was  recommended  that  the 
equality  of  treatment  to  be  accorded  still  to  all  of  the  treaty 
powers  be  acknowledged  by  some  new  formal  declaration  to  that 
effect. 

The  plan  of  the  British  representative^^''  coincided  in  its  main 
features  with  that  of  Germany.  Sir  Lionel  West  also  asserted  in 
behalf  of  his  government  that  it  was  understood  that  no  one  of  the 
three  powers  desired  to  found  a  colony  in  the  islands,  to  obtain  a 
commercial  monopoly  or  to  destroy  the  independence  of  Samoa. 
As  a  result  of  the  investigations  of  the  three  commissioners,  how- 
ever, it  was  evident  that  the  intervention  of  the  three  powers 
would  have  to  take  the  form  of  actual  administration,  and  it  was 

1"  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  pp.  8  and  9. 


BRITISH   SUPPORT   OF   GERMAN   POLICY  173 

also  evident  from  the  reports  of  the  commissioners  that  the  tri- 
partite control,  such  as  had  existed  to  greater  or  less  degree  hitherto 
was  impracticable.  The  solution,  therefore,  seemed  to  lie  in  the 
alternate  control  of  the  islands  for  a  limited  period  by  one  of 
the  three  nations.  In  the  choice  of  which  power  should  first  act 
as  mandatory.  Her  ^Majesty's  Government  considered  "  that  pre- 
ponderating commercial  interests  should  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion." ^Moreover,  since  ^Ir.  Thurston,  ]Mr.  Travers  and  ^Ir. 
Bates  all  agreed  that  this  preponderance  was  possessed  by  Ger- 
many, Her  ^Majesty's  Government  was  ready  "to  consent  to  the 
mandatory  power  being  exercised  by  the  German  representative 
for  the  first  term  of  five  years,"  absolute  eciuality  of  treatment  in 
commerce  and  all  other  matters  being  secured  to  the  three  powers. 
Sir  Lionel  also  presented  a  plan  for  the  establishment  of  an  inter- 
national Land  Court  to  dispose  of  claims  of  title  to  land  in  Samoa, 
which  claims  were  to  be  first  investigated  by  a  land  commission. 
Li  respect  to  the  matter  of  kingship,  it  was  evident  that  although 
INIalietoa  had  long  been  recognized  by  the  powers  and  Tamasese 
denied  that  recognition,  nevertheless,  the  situation  was  now  such 
that  a  new  election  was  imperative.  In  case  of  such  an  election, 
Her  ^Majesty's  Government  expressed  no  opinion,  either  favorable 
or  adverse,  to  Malietoa. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  the  British  and  German  policies  Avere  in 
accord  in  the  most  important  feature,  namely,  the  administration 
of  the  islands  by  one  power,  and  that  power — because  of  prepon- 
derance of  commercial  interests — Germany.  Secretary  Bayard's 
policy  involved  the  opposite  principle,  namely,  the  constant  equal 
participation  of  the  three  powers  in  the  administration  of  the 
islands  and  also  the  reducing  of  that  participation  to  a  minimum 
in  order  to  give  as  much  opportunity  as  possible  for  native  inde- 
pendence.   - 

In  opposing  the  idea  that  "preponderating  commercial  interests  " 
should  serve  as  a  basis  for  any  plan  for  governing  Samoa,  Secretary 
Bayard  pointed  out  that  the  chief  importance  of  the  islands  lay  in 
their  geographic  position,  directly  in  the  path  of  a  Pacific  commerce 
just  being  developed.  The  recent  developments  of  the  American 
Northwest  and  the  plans  for  the  isthmian  canal  all  gave  a  new 


174      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AXD    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

importance  to  these  islands  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  United 
States.  Moreover,  the  European  nations,  Great  Britain,  Germany, 
France  and  Spain  had  already  absorbed  nearly  all  the  important 
island  groups  in  Polynesia,  whereas  the  United  States,  with  its 
long  Pacific  coast-line,  had  not  secured  a  foot  of  territory  in  that 
region.  There  was  therefore  something  in  question  beyond  the 
value  of  land  and  products  and  for  this  reason  the  United  States 
wished  to  secure  this  group  of  islands  for  the  "common  use  of 
nations."  Von  Alvensleben  and  Sir  Lionel  contended  that  the 
mandatory  plan  in  no  way  contradicted  this  idea.  But  Secretary 
Bayard  pointed  out  that  the  German  minister  had  stated  in  his 
memorandum^^^  that, 

"  It  cannot  be  expected  that  she  (Germany)  should  consent  to 
remain  more  or  less  excluded  from  the  efficient  control  of  the 
country,  and  have  it  pass  to  one  of  the  two  powers  who  have  less 
interests." 

Here  Secretary  Bayard  showed  was  a  "clear  proposition  of 
inequality." 

"  If  Germany  could  not  be  expected  to  consent  to  remain  more  or 
less  excluded,  how  could  she  expect  another  power  to  remain  so? 
There  was  upon  the  very  proposition  of  exclusion  the  mark  of 
inequality  which  is  in  contradiction  to  the  idea  with  which  the 
conference  began." 

The  British  representative  then  replied  that  the  mandatory  plan 
itself  was  not  based  on  the  principle  of  preponderating  interests, 
but  was  conceived  of  as  the  best  means  of  securing  a  stable  govern- 
ment in  the  islands,  the  tripartite  control  having  proved  a  failure 
as  was  testified  to  by  all  three  commissioners  after  their  investiga- 
tions in  the  islands.  Her  Majesty's  Government  was  willing, 
"seeing  the  great  interest  Germany  has  in  Samoa,  to  accord  to 
the  German  representative  the  first  term  of  five  years  as  mandatory 
of  the  other  two  powers,"  and  did  not  see  that  any  exclusive  con- 
ies Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  pp.  12  ff.  and  3S  ff. 


CONTRASTING    POLICIES  175 

trol  was  involved  in  the  arranfi:ement,  as  the  mandatory  power 
could  only  be  exercised  with  the  consent  of  the  other  two  powers, 
so  that  it  seemed  a  matter  of  small  importance  which  power  should 
he  the  first  to  exercise  it. 

The  problem  of  a  method  of  adjusting  conflictins;  land-claims 
was  also  discussed  at  length  in  the  conferences  but,  as  the  organi- 
zations proposed  for  this  purpose  took  their  character  from  the 
general  plan  of  government,  the  national  policies  conflicted  on  this 
subject  also. 

Finally,  considering  that  there  was  no  hope  of  agreement,  because 
as  he  viewed  it,  the  German  plan,  acquiesced  in  by  Great  Britain, 
made  the  preponderance  of  interests  and  consequent  inequality 
of  influence  "the  actual  basis  and  controlling  principle  of  the  whole 
scheme  of  government,"  Secretary  Bayard  proposed  that  the  con- 
ference adjourn  until  autumn,  in  order  that  the  German  and  British 
ministers  might  submit  the  protocols  of  the  conference  to  their 
respective  governments  and  receive  from  them  "instructions  of  a 
more  definite  character." 

The  conference  was  therefore  adjourned  without  result  except 
to  show  the  differences  of  principle  actuating  the  policies  of  the 
three  powers.  With  Germany  and  Great  Britain  the  principle  was 
the  natural  outgrowth  of  a  colonial  policy  of  extending  the  protec- 
tion of  the  State  over  commercial  developments  once  definitely 
established  in  regions  unclaimed  by  any  civilized  power.  Bismarck 
had  stated  definitely  in'^^  1884: 

"We  intend,  moreover,  as  in  West  Africa,  so  also  in  the  South 
Seas  to  place  under  the  direct  protection  of  the  Empire  those 
regions  which,  through  the  predominating  extension  of  German 
trade  or  in  consequence  of  the  preparations  for  this,  seem  fitted 
for  it." 

^  Secretary  Bayard's  stand  was  more  of  a  defense  against  a  feared 
aggression  in  a  region  which  he  held  to  be  important  to  the  I'nited 
States  by  reason  of  its  geographic  position.     His  method  was 

f— ^ • — 

i»'  V.  R.,  ISSo,  Anl.  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Xr.  1(37,  p.  718.  (Author's  tran.s- 
latiou.~i 

12 


176    s.\:moa:  the  united  states  axd  Germany  in  the  pacific 

therefore  to  insist  on  a  maximum  of  autonomy  for  Samoa.  In 
pursuing  this  Hne  of  policy  he  was  forced  to  ignore  and  act  in 
contradiction  to  the  advice  of  the  American  Commissioner,  Mr. 
Bates,  who  had,  from  his  experience  on  the  islands,  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  a  strictly  independent  native  government  was  an 
impossibility  and  a  tripartite  government  impracticable.  Mr, 
Bates  even  considered  that  the  United  States'  policy  in  the  Samoan 
question  should  be  governed  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which,  as 
originally  stated,  applied  not  merely  to  the  continent  but  to  the 
whole  Western  Hemisphere,  and  therefore  included  nearly  all  of 
PoJ^Tiesia.  Secretary  Bayard  was  also  forced  to  take  the  seemingly 
inconsistent  stand  of  checking  the  Hawaiian  movements. ^^^  If 
the  United  States  stood  for  the  independence  of  the  small  native 

'«« House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pp.  52,  54  and  60;  also 
pp.  101  to  105  inclusive.  For  Mr.  Bates'  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  Polynesia,  see  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  276  f. 

(Extract  from  Mr.  Bates'  Report) 

"American  Intervention  in  the  Pacific. 

"To  return  to  the  subject  of  sole  control.  \Yhether  our  Government  would 
be  willing  to  undertake  it,  even  with  the  consent  of  the  other  powers,  is  a, 
question  which,  of  course,  I  cannot  determine. 

I  do  not  believe  that  a  vigorous  and  decided  interest  in  the  welfare  of  these 
native  communities  would  be  in  opposition  to  the  declared  policy  of  our 
Government,  but  that  it  would  fall  within  the  limits  of  exceptions,  not  only 
well  defined,  but  which  have  been  enumerated  and  adhered  to  by  successive 
officers  in  charge  of  our  foreign  affairs,  of  all  parties. 


The  envmciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  first  qualified  the  general  pohcy 
of  non-intervention  and  prescribed  the  limits  to  which  it  was  to  be  thereafter 
confined.  This  i)ublic  notice  to  the  world  that  we  would  not  submit  to  an 
extension  of  the  European  system  to  this  hemisphere,  or  to  the  establishment 
upon  it  of  European  colonies  in  addition  to  those  then  existing,  was  i)ut  upon 
the  express  ground  that  we  should  regard  such  action  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety. 

The  true  limitation,  therefore,  of  the  doctrine  of  non-intervention  with  the 
operations  of  any  European  powers  was  thus  stated.  It  was  that  such  action 
should  not  lie  permitted  as  might  be  considered  by  us  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety. 

It  would  be  impossible,  in  view  of  the  marvelous  growth  of  the  United 
States  in  {)0]iulation  and  its  resources,  and  the  extension  of  its  territorj', 
both  by  accjuisition  and  settlement,  that  the  limitation  by  President  Monroe 
should  at  all  i)eriods  of  our  history  be  geograpliically  the  same. 

Although  ])erhaiis  there  exists — at  least  to  some  extent — a  popular  impres- 
sion that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  intended  to  apply  to  acquisitions  by 
foreign  jiowers  ujion  this  continent,  neither  the  terms  in  which  the  doctrine 
w:is  originally  stated  nor  the  action  of  our  Government  since,  will  lie  found  to 
justify  any  such  conclusion.  .\  very  early  application  of  the  spirit  of  this 
doctrine  to  a  country  not  embraced  in  the  continent  will  be  found  in  our 
diplomatic  correspondence  respecting  Cuba;  and  wliile  the  United  States  have 


SECRETARY   BAYARD's   POLICY  ,    177 

^•o^•ernments  in  the  Pacific,  it  would  be  expected  to  encourage  the 
enterprise  of  one  of  the  strongest  native  kings  in  his  attempt  to 
confederate  with  and  strengthen  the  other  Polynesian  monarchs 
as  against  encroachments  of  all  foreigners.  The  Secretary  evi- 
dently feared,  however,  that  such  a  movement  on  the  part  of 
Hawaii,  which  was  so  closely  bound  economically  by  treaty  to  the 
United  States,  would  be  misinterpreted  and  cause  the  colonizing 
powers  to  seek  more  definite  control  over  Samoa. 

The  two  years  following  the  Washington  conference  represent 
the  ]5eriod  of  greatest  tension  between  the  three  governments  in 
reference  to  the  Samoan  question.    Bismarck  agreed'"^  nominally 

refused  to  interfere  with  the  possession  of  that  island  by  Spain,  it  was  declared 
more  than  sixty  years  ago  by  Mr.  Clay,  and  has  been  repeated  in  substance 
many  times  since,  that  we  would  not  consent  to  the  occupation  of  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico  by  any  other  European  power. 

So  in  the  Pacific.  As  the  extension  of  our  commerce  and  the  settlement 
of  our  Pacific  coast  made  it  apparent  that  the  possession  by  a  European  power 
of  the  Sandwich  Islands  would  be  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety — indeed, 
more  so  than  would  be  true  as  to  the  South  American  Republics — our  Govern- 
ment has  not  hesitated  to  declare  that  their  conquest  or  occupation  by  one 
of  the  great  powers  of  Europe  would  be  a  result  which  we  would  not  hesitate  to 
prevent  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary.  This  statement  has  been  repeated 
substantially  though  in  different  terms,  by  Mr.  Webster,  Mr.  Legare,  Mr. 
Clayton,  Mr.  Marcy,  Mr.  Fish,  Mr.  Blaine,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  and  yourself. 

The  relation  of  the  Samoan  group  to  the  future  commerce  of  the  Pacific 
is  the  same  in  kind,  though  at  present  less  in  degree,  as  that  of  the  Hawaiian 
group. 


The  intelligent  foresight  of  our  Goverment  has,  at  a  time  when  the  future 
of  that  region  was  much  less  certain  than  it  is  now,  secured  exclusive  rights 
on  the  island  of  Tutuila  in  a  harbor  probably  not  equalled  and  certainly  not 

surpassed  in  the   Pacific Having  thus  long  ago  acquired  this 

foothold  in  the  South  Pacific,  it  would  be  short-sighted  indeed  if  we  were  to 
permit  the  advantage  of  this  action  to  slip  away  from  us  by  leaving  the  way 
open  to  European  domination  in  this  grouj). 

It  is  because  of  the  conviction  that  the  situation  in  these  islands  requires 
more  active  intervention  in  their  domestic  affairs  than  was  contemplated  by 
my  instructions  to  secure  to  our  own  peoy)le  the  rights  and  privileges  which 
naturally  belong  to  them  that,  while  reporting  the  best  plan  I  could  devise  in 
accordance  with  the  instructions.  I  have  been  constrained  to  go  beyond  it 
and  to  urge  more  independent  action  on  the  part  of  this  Government  than 
has  been  heretofore  contemplated." 

1*1  Ibid.,  pp.  59  and  60.  (For  German  original  see  Weissbuch,  1889,  Fuenfter 
Theil,  No.  5.) 

No.  54.  Prince  von  Bismarck  to  Mr.  von  Alvensleben.  (Left  at  the 
Department  of  State  by  Mr.  von  Alvensleben,  August  29,  1887.  (Transla- 
tion by  source.) 

Varzin,  August  7,  1887. 
(Received  August  29.) 
"Mr.  Bayard  has  declined  to  agree  to  the  German-English  i)roposition 
to  appoint  one  adviser  to  the  Samoan  Government  as  the  representative  of 


178   SAMOA:  THE  united  states  and  GERMANY  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

in  view  of  Secretary  Bayard's  objections,  to  drop  the  German- 
English  plan  and  take  into  closer  consideration  the  American 

the  treaty  powers,  and  has  proposed  instead  the  institution  of  an  executive 
council,  consisting  of  the  King  of  Samoa,  a  native  official,  and  three  represen- 
tatives of  the  treaty  powers  {i.  e.,  one  to  be  nominated  by  each).  In  the 
course  of  the  discussions  on  this  proposition  it  has  been  pointed  out  by  the 
German  as  well  as  by  the  English  plenipotentiary  that  under  such  a  compo- 
sition of  the  executive,  the  unsettled  and  lawless  condition  of  affairs  which 
has  hitherto  prevailed  in  Samoa  would  continue,  and  that  a  uniform  adminis- 
tration of  the  Samoan  Government,  offering  sufficient  guarantees  for  public 
peace  and  order,  would  thereby  be  rendered  illusory. 

The  Imperial  Government,  while  maintaining  these  views,  and  although 
it  would  have  been  considered  desirable  if  also  the  United  States  Government 
could  have  convinced  itself  of  the  practical  advantages  of  the  German-English 
proposition,  is  nevertheless  prepared,  in  view  of  the  objections  raised  by  Mr. 
Bayard,  to  drop  that  point,  because  Germany  has  no  treaty  claim  upon  the 
consent  of  America  to  the  proposed  institution,  and  because  we  are  endeavor- 
ing to  regulate  the  relations  of  the  interested  powers  to  Samoa  in  a  common 
understanding  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  connected  by 
friendship  with   Germany. 

The  Imperial  Government  does  not  see  in  the  American  counter-proposition 
any  redress  of  the  now  existing  evils;  it  does  not  aim,  notwithstanding  the  pre- 
ponderance of  German  interests  over  those  of  other  nations  in  Samoa,  at  the 
exercise  of  a  stronger  influence  with  regard  to  the  affairs  of  the  islands  than 
England  and  America,  unless  such  influence  would,  in  the  common  interest 
of  the  three  nations,  be  willingly  conceded  to  it,  as  has  been  done  by  Great 
Britain,  and  as  we  were  in  hope  would  be  done  by  the  United  States,  too. 
This  hope  having  proved  to  be  erroneous,  we  consider,  as  we  have  done 
hitherto,  the  now  existing  equaht  j'  of  rights  of  the  three  nations,  as  the  acknowl- 
edged l>asis  of  their  relations  to  Samoa.  We  do  not,  however,  anticipate  a 
favorable  result  from  a  participation  of  the  so-called  King  and  of  one  of  his 
officials  in  the  negotiations  of  the  consuls,  neither  for  the  affairs  themselves, 
nor  for  the  agreement  of  the  powers  and  their  consuls  between  each  other. 

The  Imperial  Government  agrees,  therefore,  to  the  adjournment  of  the 
conference  proposed  liy  Mr.  Bayard  and  will,  jointly  with  the  British  Govern- 
ment, take  into  closer  consideration  the  American  counter-proposition  of  a 
common  control  of  the  Samoan  Government  to  be  exercised  by  the  three 
treaty  powers. 

The  Imperial  Government  is,  however,  unable  to  renounce  an  immediate 
reparation  for  the  insults  against  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  and  the  national 
honor  committed  by  partisans  of  Malietoa,  on  the  22nd  of  March  last,  on 
the  occasion  of  His  Majesty's  birthday,  by  the  ill-treatment  of  German  citi- 
zens in  Samoa  and  by  violence  inflicted  upon  thom.  We  also  must  obtain 
due  satisfaction  for  the  thefts  and  robberies  committee  on  German  plantations, 
which  have  hitherto  remained  vmpunished,  and  for  the  systematical  refusal 
of  legal  jM'otection  in  cases  of  criminal  offenses  committed  by  Samoans  against 
German  subjects;  and,  furthermore,  we  must  obtain  sufficient  guaranties  that 
our  treaties  with  Samoa  be  in  future  respected  and  the  German  interests  there 
duly  i)rotecte(l.  The  latter  are  in  consequence  of  the  uncalled-for  inter- 
meddling of  the  Hawaiian  Government  in  the  political  affairs  of  Samoa,  now 
menaced  by  innninent  outbreak  of  a  civil  war,  endangering  life  and  property 
of  the  Germans  residing  there. 

I'nder  these  circumstances  and  having  con\anced  ourselves,  to  our  regret 
that  our  rej^resentatives  in  Ajiia  do  not  enjoy  the  expected  support  of  their 
colleagues  in  cases  of  disagreements  and  disputes  with  Mahetoa,  we  have  to 
consider  it  our  duty  to  independently  protect  our  own  interests  and  rights  and 
to  obtain  the  satisfaction  and  reparation  which  is  due  to  our  national  honor. 


niSMARCK  S   VIEW    OF   AMERICAN    PLAN  !/!> 

coiintor-proposition,  hut  he  stated  plainly  tliat  he  saw  in  it  no 
solution  for  the  existing  evils.  ^Yhile  agreeinji;  to  the  adjourn- 
ment of  the  conference,  and  acknowledging;  as  hitherto  theetiuality 
of  rights  of  the  three  nations  in  Samoa,  Germany  could  not, 
he  declared,  "renounce  an  immediate  reparation  for  the  insults 
against  His  ^Majesty  the  Emperor  and  the  national  honor  com- 
mitted by  partisans  of  ]\Ialietoa."  If  the  king  were  either  unwilling 
or  not  powerful  enough,  to  give  Germany  the  necessary  satisfac- 
tion for  the  past  and  sufficient  guarantees  for  the  future,  the 
Imperial  Government  wcukl  feel  obliged  to  declare  war  on  him 
personally.  And  if  the  king  of  Hawaii  should  interfere  in  favor 
of  ]\Ialietoa,  then  the  former  would  be  entering  into  a  state  of  war 
with  Germany. 

We  shall  therefore  if  Malietoa  is  either  not  willing  or  not  powerful  enough 
to  give  us  the  necessary  satisfaction  for  the  past  and  sufficient  guaranties  for 
the  future,  feel  obliged  to  declare  war  on  him,  and  refuse  to  recognize  his 
government.  In  case  Hawaii,  whose  King  acts  according  to  financial  princi- 
ples which  it  is  not  desiraV)le  to  extend  to  Samoa,  should  try  to  interfere  in 
favor  of  Malietoa,  the  King  of  the  Sandwich  Islands  would  thereby  enter 
into  (a)  state  of  war  with  us. 

The  Imperial  Government  is,  of  course,  far  from  intending  to  bring  about 
any  change  in  the  i)olitical  relations  which  the  three  powers  represented  there 
and  connected  l:)y  friendship  entertain  to  Samoa;  on  the  contrary,  we  maintain 
unaltered  the  existing  treaties  and  stijnilations  between  us  and  the  Govern- 
ments of  CJreat  Britain  and  the  I'nited  States  with  regard  to  that  grouj)  of 
islands,  as  well  as  the  eciuality  of  rights  of  the  treaty  powers.  We  shall  also 
in  the  future  continue  our  endeavors  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  about  the 
necessary  reforms  in  order  to  establish  a  lasting  peace  on  the  Samoan  Islands, 
in  the  interest  of  the  foreign  and  native  population.  But  we  are  unable  to 
allow  the  dignity  of  the  German  Empire  and  the  security  of  the  German  suli- 
jects  to  l)e  any  longer  slighted  in  such  a  manner  as  has  been  done  by  Malietoti. 

I  respectfully  reciuest  you  to  bring  the  foregoing  remarks  to  the  notice  of 
Mr.  Bayard  and,  if  he  desires  it,  to  leave  a  co]>y  of  them  in  his  hands. 

V.  Bismarck." 

Count  Bismarck  later  terminated  negotiations  concerning  Bayard's  plan. 
(Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  .31,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  pp.  6  to  9.) 

Memorandum  handed  to  Bayard  by  Baron  v.  Zedwitz,  Xovemlwr  4th,  1SS7. 

"If  therefore,  the  American  Government  cannot  l)e  convinced  of  the  i)rac- 
tical  advantages  of  the  German-English  ijroposition,  and  if  it  regards  the 
carrying  out  of  the  same  as  dangerous  to  the  ind(>])endence  and  neutrtdity 
of  Samoa,  and  as  a  deviation  from  the  traditional  i)oiicy  of  the  Ignited  States 
in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  the  Imperial  Government  has  no  desire  to  adiien^  to  the 
plan  and  renew  the  discussion  thereof.  The  Imi)eri;d  Government,  however, 
for  the  reasons  stated,  considers  the  counter-projjositions  made  by  Mr.  Bayard 
during  the  conference  for  an  executive  branch  of  the  government  composed 
of  five  members  as  impracticable,  and  is  unable  to  regard  the  same  as  sufficient 
ground  for  further  negotiations. 

Count  Bismahck." 


180      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

The  especial  insult  referred  to  by  Bismarck  was  the  affair  of 
the  Emperor's  birthday,  when  a  conflict  occurred  between  some 
of  the  followers  of  ]Malietoa  and  the  German  residents  who  were 
in  the  act  of  celebrating  the  birthday  of  the  Emperor.  The 
reports^'^2  as  to  the  seriousness  of  the  conflict  vary  widely  according 
to  their  source,  the  German  consul  emphasizing  the  gravity  of  the 
event,  the  American  and  British  reports  minimizing  the  whole 
aft'air.  Germany,  however,  made  it  the  occasion  for  entering  upon 
an  aggressive  policy  against  IMalietoa.  A  heavy  fine  and  abject 
apology  for  this  and  past  offenses  were  demanded^^^  of  the  king, 
and  when  these  were  not  obtained,  war  was  declared  against  him.^*^^ 
Great  Britain  offered  her  conciliation  but  this  was  dechned  by 
Germany.  IMalietoa  fled  inland.  Tamasese  was  transported  to 
Apia  in  a  German  man-of-war  and  saluted  as  King  of  Samoa. 
The  American  and  British  consuls  immediately  issued  a  proclama- 
tion^"^^  stating  that  they  and  their  governments  did  not  recognize 
Tamasese  as  King  but  would  continue  as  heretofore  to  recognize 
Malietoa — they  urged  the  Samoans,  however,  to  submit  and 
await  the  deliberations  of  the  nations.  The  pursuit  of  jNIalietoa 
continued  and  he  later  surrendered  and  was  carried  into  exile  on 


1^-  For  accounts  of  the  "affair  of  March  22nd,"  the  Emperor's  birthday,  see 
Weissbuch,  1889,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  3.  (Becker  to  Bismarck.)  R.  L.  S., 
Vol.  XIX,  p.  418  ff.     A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  149. 

'«3  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  67  ff. 

'^■'  That  the  German  Government  did  not  expect  Mahetoa  to  comply  with 
the  demands,  nor  exhausted  effort  to  have  him  do  so,  is  evident  from  the 
following.     (A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  138,  No.  143. 

The  Marquis  of  Salisbury  to  Sir  E.  Malet. 

Foreign  Office,  August  15th,  1887. 
(Extract.) 

"The  Gorman  Aml)assador  called  upon  me  today,  and  left  with  me  the 
dispatch  of  which  I  enclose  an  extract,  explaining  the  policy  which  the  German 
Government  projiose  to  adopt  toward  Samoa. 

I  asked  the  Amt)assador  whether  it  would  not  V)e  possilile  to  give  directions 
to  the  British  Consul  to  take  steps  for  removing  the  differences  between 
King  Malieta  and  (iermany,  by  including  the  former  to  meet  the  demands  of 
Germany  as  far  as  they  were  well  founded. 

His  Excellency  said  that  such  a  course  might  be  adopted  later  but  that  it 
would  be  inconvenient  for  the  present  that  any  instructions  should  be  given 
which  might  i)rematurelv  announce  the  intentions  which  the  Chancellor  had 
confidentially  explained.'' 

'^'^  Ibid.,  p.  147. 


GERMAN  WAR   AGAINST   MALIETOA  181 

board  a  (nTiuati  war-vessel.  Meantime  Tamasese  was  being 
establislied  in  the  kingsliip.  The  "gentleman  Brandeis,"  who  had 
been  quietly  assisting  him  in  the  organization  of  his  forces,  now 
became  his  prime  ministeri^*^  and  assisted  him  in  the  organization 
of  his  government.  Throughout  one  year  Samoa  was  under  their 
regime.  The  American  Consul,  Mr.  Sewall,  offered  constant  and 
determined  opposition,  refusing  to  recognize  the  new  ruler  in  any 
manner,  and  declining  to  serve  on  the  Municipal  Council^'^^  under 
the  flag  of  Tamasese,  thus  eventually  causing  the  abandonment  of 
the  miniicipal  government  of  Apia.^''^  The  British  Consul,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  instructed^^^  to  recognize  Tamasese  as  the  de 
fdcto  ruler  of  Samoa  and  to  enter  into  such  communication  with 
him  as  the  situation  required.  He  was  also  instructed  to  observe 
strict  neutrality  as  between  the  German  and  American  authorities 
on  the  islands.  In  addition  to  this  Sir  Lionel  West,  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Washington,  was  instructed^"  to  use  his  influence 
to  induce  the  Government  of  the  United  States  "to  address  to 
their  Consul  pacific  and  conciliatory  instructions."  The  United 
States  Consul  Sewall  was  later  instructed  by  Secretary  Bayard 
to  i)reserve  strict  "  neutrality  between  the  INIalietoa  and  Tamasese 
parties,  but  to  uphold  all  rights  of  the  United  States. "^^^ 

The  war  against  ^^lalietoa  had  involved  almost  no  bloodshed  and 
very  slight  military  measures,  but  Bismarck  reahzed  that  such 

'«« Ibid.,  p.  173. 

'«•  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  163,  No.  180  and  p.  170,  No.  189. 
The  American  Consul  Sewall  protested  against  the  assumption  of  rule  of 
Tamasese  over  the  municipality  of  Apia  as  a  violation  of  the  Municipal 
Convention  of  1879  (House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  91). 
The  German  Consul,  Becker,  declared  it  necessary  to  consider  that  convention 
in  abeyance  because  the  American  Consul,  Sewall,  had  refused  to  consent  to 
the  continuance  in  office  of  the  present  magistrate,  and  had  refused  to  attend 
meetings  of  the  Municipal  Board.  Mr.  Becker  asserted  that  it  was  not  the 
German  Commander  (as  alleged  by  Mr.  Sewall)  l)ut  the  Samoan  Government 
that  had  taken  over  the  administration  of  Ai)ia.  Moreover,  he  pointed  out 
that  the  Convention  of  1879,  on  which  Mr.  Sewall  based  his  protest,  had  not 
been  ratified  by  the  United  States. 

i^sA.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  172;  also  Weissbuch,  1889,  Vol.  V, 
No.  7. 

'"  Ibid.,  pp.  169,  172  and  173.  i""  Ibid.,  p.  158. 

'"^  Weissbuch,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  12. 


182      SAMOA:  THE   UNITED   STATES  AND   GERMANY  IN  THE  PACIFIC 

measures  as  had  been  taken  were  creating  a  hostile  opinion  among 
the  other  powers.  He  therefore  instructed  the  Gennan  Consul,^''^ 
as  soon  as  he  thought  it  possible,  to  remove  the  German  maruies 
from  Apia.  Their  presence  there,  Bismarck  wrote  to  INIr.  Becker, 
was  giving  the  American  and  Australian  press  just  the  excuse 
wanted  to  cast  suspicion  on  the  German  policy  in  the  Pacific,  and 
to  accuse  it  of  aggression  against  the  treaty  rights  of  others  in 
Samoa^/The  Chancellor  had  hoped  that  the  removal  of  the  hostile 
]\Ialietoa  and  the  installation  of  Tamasese,  who  was  friendly  to 
Germany,  would  be  sufficient  assurance  of  the  protection  of  German 
subjects  and  their  interests.  As  long  as  the  mihtary  occupation 
lasted,  the  consul  was  to  avoid  anything  which  would  give  that 
occupation  any  other  character  than  merely  a  measure  of  support 
of  the  newly  recognized  king.  Any  further  action,  moreover,  was 
to  be  taken  not  in  the  name  of  Germany  nor  in  reference  to  special 
German  interests  but  in  the  name  of  the  present  Samoan  govern- 
ment, the  support  of  which  the  Chancellor  wrote  would  be  for 
the  interest  of  all. 

This  reveals  completely  the  part  played  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  further  German  interests  in  the  islands.  The  king  hostile 
to  Germany  was  removed  and  replaced  by  a  chieftain  friendly 
to  German  interests  and  well  controlled  by  a  German  advisor  as 
his  prime  minister.  This  having  been  accomplished,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  seek  to  overcome  the  hostility  aroused  among  the  other 
powers.  The  chancellor  therefore  ordered  the  immediate  removal 
of  the  signs  of  force  by  which  the  coup  had  been  accomplished  and 
directed  that  the  support  of  the  new  regime  vshould  be  rendered  as 
to  a  government  thoroughly  Samoan. 

The  Tamasese-Brandeis  regime  lasted  approximately  a  year  and 
accounts  are  contradictory'"^  as  to  whether  intrinsically  it  was 

1"  Weissbuch,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  13. 

^'^  R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  439.  Mr.  Stevenson  refers  to  the  severe  but 
salutary  laws  enacted,  the  roads  built,  l)eacons  set  up,  instruction  given  to 
the  natives  in  agricultural  methods,  and  in  the  raising  of  cacao  and  other 
products  to  relieve  the  dependence  on  the  one  product,  copra.  In  general  he 
writes,  "The  more  I  learn  of  his  brief  term  of  rule,  the  more  I  learn  to  admire 
him  and  to  wish  we  had  his  like."  In  contrast  see  also  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  Xo.  31, 
50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  159. 


TA.MASESE-BRANDEIS   REGIME  183 

mostly  uood  or  evil.  But  all  seem  to  agree  that  the  rule  was  not 
Samoan  i)ut  thoroughly  Germau.  This  fact  and  the  strict  refi;ula- 
tioiis  enforced  made  his  rule  unpopular  with  native  Samoans 
and  the  creation  of  a  new  opposition  party  was  the  natural  result. 
This  opposition  centered  in  the  person  of  Mataafa,  a  chief  of  the 
old  Malietoa  party.  According  to  the  allegations  of  the  Germans, 
it  was  supported  by  the  American  Consul  and  certain  British 
residents. ^'^  Through  whatever  causes,  the  opposition  grew  and 
the  situation  now  became  the  reverse  of  that  under  ^lalietoa, 
the  German  representatives  in  Samoa  now  rallying  to  the  support 
of  the  de  facto  king,  the  American  representatives  lending  more  or 
less  active  support  to  the  opposition  forces  under  IMataafa.^''^ 

i'-"  R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  432  f. 

"The  white  enemies  of  the  new  regime  were  of  two  classes.  In  the  first 
stood  Moors  and  the  employees  of  McArthur,  the  two  chief  rivals  of  the 
firm,  who  saw  with  jealousy  a  clerk  (or  a  so-called  clerk)  of  their  competitors 
advanced  to  power.  The  second  class,  that  of  the  officials  numliered  at  first 
exactly  one,  Wilson,  the  English  Acting-consul,  is  understood  to  have  held 
strict  orders  to  help  Germany.  Commander  Leary  of  the  Adams,  the  Ameri- 
can Captain,  when  he  arrived,  on  the  16th  October  and  for  some  time  after, 
seertied  devoted  to  the  German  interests  and  spent  his  days  with  the  German 
officer,  Captain  von  Widersheim,  who  was  deservedly  beloved  liy  all  who 
knew  him.  There  remains  the  American  Consul-general,  Harold  Marsh 
Sewall,  a  young  man  of  high  spirit  and  a  generous  disposition.  He  had 
obeyed  the  orders  of  his  government  \vith  a  grudge;  and  looked  ])ack  on  his 
past  action  with  regret  almost  to  be  called  repentance.  From  the  moment 
of  the  declaration  of  war  against  Laupei)a,  we  find  him  standing  forth  in 
bold,  consistent,  and  sometimes  rather  captious  opposition,  stirring  up  his 
government  at  home  with  clear  and  forcible  dispatches  and  on  the  spot  grasp- 
ing at  every  opportunity  to  thrust  a  stick  into  the  German  wheels.  For 
some  while  he  and  Moors  fought  tlunr  difficult  battle  in  conjmiction;  in  the 
course  of  which  first  one  and  then  the  other,  paid  a  visit  home  to  reason  with 
authorities  in  Washington;  and  during  the  Consul's  aV).sence  there  was  found 
an  American  clerk  in  Ai)ia,  William  Blacklock,  to  perform  the  duties  of  the 
office  with  remarkable  ability  and  courage.  The  three  names  just  brought 
together,  i^ewall,  Moors,  and  lilacklock,  make  the  head  and  front  of  the 
opposition;  if  Tamasese  fell,  if  Brandeis  was  driven  forth,  if  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  was  signed,  theirs  is  the  blame  or  the  credit:" 

1-5  R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  494;  also  Weissbuch,  1889,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  27. 

No.    27. 

Berlin,  den  24.  Nov.,  1888. 
Bismarck  to  Konsul  Knappe. 


"Wegen  der  Unterstuetzing,  welche  der  Kommandant  des  amcrikanischen 
Kriegsschiffes  und  der  amerikanische  Konsulatsverwcser  den  Aufstaendischen 
gewaehrt  haben,  sind  Vorstellungen  in  Washington  erhoben  worden.  Die 
beiden  amcrikanischen  Beamten  haben  in  Folge  de.ssen  Weisung  erhalten,  einc 
Einniischung  in  den  Aufstand  und   Konflikte  mit  deutschen   Behoerden  zu 


184      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

The  situation  was  more  serious  this  time  because  of  the  presence 
of  the  naval  forces  of  each  nation  now  stationed  at  the  islands  in 
anticipation  of  the  threatening  troubles. ^'"^  The  German  and 
American  commanders  took  active  part  in  the  situation,  backing 
their  consuls.  The  period  is  referred  to  as  that  of  the  "Furor 
Consularis."'^^  The  Tamasese  forces  were  routed  and  Mataafa 
j)roclaimed  king.^^*  Finally,  German  marines  landed  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  German  plantations  were  attacked  by  Mataafa 
forces  at  Fangalii  and  lost  more  than  fifty  men,  40  per  cent,  of  their 
number.  Germany  then  prepared  to  take  action  in  earnest  and 
declared  war  on  the  Mataafa  forces.  In  announcing  the  state  of 
war,  Bismarck  declared^^^  that  the  German  armed  forces  were 

vermeiden  unci,  falls  Schwierigkeiten  entstehen,  neue  Instruktionen  abzu- 
warten. 

Was  unsere  eigene  Haltung  in  Samoa  betrifft,  so  handelt  es  sich  in  erster 
Linie  darum,  die  Reichsangehoerigen  und  deren  Interessen  wirksam  zu 
schuetzen.  Es  wuerden  uns  allerdings  en\aienscht  sein,  Tamasese  zu  halten, 
wenn  dies  aber  in  Hinblick  auf  die  Stimmung  der  einheimischen  Bevoel- 
kerung  nicht  angaengig  ist,  erscheint  es  als  angezeigt,  wenn  thunlich,  einen 
Vergleich  zwischen  Tamasese  und  Mataafa  zu  Stande  zu  bringen.  Tamasese 
wiierden  hierl^ei  moeglischst  guenstige  Bedingungen  zu  sichern  sein." 

See  also  Ibid.,  Nos.  .32,  33,  34  and  36. 

'"«  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  31,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  137.  Rear  Admiral 
Kimberley  was  instructed  to  keep  one  of  his  ships  continuously  in  Samoan 
waters  and  to  give  her  commanding  officer  fuU  instructions  "to  intervene 
vigorously,  should  occasion  arise,  to  protect  the  persons  and  property  of 
American  citizens  there  residing."  Count  Arco,  German  Minister,  informed 
Secretary  Bayard  (Ibid.,  p.  161)  that  the  German  fleet  was  being  dispatched 
to  Samoa  owing  to  the  unsettled  condition  of  affairs  in  the  islands,  but  had 
no  definite  information  as  to  any  specific  object  for  this. 

'"Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  31,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  161.  Instructions 
were  sent  by  l^oth  the  German  and  American  Governments  to  their  consuls 
to  endeavor  to  avoid  all  friction  or  conflict  of  interests  between  the  citizens 
of  the  two  governments  in  their  business  operations  in  those  islands.  (See 
also  Weissbuch,  1889,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  28  and  No.  29.  After  the  defeat  of 
Tamasese  by  the  Mataafa  forces,  the  German  Consul  was  instructed  to  con- 
fine his  efforts  to  the  protection  of  the  life  and  property  of  German  subjects 
(Ibid.,  p.  162). 

'"8  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  31,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  125. 

I'O  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  118,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  15. 

No.  4  (e).     Prince  Bismarck  to  Count  von  Arco- Valley. 

(Translation  l)y  source.) 

MiNrsTRY  OF  Foreign  Affairs, 

Berlin,  January  13,  1889. 

"I  have  already  notified  Your  Excellency  that,  according  to  telegraphic 


GERMAN    WAH    ACAIXST    MATAAFA    FOHCKS  185 

iiistriuti'd  to  tnoid  all  iiijui'v  to  neutral  commerce  and  jjroperty 
and  that  all  treaty  rights  of  Americans  and  British  in  Samoa  would 
be  preserved,  and  that  the  military  measures'^"  had  in  view  only 
the  jnmishment  of  the  murderers  of  German  soldiers.  The  German 
Consul,  Dr.  Knappe,  however,  being  personally  eager  for  annexa- 
tion, adopted  measures  of  unauthorized  vigor^*^  and  placed  the 


comimuncations  from  Apia  on  the  18th  Decemtjer  of  last  year,  a  detachment 
of  German  naval  forces  which  hat!  landed  at  the  requisition  of  the  Imperial 
Consul  for  the  protection  of  the  German  settlements  which  were  endangered 
by  the  conflicts  between  the  native  jiarties  there,  was  attaclced  by  armed 
Samoans  lielonfrinfi  to  the  party  of  Chief  Mataafa.  This  unprovoked  attack 
is  said  to  have  taken  place  under  the  leadership  of  an  American  named  Klein. 
On  this  occasion  more  than  fifty  German  soldiers  and  officers  were  killed  and 
woimdetl.  In  consec}uence  of  this  we  have  been  transjilanted  from  the 
territory  of  mediatorial  negotiations,  by  which  the  Imperial  Consul  in  Apia 
was  trying  to  reconcile  the  contending  parties,  and  for  which  he  had  sought  (^ 
the  cooperation  of  his  English  and  American  colleagues,  into  a  state  of  war 
with  the  assailants,  to  our  regret. 

We  shall  carry  on  the  contest  which  has  been  forced  upon  us  liy  Mataafa 
and  his  followers,  with  the  utmost  consideration  for  English  and  American 
interests.  Our  mihtary  measures  have  in  view  only  the  punishment  of  the 
miu-derers  of  German  soldiers  and  the  protection  of  our  countrymen  and  their 
property.  As  they,  on  their  part,  are  at  war  with  Tamasese,  our  interference 
^ill  necessarily  assume  the  character  of  assistance  to  Tamasese. 

In  the  endeavor  for  the  just  punishment  of  a  murderous  crime  we  hope 
for  the  cooperation  of  the  treaty  powers  in  Samoa  in  friendship  with  us,  and 
we  ask  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  be  good  enough  to  furnish 
the  consuls,  and  the  commander  of  its  ships  of  war  in  Samoa,  with  suitable 
instructions.  Our  armed  forces  there  are  instructed  to  avoid  and  to  prevent 
all  injury  to  neutral  commerce  and  property,  and  to  adopt  measures  of  reprisal 
ancl  destruction  only  against  the  followers  of  the  party  which  initiated  the 
contest  against  our  troops  by  a  murderous  attack. 

^^'e  shall  of  course  abide  h\  the  agreements  with  America  and  England 
with  respect  to  Samoa,  and  pay  due  regard  under  all  circumstances  to  the 
rights  of  those  iiowers  as  established  by  treaty. 

I  beg  Your  Excellency  to  bring  this  communication  to  Mr.  Bayard's  knowl- 
edge by  reading  it  to  him,  and  to  leave  a  copy  of  it  with  him  if  he  recjuests  it. 

Von  Bismarck." 

18"  Bismarck  empowered  the  German  representative  to  call  upon  German 
warships  for  aid  provided  the  outlook  for  success  was  assured.  (See  Weissbuch, 
1889,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  33.) 

Bismarck  to  Gen.  Konsul,  Sydney. 

23.  Dez.,  1888. 

"Ich  ermaechtige  Sie  gegen  Aufstaendische,  welche  deutsches  Eigenthum 
schaedigen,  Huelfe  unserer  Kriegsschiffe  nach  zu  suchen,  falls  Aussicht  auf 
Erfolg  gesichert  ist." 

181  Weissbuch,  1889,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  35.  Dr.  Knappe  was  eager  for 
direct  annexation  of  the  islands  and  wrote  to  Bismarck  that  if  it  were  possible 
to  annex  the  islands  the  German  forces  present  in  Samoa  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  restore  order.  Bismarck  replied  (Ibid.,  No.  37)  that  owing  to  the 
agreement  with  America  and  England,  annexation  was  out  of  the  question 
(" Selbstverstaendlich  ausgeschlossen")- 


186      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GEmiANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

whole  islands  under  martial  law.  Protests  were  made  imme- 
diately^*^  by  the  American  and  British  Consuls  and  their  Govern- 
ments, who  refused  to  permit  the  jurisdiction  over  their  respective 
citizens  in  Samoa  to  be  transferred  to  that  of  the  German  represen- 
tatives in  the  islands.  When  news  of  the  action  of  Dr.  Knapps 
reached  Germany,  Bismarck  immediately  disavow^ed  his  measures, 
and  administered  a  sharp  rebuke  to  the  Consul. ^^^  The  Chancellor 
declared  the  protest  of  the  other  nations  to  be  "grounded,"  that 
Dr.  Knappe  had  overstepped  his  authority  and  that  his  assump- 
tion of  control  over  Samoa  was  entirely  contradictory  to  the  policy 
of  Germany, ^^^  and  in  violation  of  the  formal  treaty  with  England. 

182  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  119,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  3;  also  A.  &  P., 
1889,  LXXXVI  (C-5629),  p.  281,  No.  325. 

183  V.  R.,  1888-89,  Anl.  Bd.  VI,  Aktenstueck,  Nr.  210,  S.  1235. 

Telegramm. 

Berlin,  den  31.  Januar,  1889. 
"Folgendes  an  Konsul  in  Apia  zu  uebermitteln : 

Unter  Bezugnahme  auf  Telegramm  vom  23.  Januar,  bemerke  ich,  dass  Ihnen 
kein  Recht  zusteht,  Fremde  der  Gerichtsbarkeit  ihrer  Konsuln  zu  entziehn. 
Der  Widerspruch  Ihrer  englischen  Kollegen  gegen  die  getroffenen  IMassnah- 
men  ist  begruendet.  Bei  Konflikten  welche  aus  dieseni  Anlass  entstehen, 
•ftiierden  Sie  Sich  im  Unrecht  befinden.  Die  von  Ihnen  gestellte  Forderung, 
betreffend  Uel)ernahme  der  Verwaltung  Hamoas  durch  Deutschland,  liegt 
ausserhalb  Ihrer  Instruktionen  und  unserer  Ziele.  Xehmen  Sie  diesellien  alshald 
zurueck.  Abgesehen  von  Auslieferung  der  verbrecherischen  Angreifer  ist  keine 
Forderung  zu  stellen,  zu  der  Sie  nicht  ermaechtigt  sind.  Falls  Ihr  Telegramm 
hier  richtig  verstanden  wird,  kann  ich  Ihr  Verhalten  nicht  gutheissen. 

gez. 

Von  Bism.\rck." 
iM  Weissbueh,  1S89,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  41. 

Bismarck  to  von  der  Golz  (K.  Vizeadmiral,  Kommandierenden  Admiral). 

Berlin.  5.  Felx.  1889. 


"Auch  .\merika  gegcnuebcr  sind  wir  in  Samoa,  wcnn  nicht  vertragsmaessig 
gebunden,  doch  in  amtlicher,  ilurcli  internationale  Vcrhandlungen  anerkannter 
Kenntnis  der  Vertragsrechte,  welche  Amerika  Samoa  gegenueber  besitzt, 
und  haljcn  bisher  keinen  Anlass  in  diese  Amerikanisch-samoanischei>  Ver- 
traege  einzugreifen.  Ich  glaube  deshalb,  dass  der  Protest  der  englischen  und 
amerikanischen  Konsidn  zu  Gunsten  des  Verbleibens  ihrer  Landsleute  unter 
ihrer  konsularischen  Jurisdiktion  ein  berechtigter  ist,  soweit  die  Betheiligten 
nicht  etwa  durch  Beistand,  Foerderung  oder  Anstiftung  unserer  Angreifer  sich 
der  Sachc  derselben  aiischliessen.  ^^'enn  vom  deutschen  Konsulat  das  Ver- 
langen  nach  Uebertragung  der  \'er\valtimg  in  der  That  ausgesjirochen  sein 
solltc,  so  wuerde  ich  das  bcdau(>rn,  weil  es  mit  unscren  .\bmachungen  und 
Zusicherungen  England  und  .\mcrika  gegcnucl)er  in  Widersjiruch  stehen 
wuerde  und  daher  nicht  aufrecht  erhalten  wcrden  koennte.  Je  schwieriger  in 
Samoa  die  in  Betracht  kommendcn  voelkerrechtlichen  Fragen  liegen,  urn  so 
mehr  ist  fuer  unser  ^'erhaltcn  liefreundeten  Macchten  gegenueber  die  genaue 


HISMAHCK's    DIS.WOWAL    OF    KNAPPE'S    MEASURES  187 

INIoreover,  in  respect  to  the  Tnited  States,  thoii(j:h  not  hound  by 
any  formal  treaty,  Germany  had  recognized  officially  the  rights 

Inhaltung  tier  Greiizlinieii  unserer  Rcchte  geboten;  je  fester  wir  innerhalb 
dei-sellien  uiisere  Rechte  zu  vertreten  vuid  durchzufuehren  entschlos.scn  sind, 
uiu  so  sicherer  nuiss  jede  Ueberschreitung  vermieden  werden." 

That  Bismarck's  disavowal  of  the  action  of  Consul  Knappe  relieved  a  tense 
situation  and  served  to  allaj-  the  indignation  of  the  United  States  is  shown  in 
the  following  instructions  from  Secretary  Blaine  to  the  American  delegates  at 
the  Berlin  Conference. 

"I  do  not  desire  to  embarrass  your  discussion  of  the  restoration  of  the 
status  quo  by  reference  to  the  incidents  which  accompanied  the  declaration 
of  martial  law  by  the  German  authorities.  But  these  incidents  cannot  be 
passed  over  in  silence,  if  such  silence  is  to  lae  interpreted  as  acquiescence 
either  in  the  rightfulness  or  necessity  of  that  measure.  Such  a  declaration 
appears  to  the  President  to  have  been  in  direct  violation  of  that  equal  and 
friendly  cooperation  which  had  been  previously  recognized  as  the  principle 
of  action  for  the  treaty  powers,  and  equally  contradictory  of  the  conditions 
upon  which  the  conference  was  instituted.  But,  aside  from  these  considera- 
tions, the  manner  and  the  method  by  which  the  German  naval  authorities 
proclaimed  tlieir  intention  of  carrying  this  declaration  into  effect,  could  only 
tend  to  evoke  irritaticm  and  bitterness  over  questions  which  might  w^ell  be 
the  subject  of  grave  international  discussion.  So  trenchant  were  the  inva- 
sions of  the  rights  of  American  citizens  in  Samoa,  and  so  apparent  was  the 
purpose  to  disregard  the  dignity  of  the  flag  which  protected  them,  that,  if 
immechate  resentment  of  such  treatment  had  culminated  in  forcible  resistance, 
this  Government  while  deeply  regretting  so  unfortunate  an  occurrence,  w'ould 
have  found  it  impossible  not  to  have  sympathized  with  the  natural  indigna- 
tion which  prompted  such  a  course. 


Had  not  the  Government  of  the  X'nited  States  believed  that  the  objection- 
able proceedings  were  due  to  the  hasty  and  too  pronounced  zeal  of  German 
naval  officers,  and  not  to  the  orders  or  the  wishes  of  the  authorities  at  Berlin, 
an  earnest  and  vigorous  protest  would  have  been  made  against  the  assump- 
tion of  such  power.  In  this  belief,  the  President  is  content  to  overlook  the 
offense,  and  refers  to  it  now  lest  silence  on  his  part  should  be  misconstrued 
by  the  German  Government.  You  will  therefore,  be  careful  in  any  reference 
which  you  may  make  to  the  suljject,  to  employ  a  friendly  tone,  and  to  assume 
that  the  proceedings  referred  to  were  at  no  time  authorized  by  the  Imperial 
Government." 

In  order  to  avoid  danger  of  naval  conflict  upon  the  request  of  consuls  in 
the  future,  Germany  enacted  by  Imperial  Decree,  March  19,  1889,  the  following 
regulation : 

"The  Commander  of  a  ship  of  war  is  thereby  bound  in  the  future  to  test 
the  legal  and  jiolitical  Ixnuing  of  any  reciuest  made  of  him  by  any  German 
Representative  abroad,  when  the  latter  has  no  authorization  or  instruction 
from  the  Foreign  Office  to  show;  failing  this,  the  Commander  is  to  wait  a 
_  higher  decision,  in  case  he  does  not  share  the  view  of  the  Consul  as  to  the 
necessity  of  taking  active  measures  of  a  warlike  nature." 

Bismarck  stated  that  this  Imi)erial  Decree  was  occasioned  l)y  the  recent 
events  in  Samoa  where  an  unauthorized  consular  request  and  an  uiKiuestioning 
compliance  with  the  same,  have  resulted  in  much  loss  of  life,  and  serious 
injury  to  German  interests,  and  have,  moreover,  menaced  us  with  quarrels 


188      SAMOA:  THE  UNITED   STATES  AND   GERMANY   IN  THE   PACIFIC 

of  that  country  in  Samoa  as  secured  by  its  treaty  of  1878.  There- 
fore a  change  in  the  pohtical  status  of  Samoa  without  the  agree- 
ment of  both  these  nations  was  not  to  be  contemplated. ^^° 

During  the  hostihties  against  ]\Iataafa  the  American  Commander 
at  Apia  called  for  reinforcements  on  the  ground  that  American 
property  and  lives  were  in  danger  from  the  action  of  the  German 
forces  against  Mataafa.  The  Government  responded  by  ordering 
Admiral  Kimberly/*^  Commander  of  the  United  States'  naval 

with  friendly  Powers,  without  any  vaUd  and  sufficient  reasons  existing  for 
recourse  to  warHke  proceedings. 

For  further  condemnation  of  Consul  Knappe's  actions  by  Bismarck  see  the 
latter's  letter  of  March  9,  1889,  to  Dr.  Stuebel.  (V.  R.,  1888-89,  Anl.  Bd.  V, 
Aktenstueck,  Nr.  138,  S.  890.) 

185  Weissbuch,  1889,  Fuenfter  Theil,  No.  47. 

i8«  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  68,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  pp.  21  and  22,  No.  U. 

Mr.  Whitney,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to  Admiral  Kimberly. 

(Inclosure  in  No.  14 — telegram.) 

Navy  Department,  January  11,  1889. 

"Commarider  MuUan  of  the  Nipsic,  telegraphs,  by  way  of  Auckland,  New 
Zealand,  that  a  force  was  landed  at  Samoa  from  the  German  fleet,  which 
resulted  in  an  engagement  between  the  troops  of  Mataafa  and  the  German 
forces  and  the  defeat  of  the  latter.  He  reports  that  the  Germans  in  retaha- 
tion  bombarded  towns,  disregarding  protests  and  neutral  rights,  and  that 
the  property  and  lives  of  American  citizens  are  in  danger.  He  strongly  urges 
the  sending  of  reenforcements.  The  German  Government  claims  that  the 
German  forces  were  first  attacked,  and  that  war  now  exists  between  Germany 
and  that  portion  of  the  natives  of  Samoa,  engaged  in  the  attack  upon  the 
Germans.  The  German  Government  invites  this  Government  in  the  common 
interest  to  join  in  establishing  order  in  Samoa,  giving  assurance  of  careful 
respect  for  our  treaty  rights.  The  United  States  Government  is  willing  to 
cooperate  in  restoring  Samoan  autonomy,  as  recognized  and  agreed  to  l^y 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States,  and  has  so  informed  the 
German  Government. 

You  will  at  once  proceed  to  Samoa  and  extend  full  protection  and  defense 
to  American  citizens  and  property.  You  will  consult  with  the  American 
vice-consul,  examine  his  archives,  and  otherwise  inform  yourself  as  to  the 
situation  and  all  recent  occurrences.  Protest  against  the  subjugation  and 
displacement  of  native  government  of  Samoa  by  Germany  as  in  violation 
of  positive  agreement  and  understanding  between  treaty  powers,  liut  inform 
the  representatives  of  the  German  and  British  Governments  of  your  readiness 
to  cooperate  in  causing  all  treaty  rights  to  be  respected  and  in  restoring 
peace  and  order  on  the  basis  of  a  recognition  of  Samoan  independence. 
Endeavor  to  prevent  extreme  measures  against  the  Samoans  and  bring  about 
a  peaceful  settlement.  If  such  arrangement  can  be  made  upon  that  basis  you 
will  report  the  same  for  approval  and  you  will  inform  this  Government  as 
soon  as  possible  after  your  arrival  in  Samoa,  of  the  condition  of  affairs  and 
the  prospect  of  peaceful  adjustment,  and  whether  Germany  was  acting 
impartially  between  the  opposing  native  forces  when  the  late  conflict 
occurred. 

Whitney." 


INSTRUCTIONS   TO    ADMIRAL    KIMBERLY  189 

forces  in  the  Pacific  to  proceed  in  his  flagship,  the  Trenton,  to 
Apia.  He  was  instructed  "to  extend  full  protection  and  defense 
to  American  citizens  and  property,"  to  "protest  against  the  sub- 
jugation and  dis})lacenicnt  of  native  government  of  Samoa  by 
Germany,"  but  to  inform  the  (ierman  and  British  re{)resentatives 
of  his  readiness  to  cooperate  in  restoring  peace  and  order  on  the 
basis  of  Samoan  independence.  The  whole  correspondence  on 
the  Samoan  question  was  communicated  by  President  Cleveland 
to  Congress'*^  for  its  consideration.    The  President  declared  that 

'8'  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  68,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  2. 

Message  to  Congress. 

January  16,  1889. 

"On  the  second  of  April,  1888,  I  transmitted  to  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, in  response  to  a  resokition  passed  by  that  body,  a  report  from  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  relating  to  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Samoan  Islands,  to- 
gether with  numerous  letters,  dispatches,  and  the  documents  connected  with 
the  subject,  which  gave  a  history  of  all  disorders  in  that  locality  up  to  that 
date.  On  the  21st  day  of  December,  1888,  this  information  was  supplemented 
by  the  transmission  to  the  Congress  of  such  further  correspondence  and 
documents  as  extended  this  history  to  that  time. 

I  now  submit  a  report  from  the  Secretary  of  State,  with  later  correspondence 
and  dispatches  exliibiting  the  progress  of  the  disturbances  in  Samoa  up  to  the 
present  date. 

The  information  thus  laid  before  the  Congress  is  of  much  importance  since 
it  has  relation  to  the  preservation  of  American  interests  and  the  protection 
of  American  citizens  and  their  property  in  a  distant  locality  and  under  an 
unstable  and  imsatisfactory  government. 

In  the  midst  of  the  disturbances  which  have  arisen  at  Samoa,  such  powers 
have  been  exercised  as  seemed  to  be  within  the  executive  control  under  our 
Constitution  and  laws,  and  which  appear  to  accord  with  our  national  policy 
and  traditions,  to  restore  tranquillity  and  secure  the  safety  of  our  citizens. 

Through  negotiations  and  agreement  with  Great  Britain  and  CJermany 
which,  with  our  own  Government,  constitute  the  treaty  powers  interested  in 
Samoan  i)eace  and  quiet,  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  define  more  clearly 
the  part  which  these  powers  should  assume  in  the  government  of  that  country, 
while  at  the  same  time  its  autonomy  has  been  insisted  upon. 

These  negotiations  were  at  one  time  interrupted  by  such  action  on  the 
part  of  the  German  Government  as  appeared  to  be  inconsistent  with  their 
further  continuance. 

Germany,  however,  still  asserts,  as  from  the  first  she  has  done,  that  she  has 
no  desire  "or  intention  to  overturn  the  native  Samoan  Government  or  to 
ignore  our  treaty  rights,  and  she  still  invites  our  Government  to  join  her  in 
restoring  peace  and  quiet.  But  thus  far  her  propositions  on  this  subject 
seem  to  lead  to  such  a  pn^ponderance  of  German  power  in  Samoa  as  was 
never  contemplated  by  us  and  is  inconsistent  with  every  prior  agreement  or 
understanding,  while  her  recent  conduct  as  between  native  warring  factions 
gives  rise  to  the  suspicion  that  she  is  not  content  with  a  neutral  i)osition. 

Acting  within  the  restraints  which  our  constitution  and  laws  have  jjlaced 
upon  the  executive  power,  1  have  insisted  that  the  autonomy  and  independ- 
ence of  Samoa  should  be  scrupulously  preserved  according  to  the  treaties 
made  with  Samoa  by  the  powers  nametl  and  their  agreements  and  understand- 
ing with  each  other.     I  have  protested  against  every  act  apparently  tending 


190      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED    STATES    AND    GERMAXY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

the  German  proposition  and  actions  aimed  at  a  preponderance  of 
German  power  and  indicated  that  Germany  was  not  content  with  a 
neutral  position.  Much  feeUng  was  aroused  and  an  appropriation 
of  a  half  million  dollars  was  voted  for  the  protection  of  United 
States'  interests  in  Samoa. ^^*  In  addition  one  hundred  thousand 
was  appropriated  for  the  development  of  the  harbor  of  Pago- 

in  an  opposite  direction,  and  during  the  existence  of  internal  disturbance  one 
or  more  vessels  of  war  have  been  kept  in  Samoan  waters  to  protect  American 
citizens  and  property. 

These  things  will  al)undantly  appear  from  the  correspondence  and  papers 
which  have  been  submitted  to  the  Congress. 

A  recent  collision  between  the  forces  from  a  German  man-of-war  stationed 
in  Samoan  waters  and  a  body  of  natives  rendered  the  situation  so  delicate 
and  critical  that  the  warship  Trenton,  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Admiral  Kiml)erly,  was  ordered  to  join  the  Xipsic,  already  at  Samoa,  for  the 
better  protection  of  the  persons  and  property  of  our  citizens,  and  in  further- 
ance of  efforts  to  restore  order  and  safetj*. 

The  attention  of  the  Congress  is  especially  called  to  the  instructions  given 
to  Admiral  Kimlierly,  dated  on  the  11th  instant,  and  the  letter  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  to  the  German  Minister,  dated  the  12th  instant,  which  will  be  founi 
among  the   papers  submitted. 

By  means  of  the  papers  and  documents  heretofore  submitted  and  those 
which  accompany  this  communication,  the  precise  situation  of  affairs  in 
Samoa  is  laid  before  the  Congress  and  such  executive  action  as  has  been  taken 
is   fully  exhibited. 

The  views  of  the  Executive  in  respect  of  the  just  policy  to  be  pursued  with 
regard  to  this  group  of  islands,  which  he  in  the  direct  higliway  of  a  gro^\-ing 
and  important  commerce  between  Austraha  and  the  United  States,  have  found 
expression  in  the  correspondence  and  documents  which  have  thus  been  fully 
communicated  to  the  Congress,  and  the  subject  in  its  present  stage  is  sul)- 
initted  to  the  wider  discretion  conferred  by  the  Constitution  upon  the  legis- 
lative branch  of  the  Government. 

Grover  Cleveland." 

Executive  Mansion, 
January  15,  1889. 

188  Congressional  Record,  Yol  XX,  Part  2,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  1283. 
The  Committee  on  Appropriations  reported,  January  29,  1889,  to  insert  in 
the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  A))])roi)riation  l)ill  the  following: 

"For  the  execution  of  the  obligations  and  the  protection  of  the  interests 
of  the  United  States,  existing  under  the  treaty  l^etween  the  United  States 
and  the  Government  of  the  Samoan  Islands,  8500,000,  or  so  much  thereof  as 
may  be  necessary,  to  l)e  expended  under  the  direction  of  the  President,  this 
ai)i)roi)riation  to  l)e  immediately  availatilc. 

For  the  survey,  improvement,  and  occupation  of  the  bay  and  harbor  of 
Pago-Pago  in  the  Island  of  Tutuila,  Samoa,  and  for  the  construction  of  the 
necessary  wharves  and  l)uildings  for  such  occupation,  and  for  a  coaling  station 
therein,  under  the  direction  of  the  President,  8100,000,  this  appropriation 
to  be  immediately  available." 

For  Congressional  discussion  of  the  Samoan  situation,  see  Ibid.,  pp.  1283  ff. 
(January  29,  1889)  and  pp.  1325  ff.  (January  30,  1889). 


CONGRESSIONAL  MEASURES  191 

Pago'^-'  w  hii'h  had  remained  as  it  was  when  first  transferred  to  the 
United  States  in  1878. 

Realizing  that  affairs  in  the  ishmds  had  reached  a  critical  stage/'" 
Bismarck  concluded  that  it  was  important  for  the  three  powers  to 
come  to  an  agreement  concerning  the  future  of  Samoa.  He  there- 
fore proposed  to  Lord  Salisbury^^^  that  the  British  Government 
unite  with  him  in  inviting  the  American  Government  to  continue 
in  Berlin  the  conference  begun  in  Washington  and  to  renew  the 

'89  Congressional  Record,  Vol.  XX,  Part  2,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  1290, 
January  29,  1889.  Senator  Sherman,  of  Ohio,  after  the  lengthy  discussion 
on  the  Samoan  corres])ondence  and  situation,  set  forth  the  following  recom- 
mendation: 

"Mr.  President,  the  conclusions  to  which  I  have  come,  without  wearying 
the  Senate  any  further,  are  that  the  first  thing  to  ])e  done  is  to  assert  our 
jMiwer  and  occupancy  and  possession  of  the  Bay  of  Pago-Pago,  and  so  much 
of  the  -shores  of  the  Island  of  Tutuila  as  is  necessary  for  a  coaling  station. 
This  is  a  mere  rocky  island,  com])aratively,  of  a  few  square  miles,  l)ut  it 
possesses  this  magnificent  harl)or,  and  one  of  the  amendments  of  this  bill 
l>roi)oses  that  we  shall  take  possession  of  it,  occupy  it,  erect  a  coaling  station 
there  and  such  other  buildings  as  may  be  necessary.  That  ought  to  be  done 
inunediately,  because  it  is  manifest  that  whatever  may  happen  in  regard  to 
controversies  in  the  South  Sea  Islands,  having  secured  by  law  and  l)y  treaty 
a  foothold  thtre,  we  ought  to  secure  that,  and  not  treat  it  as  we  have  done 
our  ])rivileges  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  undertook,  or  started  to  do  it  some  time  ago,  liut  without  saying 
anything  in  respect  to  the  mode  in  which  it  was  defeated  it  was  finally  dropped 
out  of  the  approjiriation  l)ill  on  the  score  of  economy.  If  we  had  had  a  foot- 
hold in  this  bay  as  firmly  and  as  strongly  as  the  Germans  have  theirs  in  their 
bay,  I  believe  American  interests  would  not  be  so  endangered  as  they  are 
today. 

It  needs  no  war  to  protect  the  nation's  rights.  The  mere  assertion  of  those 
rights,  a  due  regard  for  them,  the  expenditure  of  money  there,  the  storing  of 
coal  there,  the  landing  of  ves.sels  there — all  the.se  are  an  assertion  of  power  far 
more  powerful,  far  more  influential  than  protocols  or  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence.    That  we  ought  to  do." 

''"Carl  Schurz,  "Speeches,  etc.,"  Vol.  V,  p.  1.  (Also  .see  Appendi.K.) 
Count  von  Arco- Valley,  German  Minister  at  Washington,  consulted  Senatoi 
Schurz  on  the  Samoan  question.  The  Senator,  speaking  as  a  ])rivate  citizen, 
recommended  that  Count  Arco  advise  his  Government  to  allow  the  publica- 
tion of  the  jjrotocols  of  the  conference  of  1887,  which  it  had  hitherto  refused 
to  do.  The  Senator  recommended  also  that  the  German  Government  acconi- 
I)any  its  invitation  to  the  conference  in  Berlin  with  the  frank  statement  that 
the  basis  of  the  negotiations  would  be  the  autonomy  of  Samoa  and  the  main- 
tenance of  all  treaty  rights.  Count  Arco  informed  Mr.  Schurz  that  he  would 
report  these  views  to  his  Government.  Both  of  these  actions  were  taken  by 
the  German  Government  in  arranging  the  Berlin  Conference. 

'9' Weissbuch,    1889,  Achtcr  Thcil,  No.    1;  also  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI 
(C-5629),  p.  270,  No.  31G. 
13 


192      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

attempt  to  end  the  hostilities  in  Samoa.  In  making  this  proposi- 
tion the  German  minister  was  instructed  to  assure  Lord  Salisbury 
that  Germany  did  not  aim  to  gain  the  islands  for  herself,  nor  to 
put  in  question  the  equality  of  rights  of  the  three  powers  there. 
On  receiving  the  acceptance  of  Great  Britain,  Bismarck  then  sub- 
mitted to  Secretary  Bayard^^^  his  proposal  that  the  United  States 
"resume  with  Germany  and  the  British  Government  the  consulta- 
tion regarding  the  Samoan  question."  In  extending  this  invitation, 
the  Chancellor  declared  that  "any  supposition  that  Germany 
would  not  feel  satisfied  with  a  neutral  position  in  the  Samoan 
Islands"  was  unfounded  and  that  it  was  not  Germa*ny's  intention 
"to  put  in  question  the  independence  of  the  island  group,  nor  the 
equal  rights  of  the  treaty  powders."  On  this  basis  Secretary  Bayard 
accepted  the  invitation  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, ^^^  with 
the  added  suggestion  that  the  three  treaty  powers  at  once  instruct 
their  officers  in  Samoa  to  suspend  all  belligerent  action  pending 
the  decision  of  the  conference.  Unless  the  free  election  of  a  new 
king  by  the  natives  should  alter  them,  affairs  in  Samoa  were 
to  remain  in  statu  quo  during  the  negotiations  between  the 
powers.  The  proposals  for  the  conference  and  Germany's  assur- 
ance that  autonomy  of  the  islands  and  equality  of  representation 
of  the  powers  should  be  the  basis  of  the  negotiations  relieved  to  a 
great  degree  the  tension  between  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  Germany.  Possibility  of  hostilities  between  the  naval 
forces  stationed  at  the  islands  was  suddenly  pre^'ented  by  a  great 
natural  catastrophe,  the  famous  hurricane  of  INIarch  16,  1889, 
which  destroyed  the  entire  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  and 
Germany  then  stationed  in  the  harbor  of  Apia."^ 

i»2  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  3,  No.  3. 

133  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  102,  50th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  4,  No.  4. 

19*  R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  541  ff.  The  naval  vessels  of  the  three  powers 
then  anchored  in  Apia  harbor  were  (American)  the  Trenton,  Nipsic,  and 
Vandalia;  (German)  the  Adlcr,  Ebcr,  and  Olga;  (British)  the  CalHope.  Of 
thirteen  vessels  assembled  in  the  harbor  the  Calliope  was  the  sole  survivor. 

After  a  vivid  description  of  the  storm  Mr.  Stevenson  concludes : 

"Thus  in  what  seemed  the  very  article  of  war,  and  within  the  duration  of 
a  single  day,  the  sword  arm  of  each  of  the  two  angry  powers  was  broken,  their 
formidable  ships  reduced  to  junk;  their  disciplined  hundreds  to  a  horde  of 


THE    CONFERENCE    OK    BERLIN  VXi 

.  The  possible  factors  for  danger  having  thus  been  removed,  the 
Conference  of  BerHn  was  opened  under  favorable  auspices  which 
were  soon  realized  in  the  success  of  the  negotiators'^'  in  reaching 
terms  of  agreement.  The  American  delegates  were  furnished  with 
the  following  instructions  :^^^ 

castaways,  fed  with  difficulty,  and  the  fear  of  whose  misconduct  marred  the 
sleep  of  their  commanders.  Both  paused  aghast;  both  had  time  to  recognize 
that  not  the  whole  Samoan  Archipelago  was  worth  the  loss  in  men  and  costly 
ships  already  sutTered.  The  so-called  hurricane  of  March  16th  made  thus 
a  marking  epoch  in  world  history;  directly  and  at  once  it  brought  about  the 
congress  and  treaty  of  Berlin;  indirectly  and  l)y  a  process  still  continuing, 
it  founded  the  modern  Xavy  of  the  States.  Coming  years  and  other  historians 
will  declare  the  influence  of  that." 

"5  Sen.  Misc.  Doc.  No.  181,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  7. 
The  Plenipotentiaries  were  as  follows: 
The  United  States: 

Mr.  John  A.  Kasson,  of  Iowa  (Former  Minister  to  Germany). 
Mr.    William    Walter    Phelps,    of     New    Jersey    (Minister    to 

Germany). 
Mr.  George  H.  Bates,  of  Delaware  (U.  S.  Commissioner  to  Samoa, 
1886). 
Germany : 

Count  Herbert  Bismarck  (Minister  of  State,  Secretary  of  State  of 

Foreign  Affairs). 
Baron  von  Holstein  (Actual  Privy  Councillor  of  Legation). 
Dr.  Krauel  (Privy  Councillor  of  Legation). 
Great  Britain: 

Sir  Edw'ard  Baldwin  Malet  (British  Ambassador  to  Germany). 
Charles  Stewart  Scott  (British  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary  to  the  Swiss  Confederation). 
Joseph  Archer  Crowe  (British  Commercial  Attache  for  Europe). 
196  Pqj.  instructions  to  the  United  States  delegates  see  F.  R.,  1889,  pp.  195  if., 
also  resume  of  these  instructions  as  presented  by  Secretary  Blaine  to  Congress. 
(Sen.  Misc.  Doc.  No.  81,  51st  Cong.,  Lst  Sess.,  pp.  1  to  6.) 

"They  were  instructed  to  be  governed  in  the  fulfilment  of  their  mission  Ijy 
the  most  earnest  assurance  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  desired 
a  speedy  and  amiable  solution  of  all  the  cjuestions  involved;  that,  while  it 
would  steadily  maintain  its  full  cciuality  of  right  and  consideration  in  any 
disposition  of  these  questions,  it  was  as  much  influenced  by  an  anxious  desire 
to  secure  to  the  people  of  Samoa  the  conditions  of  a  healthy,  prosperous, 
civihzed  life  as  it  was  bound  by  its  duty  to  protect  the  rights  and  interests 
of  its  own  citizens  wherever  their  spirit  of  lawful  enterprise  might  carry 
.them;  that,  in  the  cooperation  of  the  three  governments,  the  President  hoi)ed 
and  lielieved  that  frank  and  friendly  consultation  would  strengtiicn  their 
respect  for  each  other,  and  the  result  prove  that  it  was  not  the  wish  of  any 
of  them  to  sulwrdinate  the  rights  of  the  native  Samoans  to  the  exigencies  of  a 
grasping  commerce,  or  to  the  political  ambition  of  territorial  extension  on  the 
part  of  any  one  of  the  jKiwers  maintaining  treaty  relations  with  them.  They 
were  further  instructed  that  in  consenting,  at  the  request  of  the  Emperor  of 


194    SAMOA:  THE  united  states  and  germ  ant  in  the  pacific 

1.  They  were  to  ask  for  the  restoration  of  the  status  qiu/^''  "in 
order  that  the  disturbance  of  the  equal  rights  of  the  powers  in 
Samoa,  which  had  been  caused  by  the  intervention^^*  of  Germany 
and  the  deportation  of  Malietoa  Laupepa,  might  be  removed — 
and  their  footing  of  equaHty  restored. 

2.  They  were  to  strive  for  "the  organization  of  a  stable  govern- 
mental system  for  the  islands  whereby  native  independence  and 
autonomy  should  be  preserved  free  from  the  control  or  the  pre- 
ponderating influence  of  any  foreign  government."^^^  Any  inter- 
vention of  the  three  powers  should  be  temporary  merely  and 
"avowedly  preparatory  to  the  restoration  of  as  complete  inde- 
pendence and  autonomy  as  was  practicable." 

3.  They  were  to  secure  the  settlement  of  the  land  question  on 
some  equitable  and  comprehensive  basis  which  would  save  a 
reasonable  proportion  of  the  territory  for  the  natives. 

4.  They  were  to  prohibit  or  regulate  the  importation  and  sale 
of  firearms  and  alcoholic  liquors. 

Germany,  to  reopen  at  Berlin,  the  adjourned  proceedings  of  the  Conference 
of  Washington  of  1887,  the  President,  while  thus  manifesting  his  entire  con- 
fidence in  the  motives  and  purposes  of  the  German  Government  desired  it  to 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  step  was  the  continuance  merely  of  the  efforts 
already  made  toward  an  adjustment  of  jiending  questions,  and  not  the  initia- 
tion of  a  new  conference  on  another  basis,  inasmuch  as  the  Government  of 
the  I'nited  States  could  not  admit  the  conchtions  chrectly  influencing  the 
deliberations  of  the  conference  of  Washington  to  have  been  changed  by  any 
subsequent  occurrences  in  the  South  Pacific " 

'»"  Sen.  Misc.  Doc.  No.  81,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  3. 

"The  restoration  of  the  status  quo  however,  was  not  to  be  sulnnitted 
as  an  idtimatum  which  would  close  the  conference  or  prevent  the  President 
from  considering  any  plan  put  forward  as  a  substitute." 

is's  Ibid.,  p.  3. 

"While  the  President  was  imwilling  to  consider  that  action  of  Germany, 
which  immediately  followed  the  susjiension  of  the  conferences  at  Washington 
as  intentionally  derogatory  either  to  the  dignity  or  the  interests  of  the  other 
treaty  powers,  yet  he  could  not  l)ut  regard  it,  under  all  the  circumstances,  as 
an  al)rupt  breach  of  the  joint  relations  of  the  three  powers  to  each  other  and 
to  the  Government  of  Samoa,  and  im])()ssil)le  to  reconcile  with  the  frank  and 
friendly  declaration  of  the  German  Government,  ])reliminary  to  the  meeting 
of  the  conference  of  1887,  that  it  intended  to  maintain  the  status  as  it  had 
theretofore  existed  and  had  neither  interest  nor  desire  to  change  an  arrange- 
ment found  satisfactory  to  the  three  governments." 

i»»Ibid.,  p.  3. 

"Besides  these  evils  necessarily  attending  the  subordination  of  Samoan 
inde])endence  to  any  one  predominant  alien  interest,  the  United  States  could 
not  consent  to  the  institution  of  any  form  of  government  in  those  islands, 
subject,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  influences  which  in  the  contingencies  of  the 
future  might  check  or  control  the  use  or  develoi)ment  of  the  riglit  acquired  on 
the  inu't  of  the  United  States  by  lawful  treaty  to  establish  a  naval  station  at 
Pago-Pago  and  to  control  its  harl;or  to  that  end." 


INSTRUCTIONS  TO   AMERICAN   DELE(J  VTES  195 

').  Tliey  were  to  use  tlieir  own  jiu lament  on  tlie  subject  of 
renewini;  tlie  muiiieipal  administration  of  Apia. 

The  result  of  the  conference-'"'  was  in  the  main  "entirely  in 
accord  with  the  instructions  under  which  the  American  ])leni- 
potentiaries  acted."-"'  Provision  was  made  first  of  all  that  the 
islands  of  Samoa  should  be  considered  a  neutral  territory  in  which 
the  citizens  and  subjects  of  the  three  signatory  powers  were  to 
have  equal  rights  of  residence,  trade  and  personal  protection. 
Neither  of  the  powers  was  to  exercise  any  separate  control  over  the 
islands  which  were  recognized  as  having  an  independent  govern- 
ment. The  natives  of  the  islands  were  acknowledged  to  have 
the  free  right  to  elect  a  king  or  choose  their  forms  of  Government 
according  to  their  own  laws  and  customs.  In  view  of  the  disturbed 
conditions  in  the  islands,  however,  an  immediate  election  was 
considered  inadvisable,  therefore  it  was  decided  to  restore  to 
Samoa  as  king  the  former  monarch  Malietoa  Laupepa,  who  had 
been  recognized  by  all  three  powers  in  former  years.  It  w^as  pro- 
vided that  ]\Ialietoa's  successor  should  be  duly  elected  according 
to  the  laws  and  customs  of  Samoa.-°- 

-""  Ibid.,  p.  4.  There  were  altogether  nine  formal  conferences  held  in 
Berlin  between  April  29  and  June  14,  1889.  The  results  were  embodied  in  an 
agreement  known  as  the  General  Act  of  the  Conference  of  Berlin  signed  at 
Berlin,  June  14,  1889. 

^oi  F.  R.,  1889,  pp.  35.3  ff.,  also  Sen.  :\Iisc.  Doc.  No.  81,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Se.ss., 
p.  6  ff. 

2»2R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  561. 

"In  the  Berlin  Act,  the  throe  powers  recognize,  on  the  threshold,  'the 
independence^  of  the  Samoan  (iovernnietit  and  the  free  right  of  the  natives 
to  elect  their  chief  or  king  and  choose  their  form  of  government.'  True  the 
text  continues  that,  'in  view  of  the  difficulties  that  would  surround  an  election 
in  the  present  disordered  condition  of  the  Cxovernment,  Malietoa  Laupepa 
shall  be  recognized  as  king  unless  the  three  powers  shall  by  common  accord 
otherwise  declare.'  But  perhai)s  few  natives  have  followed  it  .so  far,  and 
even  those  who  have,  were  possibly  cast  all  abroad  again  by  the  next  clause, 
'and  his  successor  shall  be  duly  elected  according  to  the  laws  and  customs  of 
Samoa.'  The  right  to  elect,  freely  given  in  one  sentence,  was  suspended  in 
the  next,  and  a  line  or  so  further  on  appeared  to  be  reconveyed  by  a  side 
wind." 

Sen.  Mi.sc.  Doc,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  II,  No.  81,  p.  43.  One  exception 
was  made  in  the  event  of  such  an  election.  At  Count  Bismarck's  request  it 
was  agreed  in  the  fifth  session  of  the  conference  (and  eml>odied  in  the  protocol), 
that  in  view  of  the  outrages  committed  upon  German  soldiers  the  Chief 
Mataafa  should  not  be  eligible  to  the  kingship  of  Samoa. 


196      SAMOA:   THE    UNITED    STATES    AND    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

The  problem  of  foreign  assistance  to  the  native  government 
was  adjusted  in  the  Act  by  the  estabhshment  of  a  Supreme  Court 
for  Samoa  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  single  judge  termed  the  Chief 
Justice.  He  was  to  be  nominated  by  the  three  treaty  powers,  or 
if  they  could  not  agree,  by  the  King  of  Sweden  and  Norway,-"^ 
and  his  decisions  were  to  be  final.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme 
Court  was  to  include  all  questions  arising  under  the  General  Act, 
including  questions  of  rightful  kingship,  questions  of  the  powers 
claimed  by  any  king  or  chief  in  the  exercise  of  his  office,  contro- 
\ersies  between  the  Samoan  Government  and  any  one  of  the  treaty- 
powers,  and  all  civil  suits  except  those  of  crimes  of  those  foreigners 
who  were  still  under  the  jurisdiction  of  their  own  consuls. 

For  the  settlement  of  the  land  question  the  General  Act  pro- 
;  vided  that  all  future  alienation  of  Samoan  lands  to  foreigners 
should,  with  certain  exceptions,'^"^  be  prohibited.  To  adjust  all  dis- 
putes as  to  land  titles  a  land  commission  was  to  be  appointed,  to 
consist  of  three  persons,  one  named  by  each  of  the  treaty  powers. 
These  were  to  be  assisted  by  a  "natives'  advocate,"  appointed 
by  the  ruler  of  Samoa  with  the  approval  of  the  Chief  Justice.  The 
labors  of  the  commission  were  to  be  closed  in  two  years  or  sooner 
if  practicable. 

The  municipality  of  Apia  was  redefined  and  placed  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  a  IMunicipal  Council  elected  by  the  residents  of  the 
district,  and  a  magistrate  appointed  by  the  Council.  The  consuls 
were  not  to  be  eligible  as  Councillors  but  all  regulations  passed 
by  the  Coimcil  were  to  be  submitted  to  them  for  unanimous 
approval  before  becoming  laws.  Should  agreement  of  the  three 
consuls  not  be  reached,  the  matter  in  dispute  was  to  be  referred 

2"3  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  417.  It  was  first  arranged  that  the  Chief  Justice  of 
Samoa  was  to  be  named  by  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  Enghind  and  to  be  of 
English  professional  experience,  Init  the  United  States  Government  objected 
to  giving  "one  of  the  three  signatory  nationalities  an  appointment  entailing 
so  much  ))olitical  imjiortance,"  and  made  the  suggestion  finally  embodied 
in  this  article  of  the  treaty. 

20^  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  357  f.  Town  lots  in  the  Municipality  of  Apia  might  still 
be  bought  by  foreigners,  and  agricultural  tracts  might  be  leased  for  not  over 
forty  years,  all  purchases  and  leases  to  first  receive  the  approval  of  the  Chief 
Justice. 


GENERAL   ACT   OF    BERLIN,    18S9  197 

to  the  C'liief  Justice  for  final  decision.  The  President  of  the 
Municipal  Council  was  to  be  agreed  upon  by  all  three  powers,  or 
failing  this,  was  to  be  selected  from  the  nationals  of  Sweden,  the 
Netherlands,  Switzerland,  ^Mexico,  or  Brazil,  and  nominated  by 
the  ruler  of  his  own  nation. 

Further  agreements  were  made  concerning  methods  of  raising 
revenue,  the  regulation  of  the  sale  of  firearms  and  alcoholic  liquors, 
etc.,  and  inasmuch  as  certain  of  these  conflicted  with  the  several 
treaties  of  the  Powers  with  Samoa,  it  was  provided  that  in  all  cases 
of  such  conflict  the  present  act  should  be  considered  binding,  after 
the  Government  of  Samoa  should  have  given  its  formal  assent  to 
the  Act. 

The  Conference  of  Berlin  did  much  to  relieve  the  immediate 
difficidties  of  the  Samoan  question.  The  negotiations  were  con- 
ducted in  a  spirit  of  cooperation-"^  and  the  basic  principles  being 
agreed  upon  by  all  three  nations,  there  was  little  serious  difficulty 
in  creating  a  plan  of  government  involving  those  principles.    The 

2"^  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  419.  Mr.  Kasson,  American  representative,  paid  the  fol- 
lowing tribute  to  Count  Bisnaarck. 

"  'I  should  neglect  a  duty,  which  is  both  an  obhgation  and  a  pleasure,  if  I 
failed  to  express  on  the  part  of  the  American  plenipotentiaries  our  apprecia- 
tion of  the  important  service,  which  His  Excellency,  Count  Bismarck  has 
rendered  by  his  fairness  and  impart ialitj'  as  our  presiding  officer.  The  con- 
ciliatory attitude  which  he  has  maintained,  and  the  friendh'  spirit  in  wliich 
he  has  conducted  the  business  of  the  conference  have  exercised  the  most 
beneficial  influence  on  the  deliberations  which  now  touch  their  end,  and 
demand  our  frank  recognition.' 

'I  believe  that  I  interpret  the  sentiments  of  all  the  plenipotentiaries  when 
I  beg  His  Excellency  to  convey  with  him  the  assurance  not  only  of  our  high 
appreciation  of  the  official  qualities  which  he  has  so  usefully  displayed  through- 
out our  proceedings,  but  also  of  the  personal  traits  associated  with  them 
which  have  added  a  charm  to  official  functions.' 

Sir  E.  Malet  said: 

'On  behalf  of  the  British  plenipotentiaries  I  am  anxious  to  say  that  we 
most  cordially  associate  ourselves  to  the  expressions  which  have  fallen  from 
Mr.  Kasson,  and  that  we  desire  that  his  words  should  be  considered  as  coming 
equally  from  us.' 

Count  Bismarck  was  anxious  to  express  his  warmest  gratitude  for  the  very 
flattering  words  addrcs.~ed  to  him  l)y  Mr.  Ka.s.son  and  Sir  E.  Malet.  He  appre- 
ciated and  vahied  very  highly  the  complimentary  expressions  uttered  by  them; 
but  he  considered  that,  if  the  conference  had  l)een  able  to  perform  work  which 
would  prove  satisfactory  to  the  governments  concerned,  it  was  mainly  due  to 
the  loyal  and  conciliatory  attitude  of  each  and  all  of  the  plenipotentiaries  and 
to  the  large  amount  of  good  work  which  they  had  done." 


198      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANY   IN   THE   PACIFIC 

salient  feature  of  the  conference  was  the  acquiescence  of  Germany-"" 
in  the  demands  of  the  United  States.  In  response  to  the  request 
of  Secretarv'  Bayard,-"^  the  warfare  against  the  ^Nlataafa  forces 
was  stopped  and  the  losses  sustained  by  German  forces  in  the 
islands  were  left  unexpiated.  The  Tamasese  government  was 
entirely  abandoned.  Throughout  the  Conference  equality  of 
representation  of  the  three  countries  was  emphasized  and  all 
effort  to  utilize  the  "preponderating  interests"  of  Germany  in 
Samoa  to  obtain  special  treatment  was  abandoned.  The  situation 
on  the  islands  was  relieved  by  Germany's  restoration  of  the  former 
king  Malietoa  Laupepa  and  reestabhshment  of  the  status  quo.-'^^ 

2''«  R.  L.  S.,  Vol.  XIX,  p.  555. 

"It  was  agreed  so  far  as  might  he  to  obliterate  two  years  of  blundering;  and 
to  resume  in  1SS9  and  at  Berlin  those  negotiations  which  had  been  so  unhappily 
broken  off  at  Washington  in  1887.  The  example  thus  offered  by  Germany  is 
rare  in  history:  in  the  career  of  Prince  Bismarck,  so  far  as  I  am  instructed, 
it  should  stand  unique.  On  a  review  of  these  two  years  of  blundering,  bulhing, 
and  failure  in  a  little  isle  in  the  Pacific,  he  seems  magnanimously  to  have 
ownefl  his  pohcy  was  in  the  wrong.  He  left  Fangalii  unexpiated:  suffered 
that  house  of  cards,  the  Tamasese  government,  to  fall  bj'  its  own  frailty  and 
without  remark  or  lamentation,  left  the  Samoan  question  openly  and  fairly 
to  the  conference;  and  in  the  meanwhile,  to  allay  the  local  heats  engendered 
by  Becker  and  Knappe,  he  sent  to  Apia  that  invaluable  public  servant,  Dr. 
Stuebel.  I  should  be  a  dishonest  man  if  I  did  not  here  bear  testimony  to 
the  loyalty  since  shown  by  the  Germans  in  Samoa." 

Secretary  Bayard  himself  testified  to  this  attitude  in  a  letter  to  Senator 
Schurz.     (From  "Speeches,"  etc.,  Schurz,  Vol.  V,  p.  16.) 

From  Thomas  F.  Bayard. 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  February  2Sth,  1889. 


"Now  that  I  have  succeeded  in  attracting  Prince  Bismarck's  attention  to 
the  real  condition  of  Samoa,  I  find  his  views  and  disposition  very  much  as  I 
expected  them  to  be — moderate  and  conciliatory.  As  I  wrote  you,  the  shop- 
keepers at  Samoa  got  hold  of  official  power  and  abused  it,  and  the  scene  is  so 
distant  that  the  mischief  was  done  before  the  facts  were  known."     .... 

2"  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  194. 

2»8  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  198.  If  this  had  not  been  done,  there  would  have  been 
vigorous  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  as  is  evident  from  the 
following  instructions  to  the  American  delegates. 

"The  President  hopes  that  these  opinions  will  receive  the  consideration  to 
which  he  thinks  them  entitled.  You  will  submit  them  to  the  conference 
with  temperate  firmness.  If  it  be  urged,  as  it  may  be,  that  this  forcible 
intervention  has  had  consequences  which  practical  good  sense  cannot  dis- 
regard, l)ecause  they  can  not  he  undone,  you  will  say  that  the  restoration  of 
status  quo  is  necessary  to  place  the  treaty  powers  upon  their  footing  of  equality', 


FEATURES  AND  EFFECTS  OF  BERLIN  CONFERENCE     199 

I'ho  participation  of  tlie  European  nations  in  the  administration 
of  Samoa  was  fociissetl  in  the  powers  of  the  Chief  Justice,  but  the 
disinterested  character  of  that  officer  was  secured  by  the  stipula- 
tion that  he  be  approved  by  all  three  powers  or  be  appointed  by 
a  neutral  nation.  In  transmitting  the  agreement  to  the  Senate 
for  ratification  President  Harrison  declared, 

■'  I  am  pleased  to  find  in  this  general  act  an  honorable,  just,  and 
equal  settlement  of  the  questions  which  have  arisen  during  the 
past  few  years  between  the  three  powers  having  treaty  relations 
with  and  rights  in  the  Samoan  Islands." 

From  other  viewpoints  than  that  of  solving  temporarily  a  diffi- 
cult di})lomatic  situation,  the  Berlin  agreement  was  not  so  success- 
ful. In  the  first  place  it  was  a  self-contradictory  instrument. 
Starting  out  with  a  broad  declaration  of  the  independence  of  the 
Samoan  Government,  it  then  proceeded  to  draw  up  a  scheme  of 
administration  which  gave  merely  nominal  recognition  to  the  native 
executive  and  placed  all  real  powers  in  the  hands  of  foreiga  officers. 
For  instance,  the  natives  were  declared  to  have  the  free  right  to 
elect  their  own  king  according  to  their  own  custom,  but  any 
question  over  the  rightful  election  was  to  be  decided  by  the  Chief 
Justice.  ^Moreover,  any  question  as  to  the  validity  of  the  powers 
claimed  by  the  native  king  was  also  to  be  decided  by  that  foreign 
officer.  In  all  civil  suits  between  natives  and  foreigners  the  Chief 
Justice  had  the  final  decision  and  might  apply  the  code  of  the 
United  States,  England  or  Germany  as  he  thought  most  appro- 
priate. The  municipality  of  Apia  was  recreated  and  placed  under 
the  control  of  the  foreign  residents  there.    The  Act  was  therefore 

and  does  not  prevent  the  treaty  powers  and  Samoa  from  making  any  changes 
in  the  future  which  justice  and  an  unselfish  interest  may  suggest  as  necessary. 
The  desire  of  the  Government  of  the  I'nited  States  to  see  status  quo  reestab- 
lished as  the  basis  for  future  deliberation  and  action  in  no  way  commits  it  to  the 
partisan  support  of  any  plan  or  person. 

You  will  not  submit  this  proposition  as  an  ultimatum  which  would  close 
the  conference  or  prevent  the  President  from  considering  any  plan  which 
may  be  suggested  as  a  substitute.  But  should  the  proposition  be  rejected, 
you  will  not  accept  such  conclusion  except  ad  referetuhun.  You  will  com- 
municate such  result  as  promptly  as  possible,  and  the  President  will  then 
decide  upon  the  course  which  he  deems  it  his  duty  to  adopt,  and  you  will  be 
instructed  accordingly." 


200      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   GERMANT   IN  THE    PACIFIC 

in  no  sense  a  guarantee  of  the  independence-^^  of  the  islands  but 
rather  a  regulation  of  the  foreign  limitations  placed  upon  that 
independence. 

From  the  viewpoint  of  American  foreign  policy,  the  Berlin 
General  Act  was  exceptional.  It  committed  the  United  States  by 
formal  agreement  to  active  participation  with  European  powers  in 
the  administration  of  a  neutral  territory  many  thousands  of  miles 
distant  from  its  shores.  Even  the  plan  submitted  by  Secretary 
Bayard  at  the  Washington  Conference,  involving,  as  it  did,  a 
much  slighter  participation  of  the  Powers,  was  declared  by  his 
successor,  Secretary  Blaine,-^''  to  go  beyond  the  President's  desires 
and  to  be  out  of  harmony  with  the  established  policy  of  the  United 
States  Government.  The  General  Act,  however,  was  an  actual 
tripartite  government,-^^  a  system  which  was  not  only  contrary 

205  F.  R.,  1894,  p.  511.  Secretary  of  State  Gresham  stated  in  1894,  in  his 
report  on  "Affairs  in  the  Samoan  Islands:" 

"It  is  obvious  that  the  machinery  thus  devised  for  the  government  of  the 
islands  is  inaccurately  styled  an  'autonomous  government.'  It  is  true  that 
in  the  first  article  of  the  act  the  contracting  parties  declare  that  they  'recog- 
nize the  independence  of  the  Samoan  Government  and  the  free  right  of  the 
natives  to  elect  their  chief  or  King  and  choose  their  form  of  government 
according  to  their  own  laws  and  customs.'  This  declaration,  however,  only 
adds  force  to  the  fact  that  we  may  look  in  vain  in  all  the  comprehensive 
framework  of  the  treaty  for  a  single  provision  that  secures  to  the  nominal 
and  vmsalaried  King  or  to  the  natives  either  independence  or  any  substantial 
part  in  the  exercise  of  the  Government.  All  these  powers  are  in  reality  dis- 
charged by  foreign  officials  actually  chosen  by  the  treaty  powers  and  backed  up 
by  their  force  and  their  funds.  The  so-called  'autonomous  government'  is 
more  than  a  joint  protectorate.  It  is  in  substance  and  in  form  a  tripartite 
foreign  government,  imposed  upon  the  natives  and  sui)ported  and  administered 
jointly  by  the  three  treaty  powers.  Such  is  the  arrangement  to  which  the 
United  States,  in  the  pursuit  of  its  new  policy,  has  committed  itself  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  the  so-called  neutrality  of  these  chstant  islands." 

21"  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  201.  Referring  to  Bayard's  plan,  Blaine  declared  in  his 
instructions  to  the  delegates  to  the  Berlin  Conference: 

"This  scheme  goes  beyond  the  principle  upon  which  the  President  desires 
to  see  our  relations  with  the  Samoan  Government  based,  and  is  not  in  har- 
mony with  the  established  policy  of  this  Government.  For  if  it  is  not  a 
joint  protectorate,  to  which  there  are  such  grave  and  obvious  objections,  it 
is  hardly  less  than  that  and  does  not  in  any  event  promise  efficient  action." 

-"  Ibid.,  p.  '202.  No  provision  was  made  that  this  government  should  be 
temporary  in  character  and  preparatory  merely  to  restoring  complete  self- 
government  to  the  natives,  although  the  .American  delegates  were  instructed 
that  it  was  the  earnest  desire  of  the  President  that  anv  intervention  in  Samoa 


RELATION  OF   BERLIN   ACT  TO   AMERICAN   FOREIGN   POLICY      201 

to  Amerioan  foreijin  policy  but  contrary  also  to  the  advice  of  all 
the  commissioners  sent  to  Samoa  in  ISSll.  Each  of  these  men  had 
declared  that  a  simultaneous  participation  of  the  three  ])()\vers 
in  the  admhiistration  of  Samoa  had  been  proved  to  be  impractic- 
able and  a  source  of  international  controversies.  No  provision 
was  made  that  this  government  should  be  temporary  in  character, 
although  this  was  the  earnest  desire  of  the  American  President. 

The  conclusion  of  the  General  Act  of  Berlin  may  be  considered 
to  complete  the  second  period  of  the  Samoan  diplomatic  history. 
The  equality  of  rights  of  the  three  nations  in  the  island  group  had 
been  ex])ressed  ten  years  before  in  the  separate  treaties  of  each 
power  with  Samoa.  That  equality  was  now  made  emphatic  by 
formal  treaty  between  the  three  powers,  with  the  acquiescence 
of  Samoa.  During  the  intervening  decade,  the  commercial  and 
political  interests  of  the  three  nations  in  the  islands  had  developed. 
German  commerce  there  had  grown  and  with  the  strengthening 
of  German  colonial  policy,  that  commerce  received  increasingly 
the  support  of  the  Imperial  Government  and  its  military  forces. 
The  United  States,  through  the  general  increase  in  its  Pacific 
trade,  and  through  the  plans  for  an  isthmian  canal,  had  become 
increasingly  conscious  of  the  importance  of  these  islands  to  its 
commercial  future  in  the  Pacific.  Therefore,  the  State  Depart- 
ment opposed  decisively  any'measures  which  it  considered  would 
in  any  way  jeopardize  its  status  of  equality  ih  Samoa  &nd  especially 
its  hold  over  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago.  In  instructing  the  Ameri- 
can delegates  to  the  Conference  at  Berlin,  Secretary  Blaine  had 
declared-'-  that   *'In  any  question  involving  present  or  future 

should  be  merely  temporary.  Lord  Salisbury  stated  in  his  instructions  to 
the  British  Plenipotentiaries: 

"The  reports  which  have  been  sent  in  to  their  governments  by  the  respec- 
tive Consuls-General,  and  the  impressions  which  have  been  left  by  past 
experience  in  these  islands  do  not  leave  to  us  much  hope  of  the  successful 
conduct  of  affairs  by  an  at)original  government  acting  under  the  simultaneous 
impulse  of  three  rival  but  coordinate  powers." 

(A.  &  P.,  1890,  LXXXI  (C-5907),  No.  9,  p.  6.) 

2'2  Ibid.,  p.  201.  In  opposing  the  plan  of  placing  the  islands  under  any  one 
power  as  mandatory,  the  Secretary  of  State  had  asserted  the  following  policy: 

"The  obligation  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  the  South 
Pacific  is  to  protect  the  rights  and  interests  of  our  citizens  who  may  be  resi- 


202      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED    STATES   AND    GERMANY    IX   THE    PACIFIC 

relations  in  the  Pacific,  this  Government  cannot  accept  even 
temporary  subordination  and  must  regard  it  as  inconsistent  with 
that  international  consideration  and  dignity  to  which  the  United 
States,  by  continental  position  and  expanding  interests,  must 
always  be  entitled."  Great  Britain,  while  maintaining  all  rights 
~bf  British  subjects  and  their  interests  in  Samoa,  had  played  the 
role  of  mediator  between  Germany  and  the  United  States.  Annexa- 
tion measures  had  been  attempted  by  the  British  colonies,  particu- 
larly New  Zealand,  but  the  home  government,  having  come  to 
an  understanding  w4th  Germany  on  the  division  of  spheres  of 
interest  in  the  South  Seas,  had  discouraged  the  aspirations  of  the 
colonies  and  had  given  sanction  to  the  German  policy  in  Samoa.-^^ 

dent  there  and  engaged  in  any  lawful  pursuit.  We  have  no  desire  to  dominate, 
and  every  wish  to  develop  a  stable  and  just  government.  If  there  have  been 
troubles  and  annoj'ance,  they  have  not  proceeded  from  any  groundless  hostility 
of  the  Samoan  Government  or  the  Samoan  people.  They  have  arisen  and 
been  fostered  into  mischievous  activity  by  the  avarice  and  eagerness  of  com- 
peting merchants  and  land  speculators,  and  the  irregular  conduct  of  foreign 
officials  who  are,  perhaps  naturally  and  excusably  but  most  injudiciously, 
sympathetic  with  the  prejudices  and  interests  of  their  immediate  constituents, 
the  resident  foreigners.  To  convert  the  assumed  supremacy  of  any  one  of 
these  contesting  interests  into  a  legalized  government  of  these  islands,  does  not, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  President,  promise  any  relief  from  the  embarrassing 
dissensions  which  at  present  disturb  the  orderly  condition  of  things. 

But  there  are  other  reasons  why  the  Government  of  the  United  States  can- 
not accept  this  scheme  of  subordination'.  The  interests  of  the  United  States 
require  the  possession  of  a  naval  station  in  these  remote  parts  of  the  Pacific, 
and  bj'  a  treaty  with  the  lawful  authorities  of  Samoa  they  have  been  put  in 
control  of  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago  for  these  purposes.  We  cannot  consent 
to  the  institution  of  any  form  of  government  in  Samoa  subject  directly  or 
indirectly  to  influences  which  in  the  contingencies  of  the  future  might  check 
or  control  the  use  or  the  development  of  this  American  right.  Xor  can  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  forget,  what  we  are  satisfied  the  other  treaty 
powers  will  cordially  recognize,  that  our  interest  in  the  Pacific  is  steadily 
increasing;  that  our  commerce  with  the  East  is  developing  largely  and  rapidly; 
and  that  the  certainty  of  an  early  opening  of  an  Isthmian  transit  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  (under  American  protection)  must  create  changes  in 
which  no  i)ower  can  Ije  more  directly  interested  than  the  United  States.  And 
in  any  question  involving  present  or  future  relations  in  the  Pacific,  this  govern- 
ment cannot  accept  even  temporary  subordination,  and  must  regard  it  as 
inconsistent  with  that  international  consideration  and  dignity  to  which  the 
United  States  by  continental  position  and  expanding  interests  must  always 
be  entitled." 

-'3  House  Ex.  Doc.  No.  238,  50th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  Gl,  Xo.  56. 
JMr.  Sewall  to  INIr.  Porter. 

C0NSUL.\TE  GeXER.\L  OF  THE  UxiTED  StATES, 

Apia,  Samoa,  August  15,  1S87.     (Received  Sept.  12.) 
"Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  although,  for  reasons  set  forth  elsewhere, 
there  has  been  no  meeting  of  the  municipal  board  since  my  arrival  here,  the 


BRITISH-GERMAN   ACCORD   ON  SAMOAN  QUESTION  203 

In  reply  to  an  inten-oiiation  concrrning  tlie  Samoan  sitnation,  Sir 
J.  Ferguson,  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
had  dechired  to  the  House  of  Commons  in  1888'-'^  that  he  could 
not  tell  what  the  future  of  Samoa  Avould  he.  The  German  peoi)le 
formed  some  of  the  best  colonists  in  the  British  possessions.  It 
Avas  not  sui)rising  "that  the  Government  of  Germany,  with  people 
spread  all  o\er  the  world,  should  have  settled  to  some  extent  in 
colonies  of  their  own,  rather  than  altogether  in  those  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States."  The  British  people  "ought  not 
to  view  with  jealousy  the  advent  of  the  ci^•ilized  powers  to  colonies 
adjacent  to  their  own."  In  instructing  the  British  plenipoten- 
tiaries to  the  Berlin  Conference,  Lord  Salisbury  declared  that  the 
object  of  Her  IMajesty's  Government  in  taking  part  in  the  con- 
ference was  merely  to  secure  a  stable  government  which  could 
maintain  tranquillity  there  and  that  the  British  interests  in  Samoa 
were  "commercial  and  not  political. "-^^ 

The  German  Chancellor  openly  acknowledged  the  British- 
union  between  the  British  and  German  consuls  in  support  of  the  German 
cancliclate  for  municipal  magistrate  continues.  The  British  ijro-consul  acts 
against  his  personal  judgment  but  under  personal  instructions  to  support 
the  German  candidate  for  six  months  from  April  last. 

These  are  not  the  first  instructions  from  the  British  Government  to  its 
representative  here  that  have  strengthened  the  German  hand  and  tended 
to  German  domination  in  Samoa. 

As  early  as  April,  1886,  Dr.  Stuebel,  German  Consul-general  informed  Mr. 
Hugo,  the  associate  German  rejiresentative  on  the  board,  that  Count  Hatz- 
fcldt  had  written  Berlin  that  the  British  foreign  office  had  instructed  its 
representative  here  to  act  with  the  Germans. 

In  September,  1886,  written  instructions  to  this  effect  were  exhibited  by  the 
British  consul.  These  instructions  went  further  and  instructed  him  to 
request  the  then  magistrate,  a  British  subject,  to  resign.  I  enclose  a  copy 
of  an  extract  from  a  letter  called  forth  by  this  action,  written  by  Sir  Roljert 
Stout,  Premier  of  New  Zealand,  to  Sir  F.  D.  Bell,  agent  general  for  that  colony 
in  London. 

There  is  from  another  source  confirmation  of  English  support  of  the 
CJermans,  and  indirect  enc()uragem(>nt  to  the  rebels  here.  In  a  letter  referred 
to  in  my  dispatch  numl)ered  10,  written  by  Meisake,  interpreter  and  clerk 
at  the  German  consulate,  dated  June  1,  1887,  and  addressed  to  Mataafa, 
Chief  of  Atua,  it  is  affirmed  that,  'by  will  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany, 
Germany's  desires  here  will  be  approved  and  carried  out.' 

I  have,  etc., 

Harold  M.  Sewall."        ^[ 

(See  also  inclosure — account  of  interview  between  the  British  Minister, 
Sir  E.  Malet,  and  Prince  Bismarck.) 
2'^  F.  R.,  1889,  pp.  184  and  185. 
2'5  A.  &  P.,  1890,  LXXXI  (C-5907),  No.  9,  p.  6. 


204      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

German  Entente  on  the  colonial  question.    In  an  address  before 
the  Reichstag  in  1889  Bismarck  announced  r^^^ 

"In  Zanzibar  as  in  Samoa  we  are  in  absolute  unity  with  the 
English  Government  and  with  it  we  are  going  hand  in  hand,-'^ 
and  I  am  firmly  resolved  to  hold  fast  to  these  relations." 

In  further  emphasis  he  continued : 

"This  impression  is,  according  to  my  political  conception,  the 
chief  thing — just  as  in  other  colonies,  in  Samoa  for  example — I 
hold  unquestionably  to  the  accord  with  the  English  Government, 
and  to  the  resolve,  as  soon  as  we  are  in  agreement  with  the  same,  to 
go  forward  together,  and  as  soon  as  we  are  that  no  longer,  to 
refrain  or  to  act  with  restraint.     I  consider  England  as  the  old, 

2'8  V.  R.,  1889,  Bd.  Ill,  27.  Sitz.,  26.  Januar,  1889,  S.  618  (B.)  and  S.,  619  (B). 
This  speech  was  rendered  during  the  first  discussion  of  a  bill  concerning  slave 
traffic  and  protection  of  German  interests  in  East  Africa.  (Translation  by 
author.) 

2"  A.  &  P.,  1889,  LXXXVI  (C-o629),  p.  279,  No.  322.  Lord  Salisbury  took 
exception  to  this  statement  by  the  Chancellor  as  liable  to  misconstruction,  and 
expressed  the  following  modification  as  his  view  of  the  situation. 

No.  322.     The  Marquis  of  Sahsbury  to  Sir.  E.  Malet. 

Foreign  Office,  January  29,  1889. 
"Sir: 

In  speaking  to  Count  Hatzfeldt  today,  I  referred  to  the  speech  delivered 
by  the  Chancellor  in  the  Reichstag  on  Sunday  last.  I  expressed  the  satisfac- 
tion with  which  I  had  read  the  language  applied  by  the  Chancellor  to  the  value 
which  he  attached  to  the  good  understanding  between  the  two  governments. 

The  only  comment  which  it  was  at  all  necessary  for  me  to  make,  other  than 
that  of  entire  sympathy  and  concurrence,  applied  to  a  remark  of  his  Highness, 
,as  to  the  attitude  of  the  two  countries  with  respect  to  Samoa. 

His  statement,  that  in  regard  to  that  matter  the  Governments  of  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  were  going  hand  in  hand,  might  be  open  to  miscon- 
.st  ruction. 

It  was  entirely  correct  to  say  that  our  views  were  in  agreement  as  to  the 
arrangement  to  be  put  in  force  for  the  government  of  these  islands  in  the 
future,  but  in  the  conflict  which  existed  at  present  between  the  German 
Gdvernment  and  a  certain  portion  of  the  inhabitants,  it  could  not  be  said 
that  we  were  going  hand  in  h:ind  with  Germany.  We  were  maintaining  an 
attitude  entirely  neutral,  and  were  in  no  degree  concerned  in  or  responsible 
for  the  action  which  the  German  Government  thought  it  right  to  take. 

Count  Hatzfeldt  expressed  himself  entirely  in  accord  with  me  as  to  the 
accuracy  of  the  correction  and  said  that  he  had  no  doubt  that  when  the 
Chancellor  used  that  expression,  he  was  speaking  of  the  more  permanent 
arrangement  with  respect  to  which  the  views  of  the  two  governments  were 
the  same. 

I  am,  &c., 

(Signed)        Salisbury." 


OPERATION   OF   THE   GENERAL  ACT  205 

traditional  ally,  witlf  whom  we  have  no  conflicting;'  interests; 
when  1  say  ally,  that  is  to  be  taken  in  a  diplomatic  sense;  we  have 
no  treaties  with  England;  l)nt  I  wish  to  hold  fast  also  in  colonial 
questions  to  the  feeling  which  we  have  had  with  England  for  at 
least  one  hmidred  and  fifty  years.  (Bravo  on  the  left.)  And  if 
it  were  to  be  shown  to  me  that  we  were  losing  that,  then  I  would 
become  cautious  and  seek  to  prevent  the  loss." 

The  third  period  of  Samoan  diplomacy  was  characterized  by  the 
difficulties  of  putting  into  operation  the  stipulations  of  the  General 
Act.-^^  At  the  base  of  these  difficulties  was  the  reluctance  of  the 
natives  to  submit  to  a  centralized  government,  or  to  the  restric- 
tions of  any  government.  Being  averse  to  taxes,  coercive  measures 
were  required  to  collect  these — the  warrants  of  the  Supreme  Court 
went  unheeded  and  the  Treaty  Powers  were  compelled  to  send 
men-of-war  to  enforce  the  rulings  of  the  court.  In  1893  revolu- 
tions broke  out  again  requiring  the  armed  interference  of  all  three 
of  the  treaty  powers. -^^  In  order  to  uphold  the  rule  of  Malietoa, 
and  the  order  of  the  islands,  Mataafa  and  several  insurgent  chiefs 
were  deported  to  the  Marshall  Islands  and  retained  there  at  the 
expense  of  the  three  governments.  Difficulties  also  arose  concern- 
ing the  powers  of  the  Chief  Justice-'-"  as  in  conflict  with  those  of 
the  President  of  the  IMunicipal  Council,  who  had  been  given  by 
the  Treaty  the  power  to  act  as  adviser  to  the  native  king.  The 
relationship  of  the  Chief  Justice  to  the  Consuls  was  also  a  source  of 

-'*  F.  R.,  '94,  p.  511.  For  diplomatic  cjrrespon4ence  on  this  period,  see 
also  A.  &  P.,  1890,  LXXXI  (C-5907),  and  1893,  CIX  (C-6973). 

219  F.  R.,  1894,  p.  512  and  p.  594  ff.  The  British  and  German  Governm(>nts 
agreed  to  disarm  the  natives  by  force,  l)ut  the  United  States  objected  on  the 
ground  that  such  measures  were  unnecessary  and  Hkely  to  frustrate  the  good 
effects  of  the  Berhn  Conference.     (Ibid.,  pp.  651  and  655.) 

-OF.  R.,  1894,  p.  512.  The  first  Chief  Justice,  Mr.  Cederkranz,  was  a 
Swede,  appointed  according  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  by  the  King  of  SwcMfcn 
and  Norway.  The  President  of  the  Municipal  Council  was  a  German  subject 
Baron  Senfft  von  Pilsach.  Both  of  these  became  involved  in  difficulties  con- 
nected with  their  powers,  with  questions  of  currency  and  the  management 
,of  the  Treasury,  etc.,  and  resigned.  Mr.  Henry  C.  Ide,  an  American,  former 
member  of  the  Land  Commission,  was  proposed  by  Germany  and  endorsed  by 
all  three  governments  as  Mr.  Cedcrkranz'  successor  in  the  position  of  Chief 
Justice.  Mr.  Schmidt,  former  German  Vice-consul  at  Apia  })ecame  President 
of  the  Municipal  Council. 


206      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AND    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

difficulty-'^  as  was  the  power  of  the  President  of  the  Municipal 
Council  o^'er  the  native  treasury.-- 

The  troubles  culminated,  at  the  death  of  the  old  king  Malietoa. 
Great  Britain  suggested  even  before  this  occurred,  that  in  view  of 
possible  troubles  arising  from  this  event,  the  Treaty  Powers  should 
consider  arrangements  for  the  selection  of  his  successor.^^^  The 
United  States  maintained  that  the  Berlin  Treaty  clearly  stated  the 
right  of  the  Samoans  to  elect  their  own  king  according  to  their 
own  custom,  and  that  the  United  States  would  abide  by  this  and 
would  support  the  choice  of  the  people.  The  British  Government 
concurred  in  supporting  the  treaty  stipulations,  but  suggested 
that  the  treaty  powers  through  their  consuls  might  arrange  the 
manner  of  procedure.  Germany  shared  this  view,  but  the  United 
States  considered  it  "undue  influence  and  violation  of  the  treaty." 
Meantime  as  an  offset  to  certain  groups  of  the  natives,  who  were 
assembling  against  the  old  king,  the  former  chief  Mataafa  and  his 
companions  were,  by  agreement  of  the  three  powers,  brought 
back  to  Samoa  after  signing  a  promise  that  they  would  remain 
loyal  to  Malietoa  and  his  successors.  At  the  death  of  the  old  king, 
howe^'er,  this  agreement  was  ignored  and  Mataafa  claimed  the 
kingship,'"^  his  opponent  being  the  king's  son  Malietoa  Tanu. 
Following  the  provisions  of  the  Berlin  Act,  the  matter  was  placed 
in  the  hands  of  the  Chief  Justice,  who  rendered  the  decision  that 
Mataafa  had  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin  Conference  been  declared 
to  be  ineligible  for  the  kingship,--^  which  should  therefore  fall  to 
Malietoa  Tanu.  The  adherents  of  Mataafa  refused  to  accept  the 
decision,  declared  war,  defeated  the  Malietoa  forces  in  conflicts 
involving  considerable  damage  to  the  property  of  Europeans,  and 
established  themselves  in  possession  of  the  Government.  The 
Chief  Justice  and  INIalietoa  Tanu  himself  were  given  refuge  on 

•"'  F.  R.,  1894,  p.  735  ff.  222  p.  R.,  1895,  (2),  pp.  1136  ff. 

"3  F.  R.,  1899,  pp.  605  ff.  ^24  a.  &  P.,  1899,  CX  (C-9506),  p.  2. 

2-5  Sen.  Misc.  Doc,  51st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  II,  No.  81,  p.  43.  This 
stii)ulation  was  brought  forward  by  Count  Bismarck  during  the  fifth  session 
of  the  Conference;  it  was  approved  by  the  British  representative,  and  no 
objections  were  raised  by  the  American.  See  note  202,  also  A.  &  P.,  1899, 
CX  (C-9506),  p.  3. 


INSURRECTION  OF   MATAAFA  207 

board  the  Britisli  war  \essel.  After  several  conferences  })etween 
the  foreiun  consuls,  the  naval  commanders,  the  Chief  Justice  and 
the  l^vsident  of  the  ]\Iunicii)al  Council,  it  was  decided  to  recofij- 
nize  Mataafa  and  his  |)arty,  then  in  de  facto  possession  of  the 
g;o\ernment,  to  constitute  the  Provisional  Government  of  Samoa, 
pending  instructions  from  the  three  Treaty  Powers.^^"  Notwith- 
standing this  decision,  the  American  and  British  forces  at  Apia, 
desiring  to  support  the  decision  of  the  Chief  Justice,  and  thus 
enforce  the  provisions  of  the  Berlin  Act,  gave  active  assistance  to 
the  Malietoa  forces.-'-'  INIalietoa  adherents  were  brought  from 
various  parts  of  the  island  to  Apia  and  fiu^nished  w^ith  arms  and 
ammunition.  For  the  protection  of  American  and  British  citizens 
and  property  in  Apia,  marines  and  sailors  patrolled  the  streets  and 
the  American  naval  vessel  "Philadelphia,"  assisted  by  the  British 
ships  "Porpoise"  and  "Royalist,"  opened  fire  across  Apia,  bom- 
barding the  ^lataafa  forces  behind  the  town.  Damages  caused  by 
these  activities  were  later  made  the  subject  of  international  arbi- 
tration.--'^ The  Mataafa  forces  were  in  great  strength  and  it  was 
evident  that  the  local  officials  were  unable  to  control  the  situation, 
which  meant  that  the  authority  of  the  Berlin  Act  was  being  defied. 
The  island  affairs  claimed,  therefore,  once  more  the  intervention 
of  the  home  governments. 

2^«  A.  &  P.,  1899,  CX  (C-9508),  p.  3. 

22' Sen.  Doc.  Xo.  85,  59th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  9,  also  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  BKi. 

228  F.  R.,  1889,  p.  670  flf.  By  exchange  of  notes,  August  23rd,  1899,  the 
German  and  British  Governments  agreed  to  submit  to  arbitration  the  claims 
presented  by  indi\aduals  or  companies  for  damages  inflicted  by  the  military 
action  of  British  or  German  officers  at  Samoa  at  this  time.  The  United 
States  accepted  the  invitation  to  cooperate  in  this  settlement,  and  Ijecame 
signatory'  to  a  convention  for  this  purpose,  November  7,  1899.  The  King 
of  Sweden  and  Norway  accepted  the  role  of  arl)itrator.  The  decision  rendered 
by  Oscar  II,  on  October  14,  1902  (See  IVI.,  II,  p.  1595  or  F.  R.,  1902,  p.  444) 
was  in  favor  of  Germany.  The  military  action  of  the  British  and  .\merican 
forces  on  the  islands  at  the  time  of  the  revolution  was  considered  unwarranted, 
and  the  British  and  .■\merican  Governments  were,  therefore  held  responsible 
for  the  losses  incurred  through  these  activities.  The  amount  of  claims  allowed 
was  finally  placed  at  S40,000,  of  which  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
each  paidS20.000.     (See  Son.  Doc.  No.  85,  59th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Vol.  III.) 


208    s.uioa:  the  united  states  and  Germany  in  the  pacific 

By  agreement  of  the  three  powers-^  a  second  Samoan  Commis- 
sion was  sent  to  the  islands  for  the  purpose  of  "restoring  tran- 
quiUity  and  order  therein."  Identic  instructions-^*^  were  issued  to 
the  commissioners,  directing  them  to  undertake  the  provisional 
Government  of  the  islands,  for  which  purpose  they  were  to  exercise 
supreme  authority  in  Samoa.  Consular  and  naval  officers  were 
ordered  to  submit  to  their  decisions,  which  were  not  necessarily 
to  be  governed  by  the  Berlin  Act.  No  act  of  the  commissioners, 
however,  was  to  be  valid  unless  acceded  to  by  all  three.-^^  After 
securing  temporarily  a  condition  of  peace  in  the  islands  they  were 
to  consider  plans  necessary  for  the  future  government  of  Samoa  or 
for  the  modification  of  the  Berlin  Act.  Though  its  purpose  was, 
in  the  main,  the  same  as  that  of  the  Commission  sent  by  the  three 
governments  to  the  islands  in  1886,  the  conditions  of  procedure 
were  very  different.  The  Commission  of  1899  was  given  temporary 
sovereignty  in  Samoa,  and  the  unity  of  action  on  the  part  of  the 
three  members  was  not  only  recommended  but  required. 

The  work  of  the  Commission  in  Samoa  was  efficient  and  success- 
ful.-^- The  two  rival  native  factions  were  induced  to  surrender 
their  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  Commissioners  and  to  disband 
their  forces.  The  former  decision  of  the  Chief  Justice  that  ^Nlalietoa 
Tanu  was  the  rightful  king,  was  upheld  as  a  matter  of  principle,, 
but  to  solve  the  immediate  practical  diflnculties,  the  office  of  king 
was  abolished  entirely.    This  met  with  approval  from  the  natives, 

22'J  Witte,  Emil,  "Ten  Years  of  German-American  Diplomacy,"  p.  54  f. 
According  to  Mr.  Witte,  at  this  time  an  attache  at  the  German  Embassy, 
the  suggestion  of  sending  the  commission  was  first  made  privately  by  Lord 
Pauncefote,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Washington.  Von  Holleben,  German 
Ambassador,  quickly  secured  the  consent  of  his  Government  to  the  plan  and 
also  the  consent  of  Secretary  Hay.  According  to  this  author.  Lord  Paimce- 
f  ote  wished  a  simple  plurality  vote  to  determine  the  validity  of  any  resolutions 
of  the  Commissioners.  Von  Hollcl)en,  however,  insisted  that  unanimity  be 
secured  l)cfore  action  of  any  kind  should  be  taken. 

23°  F.  R.,  1S99,  p.  614  ff. 

231  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  615.     The  Commissioners  appointed  were  as  follows: 
For  Great  Britain:     Mr.  C.  N.  E.  Eliot,  C.  B.,  Second  Secretary  of  the 

British  Embassy  in  Washington. 
For  Germany :  Freiherr  Speck  von  Sternburg,  Counselor  of  Legation  and 

First  Secretary  of  the  Embassy  at  Washington. 
For  the  United  States:     Mr.  Bartlett  Tripp. 

232  F.  R.,  1899,  pp.  621  ff. 


JOINT   COMMISSION   OF    1S99  209 

for  whom  tril)al  organization  uikUt  High  Chiefs  was  tlio  iiormal 
■  form  of  society,  the  kingshij)  liaving  been  an  artificial  creation 
produced  under  the  influence  of  foreigners.  The  Commissioners 
then  gave  their  attention  to  a  careful  study  of  conditions  in  the 
isianfls,  the  causes  for  the  prolonged  difficulties  in  Samoa  and 
finally  agreed  upon  recommendations  which  they  considered  would 
he  "if  not  entirely  satisfactory,  at  least  workable."  Using  the 
General  Act  of  Berlin  as  a  basis,  they  introduced  a  number  of 
modifications,  the  most  important  of  which,  besides  the  removal 
of  the  native  king,  were  the  abolishment  of  consular  jurisdiction, 
and  the  establishment  of  the  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  an 
administrator,  to  be  chosen  from  some  disinterested  power  and 
assisted  by  a  council  of  delegates  from  the  three  governments. 
Having  framed  this  scheme  as  the  best  one  they  could  devise 
inider  the  tripartite  principle  of  control,  the  commissioners  then 
recorded  in  their  joint  report  their  opinion-^^  that  "  the  only  natural 
and  normal  form  of  government  for  these  islands,  and  the  only 
system  which  can  assure  permanent  prosperity  and  tranciuillity, 
is  a  government  by  one  power."  The  American  Commissioner, 
Mr.  Tripp,  reemphasized  this  viewpoint  in  his  private  report  to 
Secretary  Hay.-^^ 

"I  am  by  no  means  sanguine,"  he  wrote,  "that  the  form  pro- 
posed will  produce  the  eft'ect  desired,  for,  while  I  have  no  doubt 
that  any  one  of  the  great  powers  could  easily  govern  these  islands 
in  the  manner  proposed,  I  fear  their  ability  to  do  so  when  acting 
together,  and  I  cannot  forbear  to  impress  upon  my  Government 
not  only  the  proj^riety  but  the  necessity  of  dissolving  this  partner- 
ship of  nations  which  has  no  precedent  for  its  creation  nor  reason 
for  its  continuance.  It  will  produce  national  jealousies  and 
endanger  the  friendly  relations  that  have  so  long  existed  between 
the  powers.  Considerations  of  national  welfare  should  terminate 
this  unusual  alliance  at  the  earliest  moment  that  it  can  be  done 
with  proper  regard  for  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  powers 
concerned." 

A  similar  stand  in  ()p])osition  to  the  joint  control  over  Samoa 
was  taken  five  years  previous  by  Secretary  of  State,  Gresham. 
Concludmg  a  report  to  Congress  on  Samoan  affairs,-''^  he  stated: 

-''  F.  R.,  1899,p.  638.  ^^4  ihjd.,  p.  659. 

25'  F.  R.,  1894,  p.  513.     Earlier  in  the  report  (p.  509)  Secretary  Gresham 


210      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED    STATES    AND    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

"  Soberly  surveying  the  history  of  our  relations  with  Samoa  we 
well  may  inquire  what  we  have  gained  by  our  departure  from  our 
established  policy  beyond  the  expenses,  the  responsibilities,  and 
the  entanglements  that  have  so  far  been  its  only  fruits.  One  of  the 
greatest  difficulties  in  dealing  with  matters  that  lie  at  a  distance 
is  the  fact  that  the  imagination  is  no  longer  restrained  by  the  con- 
templation of  objects  in  their  real  proportions.  Our  experience 
in  the  case  of  Samoa  serves  to  show  that  for  our  usual  exemption 
from  the  consequences  of  this  infirmity,  we  are  indebted  to  the 
wise  policy  that  had  previously  preserved  us  from  such  engage- 
ments as  those  embodied  in  the  General  Act  of  Berlin,  which, 
besides  involving  us  in  an  entangling  alliance,  has  utterly  failed  to 
correct,  if  indeed  it  has  not  aggravated,  the  very  evils  which  it  was 
designed  to  prevent." 

The  objections  to  tripartite  control  over  the  island  group  had 
many  times  found  expression  by  British  and  German  officials  and 
special  commissioners.  Therefore,  when  after  the  report  of  the 
Commission  of  1899,-^*'  the  move  was  made  to  dissolve  the  "  entang- 
ling alliance,"  it  found  favorable  sentiment  in  all  three  countries. 

gave  further  expression  to  his  disap]iroval  of  the  jjarticipation  of  the  United 
States  in  the  administration  of  Samoa. 

"In  revieAving  this  chapter  in  the  history  of  our  relations  to  Samoa,  fraught 
with  so  much  peril  to  our  'safety  and  prosperity,'  we  look  in  vain  for  any 
compensatinjr  advantage.  So  far  as  the  departure  from  our  early  and  con- 
servative ]iolicy  had  produced  any  appreciable  result,  it  had  been  one  of 
unmitigated  disadvantage.  It  certainly  cannot  be  maintained  that  the 
condition  of  the  natives  was  improved  l^y  our  interference.  On  the  other 
hand,  no  interest  of  our  own  had  l:)een  promoted.  The  whole  trade  of  the 
islands  is  of  small  value,  and  of  this  only  an  insignificant  part  is  with  the 
Ignited  States.  We  have  never  found  it  necessary  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  a 
foreign  country  in  order  to  trade  with  it." 

'""  Thayer,  Life  of  Hay,  \'ol.  II,  p.  220.  Concerning  the  results  of  the 
Commission,  Secretary  Hay,  wrote  to  Henry  White,  Scpteml)er  9,  1899. 

"We  are  on  the  best  of  terms  about  Samoa;  Sternburg  backed  up  Tripp  in 
everything.  It  was  rather  the  English  Commissioner  who  was  offish.  The 
Emperor  is  nervously  anxious  to  be  on  good  terms  with  us — on  his  own  terms, 
hien  entendu." 

The  American  Commissioner  also  wrote  of  von  Sternburg  (F.  R.,  1899,  p. 
634): 

"I  cannot  speak  too  highly  of  the  conduct  of  the  German  member  of  the 
Commission.  With  one  less  experienced,  less  honorable  and  conscientious, 
representing  the  great  Empire  of  Germany,  our  task  would  not  only  have  been 
difficult,  but  I  fear  a  hoi)eless  and  unprofitable  one." 


i 


PARTITION   OF  THE   ISLANDS  211 

The  move  was  made  by  the  German  Government.  It  stron<j;ly 
uri;e<l'-"  the  partitit)n  of  the  Ishinds,  "the  Ignited  States  to  retahi' 
Tutuila  and  adjaeent  islets,  and  England  and  Germany  to  divide 
the  rest."  Secretary  Ilay  replied  immediately  that  the  President 
was  "dispi^sed  to  regard  this  proposition  favorably  if  details  could 
be  satisfactorily  arranged  with  due  regard  to  the  national  interests'-'^** 
and  to  the  welfare  of  the  inhal)itants."  Meantime  the  German  and 
British  governments  were  negotiating  concerning  the  disposition 
between  them  of  the  remainder  of  the  group — the  difficulty  being, 
as  Lord  Salisbury  stated,  that  there  were  "three  parties  to  divide 
and  really  only  two  islands  to  be  divided."  For  after  setting  apart 
Tutuila  for  the  United  States,  the  only  other  island  of  value  was 
r})olu  on  which  Apia  was  situated.  The  result  of  the  negotiations 
was  the  conclusion  of  a;  preliminary  agreement^^''  betw'een  Great 

=3-  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  663  ff. 

238  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  662.  The  American  Commissioner,  Mr.  Tripp,  in  his 
final,  incii\'idual  report  to  Secretary  Hay,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
American  national  interest  in  Samoa  centered  in  the  island  of  Tutuila. 

"The  importance  of  the  Samoan  Islands,  however,  lies  not  so  much  in  their 
commercial  advantag;e  as  in  their  geographical  location.  They  are  in  the 
great  future  pathway  of  commerce,  and  their  importance  in  this  respect  can 
not  be  overestimated.  ...  I  cannot  impress  upon  my  Government  too 
strongly  the  necessity  of  its  undivided  possession  of  this  harbor  (Pago-Pago). 
It  is  the  only  one  worthy  of  the  name  on  the  islands.  .  .  .  The  harbor 
and  the  entire  island  should  le  under  our  individual  control.  A  coaling 
station  within  the  harbor,  or  the  harbor  alone  would  be  of  little  value.  The 
modern  coaling  station  must  be  fortified,  and  to  do  this  the  adjoining  l)ay  of 
Leone  must  be  had  with  its  connecting  penin.=ula.  In  .short  the  whole  island 
must  be  had;  and  it  would,  in  my  judgment,  be  a  wise  policy  to  give  oiu'  allies 
and  the  world  to  l)e  informed  that  our  interests  in  Samoa  center  most  closely 
about  Pago-Pago  and  the  island  of  Tutuila,  and  that  we  should  not  look  with 
favor  upon  any  effort  on  the  part  of  any  nation  to  interfere  with  our  rights 
or  make  them  less  available  for  future  requirements  cf  the  natirn,  liy  curtail- 
ment of  our  interests  in  the  harbor  or  in  the  island  its-elf.  Negotiations 
between  England  and  Germany  have  been  several  times  had  to  exchange  the 
the  individual  interests  of  the  one  for  the  sole  possession  of  other  island 
properties.  So  far  as  1  am  informed,  the  jiroposition  has  been  only  to  sur- 
render to  Great  Britain  the  German  interests.  This  Germany  will  probably 
decline  to  do  so  long  as  the  German  firm  retains  its  interests  in  the  large 
German  plantations;  but  recently,  it  is  said,  large  offers  have  l)een  made  by 
British  capitalists  for  these  projierties.  Sh(;uld  this  result  be  brought  alxnit, 
it  would  undoubtedly  follow  that  Germany  would  exchange  her  Samoan 
interests  for  some  British  island  interests,  and  the  United  States,  which  has 
so  long  been  the  buffer  power  l)etween  tliese  two  great  nations,  would  be  in  a 
position  to  ask  for  a  severance  of  the  joint  rule  we  have  so  long  maintained 
contrary  to  all  our  former  national  policies  and  traditions." 

2"  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  665. 


212      SAMOA:   THE   UXITED    STATES   AND    GERMAXY   IX   THE    PACIFIC 

Britain  and  Germany,  in  which  a  new  settlement  of  many  out- 
standing colonial  issues  was  made.  Both  countries  renounced  their 
rights  over  Tutuila  and  Great  Britain  renounced  all  rights  in  the 
Samoan  group,  recei\ang  in  return  from  Germany  the  renuncia- 
tion of  the  latter's  rights  in  the  Tonga  and  parts  of  the  Solomon 
Islands.2« 

The  preliminary  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
was  followed  a  few  weeks  later  by  a  Convention  of  all  three  powers 
concluded  in  Washington,  December  2,  1899.-^^  The  General 
Act  of  Berlin  and  all  previous  treaties,  conventions  and  agree- 
ments, relating  to  Samoa  were  annulled.  Germany  renounced  in 
favor  of  the  United  States  all  rights  over  the  Island  of  Tutuila 
and  all  other  islands  of  the  Samoan  group  east  of  Longitude  171 
west  of  Greenwich.  Great  Britain  made  a  similar  renunciation 
in  favor  of  the  United  States.  Reciprocally  thereupon  the  United 
States  renounced  in  favor  of  Germany  all  rights  and  claims  over 
the  Islands  of  Upolu  and  Savii  and  all  other  Islands  of  the  Samoan 
group  west  of  Longitude  171  west  of  Greenwich.  It  was  further 
agreed  that  the  three  signatory  powers  were  to  continue  to  enjoy 
all  privileges  in  the  Samoan  group  "  equal  to  those  enjoyed  by  the 
so\'ereign  po^er  in  all  ports  which  may  be  open  to  the  commerce 
of  either  of  them." 

In  surveying  the  Samoan  situation  as  a  Avhole,  the  conclusion 
is  evident  that  this  outcome  though  taken  on  the  initiative  of 
Germany  was  favorable  to  the  Ignited  States.  Although  possessing 
what  the  United  States  Secretary  of  State  acknowledged  to  be 
"only  an  insignificant  part"  of  the  trade  of  the  Samoan  Islands, 
it  secured  full  control  over  a  part  of  the  island  group  which,  though 
less  in  area  than  that  retained  by  Germany,  contained  "  the  finest 
harbor  in  the  South  Pacific."    Secretary  Hay'^'-  considered  Tutuila 

2"  Thayer,  "Life  of  Hay,"  Vol.  II,  p.  281.     (See  footnote  No.  242.) 
='■"  F.  R.,  1899,  ]).  067.     The  Convention  was  signed  by  the  following  pleni- 
potentiaries : 

For  the  United  States:     John  Hay  (Secretary  of  State). 

For  Germany:     Von  Hollelicn  (German  Aml^assador). 

For  Great  Britain:     Lord  Pauncefote  (British  Ambassador). 
2«  Thayer,  "Life  of  Hay,"  Vol.  II,  p.  281. 


CONVENTIONS  OF   1899  213 

to  be  "infinitely  the  most  important  of  the  islands"  and  the  most 
useful  to  the  United  States,  and  declared  that  the  United  States 
Xavy  Department,  which  had  for  a  long  time  been  anxious  for 
this  solution,  was  delighted  with  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 
In  addition  to  the  fact  of  the  value  of  Tutuila,  was  the  fact  that 
the  United  States,  having  httle  commercial  interests  in  the  islands 

Hav  to  Jos:eph  H.  Choate. 

NOATSMBER  28,  1899. 

"1  was  kept  quite  in  the  dark  up  to  the  last  moment  as  to  the  arrangement 
made  between  Germany  and  EngUind.  The  newspapers  have  announced, 
without  the  least  reserve,  that  England  was  to  keep  Samoa  and  Germany 
get  the  Gilliert  and  Solomon  Islands,  or,  as  the  boys  with  a  natural  reminis- 
cence of  the  "opera  bouffe,'  called  them,  'The  Gilbert  and  Sullivan.'  I  should 
have  been  glad  if  you  had  squandered  a  little  of  the  public  money,  letting 
me  know  by  telegraph  the  true  state  of  the  case.  It  is  a  satisfaction  to  me 
to  know  that  Lord  Sahsbury  assured  you  that  equal  rights  as  to  trade  and 
commerce  would  be  reserved  for  the  other  Powers  in  Samoa,  and  of  this  he 
was  informed  by  your  letter  before  the  German  Embassy  received  the  authentic 
news  that  the  arrangement  had  been  made.  Germany,  it  is  true,  has  been 
excessively  anxious  to  have  the  matter  concluded  before  the  Emperor's  visit 
to  England,  and,  in  the  intense  anxiety,  1  am  inchned  to  think  they  have 
somewhat  lost  sight  of  their  material  interests  in  the  case.     .     .     . 

Our  interests  in  the  archipelago  were  very  meager  always  excepting  our 
interests  in  Pago-Pago,  'which  was  of  the  most  vital  importance.  It  is 
the  finest  harbor  in  the  Pacific  and  absolutely  indispensable  to  us.  The 
general  impression  in  the  country  was  that  we  already  owned  the  harbor, 
but  this,  as  you  know,  was  not  true.  .  .  .  Seeing  the  intense  anxiety  of 
the  Emperor  that  the  negotiations  should  be  hastened,  I  sent  at  his  personal 
request  the  dispatches  which  you  have  received;  assured  that  all  our  interests 
would  be  safeguarded  and  knowing  also  that  in  case  the  arrangement  proposed 
was  not  satisfactory,  we  always  had  the  power  of  a  peremptory  veto.     .     .     . 

Our  Xavy  Department  has  for  a  long  time  been  very  anxious  for  this  consum- 
mation, and  of  course,  they  are  delighted  with  it.  Tutuila,  though  the 
smallest  of  the  islands,  is  infinitely  the  most  important  and  the  most  useful 
to  us.  The  argimient  from  size,  which  the  Sun  makes  so  much  of,  is  hardly 
worth  a  moment's  consideration.  An  acre  of  land  at  the  corner  of  Broad  and 
Wall  Streets  is  worth  something  like  a  million  acres  in  Nevada.  The  proof 
that  size  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  case  is  that  Savaii,  by  far  the  largest  of 
the  islands,  was  considered  by  Germany  and  l)y  England  as  entirely  worthless. 
My  own  opinion  is  that  Germany  has  the  least  valuable  bargain  of  the  three 
and  that  she  was  led  by  her  sentimental  eagerness  into  a  bad  trade." 

Secretary  Hay  also  gave  public  expression  to  his  satisfaction  over  the  out- 
come of  the  Samoan  question  in  an  address  before  the  New  York  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  November  19,  1901. 

"We  consider  our  interests  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  as  great  now  as  those  of 
any  other  power  and  destined  to  indefinite  development.  We  have  opened 
our  doors  t(j  the  people  of  Hawaii;  we  have  accepted  the  responsibility  of 
the  Philii^pines  which  Providence  imposed  upon  us;  we  have  put  an  end 
to  the  embarrassing  condominium  in  which  we  were  involved  in  Samoa,  and 
while  al)andoning  none  of  our  commercial  rights  in  the  entire  group,  we  have 
established  our  flag  and  our  authority  in  Tutuila,  which  gives  us  the  finest 
harbor  in  the  South  Seas." 


214      SAMOA:   THE   UNITED   STATES   AXD    GERMANY   IN   THE    PACIFIC 

renounced  to  Germany,  and  retaining  still  equal  opportunities  to 
trade  there,  lost  practically  nothing  in  the  transfer.  Secretary 
Hay  considered  that  Germany  had  made  "the  least  valuable 
bargain  of  the  three,"  and  was  probably  led  into  doing  it  by  her 
eagerness  to  have  the  Samoan  and  other  colonial  questions  settled 
with  the  British  Government  before  the  Emperor's  visit  to  England. 
Whatever  the  reasons,  the  proposition  was  the  result  of  an  arrange- 
ment between  Germany  and  England.  The  United  States  merely 
accepted  the  offer  made  by  agreement  of  the  other  two  powers. 

The  whole  of  the  third  period  of  Samoan  diplomacy  was  charac- 
terized by  better  feeling  between  the  treaty  powers  in  regard  to 
their  interests  in  the  islands.  Germany,  at  the  time  of  the  Berlin 
treaty,  apparently  abandoned  all  attempts  to  make  her  "pre- 
ponderating interests"  the  basis  of  policies  of  administration  in 
the  islands.  There  continued  to  be  the  participation  of  the  white 
residents  of  Samoa  according  to  their  nationalities  in  the  disputes 
of  native  factions.  But  the  representation  of  the  three  powers 
had  been  fairly  well  regulated  by  the  Berlin  Act,  so  that,  although 
defective  as  a  means  to  control  the  native  Samoans,  it  was  not 
without  value  in  relieving  friction  between  the  foreign  govern- 
ments. Its  failure,  however,  as  a  practical  means  for  maintaining 
law  and  order  in  the  islands,  gave  renewed  evidence  to  the  powers^'*^ 
of  the  difficulties  of  continuing  a  tripartite  government  there. 
There  was  therefore  little  opposition  when  the  plan  of  division 
was  presented  by  Germany.  By  the  removal  of  a  long  continued 
source  of  controversy,  this  solution  had  a  favorable  effect  on  the 
relations  between  that  country  and  the  United  States. 

The  long  history  of  the  Samoan  controversy  gives  a  clear 
demonstration  of  the  contrasting  foreign  policies  of  Germany  and 
the  United  States.  With  Germany  the  Samoan  Islands  and  the 
German  commercial  developments  there  were  merely  a  factor  of 
a  great  expansion  system,  a  factor  therefore  to  be  both  supported 
and  utilized  by  the  home  Government  toward  that  end.  The 
United  States'  object  in  the  islands  was  the  retention  unquestioned 

2«  F.  R.,  1S99,  p.  XXVI  ff.  (President  McKinley's  Annual  Message  to 
Congress.) 


CONTRASTING    POLICIES   <^F   GERMANY  AND   UNITED   STATES      215 

and  iiiiliniited  of  the  harbor  of  Paso-Pafj;o  as  a  protective  point 
for  trade  ah-eady  estahHshed  between  the  American  west  coast 
and  the  British  colonies,  and  for  the  increased  trade  expected  after 
the  building  of  an  Isthmian  Canal.  The  Americaii  policy  was 
also  directed  toward  preserving  the  independence  of  the  islands. 
As  we  have  seen,  therefore,  throughout  both  the  negotiations  of 
the  home  governments  and  the  activities  in  Samoa,  the  American 
policy  was  on  the  defensive.  The  German  Government,  on  the 
other  hand  took  constantly  the  offensive  in  measures  in  and  con- 
cerning the  islands.  The  contrast  is  marked  in  the  treatment  of 
the  native  Samoans.  The  German  authorities  dictated  terms  to 
the  native  kings  and  did  not  hesitate  to  resort  to  military  measures 
if  their  terms  were  not  promptly  met.  The  American  representa- 
tives at  no  time  exacted  by  force  concessions  from  the  Samoans. 
The  different  attitudes  of  the  two  nations  toward  self-government 
were  demonstrated.  \Yith  the  Germans  the  problem  was  always 
as  to  how  a  strong  government  could  be  secured.  With  the  Ameri- 
cans the  problem  was  how  an  independent  native  government-^^ 
might  be  maintained.  The  Germans  do  not  appear  to  have  mis- 
ruled the  Samoans.  Reports  from  non-German  sources  testify  to 
the  well-kept  plantations  and  the  general  well-being  of  the  workers, 
but  the  rule  was  to  be  thoroughly  German  and  favorable  to  German 
interests.  The  rights  of  the  natives  did  not  factor  in  the  measures 
adopted.  The  effect  was  clearly  reflected  in  the  measures  initiated 
from  time  to  time  by  the  Samoan  chiefs.  Several  attempts  were 
made  b\-  them  to  secure  annexation  of  the  Islands  by  either  Great 
Britain  or  the  United  States.  But  there  is  no  record  of  a  Samoan 
king  or  council  appealing  for  annexation  to  Germany. 

2«Root,  "Military  and  Colonial  Policy  of  the  United  States,"  pp.  161  and 
162.  Mr.  Root,  American  Secretary  of  War,  voices  clearly  the  American 
Government's  principles  of  colonization.  In  his  report  for  1899  on  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippines,  the  Secretary  writes: 

"I  assume,  also,  that  the  obligations  correlative  to  this  great  power  arc 
of  the  highest  character,  and  that  it  is  our  unquestioned  duty  to  make  the 
interests  of  the  people  over  whom  we  assert  sovereignty,  the  first  and  (vju- 
troUing  consideration  in  all  legislation  and  administration  which  concerns 
them,  and  to  give  them,  to  the  greatest  possil)le  extent,  individual  freedom, 
self-government  in  accordance  with  their  capacity,  just  and  eiiual  laws,  and 
opportunity  for  education,  for  profitable  industry,  and  for  development  in 
civilization." 


CHAPTER    VI 

THE  SPANISH-AINIERICAX  WAR 

,  The  years  from  1897  through  1900  represent  the  time  of  greatest 
j  friction  betweeti  the  United  States  and  Germany  in  the  forty-year 
'  period  under  consideration.  Dr.  Andrew  D.  White,  who  was  sent 
on  his  second  mission  to  Germany  in  1897,  testifies  in  his  Auto- 
biography to  the  marked  change  of  sentiment  in  that  country  from 
the  time  of  his  earher  mission  in  1879.^  At  that  time  the  cordial 
relations  of  1870^  still  prevailed.  Upon  his  second  arrival  in 
Berlin,  however,  he  found  pubUc  opinion  generally  adverse  to  the 
United  States,  and  among  some  classes  bitterly  hostile.  The 
German  press  was  overi\-helmingly  anti- American  and  featured 
whene\er  possible  accounts  of  administrative  frauds  and  scandals 
in  the  United  States.  The  American  press  replied  in  kind,  pub- 
lished anti-German  articles  and  editorials,  and  republished  the 
anti-American  editorials  from  German  newspapers.^  The  hostile 
attitude  toward  the  United  States  was  not  confined  to  the  press 
and  to  the  rival  commercial  interests,  but  was  shared  by  men  who 
stood  high  at  German  universities  and  who  had  once  beeu  warm 
friends  of  America.* 

^1  White:  Autobiography,  ^■l)l.  II,  p.  144  ff. 
*  See  Chajitcr  I,  Relations  between  the  United  States  and    the    German 
Empire,  1S70. 

^  MVitte:  Revelations  of  a  German  Attache,  pp.  30  ff.     V.  R.,  '9S-'00,  30 
Sitz.,    11   Feb.,   '99,  p.  808. 

'  •*  See  Chapter  IV,  Commercial  Relations.  Commercial  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1899,  Vol.  VII,  p.  244.  Mr.  Frank  H.  Alason,  American 
Consul  General  at  Berlin,  wrote  the  following  comment  in  liis  report  of 
September  20,  1899. 

"It  is  not  to  l)e  denied  or  overlooked  that  while  the  attitude  of  the  Imperial 
Government  towards  our  country  has  been  uniformh' correct,  there  is  in  certain 
business  circles  here  a  feeling  of  enmity  and  resentment  which  did  not  exist 
])rior  to  1898.     The  heavy  balance  of  trade  which  the  United  States  now 


CAUSES   OF   FRICTION  '217 

A  luiniber  of  causes  combined  to  create  this  hostile  atniosj)here. 
Fundamental  was  the  increasing  economic  rivalry  between  the 
two  countries  and  the  legislative  measures  enacted  by  the  two 
goM^ninients  to  ])rotect  their  rival  trade  interests  seemed  to  come 
to  a  head  at  this  thne.  The  American  cattle-raisers  and  meat- 
j)ackers  were  eml>ittert'd  by  the  German  decrees  of  prohibition 
against  their  product,  and  the  American  fruit-growers  had  a  similar 
grievance.  American  life  insurance  companies  were  excluded 
from  Prussia.  American  lumber  and  oil  interests  were  protesting 
at  the  preferential  rates  granted  by  German  government-owned 
railways  to  products  from  Austria  and  Russia.^  On  the  other 
hand  German  sugar-growers  resented  the  American  surtax  on 
sugar  from  bounty-paying  countries  which  they  considered  a 
discrimination.  German  manufacturers  who  had  considered  the 
]\IcKinley  tariff  as  ruinous  to  their  interests  were  bitterly  hostile 
over  the  new  Dingley  tariff,  which  went  still  further.  At  the  same 
time  they  were  so  dependent  on  American  raw  materials  that  they 
could  not  retaliate  effectively  against  the  United  States.  The 
Agrarians  were  American  rivals  of  long  standing  and  the  increase 
of  American  food  exports  increased  their  opposition  and  their 
demands  on  the  government  for  restrictive  measures.  There  was 
also  a  widespread  fear  of  American  commercial  penetration  of 
Germany  and  an  anxiety  over  the  trade  balance  in  favor  of  the 
United  States.    Almost  the  only  class  as  such  which  showed  any 

holds  against  the  Fatherhmd,  the  dechne  in  textile  exports  and  the  sharpened 
customs  regulations  against  undervaluation,  the  concessions  recently  granted 
to  France,  and  above  all,  the  enormous  growth  of  American  manufactured 
exports,  the  aggressive  comjietition  of  American  metal  and  other  products  in 
South  American  and  Eastern  markets — all  these  weigh  heavily  on  the  hearts 
of  the  iieoi)le  here,  and  will  he  heard  from  when  the  new  tariff  and  treaties 
come  to  ojien  debate  in  the  Reichstag.  What  most  enlightened  thinkers 
expect,  or  at  least  hoj)e  for,  is  that  out  of  all  these  mutations  will  come  a 
broad,  liberal,  comprehensively  framed  treaty,  or  series  of  treaties,  between 
the  I'nited  States  and  (iermany,  in  which  all  the  vexed  and  irritating  questions 
relating  to  naturalized  citizenship,  countervailing  duties,  and  port  charges 
on  vessels  shall  be  regulated  and  liberal  justice  to  imjiorts  of  food  products 
secured  by  reciprocal  concessions  and  embodied  in  jiermanent  conventions 
between  the  two  countries." 

5  See  F.  R.,  1896,  1897,  1898  and  1900  for  correspondence  on  these  subjects. 
Also,  see  Fisk,  G.  M.,  in  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  March,  1903,  pp. 
223  ff.,  and  White:    Autobiography,  Vol.  II,  p.  158  ff. 


218  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

sympathy  with  the  United  States  was  that  of  the  Social  Democrats 
and  other  radicals.^ 

In  the  poUtical  field  a  number  of  important  questions  were  still 
pending.  The  Samoan  situation  had  not  yet  received  its  solution 
through  the  division  of  the  islands  and  was  still  a  source  of  friction. 
In  China,  Germany  had  taken  Kiao-chao  and,  with  the  subsequent 
seizures  by  the  other  European  Powers,  the  dismemberment  of 
that  empire  was  threatened  and  the  United  States  had  not  yet 
secured  from  any  of  these  nations  a  declaration  agreeing  to  main- 
tain the  integrity  of  China  and  to  establish  the  "open  door"  to 
commerce  there. 

The  most  immediate  and  direct  factor,  however,  in  creating 
unfriendly  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  at 
this  time  was  the  attitude  taken  by  Germany  during  the  war  with 
Spain.  From  the  very  outbreak  of  the  war  the  public  sentiment 
in  Germany  was  pro-Spanish  and  the  United  States  was  looked 
upon  as  the  oppressor  of  a  small  nation  in  a  war  unjustly  provoked.'^ 
The  cause  of  the  Cubans,  so  appealing  to  the  public  in  the  United 
States,  seems  to  have  been  totally  disregarded.  This  was  true 
not  only  in  the  case  of  Germany  but  throughout  the  continent  of 
Europe,  and  significant  evidence  of  the  general  attitude  was  given 
in  the  joint  note^  presented  to  President  McKinley  by  the  repre- 

« V.  R.,  '98-'00,  Bd.  I,  3  Sitz.,  12.  Dez.,  98  S.,  27  D.  Von  Halle :  "  Deutsch- 
land  iind  die  oeffentliche  Meinung  in  den  Vereinigten  Staaten,"  Preussische 
Jahrbuccher,  Bd.  107,  1902,  p.  205. 

'  V.  R.,  '9S-"00,  Bd.  I,  3  Sitz.,  12.  Dez.,  '98  S.,  25  D.  White:  Autobiog- 
raphy, Vol.  II,  p.  168.     Witte:    Revelations  of  a  German  Attache,  p.  30  ff. 

»F.  R.,  '98,  pp.  740  and  741. 

Joint  Note  of  the  Powers 

Washington,  April  6,  1898. 

"The  undersigned  representatives  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Great  Britain,  Italy  and  Russia,  duly  authorized  in  that  behalf,  acldress,  in 
the  name  of  their  resjjective  Governments,  a  ])ressing  apjieal  to  the  feelings 
of  humanity  and  moderation  of  the  President  and  of  the  American  people  in 
their  existing  differences  with  Spain.  They  earnestly  hope  that  further  nego- 
tiations will  lead  to  an  agreement  which,  while  securing  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  will  afford  all  necessary  guarantees  for  the  reestablishment  of  order 
in  Cuba. 

The  Powers  do  not  doubt  that  the  humanitarian  and  purely  disinterested 


SENTIMENT  IN  FAVOR  OF  SPAIN  219 

'soiitatives  of  tlir  six  i)()\vers,  (rreat  Hritaiii,  Germany,  France, 
Austria-Hungary,  Russia  and  Italy,  ai)i)ealing  to  liini  to  maintain 
peace.  This  note  was  presented  by  the  powers  on  the  grounds  of 
hunnmity.  President  INIcKinley's  reply  was  in  substance  that 
the  Tnited  States  shared  their  wish  for  peace,  but  if  it  should 
declare  war,  it  would  be  on  the  same  grounds  of  humanity.  John 
Hay,  then  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain,  testified  to  the  anti- 
American  sentiment  on  the  continent,  where  he  declared  sym- 
pathies were  openly  against  the  United  States.  This  he  con- 
trasted ^^'ith  English  public  sentiment,  which  was  predominantly 
pro- American." 

character  of  this  rejiresentation  will  he  fully  recognized  and  appreciated  by 
the  American  nation. 

JuLiAX  Pavncefote,  Holleben, 

P'or  Great  Britain.  For  Germany. 

Jules  C.\mbon,  von  Hengelmueller, 

For  France.  For  Austria-Hungary. 

De  Wollant,  G.  C.  Vinci, 

For  Russia.  For  Italy." 
The  President's  Reply 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  recognizes  the  good  will  which  has 
))roini)ted  the  friendly  communication  of  the  representatives  of  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Russia,  as  set  forth  in 
the  address  of  your  excellencies,  and  shares  the  hope  therein  exjiressed  that 
the  outcome  of  the  situation  in  Cul)a  may  l)e  the  maintenance  of  peace  between 
the  United  States  and  Sjiain  by  affording  the  necessary  guaranties  for  the 
reestablishment  of  order  in  the  island,  so  terminating  the  chronic  condition 
of  disturbance  there,  which  so  deeply  injures  the  interests  and  menaces  the 
tranciuillity  of  the  American  nation  by  the  character  and  consequences  of  the 
struggle  thus  kept  up  at  our  doors,  besides  shocking  its  sentiment  of  humanity. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  appreciat^^s  the  humanitarian  and 
disinterested  character  of  the  communication  now  made  on  behalf  of  the  jiowers 
named,  and  for  its  part  is  confident  that  equal  appreciation  will  be  shown 
for  its  own  earnest  and  unselfish  endeavors  to  fulfill  a  duty  to  humanity  by 
ending  a  situation  the  indefinite  prolongation  of  which  has  become  insufferable." 

That  the  note  of  the  Powers  was  not  presented  in  more  vigorous  form  is 
said  to  have  been  due  to  the  influence  of  England.  A  similar  address  was 
presented  two  days  later  by  the  same  nations  at  Madrid,  supporting  the 
Pope's  plea  for  an  armistice.  Spain  yielded  and  ordered  hostilities  in  Cuba 
suspended.  (See  Benton:  "International  Law  and  Dii)k)macy  of  the  Spanish- 
American  War,"  p.  89.) 
^  9  Letters  and  Diaries  of  John  Hay,  Vol.  HI,  pp.  119  ff. 

Hay  to  H.  Cabot  Lodge. 

American  Embassy, 

London,  April,  1898. 
"Dear  Lodge: 

I  do  not  know  whether  you  especially  value  the  friendship  and  sympathy 
of  this  country.     I  think  it  important  and  desirable  in  the  jjrescnt  state  of 


220  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Germany  drew  upon  herself  in  particular  the  resentment  of  the" 
United  States  because  of  her  actions  in  the  Far  East.  ]Many 
Americans  were  convinced  that  Germany  intended  to  rob  the 
United  States  of  the  fruits  of  victory  and  seize  the  Philippines.^" 
\  The  immediate  cause  of  this  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  pubhc  was 
the  Dewey-von  Diederichs  episode  in  ]\Ianila  Bay. 

Though  extensively  featured  by  the  press  and  causing  so  much 

hostile  feeling,  especially  in  the  United  States,  the  story  was  not 

told  by  the  chief  actors  until  fifteen  years  afterward,  when  Admiral 

Dewey  published  his  Autobiography  and  Admiral  von  Diederichs 

replied   with   his   own   account"   of   the    controversy.     Admiral 

* 
things, — as  it  is  the  only  European  country  whose  sympathies  are  not  openly 
against  us.  We  will  not  waste  time  in  discussing  whether  the  origin  of  this 
feeling  is  wholly  selfish  or  not.  Its  existence  is  beyond  question.  I  find  it 
wherever  I  go — not  only  in  the  Press,  but  in  private  conversation.  For  the 
first  time  in  my  life  I  find  the  'drawing  room'  sentiment  altogether  with  us. 
If  we  wanted  it, — which,  of  course,  we  do  not,  we  could  have  the  practical 
assistance  of  the  British  Navy, — on  the  do  ut  des  principle  naturally. 

I  think,  in  the  near  future,  this  sentiment,  even  if  it  amounts  to  nothing 
more,  is  valuable  to  us.     .     .     . 

You  may  imagine  what  it  is  to  be,  absolutely  without  Ught  or  instruction, 
compelled  to  act  from  day  to  day  on  my  own  judgment,  and  at  no  moment 
sure  of  the  wishes  of  the  Department.  What  I  should  have  done,  if  the 
feehng  here  had  l)een  unfriendly  instead  of  cordially  sympathetic,  it  is  hard 
to  say.  The  commonest  phrase  is  here:  'I  wish  you  would  take  Cul)a  at 
once.     We  wouldn't  have  stood  it  this  long.' 

And  of  course  no  power  on  earth  would  have  shown  such  patience,  and  such 
scrupulous  regard  for  law." 

Ibid.     Hay  to  H.  Cabot  Lodge. 

American  Embassy, 

London,  May  25,  1S9S. 
".My  de.\r  Lodge:  • 

The  state  of  feeling  here  is  the  best  I  have  ever  known.  From  every 
quarter,  the  evidences  of  it  come  to  me.  The  royal  family,  by  haliit  and 
tradition,  are  most  careful  not  to  break  the  rules  of  strict  neutrality,  but  even 
among  them  I  find  nothing  l)ut  hearty  kindness,  and,  so  far  as  is  consistent 
with  propriety — sympathy.  Among  the  political  leaders  on  both  sides,  I  find 
not  only  sympathy  but  a  somewhat  eager  desire  that  '  the  other  fellows "  shall  not 
seem  the  more  friendly.  Chaml)erlain's  startling  speech  was  partly  due  to  a 
conversation  I  had  with  him,  in  which  I  hoped  he  would  not  let  the  opposition 
have  a  monoi)oly  of  expression  of  good-will  to  America.  He  is  greatly  jileased 
with  the  reception  his  speech  met  with  on  our  side,  and  says  'he  don't  care 
a  hang  that  they  say  about  it  on  the  Continent.' " 

10  V.  R.,  '9S-'0O,  30  Sitz.,  11  Feb.,  '99,  p.  791,  p.  808. 

"  Von  Diederichs:  A  Statement  of  Events  in  Manila  Bay:  Translated  by 
permission  from  Marine  Rundschau  and  published  in  Journal  of  the  Royal 
United  Service  Institution,  Vol.  LIX,  No.  4.37,  August,  1914,  pp.  421  to  446 
inclusive. 


DEWEY-VON  DIEDERICIIS   EPISODE  221 

Dewey  calls  his  chapter  "A  Period  of  Anxiety."  The  Spanish 
fleet  liad  been  defeated  but  the  battle  had  depleted  Dewey's  stores 
of  aniiiumition  to  such  an  extent  that  he  could  not  have  met  the 
emergencies  of  another  engagement,  and  in  this  situation  he  was 
confronte<^l  with  the  knowledge  that  a  stronger  Spanish  scjuadron 
was  on  its  way  and  with  the  realization  that  another  nation  was 
assembling  a  powerful  fleet  in  [Manila  harbor.  That  nation,  more- 
over, was  showing  itself  determined  to  ignore  his  authority  and 
inclined  to  fraternize  with  the  Spanish  officials  in  ^Manila.  Having 
decided  to  allow  visiting  naval  vessels  every  privilege  admitted 
under  international  law  to  neutrals  in  a  blockaded  harbor,  Dewey 
permitted  all  foreign  ships  of  war  to  enter  the  harbor,  insisting  only 
on  the  right  of  boarding  them  to  establish  their  identity.  The 
British,  French  and  Japanese  vessels  acquiesced,  and  on  their 
first  entrance  to  the  harbor  reported  to  Dewey  and  asked  where 
they  might  anchor.  German  vessels,  on  the  other  hand,  omitted 
this  etiquette  and  moved  about  the  harbor  as  they  chose,  taking 
soundings.  On  its  entering  the  harbor  at  night  Dewey  found  it 
necessary  at  times  to  halt  a  German  vessel  by  firing  a  shot  across 
its  bow.  The  German  officers  frequently  visited  the  Spanish  troops 
and  outposts,  where  they  were  paid  marked  attention — the  talk 
of  the  town  of  ^Manila  being  that  Germany  would  intervene  in 
favor  of  Sjiain.  Vice-Admiral  von  Diederichs  himself  had  paid  an 
official  visit  to  the  Spanish  captain-general,  who  returned  his  call 
at  night.     According  to  Dewey  no  other  senior  foreign  naval 

Admiral  Dewey  had  not  even  made  mention  of  the  controversy  in  his 
reports  to  the  Department.     In  his  autobiography  he  states  (Chap.  XVII,  p. 

252): 

"At  a  dinner  given  me  at  the  White  House  upon  my  return  homo  President 
McKinley  mentioned  the  repeated  statements  in  the  press  about  the  friction 
in  my  relations  with  Vice-Adrairal  von  Diederichs,  in  command  of  the  German 
Asiatic  squadron. 

'There  is  no  record  of  it  at  all  on  the  files,'  he  said. 

•No,  Mr.  President,'  I  answered.  'As  I  was  on  the  spot  and  familiar  with 
the  situation  from  day  to  day,  it  seemed  best  that  I  look  after  it  myself,  at 
a  time  when  you  had  worries  enough  of  your  own.'" 

Dr.  White,  .American  Ambassador  to  Germany  has  stated  that  no  exi)lana- 
tions  of  the  episode  were  sought  from  the  German  Government  In'  the  United 
States.  (Washington  Post,  April  17,  1907,  cited  by  Latane,  America  as 
World  Power,  p.  38.) 


222  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

officer  had  made  such  an  official  exchange  of  visits  with  the 
Spanish  chief  of  command.  jNIost  disturbing  to  the  American 
commander,  however,  was  the  fact  of  the  increasing  number  of 
German  naval  vessels  which  kept  arriving  in  the  harbor.  Within 
one  week  there  were  five  German  men-of-war  in  Manila  harbor, 
two  of  them  haxing  a  heavier  displacement  than  any  of  Dewey's 
own  ships.  Beside  these  a  German  transport,  the  "Darmstadt," 
had  arrived  bringing  as  relief  crews  for  the  German  vessels  a 
force  of  1400  men,  nearly  equal  to  the  total  number  of  Dewey's 
own  crews.  While  the  "Darmstadt"  received  Dewey's  permission 
for  this  transfer,  it  did  not  add  to  the  American  commander's 
peace  of  mind  that  the  transport  remained  at  anchor  in  the  harbor 
for  four  weeks.  It  was  in  reference  to  Admiral  Dewey's  question 
concerning  the  presence  of  the  large  German  force  at  Manila 
that  Admiral  von  Diederichs  was  said  to  have  replied,  "  I  am  here 
by  order  of  the  Kaiser,  sir." 

The  subject  of  actual  controversy  between  the  two  commanders 
was  the  right  of  the  blockading  force  to  send  an  officer  on  board 
each  neutral  war  vessel  to  establish  its  identity  before  permitting 
it  to  enter  the  blockaded  zone.  This  right  Admiral  Dewey  claimed 
under  international  law,  though  he  disclaimed  any  intention  of 
exercising  the  technical  "droit  de  visite"  which  involved  rights  of 
search.  Admiral  von  Diederichs  denied'-  this  right  of  boarding 
neutral  war  vessels,  holding  that  if  a  neutral  warship  was  admitted 
within  the  zone,  then  the  belligerent  had  no  more  authority  over 
the  ship  than  during  peace;  that  there  was  no  requirement  to 
report  the  arrival  of  neutrals  to  the  blockading  party;  that  the 
only  requirement  was  that  of  an  official  visit  by  the  officer  in 
command  as  in  time  of  peace — a  duty  with  which  he  had  complied. 
Correspondence  on  the  subject  was  exchanged,  in  which  Dewey 
quoted  several  authorities  on  international  law  who  supported 
his  position.  Admiral  Dewey  then  relates  that  Admiral  von 
Diederichs  notified  him  that  he  would  submit  the  point  to  a  con- 
ference of  all  senior  officers  of  men-of-war  in  the  harbor,  but  that 

12  Von  Diederichs:    "Statement  of  Events  in  Manila  Bay;"  in  Journal  of  the 
Royal  United  Service  Institution,  Vol.  LIX,  No.  437,  p.  430. 


COXTUOVKHSV    ON    RKillTS    OF    HLOCKADING    SQUADRON       223 

only  one  officer  appeared,  Captain  Cliiehester,  tlie  Britisli  senior 
officer.  AcconHnu;  to  Dewey,  Captain  Cliicliester  field  tliat  the 
American  connnander  was  acting  entirely  within  his  rights  and 
that  he  had  received  instructions  from  his  government  to  comply 
with  even  more  rigorous  restrictions  than  Admiral  Dewey  had  laid 
down.  Atlmiral  von  Diederichs  gave  a  radically  different  account 
of  the  proceedings,  stating  that  he  communicated  individually 
witli  the  French,  Austro-Hungarian  and  Japanese  officers,  that 
they  agreed  with  him  that  the  boarding  of  a  neutral  war  vessel 
was  not  permissible  and  they  gave  orders  to  refuse  visits  to  establish 
identity.  In  the  case  of  Captain  Chichester,  the  German  Admiral's 
account  states  tliat  though  first  agreeing  with  Dewey,  lie  was 
later  convinced  of  the  correctness  of  von  Diederich's  stand. ^^ 
This  does  not  seem  in  keeping  with  the  subsequent  actions  of  the 
British  Admiral.  The  controversy  was  finally  settled  by  a  ruling 
forwarded  to  the  German  commander  from  his  home  government 
(upon  agreement  witli  the  government  of  the  United  States) 
instructing  that  "for  tlie  future,  and,  as  a  rule,  prior  to  the  arrival 
of  German  ships  of  war  before  blockaded  ports,  the  names  of  such 
ships  should  be  communicated  to  the  commander  of  the  block- 
ading squadron,  when  all  that  will  be  required  will  be  for  these 
to  exchange  signals  with  the  commander  of  the  blockading  squad- 
ron or  his  representative."  This  ruling  thus  steered  a  middle 
course  between  the  views  of  the  German  and  American  com- 
manders.   Admiral  Dewey  had  in  the  meantime  expressed,  in  an 

<"Ibid.,  p.  440. 

Describing  the  interview  with  Captain  Chichester,  Admiral  von  Diederichs 
wrote: 

"He brought  \\'ith  him  a  .  .  .  work  dealing  with  blockade,  and  endeav- 
ored to  prove,  by  showing  me  several  paragraphs,  that  Dewey's  assertions  were 
justified.  In  every  instance  I  was  able  to  prove  that  his  book  referred  only 
to  merchant  ships.  On  being  asked,  he  admitted  the  phrase  'inquiries  neces- 
sary to  establish  identity'  as  imj)lying  'search  for  evidence.'  I  then  asked 
him  the  question  what  he  would  do  were  an  officer  of  another  nation  to 
endeavor  thus  to  act  against  him,  and  received  the  rejjly,  'I  would  fire  on  him.' 
He  then  admitted  that  a  search  was  unpermissible,  that  only  a  polite  question- 
ing could  be  allowed,  and  that  this  could  go  no  further  than  the  officer  ques- 
tioned ch(>s(>  to  allow,  and  he  added:  'If  the  officer  does  not  take  my  word  for 
it  the  worse  for  him.'" 


15 


224  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

interview  with  a  young  German  officer,^"*  his  rights  and  intentions 
in  regard  to  the  blockade  in  vigorous  and  unmistakable  terms  and 
instructed  the  officer  to  convey  these  to  Admiral  von  Diederichs. 
After  this  incident,  as  Dewey  himself  records,  "there  was  no 
further  interference  with  the  blockade  nor  breach  of  the  etiquette 
which  had  been  established  by  the  common  consent  of  the  other 
foreign  commanders." 

The  account  of  Admiral  von  Diederichs  was  written  as  an 
answer^^  to  that  of  Admiral  Dewey,  as  a  defense  of  the  German 

"  Ibid.,  p.  438.  The  young  officer  referred  to  was  a  Lieutenant  Hinze. 
Admiral  von  Diederichs  gives  this  officer's  account  of  the  interview  in  which, 
as  Hinze  describes  it,  he  Kstened  and  Dewey  talked. 

"Then  suddenly  Admiral  Dewey  exclaimed  angrily,  'Why,  I  shall  stop 
each  vessel,  whatever  may  be  her  colors;  And  if  she  does  not  stop  I  shall 
fire  at  her,  and  that  means  war,  do  you  know.  Sir?  etc.,  etc'  When  the 
words  'if  Germany  wants  war'  and  so  on  were  repeated,  I  took  my  departure. 

I  received  the  impression  from  this  trivial  matter  that  the  explosion  material 
engendered  for  some  time  past  in  Admiral  Dewey  through  mistrust  rumors  and 
press  reports,  was  on  the  point  of  going  ofT!" 

Admiral  von  Diederichs  then  comments  on  this  interview  as  follows: 

"Admiral  Dewey  knew  well  enough  that  a  declaration  of  war  could  not 
emanate  either  from  him  or  from  me.  I  put  down  this  behavior  toward  a 
young  officer,  who  was  interviewing  him  as  the  representative  of  a  foreign 
commander,  as  due  to  the  burden  of  his  responsibility  as  commander  of  the 
blockading  squadron  and  the  nervous  strain." 

This  attitude  of  excusing  Dewey's  behavior  on  the  ground  of  his  difficult 
and  vmenviable  situation  at  Manila  is  characteristic  of  the  general  tone  of 
the  von  Diederichs  account.  Dewey's  own  account  of  the  interview  reads  as 
follows:     (Autobiography,  p.  267): 

"On  the  following  day  Vice- Admiral  von  Diederichs  sent  a  capable,  tactful 
young  officer  of  his  staff  to  me  with  a  memorandum  of  grievances.  When 
I  had  heard  them  through,  I  made  the  most  of  the  occasion  by  using  him  as 
a  third  person  to  state  candidly  and  firmly  my  attitude  in  a  verbal  message 
which  he  conveyed  to  his  superior  so  successfuly  that  Vice-Admiral  von 
Diederichs  was  able  to  imderstand  my  point  of  view.  There  was  no  further 
interference  with  the  blockade  or  breach  of  the  etiquette  which  had  been 
established  by  the  common  consent  of  the  other  foreign  commanders.  Thus, 
as  I  explained  to  the  President,  after  the  war  was  over,  a  difference  of  opinion 
about  international  law  had  been  adjusted  amicably,  without  adding  to  the 
sum  of  his  worries." 

15  V.  R.,  1914,  Bd.  293,  S.  7505,  19.  Februar,  1914.  After  the  publication 
of  Dewey's  Autobiography,  the  sulijcct  of  the  Manila  controversy  was  brought 
by  Mr.  Erzberger  (Center  Party)  before  the  Reichstag.  In  the  course  of  a 
discussion  of  the  naval  budget,  Mr.  Erzberger  spoke  as  follows  (translation 
by  author): 

"If  I  am  rightly  informed  the  American  Commander  proceeds  from  quite 
false  premises.     He  speaks  of  a  blockade.     I  know  nothing  of  the  fact  that 


ADMIRAL   VOX    DIEDERICIIS'    ACCOUNT  225 

Adiniral's  actions  at  Manila  and  as  an  explanation  of  the  presence 
of  the  German  forces  there.  Admiral  von  Diederichs  takes  up 
])oint  for  point  the  incidents  related  by  Dewey,  and  in  some  cases 
offers  his  ex])lanation  and  in  others  <i;ives  direct  contradiction.  In 
the  main  he  stresses  the  following  points:  First,  that  there  was  no 
official  announcement  to  him  of  the  establishment  of  a  blockade.  \ 
The  blockade  of  jManila  had  been  announced  to  the  Spanish 
Go\ernor-General  on  ]\Iay  1,  but  its  contents  were  first  commu- 
nicated to  the  German  consul,  at  his  request,  by  the  Governor- 
General  on  May  10.  But  that  neither  to  the  German  coflamander 
nor  to  the  German  consul  was  there  made  directly  or  indirectly 
any  declaration  of  blockade  from  the  American  side  announcing  the 
time  of  commencement,  the  limits  of  the  blockaded  territory,  etc., 
as  required  by  international  law  and  as  carried  out  by  the  United 
States  on  the  coast  of  Cuba.  Secondly,  that  the  intercourse  with 
the  Spaniards  in  ]\Ianila  was  merely  that  due  to  Germany's  posi- 
tion as  a  neutraP^  and  to  the  customary  official  observation  of  con- 


a  l)lockade  was  established  at  Manila,  at  least  nothing  of  the  kind  has  been 
piil)lished.  On  the  occasion,  however,  he  made  against  the  German  officer,  the 
well-known  Admiral  von  Diederichs,  quite  serious  reproaches.  Now  that  is 
in  itself  not  to  be  taken  so  seriously;  for  when  a  man  has  been  victor  in  so 
great  a  sea-fight  as  took  place  fifteen  years  ago  at  Manila  (amusement)  then  he 
is  conscious  of  himself  (dann  fuehlt  er  sich) ;  he  looks  at  everything  through 
a  magnifying  glass.  Such  things  often  occur  in  memoirs.  I  only  wish  that 
these  very  colored  (tendeinzioesen)  rejjresentations,  which  allow  our  German 
officers  to  appear  as  quite  inferior  officials  who  haven't  a  glimmer  or  a  notion 
of  international  law,  or  of  marine  law,  or  of  decorum  .  .  .  should  be 
confronted  with  the  necessary  evidence  from  official  German  .sources,  and 
that  we  do  not  permit  this  unpleasant  impression  to  be  in  any  way  strength- 
ened by  our  silence.  .  .  .  Personally  I  can  still  give  expression  to  the 
conviction  that  the  officer  in  command  of  our  squadron  during  the  war  in  the 
Philippines  cannot  deserve  the  sUghtest  reproach.  That  is  my  firm  convic- 
tion and  I  have  reason  to  express  it.  But  if  this  is  so,  then  those  in  official 
positions  should  lay  aside  all  timidity  and  speak  the  truth." 

In  reply  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  informed  the  Reichstag  that  Admiral  von 
Diederichs  intended  to  issue  a  complete  publication  of  the  events  of  that 
time.     (This  was  pul)lished  in  the  Marine  Rimdschau.) 

'«Ibid.,  p.  431. 

Von  Diederichs  records  that  he  had  two  official  interviews  with  the  Governor- 
General  : 

■'I  paid  an  official  visit  to  the  Governor-General  of  Manila  just  as  I  did  to 
Admiral  Dewey.  The  .Spanish  flag  waved  over  Manila  and  vmder  its  folds 
lived  very  many  Germans  and  others  under  the  protection  of  Germany. 
The  Governor-General  Ijehaved  towards  these  in  an  indulgent  and  friendly 
manner;  but  even  had  this  not  l)een  the  case,  I  should  have  regarded  it  as  a 


226  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

ditions  of  warfare.  Thirdly,  that  the  movement  of  German  ships 
in  and  around  the  harbor  was  in  no  way  different  from  that  of  the 
vessels  of  other  neutrals.  Fourthly,  the  controversy  between 
himself  and  Admiral  Dewey  was  soon  smoothed  over  and  cordial 
relations  restored. ^^  Finally,  the  presence  of  the  first  German 
war  vessels  in  the  harbor  of  Manila  was  due  to  the  necessity  for 
the  protection  of  German  nationals  during  hostilities.  The  pres- 
ence of  the  increased  force  was  due  to  exceptional  circumstances 


breach  of  international  etiquette  had  I,  for  any  trifling  reason,  omitted  to 
greet  the  leading  representative  in  the  place — of  one  of  the  great  European 
nations  living  in  peace  with  the  German  Empire.  That  would  have  been  to 
behave,  not  in  a  neutral,  but  in  a  brutal  manner.  According  to  agreement, 
General  Augustin  returned  my  visit  the  same  day  at  the  German  Consulate." 

Von  Diederichs  was  told  that  the  French  Admiral  did  the  same  i)ut  he  did 
not  know  about  the  other  neutral  commanding  officers.  Concerning  the  visits 
of  German  officers  to  the  Spanish,  von  Diederichs  states  (p.  432) : 

"The  officers  took  a  professional  interest,  as  did  other  neutral  officers, 
in  following  the  course  of  the  operations  between  the  Spaniards  and  the 
rebels.  I  was  inclined  to  sanction  the  gratification  of  this  wish  so  long  as 
no  breach  of  neutrality  was  occasioned.  No  complaints  on  this  matter  reached 
me.  A  certain  acquaintance  with  the  terrain  in  which  the  operations  were 
carried  on  was  acquired  by  the  officers,  but  in  this  case  there  was  nothing 
improper,  and  no  possible  injury  could  be  clone  to  anybody  but  the  Spaniards." 

^"  Ibid.,  p.  444.     Admiral  von  Diederichs  relates: 

"The  relations  with  Admiral  Dewey  soon  took  on  a  more  friendly  complexion 
The  Admiral  sent  me  a  present  of  some  mutton  from  a  transport  bringing 
frozen  meat  for  the  American  forces,  and  owing  to  the  want  of  fresh  meat 
experienced  during  the  blockade,  the  change  was  very  welcome.  I  made  a 
return  with  a  live  calf  which  I  had  received  from  Hong  Kong.,  Thus  a  dead 
shec])  and  a  live  calf  formed  something  of  the  nature  of  a  sacrifice  on  the  altar 
of  friendship." 

The  German  Admiral  then  quotes  a  letter  received  from  Admiral  Dewey 
the  following  year  in  reply  to  von  Diederichs'  congratulations  on  Dewey's 
promotion. 

U.  S.  Nav.\l  Forces  on  Asiatic 
Station  Flagship  Olympia, 
Manila,  P.  I.,  16  April^  '99. 
"Dear  Admiral  von  Diederichs: 

I  wish  to  thank  you  most  heartily  for  your  cordial  letter  of  congratula- 
tions upon  my  ijromotion.  It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  me  to  feel  that  my  advance- 
ment is  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  you,  and  I  rejoice  that  our  differences  have 
been  of  newspaper  manufacture. 

Hoping  to  have  the  pleasure  of  meeting  you  again  before  leaving  the  station, 
I  am 

Very  sincerely, 
(Sd.)        Geokoe  Dewey, 

Admiral  l^  S.  Navy, 

Com'ding    U.    S.    Naval    Force    on 
Asiatic  Station." 


ADMIRAL  VON  DIEDERICHS     ACCOUNT  'I'll 

Avhic'h  von  Diederichs  then  i)r()coe(Is  to  explain,  chicHy  on  the 
ground  that,  it  hein^-  necessary  to  maintain  one  or  two  vessels 
there  for  the  protection  of  (German  citizens,  it  seemed  advisable 
to  bring  the  transport  and  supply  ship  "  Darmstadt"''*  to  that  port 
and  have  the  other  vessels  come  from  Tsing  Tao  to  the  "Darm- 
stadt" for  their  relief  crews  and  supplies.  Realizing  that  this 
might  awaken  unfortunate  suspicions,  he  had  taken  care  to 
explain  to  Admiral  Dewey  the  reasons  for  the  presence  of  the 
extra  ships. '^  In  general,  von  Diederich's  account  of  events  seeks 
to  minimize  the  significance  of  German  activities  in  the  Philippines 
at  that  time  and  to  account  for  the  hostile  and  suspicious  feelings 
engendered  by  attributing  them  to  Dewey's  natural  anxiety  over 
his  isolated  position  and  to  the  unfortunate  rumors  circulated  in 
the  town  of  Manila  that  Germany  intended  to  come  to  the  rescue 
of  the  Si)aniards  there.-'' 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  Admiral  von  Diederichs'  attitude 
toward  the  validity  of  the  blockade  in  any  other  light  than  that  of 


.,  p.  427.     idr 


's  Ibid.,  p.  427.  admiral  von  Diederichs  states  that  the  "Darmstadt"  had 
leen  ordered  to  Manila  before  any  intention  of  the  American  attack  on  the 
Philip])ines  had  been  issued,  and  that,  being  unarmed  and  filled  with  recruits 
and  stores,  it  could  only  be  regarded  as  a  source  of  weakness  because  of  the 
protection  it  required. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  427.  Admiral  Dewey  asked  Admiral  von  Diederichs  if  Prince 
Henry,  then  about  to  visit  China,  were  coming  to  Manila  and  the  Admiral 
von  Diederichs  replied  in  the  negative.     The  German  Admiral  then  continued : 

'  'I  then  joined  in  and  explained  the  reason  of  my  arrival  and  of  the  coming  of 
two  more  German  ships.  The  expression,  'I  have  come  here  by  orders  of  the 
Emperor'  may  then  have  been  used,  but  only  in  the  sense  that  only  a  direct 
order  had  brought  me  there,  not  a  wish  to  add  to  the  forces  before  Manila 
and  with  the  addition  of  the  conjecture  that  the  alarm  created  among  the 
Germans  threatened  by  the  insurgents  may  possibly  have  aroused  a  wish  in 
the  highest  cjuarters  to  oijtain  from  me  personally  an  impartial  verdict  as  to 
the  actual  danger  of  the  situation.  The  expression  is  used  and  is,  indeed, 
customary  among  German  officers,  since  the  orders  for  the  movement  of  the 
ships  on  foreign  stations  are  authorized  after  being  reported  to  His  Majesty, 
and  are  accepted  as  Royal  Commands.  I  certainly  did  not  use  in  their  almost 
threatening  .sense  the  words,  '1  am  here  by  order  of  the  Kaiser,  8ir."' 

20  Ibid.,  p.  445. 

"A  misdirected  public  oi)inion  in  Manila  had  expressed  a  wholly  unjustified 
hope  of  German  assistance,  and  thus  a  mistrust  of  Germany's  intentions  was 
aroused.  Many  newspapers,  especitdly  those  i)ul)lished  in  P^nglish  on  the 
East  Asiatic  Coast,  spread  abroad  all  rumors  having  a  mistrustful  reference 
to  Germany." 


228  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

the  desire  to  oppose  it  so  far  as  technical  interpretations  would 
permit.  The  German  admiral  even  goes  so  far  as  to  declare  that 
"there  was  never  any  'effective'  blockade  at  Manila."  This  does 
not  harmonize  with  Dewey's  statement,  not  contradicted  by  von 
Diederichs',  that  all  merchant  vessels  were  stopped  at  the  harbor 
entrance,  informed  of  the  blockade  and  warned  off,  unless  laden 
with  coal,  in  which  case  they  were  allowed  entrance  and  their 
cargo  purchased  for  the  American  squadron.  The  war  vessels  of 
neutral  nations  were  admitted  as  an  act  of  courtesy.  That  they  so 
recognized  this  was  evident  from  their  acquiescence  in  Dewey's 
measures  and  their  policy  of  reporting  to  him  on  entering  the  bay 
and  asking  him  to  assign  them  anchorage.  Then,  too,  the  very 
grounds  of  the  complaint  which  Admiral  von  Diederichs  addressed 
to  Dewey,  namely,  that  of  stopping  German  vessels  with  a  shot 
across  the  bow  in  order  to  force  them  to  report  is  e^'idence  in  itself 
of  the  effectiveness  of  the  American  admiral's  blockade.  That 
the  German  Government  did  not  question  its  effectiveness-^  is 
shown  in  the  instructions  sent  to  Admiral  von  Diederichs  directing 
that  German  ships  before  arri\'ing  at  blockaded  ports  should  report 
to  the  commander  of  the  blockading  squadron.  The  German 
admiral  and  the  officers  of  the  other  German  vessels  seemed 
determined  to  ignore  Dewey's  authority  in  the  bay  and  the 
existence  of  the  blockade  so  far  as  it  was  possible  to  do  so. 

Three  months  after  the  naval  battle,  Dewey  proceeded  up  the 
bay  for  the  taking  of  the  town  of  ^Manila.  The  foreign  men-of-war 
were  notified  to  move  out  of  the  probable  line  of  fire.  The  German 
and  French  vessels  took  positions  to  the  north  of  the  city,  but  the 
British  Captain  (Chichester)  followed  Dewey's  fleet  near  to  the 
town  and  placed  his  two  warships  between  the  American  and  the 
foreign  fleet.  This  act  was  not  only  deeply  appreciated  by  Admiral 
Dewey  l)ut  A\as  featured  and  cheered  in  the  American  press  as 
evidence  of  the  British  sympathies  for  the  United  States  in  the 

-'  W'itte:  Revelations  of  a  German  Attache,  p.  31.  Mr.  Witte  states  that 
Dr.  A.  von  IViumni,  German  minister  at  Washington  during  the  absence  of 
Ambassador  von  Holleben,  confessed  to  him  privately  that  in  the  von  Dieder- 
ichs controversv  the  fault  lav  on  the  German  side. 


EFFECT   OF  GERMAN   ACTIONS   AT   MANILA  229 

war."  This  sentiment  was  supported  by  Ambassador  Hay,  who 
MTote  from  London^^  to  Senator  Lodge  that  if  the  United  States 
wished  it  could  have  the  practical  assistance  of  the  British  navy. 
The  controversy  between  the  two  commanders  was  of  short 
duration,  and  would  have  excited  little  comment  in  the  United 
States  had  it  not  been  interpreted  by  the  American  press  and 
])ublic  to  be  indicative  not  only  of  anti-American  sATnpathies  on 
the  i)art  of  Gennany  but  also  of  that  country's  intention  to  annex 
the  Philippines.  While  there  was  much  opposition  in  the  United 
States  to  the  retention  of  those  islands  by  the  American  Govern- 
ment,-^ still  there  was  greater  opposition  to  having  them  taken 
by  a  strong  power  which  had  definitely  embarked  on  a  colonial 
policy  in  the  western  Pacific.  In  the  preceding  decade  Germany 
had  acquired  her  large  colonial  possessions  in  Africa,  and  in  agree- 
ment with  Great  Britain  had  divided  the  remaining  unclaimed 
islands  of  the  West  Pacific  into  British  and  German  spheres  of 
interest  for  purposes  of  colonization.-^  During  the  same  period 
she  had  annexed  the  north  coast  of  New  Guinea  and  the  adjacent 

-'-  Dewey:  Autobiographj^,  p.  280.  Admiral  Dewey  also  records  the  fact 
that  upon  this  formal  notification  to  the  foreign  commanders  of  the  American 
occupation  of  the  city,  Captain  Chichester  was  the  only  commander  who 
acknowledged  the  notification  with  a  national  salute  of  twenty-one  guns. 

"  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  165  (see  footnote  9). 

-^Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  pp.  198  and  199.  Among  the  opponents 
of  annexation,  which  was  termed  "imperialism,"  were  Senator  G.  F.  Hoar, 
Senator  Carl  Schurz,  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Charles  EUot  Norton  and 
Edward  Atkinson.  Mr.  Hay,  then  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  to  Mr.  Whitelaw 
Reid  November  29,  1898: 

"There  is  a  wild  and  frantic  attack  now  going  on  in  the  press  against  the 
whole  Philippine  transactions.  Andrew  Carnegie  really  seems  to  be  off  his 
head.  He  writes  me  frantic  letters  signing  them  'Your  Bitterest  Opponent.' 
He  threatens  the  President,  not  only  with  the  vengeance  of  the  voters,  but 
with  practical  i)unishment  at  the  hands  of  the  mob.  He  says  henceforth  the 
entire  labor  vote  of  America  will  be  cast  against  us  and  that  he  will  see  that 
it  is  done.  He  says  the  Administration  will  fall  in  irretrievable  ruin  the 
moment  it  shoots  down  one  insurgent  Filipino." 

For  the  Senate  opposition  to  Annexation  see  Congressional  Record,  55th 
Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  pp.  733,  921,  1211,  1239,  1241,  1299,  1348,  1349,  1479,  1480, 
1485,  1486,  1529,  1678,  1740,  1741,  1830.  Senator  Schurz  believed  the 
Philippines  should  be  placed  under  a  guarantee  of  neutrality  by  the  powers 
having  interests  in  the  Islands.     (See  Schurz,  Speeches,  etc.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  37.) 

^  See  Chapter  V,  Samoa. 


230  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

islands.  In  Samoa  the  German  interests  had  come  into  direct 
contact  with  those  of  the  United  States.  Just  the  year  before  the 
Manila  episode  Germany  had  taken  the  port  of  Kiao-chao  in  China, 
extending  her  influence  through  the  province  of  Shantung,  and  the 
Kaiser's  brother,  Prince  Henry,  was  at  that  time  paying  an  official 
visit  to  the  Orient  with  his  squadron  and  being  feted  at  Hong 
Kong.-^  The  German  Goverimient  was  openly  asserting  its  power 
in  the  Pacific.  Moreover,  Germany  had  in  the  previous  decade 
negotiated  with  Spain  over  the  Caroline  Islands,  and,  while  this 
controversy  residted  in  the  retention  of  the  islands  by  Spain,  new 
negotiations  were  being  conducted  between  Germany  and  Spain 
at  this  time.-^  There  would  therefore  have  been  nothing  contra- 
dictory to  the  policy  pursued  by  Germany  up  to  that  time  in  the 
inclusion  of  the  Philippines  in  the  colonial  program.  It  was  evident 
that  Spain  was  about  to  lose  the  islands.  The  United  States  had 
always  shown  itself  averse  to  foreign  colonies.  The  Philippines 
would  therefore  be  unattached.  Consequently  the  American 
feeling  that  Germany's  aims  extended  to  this  island  group  ha(^ 
natural  foundation.  Though  it  seems,  therefore,  most  probable 
that  Germany's  colonial  ambitions  in  this  region  included  the  Philip- 
pines, they  were  not  considered  by  the  Imperial  Government-* 

2*  Dewey:  Autobiography,  p.  185.  Admiral  Dewey  met  Prince  Henry 
frequently  during  this  visit  and  relates  the  following: 

"Upon  one  occasion,  in  discussing  the  possible  outcome  of  our  complications 
with  Spain,  Prince  Henry  remarked  that  he  did  not  beheve  that  the  powers 
would  ever  allow  the  United  States  to  annex  Cuba. 

'VVe  do  not  wish  to  annex  Cuba,  your  Highness,'  I  answered,  'but  we  cannot 
suffer  the  terrible  condition  of  affairs  which  exists  at  present  in  that  island 
at  our  very  doors  to  continue,  and  we  are  l)ound  to  put  a  stop  to  it.' 

'And  what  are  you  after?  What  does  your  country  want?'  the  prince 
asked  jokingly  on  another  occasion,  in  referring  to  the  general  scramble  for 
a  foothold  in  the  Far  East. 

'Oh,  we  need  only  a  bay,'  I  said  jokingly  in  return,  having  in  mind  that 
this  was  all  the  Germans  said  that  they  wanted  at  Kiau  Chau.  It  did  not 
then  occur  to  me  that  we  should  be  taking  Manila  Bay  permanently." 

"  V.  R.,  1898-1900,  Bd.  II,  54  Sitz.,  11.  Maerz,  1899. 

-^  Von  Diederichs:  Events  in  Manila,  Journal  of  Royal  United  Service 
Institution,  Vol.  LIX,  No.  437,  August,  1914,  p.  424.  Admiral  von  Diederichs 
declares  in  his  account  that  on  being  ordered  to  Manila  he  had  no  jjolitical 
instructions,  that  only  one  utterance  from  the  Foreign  Office  in  regard  to  the 
question  of  the  Philippines  came  to  his  knowledge.     This  stated  that  the 


GERMANY   AND  THE   PHILIPPINES  2:^1 

sufficient  to  warrant  direct,  open-'-*  opposition  to  the  policy  of 
the  Ignited  States  in  the  islands.  As  a  demonstration  of  her 
acquiescence  in  the  American  authority  in  the  Philippines,  Ger- 
many shortly  after  the  taking  of  the  town  of  Manila  withdrew  her 
ships,  except  for  one  cruiser,  from  the  islands  and  placed  the 
German  nationals  and  their  interests  there  under  the  protection 
of  the  United  States.^^o 

That  Germany  was  seekino;  more  islands  in  this  region,  however, 
the  Imperial  Government  made  no  attempt  to  deny.  The  policy 
became  quite  clear  in  the  purchase  of  the  Carolines.^^    In  March, 

Kaiser  had  altogether  disclaimed  any  idea  of  the  establishment  of  a  German 
protectorate  over  the  Philippines.  The  German  Admiral  holds  that  this 
declaration  was  probably  called  forth  by  the  "irresponsible  allusions"  current 
against  German  intentions  in  the  islands. 

=MVitte,   Emil:     Revelations  of  a  German  Attache,   p.  61.     Mr.   Witte 
then  employed  by  the  German  Embassy  at  Washington  under  the  title  of 
"Councillor  of  Legation,"  testifies  to  Germany's  indirect  opposition  to  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  by  the  United  States.     He  states: 

"I  can  testify,  however,  to  the  fact  that  betwesn  the  Filipino^;  and  the 
Foreign  Office  in  Berlin  there  was  a  secret  alliance  which  was  tirinight  about 
by  Professor  Blumentritt,  publicity  agent  in  Prague  for  the  insurgent  natives 
fighting  for  their  freedom. 

Only  a  few  days  before  the  German  interests  in  the  Philippines  were  placed 
under  American  protection,  I  received,  to  translate,  or  perfect  for  the  press, 
an  official  order  which  Professor  Blumentritt  had  prepared  for  Count  von 
Buelow  about  the  Filijjino  uprising.  This  account  contains  the  most  intimate 
details  of  the  means  of  defence  and  reserves  of  the  Filipinos,  the  ways  and 
means  of  their  arming  and  equij)ment,  their  possessions  in  munitions  and 
means  of  sustenance,  the  jiersonncl  of  their  leaders,  etc.,  etc.,  and  ends  with 
the  prophecy  that  the  Americans  would  never  subjugate  the  Filipinos,  who, 
besides,  would  be  glad  to  put  themselves  under  a  German  protectorate. 
This  last  remark  of  the  professor  explains  in  part  the  polite  attention  which 
George  Dewey  and  the  American  fleet  received  from  Admiral  von  Diederichs. 

when  I  expressed  mv  surprise  that  the  Ambassador  should  juiblish  such 
an  article  at  a  time  when  Germany  was  seeking  the  protection  of  America 
for  its  interests  in  the  Philip])ine  Islands,  I  received  the  following  very  sig- 
nificant answer: 

'We  must  not  allow  America  to  become  too  large."' 

All  support  of  the  Filipinos  as  against  the  United  States  was  emphatically 
denied  by  Secretary  von  Buelow  before  the  Reichstag.  (See  V.  R.,  LS9S- 
1900,  Bd.  I,  30  Sitz.,  11.  Feb.,  '99,  S.  794  D. 

30  V.  R.,  1S98-1900,  Bd.  I,  30  Sitz.,  11.  Feb.,  '99,  S.  795.     F.  R.,  '99,  p.  302. 

^'  Witte:  Revelations  of  a  German  Attach^,  p.  60.  Mr.  Witte  declares 
that  Germany  had  Herr  Speck  von  Sternburg  to  thank  for  the  acquisition  of 
the  Carolines.  Baron  von  Sternburg  was  temporarily  in  charge  of  the  German 
Embassy  during  the  war  and  was  on  friendly  terms  with  Mr.  Roosevelt. 
The  German  attache  states  that  it  was  thi'ough  the  personal  influence  of 


232  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR 

1899,  Dr.  Richter  (member  of  the  Freisinnige  Volkspartei)  ques- 
tioned the  Government  in  the  Reichstag^^  as  to  whether  it  was 
true,  as  stated  in  the  foreign  press,  that  the  German  Government 
was  conducting  negotiations  with  the  Spanish  Government  con- 
cerning the  sale  of  the  Caroline  Islands.  Von  Buelow,  Secretary 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  replied  that  he  was  not  prepared  to  report 
anything  definite.  He  considered,  moreover,  that  there  would  be 
little  profit  in  an  academic  discussion  of  the  question  whether  the 
acquisition  of  these  or  those  South  Sea  Islands  would  make  for 
German  interests.  The  situation  could  first  be  taken  up  for  con- 
sideration after  the  peace  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  should  have  been  ratified. 

Later,  when  the  treaty  with  Spain  ceding  the  Caroline,  Pelew 
and  Marianne  Islands  was  brought  before  the  Reichstag,^^  Secre- 
tary von  Buelow  set  forth  the  government's  reasons  for  their 
acquisition  and  the  relation  of  these  islands  to  the  German  policy 
in  the  West  Pacific.  Through  the  acquisition  of  the  Carolines,  he 
explained,  the  German  possessions  in  the  South  Sea  were  made 
complete.  Up  to  this  time,  the  Secretary-  stated,  they  had  formed 
an  extended,  disconnected  semicircle;  now  that  circle  was  closed 
and  formed  a  connected  whole.  If  these  islands  had  gone  out  of 
the  possession  of  Spain  into  the  possession  of  another  power  than 
Germany,  he  pointed  out  that  the  German  colonial  territory 
(Schutzgebiet)  in  the  South  Seas  would  have  been  split  up  and  its 

von  Sternburg  with  Roosevelt  that  the  United  States  withdrew  the  Caroline 
and  Pelew  Islands  (except  Guam)  from  its  territorial  claims.  Mr.  Witte  is 
probabh'  mistaken  in  this,  since  at  the  time  of  Germanj-'s  acquisition  of  the 
Carolines  (by  treaty  concluded  with  Spain,  February  12,  1899)  Mr.  Roosevelt 
was  Governor  of  New  York  and  could  hardh-  have  influenced  President 
McKinley's  foreign  polic}'  to  such  an  extent. 

•■••^  V.  R.,  1898-1900,  Bd.  II,  54  Sitz.,  11.  Maerz,  1899,  S.  1490.  At  the  time 
of  Dr.  Richter's  question  the  German  agreement  with  Spain  concerning  the 
Carolines  had  been  in  existence  for  a  month.  It  was  signed  on  February  12, 
1899.  (See  V.  R.,  1898-1900,  Vol.  Ill,  Anlagen,  p.  2503.)  Dr.  Richter  in 
opposing  the  purchase  of  more  colonies  declared  that  he  considered  it  self- 
evident  that  such  a  treaty  of  purchase  could  not  be  concluded  without  the 
consent  of  the  Reichstag.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  agreement  deter- 
mining the  price  and  all  other  considerations  was  signed  the  previous  month. 

«  V.  R.,  1898-1900,  Bd.  Ill,  pp.  2695  ff. 


GERMAN   POLICY   IN  THE   PACIFIC  233 

(K'NX'lopinont  clu'ckt'd.  From  the  standpoint  of  German  general 
political  interests  in  the  wSoiith  Seas,  therefore,  Secretary  von 
BuelcAv  tleclared  that  this  new  extension  of  the  German  sphere 
of  i)ower  there  was  useful  and  necessary  and  the  situation  of  the 
newly  acquired  islands  was  particularly  favorable.  Finally  he 
advised  that  those  members  of  the  Reichstag  who  considered 
the  price  too  high  shoidd  remember  that  in  questions  of  large 
policy  other  considerations  must  be  weighed  besides  the  exact 
^•allle  of  the  territory  and  number  of  the  inhabitants. 

Secretary  von  Buelow  then  declared  that  this  present  treaty 
with  Spain  acquiring  the  Carolines  resembled  the  treaty  with 
China  concerning  Kiao-chao  and  Shantung,  in  that  both  treaties 
were  i)iilest())ics  oti  the  same  road  and  links  of  a  chain.  In  both  cases 
Gennany  had  proceeded  calmly  (ruhig),  soberly  (nuechtern)  and 
deliberately  (besonnen).  He  said  that  it  had  been  necessary, 
however,  for  the  government  to  see  to  it  that  this  new  acquisition 
disturbed  in  no  way  Germany's  relation  to  other  powers.  Through 
timely  and  cautious  procedure  (rechtzeitiges  und  vorsichtiges 
^'orgehen)  it  had  accomplished  this,  without  (as  he  especially 
emphasized)  obliging  Germany  to  grant  any  return  concessions  to 
anyone.  Secretary  von  Buelow  asserted,  however,  that  Germany  i 
had  had  no  intention  of  setting  up  in  the  South  Sea  any  opposition  > 
to  the  Americans.  In  that  great  region  there  was  room  for  more 
than  one  people  and  he  hoped  through  the  new^  possessions  the 
Germans  would  enter  into  still  closer  relations  with  their  nearest 
neighbors  there,  the  Americans  and  the  Japanese.  This  official 
utterance  a  very  frank  expression  of  the  German  national  expan- 
sion policy  Ml  which  the  recent  acquisitions  constituted  merely 
milestones  of  progress.  The  secretary's  speech  also  gives  first 
indications  of  the  new  policy  adopted,  that  of  taking  into  account 
the  factor  of  the  United  States. 

The  relations  created  with  the  United  States  by  these  events  of 
1898  to  1900  were  made  the  subject  of  discussion  in  the  Reichstag.'*' 

"  V.  R.,  1S9S-1900,  Bd.  I,  3  Sitz.,  12.  Dez,  '98,  S.  25  ff. 
Fritzen  (Center  Party)  (translation  ])y  author). 

"In  the   Spanish- American  war  the   Imperial  pohcy  maintained  a  strict  • 
neutraUtv,  and  indeed  in  harmony  with  the  great  majority  of  the  German 

s 


234  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

Most  of  the  speakers  admitted  the  sjnipathy  for  Spain  which  had 
prevailed  throughout  Germany,  but  declared  that  the  Government 
had  observed  a  careful  neutrality  throughout  the  conflict.  Secretary 
von  Buelow  explained  that  the  government  had  had  during  the 
conflict  the  double  duty  of  seeing  to  it  that  the  relations  of  Ger- 
many with  both  Spain  and  the  United  States  should  remain  undis- 

people,  and  even  though  in  this  war  the  sympathies  of  our  nation — I  say  it 
quite  openly — stood  on  the  side  of  the  weaker  and  unjustly  provoked 
belligerent  (Bravo!  in  the  center  and  on  the  right,  laughter  on  the  left), 
nevertheless  all  the  reports  of  the  English  and  American  papers  which  talk  of 
a  violation  of  the  principle  of  neutrality,  especially  by  our  navy,  may  be 
rejected  as  evil  inventions." 

Dr.  Richter  (Liberal  People's  Party)  (Freisinnige  Volkspartei),  S.  27  D. 

"I  too  consider  the  conduct  of  the  German  Government  in  the  Spanish- 
American  war  entirely  correct,  but  I  am  not  of  the  opinion  of  my  colleague 
Mr.  Fritzen  that  the  sympathies  in  Germany  stood  everywhere  predominantly 
on  the  side  of  Spain.     (Very  true!  on  the  left)" 

Dr.  Richter  then  urged  a  liberal  commercial  treaty  and  poHcy  with  the 
United  States. 

Von  Kardorff  (Empire  party)   (Reichspartei),  p.  70  C.: 

"In  connection  with  America  I  should  like  to  refer  to  a  statement  which  the 
representative,  Mr.  Fritzen,  made.  The  representative,  Mr.  Fritzen,  said 
that  in  the  Spanish-American  war  the  sympathies  of  the  German  peojile  were 
with  Spain.  To  a  certain  extent  Mr.  Fritzen  is  right.  It  lies  in  the  pecuharity 
of  our  national  character  that,  when  a  weaker  (nation)  is  attacked  by  a 
stronger,  we  are  always  inclined  to  take  the  side  of  the  weaker  and  in  the 
German  nation  there  existed  to  a  certain  extent  the  feeling  that  the  conflict 
of  poor  Spain  with  powerful  America  was  an  unequal  conflict.  Gentlemen,  I 
admit  that  I,  too,  was  not  entirely  free  from  this  conception,  but  I  must  say 
that  is  a  sentimental  conception  which  politically  cannot  be  turned  to  account, 
(nicht  verwertbar)  (verj'  true!  on  the  right). 

We  must  remind  ovu'.selves  that  it  is  more  useful  to  us  that  a  great  aspiring 
people  like  the  Americans  should  win  the  upper  hand,  especially  since  the 
conditions  in  Spain  have  shown  themselves  to  be  so  decadent  as  has  come 
to  light  during  this  war.  I  hope  that  we  preserve  through  the  future  the  good 
relations  with  the  United  States  which  the  Prussian  government  has  main- 
tained since  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great.  At  first  it  may  have  seemed 
rather  startling  that  the  Americans  should  all  at  once  begin  to  pursue  a  quite 
different  policy  from  that  which  they  were  formerly  accustomed  to  pursue; 
an  expansion  policy  which  formerly  all  American  statesmen  had  opposed. 
But,  gentlemen,  I  lielieve  that  actually  it  is  more  to  our  interests  here  in  Ger- 
many that  a  country  Hke  America  should  enter  into  competition  with  all  the 
great  powers  which  compete  in  the  world,  and  which  possess  fleets  and  armies 
ready  for  conflict,  ^^'e  have  no  cause  to  regret  this  fact  in  any  way,  just  as 
little  (cause)  as  towards  Japan.  But  in  the  case  of  America  I  have,  besides, 
the  feeling  that  it  gives  me  a  certain  satisfaction  to  see  the  Anglo-Saxon,  the 
Germanic  stock — for  the  Americans  are  in  great  part  Germanic — come  for- 
ward so  powerfully  as  the  Americans  have  done  'in  the  last  war.  When  I 
hope  for  a  good  understanding  with  America  for  the  future,  then  I  am  count- 
ing on  it  that  the  old  Bismarck  principle  shall  be  revived,  namely,  not  to  mix 
commercial-political  questions  with  other  political  questions." 


ATTITUDE   OF   THE    KAISEU  235 

turl)0(l.  In  the  iiittrest  of  humanity  and  from  the  standpoint  of 
international  commerce,  he  stated,  Germany  would  rather  have  seen 
prevented  a  war  which  inflicted  grievous  wounds  on  hoth  sides. 
Xevertheless.  he  said,  after  the  efl'orts  toward  this  end  had  proved 
unsuccessful,  there  remained  nothing  for  Germany  to  do  but  to 
allow  things  to  take  their  coui-se.  The  Cuban  affair,  the  secretary 
stated,  did  not  constitute  an  actual  interest  of  Germany,  nor  was 
Germany  called  upon  to  judge  who  was  right  and  who  was  wrong 
in  the  conflict.  Germany,  he  said,  had  merely  the  task  of  observ- 
ing a  loyal  neutrality.  That  duty,  he  declared,  Germany  had  ful- 
filled most  conscientiously  and  never  at  any  stage  of  the  war  had 
the  German  Government  contemplated  unauthorized  interference 
in  any  form.  The  American  ambassador,  Dr.  White,  endorses^^ 
the  statement  that  the  official  neutrality  stand  was  correctly 
maintained  by  Germany  and  that  the  course,  especially  of  the 
Foreign  Office  under  Count  von  Buelow  and  Baron  von  Richthofen, 
was  all  that  could  be  desired.  In  regard  to  the  Kaiser  himself. 
Dr.  White  states  that  never  to  his  knowledge  did  the  monarch 
show  the  slightest  leaning  toward  the  Spanish,  and  that,  when 
certain  publicists  and  statesmen  suggested  measures  against  the 
American  Republic,  the  Kaiser  quietly  but  effectively  put  his  foot 
upon  them. 

The  American  Ambassador  relates  that  at  the  time  of  the  visit 
of  Prince  Henry  to  America  the  Emperor  said  to  him: 

35  White:   Autobiographj^  Vol.  II,  pp.  168  and  169. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  204.  For  accounts  of  the  British-German  controversy  as  to  the 
actions  of  both  governments  in  1898,  see  Latane  "America  as  a  World  Power," 
pp.  63  and  64;  also  Review  of  Reviews,  \^ol.  XXV,  pp.  267  ff.;  also  the  Nation, 
1902,  Vol.  LXXIV,  p.  141.  The  following  are  the  references  made  to  this 
subject  in  the  British  Parliament: 

Parliamentary  Debates,  Vol.  II  of  Session  11  Feb.,  1902,  p.  992. 

Mr.  Norman  (Wolverhampton,  S.).  "I  beg  to  ask  the  Undersecrctarj'  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  whether  Cireat  Britain,  throiigh  her  Ambassadors 
ever  proposed  a  .Joint  Note  in  which  the  Powers  should  declare  that  Europe 
did  not  regard  the  armed  intervention  of  the  United  States  in  Cul)a  as  justi- 
fial)le,  and  whether  in  couseciucnce  of  the  refusal  of  Germany  this  step  was 
abandoned;  and  whether  he  can  make  any  further  statement  upon  the  subject." 

The  Undersecretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Lord  Cranl)orne, 
Rochester).  "No!  Great  Britain  never  projwsed  through  Her  Majesty's 
Ambassadors  or  otherwise  any  declaration  adverse  to  the  United  States  in 
regard  to  their  intervention  in  Cuba.  On  the  contrary  Her  Majestj-'s  Gov- 
ernment declined  to  assent  to  any  such  proposal." 


236  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

"My  brother's  mission  has  no  poHtical  character  whatever, 
save  in  one  contingency.  If  the  efforts  made  in  certain  parts  of 
Europe  to  show  that  the  German  Government  sought  to  bring 
about  a  European  combination  against  the  United  States  during 
your  Spanish  War  are  persisted  in,  I  have  authorized  him  to  lay 
before  the  President  certain  papers  which  will  put  that  slander  to 
rest  forever."  Dr.  White  adds  that  "As  it  turned  out  there  was 
little  need  of  this,  since  the  course  both  of  the  Emperor  and  his 
government  was  otherwise  amply  vindicated." 

The  evidence"  referred  to  by  the  Emperor  and  later  published 
consisted  of  despatches  from  the  German  ambassador  at  W^ashing- 
ton  transmitting  the  joint  proposal  of  the  diplomatic  corps  that 
a  collective  note  be  sent  to  the  United  States  remonstrating  against 
its  intervention  in  Cuba.  The  Emperor  had  written  on  the  margin 
of  the  despatches  his  express  disapproval. 

There  were,  however,  many  contradictory  statements  issued 
by  the  German  and  British  Governments  and  their  representatives 
in  regard  to  this  movement  at  the  opening  of  the  Spanish  war. 
The  German  ambassador  had  accused  Lord  Pauncefote  of  being 
the  leader  of  the  movement.  Lord  Cranborne,  British  Under- 
secretary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  denied  categorically  before 

Parliamentary  Debates,  Vol.  Ill  of  Sess.  14  Feb.,  1902,  pp.  38  and  39. 

Mr.  Charles  Hobhouse:  "On  behalf  of  the  honorable  member  for  South 
Wolverhampton,  I  beg  to  ask  the  Undersecretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
whether  he  is  able  to  recall  any  statement  concerning  a  meeting  of  Ambassa- 
dors at  the  British  Ambassy  in  Washington  in  April,  1S98." 

The  Undersecretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  (Lord  Cranborne  Roches- 
ter). "The  meeting  which  took  place  on  the  14th  April,  1898,  was  convened 
by  Lord  Pauncefote  as  Doyen  of  the  Ambassadors  at  the  verbal  suggestion  of 
some  of  his  colleagues.  Whatever  opinions  were  expressed  by  Lord  Paunce- 
fote during  the  discussion,  which  was  of  an  informal  character,  were  personal 
to  himself  and  not  in  pursuance  of  any  instructions  from  Her  Majesty's 
Government.  The  discussion  resulted  in  an  agreement  by  the  Ambassadors 
to  forward  an  identical  telegram  to  their  respective  governments  suggesting 
a  further  communication  to  the  United  States.  On  the  receipt  of  this  message, 
Her  Majesty's  Government  at  once  replied  objecting  to  the  terms  of  the 
proposed  communication  as  injudicious.  Two  days  later  Lord  Pauncefote  was 
informed  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  had  resolved  to  take  no  action. 
We  had  at  that  time  no  information  of  the  attitude  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment." 

Mr.  Dillon.  "Is  the  noble  Lord  jirepared  to  state  whether  the  official 
German  statement  as  to  what  has  taken  place  is  correct  or  incorrect?" 

Lord  Cranborne.  "I  have  nothing  to  add  to  the  answer  I  have  just  given 
to  the  House." 

^'  Latan^:  America  as  a  World  Power,  pp.  63  and  64;  also  Review  of  Reviews, 
Vol.  XXV,  pp.  269  ff. 


INTERVENTION   MOVEMENTS  237 

the  IIdusc  of  C'onimons  that  Great  Britiiiii  had  ever  proptjsed  any 
(lechiration  adverse  to  the  United  States  in  regard  to  their  inter- 
\ention  in  Cuba,  and  had,  on  the  contrary,  refused  to  agree  to 
such  a  suggestion.  A  few  days  later  Lord  Cranborne,  on  being 
interrogated  in  regard  to  tlie  German  Ambassador's  accusations, 
repHed  that  the  meeting  of  diplomats  in  Washington  was  con- 
vened by  Lord  Pauncefote  at  the  suggestion  of  some  of  his  colleagues 
because  he  was  Doyen  of  the  diplomatic  corps  and  that  any 
opinions  that  may  have  been  expressed  by  the  British  ambassador 
at  that  time  were  personal  ones  and  not  based  on  instructions  from 
his  government.  Whatever  the  facts  at  that  period,  it  is  evident 
that  both  goNernments  did  reject  the  proposal  and  that  both  were 
most  eager  at  this  period  after  the  war  to  show  that  they  had 
done  so. 

Again,  apropos  of  Germany's  official  neutrality  in  the  war,  Dr. 
White  records^^  that  on  one  occasion  the  German  authorities  over- 
hauled and  searched  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe  a  Spanish  vessel 
suspected  to  be  carrying  arms  for  use  against  American  forces  in 
Cuba.  This  action  Dr.  White  took  pains  to  make  known  in  a 
speech  at  an  American  Fourth  of  July  celebration  in  Leipsic.  On 
the  same  occasion  he  reminded  his  audience,  as  he  was  in  the  habit 
of  doing,  that  during  the  Civil  War,  when  America's  foreign  friends 
were  few,  the  German  press  and  people  had  been  steadily  on  the 
side  of  the  Union. 

It  is  evident  that  the  American  ambassador  and  the  German 
Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office  were  both  bending  their  efforts'''-' 
toward  counteracting  and  dissipating  the  hostile  sentiments 
engendered  between  the  two  countries  during  the  war.     Baron 

38  White:  Autobiography,  Vol.  II,  pp.  168  and  169. 

"  White:  Autobiographj-,  Vol.  II,  p.  139.  Dr.  White  writes  of  the  German 
Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office: 

"With  the  multitude  of  trying  questions  which  pressed  upon  me  as  ambas- 
sador during  nearly  six  years,  it  hardly  seems  possible  that  I  should  be  still 
alive  were  it  not  for  the  genial  hearty  intercourse,  at  the  Foreign  Office  and 
elsewhere,  with  Count  von  Buelow.  Sunilry  German  papers,  indeeil,  attacked 
him  as  yielding  too  much  to  me,  and  sundry  American  papers  attacked  me  for 
yielding  too  much  to  him;  but  both  of  us  exerted  ourselves  to  do  the  best 
possible,  each  for  his  own  country,  and  at  the  same  time  to  preserve  peace  and 
increase  good  feeling." 


238  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAX   WAR 

von  Buelow  made  a  long  speech  in  the  Reichstag**^  on  the  special 
subject  of  the  relations  between  Germany  and  the  United  States. 
After  reiterating  the  strictly  neutral  course  followed  by  the 
empire,  he  declared  emphatically  that  the  presence  of  German  ships 
at  Manila  was  actuated  by  no  other  motive  than  the  obligation  to 
protect  German  life  and  property  and  that  of  the  subjects  of  other 
natibns  who  had  been  placed  under  German  protection.  The 
accusation  of  the  foreign  press  that  Germany  was  supporting 
the  resistance  of  the  Filipinos  against  the  American  occupations^ 
he  declared  to  be  absolutely  false.  The  reports  of  tension  between 
the  German  and  American  officers  at  Manila  the  Baron  termed 
myths,  and  he  asserted  that  their  intercourse  was  conducted  in  the 
spirit  of  mutual  courtesy.  He  pointed  out  that  after  the  close  of 
hostilities  Germany  had  withdrawn  all  her  ships  except  one  cruiser 
from  the  Philippines  because  she  was  convinced  that  the  Germans 
would  be  safe  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  The 
Secretary  then  declared  that  the  relations  between  the  German 
Government  and  the  American  Government  were  good  and 
friendly  and  had  never  ceased  to  be  such.  The  distinguished  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  at  Berlin,  Mr.  White,  had  testified 
to  this  in  his  speech  on  the  Fourth  of  July.  From  the  standpoint 
of  rational  policy  the  Secretary  declared  there  was  no  reason  why 
Germany  and  America  should  not  stand  toward  each  other  in  the 

pf  V.  R..  1S9S-1900,  Bd.  I,  30  Sitz.,  11.  Feb.,  '99,  S.  794  D  ff. 
"^^'Schurz:     Speeches,  etc.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  37. 

New  York,  January  10,  1S99. 
To  Charles  Francis  Adams,  Jr. 


"As  to  the  intention  of  Germany  to  pounce  upon  the  PhilipiMue  Islands 
as  soon  as  our  forces  are  withdrawn,  nothing  could  he  more  absurd.  I  became 
firmly  convinced  of  this  by  a  conversation  I  had,  immecHately  after  his  return 
from  Europe,  with  the  German  ambassador  Mr.  von  Holleben.  He  gave  me 
the  most  am]:)le  proof  that  the  German  Government  did  not  only  not  intend 
to  cross  our  jiurjioses  in  any  way,  but  that  it  was  on  the  contrary  bent  upon 
doins  its  utmost  to  remain  on  friendly  terms  with  the  United  States.  It  seems 
to  me  the  true  i>olicy  is  for  the  United  States  to  secure  an  agreement  of  the 
jiowers  most  interested  in  that  region  to  jnit  the  Philippine  Islands  under  the 
cover  of  a  guarantee  of  neutrality,  as  Belgimn  and  Switzerland  are  covered 
in  Europe. 

The  only  Power  that  might  feel  inclined  to  frustrate  such  a  scheme  might 
be  Great  Britain  who  would  like  to  force  us  to  take  the  Philippines  for  good 
and  thus  become  dependent  in  a  sense,  upon  her  protection." 


vox    HUt>U)\V    ox    KELATIOXS   WITH   THE    UXITED    STATES      239 

best  relations.  He  saw  no  point  at  which  German  and  American 
interests  met  in  hostile  manner,  and  also,  in  the  future,  no  point 
M-here  their  lines  of  develoimient  need  cross  in  hostilit\'.  Germany, 
\iv  said,  in  no  way  begrudged  the  Americans  the  fruits  of  their 
\ict()ry.  But  (iernian  public  opinion,  the  Secretary  ex])lained,  had 
not  withheld  from  the  brave  and  sorely  tried  Si)auish  i)e()i)le  the 
expression  of  its  sympathy,  and  this  expression  would  not  have  loeen 
misconstrued  in  the  United  States  if  certain  foreign  press  organs 
had  not  perfidioush'  distorted  it  in  order  to  create  in  America 
distrust  of  Gennany.  The  Baron  then  concluded  with  references 
to  the  volume  of  commercial  and  social  intercourse  between  the 
two  countries,  and  to  their  friendly  political  relations  throughout 
their  history. 

It  had  become  evident  to  German  leaders  that  the  danger  of  a 
strong  anti-German  sentiment  in  the  United  States  was  a  real  one, 
and  that  it  would  be  harmful  to  allow  it  to  make  further  headway. 
They  realized  that  the  friendliness  of  the  German  public  opinion 
toward  the  Spaniards  had  been  a  political  mistake"*-  and  that  in 
the  meantime  the  great  rival  England,  had  made  progress  in 
winning  American  favor.  The  American  Secretary  of  State  John 
Hay  was  known  to  favor  close  relations  with  England^^  and  to 

*-  \'on  Halle:  " Duetschland  und  die  oeffentliche  Meinung  in  den  Vereinigten 
Staaten,"  Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  Vol.  107,  1902,  p.  205. 

"Like  the  friendly  attitude  towards  the  Transvaal  in  1896,  so  was  the 
unfriendly  attitvide  of  German  ])ublic  opinion  towards  America  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  Spanish  war,  undouljtedly  a  jiolitical  mistake.  The  latter  is  the  more 
inexplical)le  since  it  concerned  a  war  with  Spain,  that  country  which  from 
the  tliirty  years'  war  on  to  the  refusal  of  the  German-Spanish  conunercial 
treaty  a  few  years  ago,  has  mostly  confronted  Germany  as  an  opponent.  It 
stands  immeasural)ly  further  from  the  German  realm  of  cui?tom,  culture  and 
interests  than  does  the  United  States,  and  its  WTctched  colonial  administration 
gave  retdly  no  cause  for  any  sympathy." 

*^  Ibid.,  p.  207.     Thayer:     Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  221. 
Mr.  Hay  wrote  to  Henry  White  September  24,  1899: 

".\s  long  as  I  stay  here  no  action  shall  be  taken  contrary  to  my  connction 
that  the  one  indispensal)le  featvuv  of  our  foreign  i)olicy  should  be  a  friendly 
understanding  with  England.  But  an  alliance  must  remain,  in  the  present 
state  of  thinii<,  an  unattainable  dream." 

Ibid.,  p.  248.     Secretary  Hay  wrote  to  Henry  White,  Noveml)er  21,  1900, 
apropos  of  the  German-British  agreement  over  China: 
16 


240  THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN   WAR 

oppose  Germany.  In  the  most  recent  events  in  Samoa  the  British 
and  American  forces  had  combined  against  the  Gemian.^^  The 
British  had  shown  sympathy  with  the  United  States  in  the  recent 
war  and  had  encouraged  the  Americans  to  retain  the  Phihppines.*^ 
It  was  therefore  very  clear  that  Germany  must  take  steps  to  undo 
as  far  as  possible  what  hann  had  been  done  and  to  endeavor  to 
build  up  in  the  United  States  a  sentiment  in  favor  of  Gennany.'*^ 
The  speeches  of  Baron  von  Buelow,  referred  to  above,  might 
be  considered  to  mark  the  opening  of  this  policy  which  was  con- 
ducted along  many  lines  during  the  next  decade.  One  of  the  lines 
of  procedure  was  hostility  to  England  and  the  effort  to  make  it 
appear  that  not  Germany  but  Great  Britain  was  the  real  enemy  of 
the  United  States.^^    Another  method  was  the  cultivation  of  the 

''At  least  we  are  spared  the  infamy  of  an  alliance  with  Germany.  I  would 
rather,  I  think,  be  the  dupe  of  China,  than  the  chum  of  the  Kaiser." 

See  also  von  Halle:  "Deutschland  und  die  oeffentliche  Meinung  in  den 
Vereinigten  Staaten,"  in  Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  Vol.  107,  1902,  p.  207. 
Von  Halle  refers  to  Hay  as  an  undoubted  Anti-German  and  an  Anglophile 
"ein  zweifelloser  Deutschengegner  und  Anglomane." 

^*  See  Chapter  V,  Samoa. 

^=  Congressional  Record,  55th  Congress,  3rd  Session,  Vol.  XXXII,  Part  I, 
p.  737.  Senator  Bacon,  of  Georgia,  declared  that  the  reason  Great  Britain 
was  anxious  to  have  the  United  States  retain  the  Philippines  was  that,  in  case 
of  a  war  of  the  powers  over  China  the  United  States  could  lend  her  effective 
aid  from  this  important  base  of  operations.  Senator  Schurz  held  the  reason 
to  be  so  that  the  United  States  would  become  dependent  on  British  sea-power. 

^^  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  220.  Secretary  Hay  wrote  to  Henry 
White  Sept.  9,  1899: 

"The  Emperor  is  nervously  anxious  to  be  on  good  terms  with  us — on  his 
own  terms,  bien  entendu." 

Von  Buelow:  "Imperial  Germany,  p.  50.  Prince  von  Buelow  gives 
frank  acknowledgment  of  this  new  policy  adopted  by  Germany. 

"During  the  Spanish-American  War  a  section  of  German  pubhc  opinion 
manifested  strong  sympathy  with  Spain,  which  was  resented  in  the  States. 
<(  German  relations  with  America  had  also  been  clouded  by  the  way  in  which 
^part  of  the  English  and  American  Press  had  interpreted  certain  incidents 
which  had  occurred  between  our  squadrons  and  the  American  fleet  off  Manila. 
This  tlifference  reached  its  height  in  February,  1S99,  so  that  it  seemed  desir- 
aljle  strongly  to  advocate  preparations  for  a  better  understanding  between 
the  two  nations  of  kindred  race." 

^' Witte:  Revelations  of  a  German  Attache,  p.  39.  Mr.  Wltte,  appointed 
as  Press  Attache  of  the  German  Embassy  in  Washington,  WTites: 


/^ 


EFFORTS  TO   IMPROVE   RELATIONS   WITH   UNITED   .STATES      241 

German-American  element  as  a  nucleus  for  the  creation  of  public  '> 
sentiment  favorable  to  the  Fatherland/**  Americans  in  Germany 
were  gi^•en  cordial  reception.  A  direct  cable  to  Germany  was 
landed  in  the  United  States.  A  special  collection  of  casts  of 
medieval  German  architecture  and  sculpture  was  presented  by 
the  Emperor  to  Harvard  University.  The  daughter  of  the 
American  President  was  requested  to  christen  the  Kaiser's  yacht. 
The  brother  of  the  Kaiser  was  sent  to  visit  the  United  States."*^ 
The  following  year  the  American  squadron  was  very  cordially 
entertained  at  Kiel.^'^     The  German  Ambassador  von  Holleben, 

"In  entering  upon  my  duties  I  received  general  instructions  to  make  every 
effort  to  make  the  papers  keep  silence,  which  were  antagonistic  to  Germanv, 
and  to  perform  the  miracle  of  turning  them  from  l^itter  opponents  to  friends 
and  admirers  of  the  Emperor,  as  well  as  to  make  it  appear  that  the  real  enemy 
of  the  United  States  in  America  was  not  Germany  but  England." 

« Ibid.,  Chap.  XXII.     Thayer:     Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  378. 

^'^F.  R.,  1902,  pp.  422  to  425.  Mr.  Jackson,  Secretary  of  the  American 
Embassy  at  Berlin,  wrote  to  Secretary  Hay  after  the  visit  of  Prince  Henry 
as  follows: 

Berlin,  March  19,  1902. 


"As  already  stated,  in  no  responsible  quarter  is  it  anticipated  that  Prince 
Henry's  \'isit  will  have  any  definite  political  or  commercial  result,  but  confi- 
dence is  felt  that  'it  will  bear  beautiful  flowers,  if  not  fruit,'  that  the  efforts 
of  those  opposed  to  our  having  clo.ser  relations  with  Germany  will  be  less 
liable  to  do  harm;  that  the  transmission  of  news  will  be  more  direct,  and  the 
efforts  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  every  irresponsible,  unfriendly  state- 
ment may  be  discontinued;  and  that  the  consideration  of  international  ques- 
tions— ■i)olitical  and  economic — will  be  approached  with  mutual  feelings  of 
friendliness.  Prince  Henry's  visit  has  been  described  as  the  'rediscovery  of 
America'  and  one  of  its  results  has  been  to  open  the  eyes  of  Germany  generally 
to  the  growth  and  imjjortance  of  the  United  States.  Increased  acquaintance 
with  the  United  States  is  warmly  advocated  in  important  educational  and 
industrial  circles  as  being  of  reciprocal  advantage  and  it  is  probable  that  in 
the  future  many  more  Germans  of  'the  better  classes'  will  visit  America  as 
tourists  than  heretofore.  A  more  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  United 
States  and  a  better  knowledge  of  our  people,  our  institutions,  and  resources 
cannot  fail  to  be  of  advantage  to  Germany  and  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  it 
is  hard  to  see  wherein  it  can  be  otherwise  than  beneficial  to  us  as  well." 

Mr.  Witte  presents  a  different  account  and  writes  (see  preface)  that  the 
visit  of  Prince  Henry  actually  terminated  in  a  diplomatic  incident — by  which 
he  refers  to  the  dismissal  of  Ambassador  von  Holleben  immediately  after  the 
departure  of  the  Prince. 

5"  F.  R.,  1903,  pp.  449  and  450.  On  this  occasion  Ambassador  Tower  said 
in  the  course  of  his  speech: 

"Mutual  understanding  between  nations,  as  between  inilividuals,  is  best 
attained  by  personal  intercourse  which  leads  to  better  acriuaintance;  and  it 
is  the  happy  outcome  of  an  occasion  like  this  that  strengthens  the  bond  of 


242  THE   SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

who  had  been  unsuccessful  in  his  diplomatic  dealings  with  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  was  recalled^^  and  Baron  von 

friendship,  which,  in  the  case  of  the  two  great  powers  like  Germany  and  the 
United  States,  is  a  benefit  to  the  whole  ci^^Uzed  world.  The  efforts  of  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States  are  constantly  tending  toward  the  same  purposes 
in  the  development  of  civilization,  the  extension  of  commerce,  and  the  peace 
of  the  world.  The  closer  our  personal  acquaintance  becomes,  the  more  we 
are  sure  to  discover  how  near  our  paths  lie  to  each  other,  how  readily  we  may 
follow  them  together,  and  how  much  we  have  each  to  gain  by  the  mainte- 
nance of  harmony  in  the  future,  as  in  the  present  and  the  past.  America 
wishes  this,  sir,  vdth  all  sincerity. 

There  are  hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  of  German  birth  and  German 
e.xtraction  living  in  the  United  States  who  look  back  from  their  new  home  with 
feehngs  of  tender  affection  toward  the  Fatherland.  They  are  among  the 
Ijest  of  our  citizens.  They  bring  with  them  to  us  the  habits  of  thrift  and 
industry  and  the  high  ideals  of  domestic  hfe  which  they  have  inherited  from 
their  ancestors,  and  which  have  contributed  so  much  to  make  America  what 
it  is." 

The  Emperor  replied  as  follows: 

"In  responding  to  your  excellency's  warm  and  sympathetic  toast,  I  offer 
a  cordial  welcome  to  the  American  squadron,  Admiral  Cotton,  and  his  officers, 
in  the  name  of  the  German  people.  We  look  upon  them  as  the  bearers  of 
friendly  sentiments  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  to  which  I  can  assure 
your  excellency,  the  whole  of  Germany  heartily  responds.  I  am  happy  that 
mj-  hopes  for  a  better  mutual  understanding  l:)etween  our  two  countries, 
through  the  personal  intercourse  wliich  my  brother.  Prince  Henry,  was  able 
to  hold  with  your  excellency's  countrymen,  have  been  fully  realized  and  have 
strengthened  the  bonds  of  friendship  between  Germany  and  America.  That 
ni}^  gift  of  the  casts  of  medieval  German  architecture  has  been  received  in  so 
gracious  a  manner  by  the  Harvard  University  gives  me  the  greatest  satisfaction. 
I  hope  that  the  samples  relating  to  our  old  history  will  induce  many  of  the 
young  students  to  come  over  to  Germany  to  study  the  originals  and  the  people 
who  lived  around  them.  My  sincerest  wish  is  that  our  two  peoples  may 
become  closer  acquainted.  No  serious  citizen  in  America  or  Germany,  I 
trust,  IjeHeves  that  the  harmony  and  continuance  of  our  mutual  interest 
could  be  distur])ed  by  jjermanent  factors  in  our  relationship.  We  are  knit 
too  closely  together  in  our  material  interests.  Rivalries  of  trade  and  com- 
merce will  always  exist,  l)ut  the  power  which  draws  us  together  is  too  strong 
to  allow  the  development  of  any  antagonism.  It  is  my  firmest  conviction 
that  the  fact  of  so  many  himdreds  of  thousands  of  Germans  living  and  thriv- 
ing in  the  United  States,  with  their  hearts  still  warm  with  their  love  of  their 
Fatherland,  will  render  the  task  more  easy  for  smoothing  the  path  of  undis- 
turbed and  progressive  relations  which  are  of  vital  imjiortance  to  our  countries. 
It  is  now  my  duty  to  beg  your  excellency  to  thank  His  Excellency  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Ignited  States  for  the  joyous  occasion  for  which  we  are  indebted 
to  his  kindness.  We  all  over  here  admire  his  firmness  of  character,  his  iron 
will,  his  devotion  to  his  country,  and  his  indomitable  energy,  and  we  readily 
gras])  the  hand  proffered  to  us  across  the  sea  in  cordial  friendship,  feeling  at 
the  same  time  that  blood  is  thicker  than  water. 

Gentlemen,  I  jjroposo  the  toast  of  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the 
United  States.     God  bless  him  and  the  United  States. " 

^'  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  293.  Mr.  Thayer  assigns  von  Holleben's 
recall  to  his  activities  against  England  in  the  United  States  and  his  insinuations 
against  the  British  Ambassador,  Lord  Pauncefote.  According  to  Mr.  Witte, 
von  Holleben  was  dismissed  because  of  intrigue.     See  Chap.  XVIII. 


THE    R()OS?:VELT    ADMINISTRATION  243 

Sternbiirg,  wlio  was  personally  on  very  friendly  terms  with 
President  Roosevelt,  was  ai)])i)inted  in  his  place.  Coiniections 
with  the  universities  were  encouraued  and  the  system  of  excliaiiji;e 
professors  established.  The  Emperor  presented  to  the  United 
States  a  statue  of  the  father  of  German-American  good-relations, 
P>ederick  the  Great.  In  recognition  of  this,  a  few  years  later, 
Congress  presented^-  to  the  German  Emperor  and  the  German 
nation  a  statue  of  General  von  Steuben. 

In  addition  to  "these  forces  set  in  motion  the  solution  of  several 
diplomatic  controversies  helped  to  create  an  era  of  better  feeling. 
The  Samoan  situation  had  been  terminated  in  a  way  satisfactory 
to  both  countries.  Secretary  Hay  had  secured  from  Germany  at 
least  a  provisional  acquiescence  in  the  policy  of  the  "open  door" 
in  China,  which  was  followed  through  agreement  between  Germany 
and  England  by  a  more  positive  declaration  of  adherence  to  that 
jjrinciple.  Temporarily  commercial  relations  had  been  regulated 
by  diplomatic  agreements.  Such  efforts  as  these  were  not  without 
results  and  produced,  especially  during  the  Roosevelt  adminis- 
tration-^^ favorable  sentiment  toward  Germany  in  the  United  States, 
which  to  a  certain  extent  overcame  the  hostility  aroused  during 
the  S})anish-American  war. 

52F.  R.,  1911,  p.  243. 

^  Von  Halle :  Deutschland  unci  tlie  oeffentliche  Meinung  in  den  Vereingten 
Staaten,  Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  Vol.  107,  1902,  p.  210  (transl.  by  author) . 

"From  this  viewpoint  the  presidency  of  Roosevelt — disturbed  as  were  the 
circumstances  which  attended  his  entrance  into  office — is  to  be  considered  in 
Germany  as  thoroughly  satisfactory.  For  thereby  there  came  to  the  head 
of  the  government  a  wise,  farsighted  man,  who  through  his  own  observation 
and  knowledge  is  well  accjuainted  with  Germany,  and,  being  a  .stronger 
character  than  McKinley,  will  hardly  offer  his  hand  to  have  the  American 
policy  work  for  the  interests  of  one  foreign  country  against  those  of  another." 


CHAFER    VII 

GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

After  the  IVIonroe  Doctrine  perhaps  the  most  conspicuous 
feature  of  the  foreign  pohcy  of  the  United  States  is  that  of  the 
principle  of  the  "open  door"  to  commerce  in  the  Chinese  Empire. 
It  is  important,  therefore,  in  studying  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  the  United  States  to  consider  the  policy  of  the 
German  Government  toward  this  principle  so  repeatedly  enun- 
ciated and  acted  upon  by  the  American  Government.    , 

Though  no  new  idea,  the  principle  received  its  first  specific 
and  expressed  application  as  an  American  policy  in  China  during 
the  year  1899,  and  because  of  his  earnest  efforts  in  its  behalf,  has 
been  associated  with  the  name  of  the  x\merican  Secretary  of  State 
John  Hay.  The  immediate  events  giving  rise  to  Secretary  Hay's 
first  approach  to  the  European  powers  on  this  question  were  the 
acquisition  by  Germany,  Russia,  England  and  France  of  Chinese 
harbors^  and  the  division  of  China  by  those  powers  into  "spheres 
of  interest"  for  their  commercial  enterprises.^ 

German  acquisitions  in  China  began  with  the  seizure  in  1897 
of  the  harbor  of  Kiao-Chao  on  the  ground  of  the  murder  by  Chinese 
of  two  German  missionaries.  The  diplomacy  connected  with  the 
event,  however,  extended  back  to  the  close  of  the  Chino-Japanese 
war  in  1895,  when  Germany,  France  and  Russia  had  intervened 
in  favor  of  China  and  had  forced  the  ^'ictorious  Japanese  to  give 

1  F.  R.  1898,  pp.  182  to  191.  During  the  year  1897  to  1898,  Germany 
acquired  the  harbor  of  Kiao-Chao,  Russia  acquired  Port  Arthur  and  Tahen- 
wan,  Great  Britain  acquired  Wei-hai-wei  and  extensions  to  her  possessions 
in  Hong-Kong,  and  France  acquired  Kwangchau  Bay  in  the  Province  of 
Kwangtung.  See  also,  A.  &  P.  '98,  CV  (C-8814),  Nos.95,  133  and  141,  144 
and  A.  &  P.  '99,  CIX  (91317),  No.  17.  Japan  also  obtained  a  small  con- 
cession at  Amoy.     F.  R.  1899,  pp.  150  to  153. 

2  F.  R.  1899,  pp.  129  ff. 


SEIZURE    OF    KIAO-CHAO  245 

up  possession  of  the  Liud-tung  Peninsula.  For  this  act  it  was  tacitly 
understood  by  these  powers — and  reaUzed  by  China — that  some 
tangible  compensation  was  expected.'*  The  German  Secretary  of 
the  Foreign  Office  had  declared  that  there  was  no  connection 
between  the  intervention  in  1895  and  the  acquisition  of  Kiao- 
Chao.*  This  Mas  contradicted,  however,  in  the  Reichstag  by  Dr. 
Richter  (Liberal  People's  Party)  and  by  Dr.  Hasse  (National 
Liberal),  who,  as  spokesmen  of  their  parties,  declared  the  cession 
of  Kiao-Chao  to  be  a  reward  for  the  former  intervention  against 
Japan.  Conclusive  evidence  of  this  is  seen  in  the  report  of  the 
Chinese  officials  (Tsungli  Yamen)  concerning  their  negotiations 
with  German  minister,  Baron  Heyking,  who  give  as  among  the 
grounds  set  forth  by  Germany  for  her  demands  the  fact  of  her 
assistance  to  China  in  securing  the  evacuation  of  the  Liao-tung 
Peninsula  by  the  Japanese.^ 

There  was  little  attempt  by  the  German  Government  to  conceal 
the  fact  that  the  event  of  the  murder  of  the  two  German  mission- 
aries was  merely  chosen  as  a  fitting  occasion  to  secure  that  which 
it  had  become  a  part  of  deliberate  German  policy  to  secure,  namely, 
a  foothold  in  China,  or,  in  the  famous  words  of  Secretary  von 
Buelow,  a  "place  in  the  sun."**    The  secretary  declared  that  the 

•^  A.  &  P.  '98,  CV  (C-8814),  Xo.  114.  Count  IMoura\-ieff  said  to  Sir  N. 
O'Conor  that  Russia  considered  that  China  owed  her  the  ))orts  of  TaHenwan 
and  Port  Arthur  in  return  for  her  services  to  China  during  the  war  with  Japan. 

'  V.  R.  1897-1898,  Bd.  II,  35  Sitz.,  8.  Februar,  '98,  S.  893,  B.  and  S.  909,  A. 
Dr.  Hasse  stated  that  he  and  his  friends  had  been  waiting  for  years  to  see  in 
what  way  Germany  would  be  recompensed  for  her  action  at  that  time  (1895). 
It  was  therefore  no  longer  a  secret  (as  it  had  to  be  for  years)  that  Germany 
wanted  to  have  a  reward  for  jilacing  herself  on  the  side  of  China. 

5  F.  R.,  1898,  p.  189. 

«  V.  R.,  1897-98,  Bd.  1,  4  Sitz.,  G.  Dezember,  1897,  S.  GO  (translation  by 
author). 

"The  time  when  the  German  left  to  one  of  his  neighbors  the  earth  and  to 
the  other  the  sea  and  reserved  for  himself  the  sky  where  pure  theory  reigns 
(amusement!  Bravo!) — that  time  is  past.  We  consider  it  as  one  of  our  most 
distinguished  tasks  to  advance  (foerdern)  and  to  take  care  of  (pflegen)  the 
interest  of  our  na\'igation,  our  commerce  and  our  industry  in  Eastern  Asia. 

The  sending  of  our  squadron  to  the  bay  of  Kiao-Chao  and  the  occupation 
of  this  l)ay  was  done  partly  to  secure  full  amends  for  the  murder  of  German 
Catholic  missionaries,  partly  to  obtain  greater  security  than  heretofore 
against  the  repetition  of  such  events.     .     . 

We  must  insist  that  the  German  missionary  and  German  enterprise,  German 


246         GERMANS'  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

sending  of  the  squadron  to  Kiao-Chao  was  not  an  improvisation ;'' 
on  the  contrary,  that  it  was  the  product  of  the  full  weighing  of  all 
contingencies  and  was  the  expression  of  a  calm  policy  conscious 
of  its  goal.  For  the  future,  von  Buelow  declared  Germany  would 
proceed  without  undue  haste,  but  also  without  petty  narrowness, 
steadily,  deliberately,  step  by  step,  not  as  conquest  seekers,  also 
not  as  calculators,  but  rather  as  efficient  and  wise  merchants  who, 
like  the  Maccabees  of  old,  hold  in  one  hand  a  weapon  but  in  the 
other  a  trowel  and  a  spade. 

This  deliberate  expansion  policy  of  the  German  Government, 
with  its  complete  ignoring  of  the  rights  of  China  in  the  case,  did 
not  escape  unchallenged  in  Germany.  The  radical  elements  of 
the  Reichstag  attacked  it  with  vigor  and  courage.     Mr.  Bebel,^ 


goods,  the  German  flag  and  the  German  ship  in  China  be  respected  just  Hke 
those  of  other  powers.  (Hearty  bravo!)  Finally  we  are  gladly  ready  to  take 
into  account  the  interests  of  other  great  powers  in  East  Asia,  in  the  seciu'e 
foresight  that  our  own  interests  will  also  find  their  due  appreciation.  (Bravo!) 
In  a  word:  we  wish  to  place  no  one  in  the  shade,  but  we  too  demand  our  place 
in  the  sun." 

'  V.  R.,  1897-'98,  Bd.  II,  35  Sitz.,  8.  Februar,  1898,  S.  895  A.  Also  A.  &  P. 
CV  (C.  8814),  No.  74. 

8  V.  R.,  1897-'98,  Bd.  II,  35  Sitz.,  8.  Februar,  1898,  S.  899.     See  also  vehe- 
ment speech  against  the  Government  expansion  poUcy  by  Liebknecht  (Social 
Democrat),  V.  R.,  '97-'98,  Bd.  Ill,  76  Sitz.,  27.  April,  '98,  S.  1981. 
Liebknecht — (translation  by  author). 

"I  have  noticed  that  there  is  no  inclination  to  discuss  in 

detail  the  supplementary  budget  nor  to  examine  closely  the  general  policy. 
But  I  cannot  comply  with  this  desire.  I  perceive  in  the  part  of  the  supple- 
mentary budget,  so  far  as  it  pertains  to  Kiao-Chao,  the  beginning  of  a  policy 
which  can  only  become  fatal  to  Germany.  Kiao-Chiao  itself  is  an  extraordi- 
narily imimportant  thing  of  little  intrinsic  value.  By  means  of  remarkable 
advertising  the  imagination  of  the  German  people  has  been  kindled  for  this 
corner  of  the  earth  and  there  are  actually  many  people  in  Germany  who  imagine 
that  we  have  in  Kiao-Chao  something  wonderful.     .     .     . 

Let  us  recall  how  we  came  to  Kiao-Chao  at  all;  and  here  we  must  touch 
on  a  point  which  must  make  every  German  Itlush  Viefore  the  foreign  world 
(clen  Ausland).  ^^'ho  had  thought  of  Kiao-Chao  a  half  year  ago?  Who,  a 
year  and  a  half  or  two  years  ago,  had  thought  that  Germany  must  have  a 
fleet  large  enough  to  rival  France,  Russia,  if  not  even  England,  as  a  sea-power? 
No  one  among  the  }ieople  had  thought  of  it  and  here  in  the  Reichstag  itself 
only  a  few  had  thought  of  it;  those  who  timidly  came  forward  with  the  thought 
were  in  a  disappearing  minority.  Suddenly  a  complete  reversal!  Was  it,  as 
has  just  been  stated  here,  a  reversal  within  the  German  people?  Truly  not. 
The  German  people  whom  we  know  does  not  bother  itself  about  Kiao-Chao 
and  this  colonial  policy  and  fleet  policy  in  the  least.    It  rejects  them.     .     .     . 

What  is  to  be  made  out  of  this  piece- of  territory?  Without  the  hinterland 
it  is  alisolutely  worthless.     And  what  was  the  role  which  Germany  played 


OPPOSITION    OF    RADICALS  247 

Social  Democrat,  compared  the  descent  of  the  German  squadron 
on  Kiao-Chao  to  the  Jameson  raid  on  the  Transvaal  which  (Ger- 
many had  so  condemned  and  which  had  called  forth  the  Kaiser's 
telegram  of  sympathy  to  the  Boer  President.  He  then  stated 
that  there  would  Iwve  been  nothing  to  be  wondered  at  if  some 
third  nation  had  at  this  time  sent  a  similar  telegram  of  sympathy 
to  the  government  of  China.  The  German  troops  had  no  right  on 
Chinese  soil,  and  if  the  Chinese  had  forcibly  ejected  them  they 
would  have  had  good  right  to  do  so.  That  the  murder  of  the  mis- 
sionaries was  only  a  mere  excuse  in  order  to  be  able  to  break  into 
China,  no  one  doubted  any  longer.  Such  protests  as  this,  however, 
were  confined  chiefly  to  the  radical  groups,  among  whom  opposi- 
tion to  colonization  had  become  practically  a  part  of  the  party 
program  and  had  little  effect  on  the  government  policy. 

The  treaty'-"  governing  the  transfer  of  Kiao-Chao  to  Germany 
leased  to  that  country  for  ninety-nine  years  the  bay  and  islands 
of  Kiao-Chao  and  the  land  projections  on  each  side  of  the  harbor 
entrance.  Over  all  this  Germany  should  have  not  only  adminis- 
trative but  also  sovereign  rights  for  the  period  of  the  lease.  In 
addition,  it  was  agreed  that  within  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometers  around 
the  bay,  China  was  to  permit  German  troops  to  march  through  the 
territory  at  any  time  and  was  not  to  take  any  measures  or  issue 
any  ordinances  without  the  consent  of  the  German  Government. 

there?  First  it  was  said :  it  is  a  lease ;  then  it  was  said  in  all  German  newspapers, 
it  is  a  lease  only  in  form  hut  a  lease  in  perpetuity,  we  will  never  give  up  the 
land.    Therefore  it  was  a  conquest  in  the  midst  of  peace. 

This  robbery  or  colonial  policy  does  not  help  the  people  in  the  least;  on  the 
contrary  it  injures  them.  Price  Bismarck,  as  obedient  servant  of  the  capi- 
talist class,  which  granted  him  in  return  important  and  substantial  rewards, 
tried  it  first  with  Samoa,  then  in  Africa.  And  what  happened  then,  and  is 
still  going  on,  does  not  redound  to  the  honor  of  the  German  name  and  has 
brought  only  harm  to  the  German  i)eople.  Now  we  are  trjnng  it  with  China. 
And  here  the  fiasco  will  be  still  greater. 

In  China  we  had  the  choice  between  the  English  policy,  of  cultivating  China 
and  furthering  its  develojiment  by  economic  methods,  by  estal)lisliing  com- 
mercial connections,  etc.,  and  the  Russian  policy  which  leads  to  the  sjjlitting 
up  of  China.  We  have  decided  on  the  Russian  jjolicy  and  our  government 
has  preeminently  militaristic  and  naval  purposes  in  view.     ... 

Against  the  whole  present  policy,  especially  against  the  whole  colonial 
policy,  against  the  whole  fleet  craze  (Plottenschwindel) — I  can  use  no  other 
expression — (jireat  disturbance,  hvely  interruptions)  we  protest:  during  the 
election-battle  and  after  it  we  will  speak!" 

9  V.  R.,  1S97-'9S,  Anlagen  Vol.  HI,  No.  262. 


248         GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

Nevertheless,  it  was  stated  that  China  retained  all  her  sovereign 
rights  in  this  zone.  It  is  further  illustrative  of  the  aggressive 
character  of  the  treaty  that  provision  was  made  that  in  case  Ger- 
many, before  the  expiration  of  the  lease,  should  desire  to  withdraw 
from  Kiao-Chao,  China  would  grant  her  some  other  place  better 
suited  to  her  purposes  and  in  addition  would  recompense  Germany 
for  the  expenditures  made  up  to  that  time  in  developing  the  port. 
Though  shedding  much  light  on  the  expansion  system  of  Ger- 
many,^'' the  treaty  bears  on  the  policy  of  the  "open  door"  only 
in  this  respect — that  it  guarantees  to  China  in  the  leased  territory 
equal  rights  of  commerce  and  navigation  with  the  merchants 
and  vessels  of  other  nations.  Germany  retains,  however,  the  right 
to  decide  at  any  time  what  those  privileges  of  other  nations  shall 
be.  That  is,  as  far  as  the  treaty  stipulated,  Germany  was  free  to 
make  Kiao-Chao  an  open  or  a  closed  port.  She  declared  it  a  free 
port,  aided  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  establislmient  of  a 
customs  house  there,  and  gave  assurances  to  the  American  Ambas- 

1"  A.  &  P.  '99,  CIX  (C-9131),  No.  62  (Inclosure).  Following  the  taking 
of  Kiao-Chao,  Germany  reasserted  her  power  and  interest  in  the  Orient  by 
sending  Prince  Henry  with  a  squadron  on  a  tour  of  the  Orient  which  should 
include  a  personal  Aisit  to  the  Enii)eror  of  China.  The  \isit  was  of  such 
importance  that  the  details  of  it  were  arranged  by  formal  agreement. 
Lascelle.'^  to  Salisbury,  Extract  from  'Reichsanzeiger'  of  Apr.  25,  1898  (trans- 
lation). 

Berlin-,  April  27,  1898. 

"His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Henry  will,  in  the  course  of  his  travels  in 
Eastern  Asia,  pay  a  visit  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  at  Peking. 
With  regard  to  the  ceremonial  to  he  observed  on  this  occasion,  a  detailed 
agreement  has  been  arrived  at  lietwcen  the  Imperial  German  Minister  at 
Peking  and  the  Imperial  Chinese  Government ;  which,  according  to  telegraphic 
information,  has  received  the  assent  of  His  lilajesty  the  Emperor  of  China. 
According  to  the  terms  of  this  agreement,  His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Henry 
will  be  received  on  his  arrival  at  the  Peking  railway  station  by  the  Tsung-li- 
Yamen  and  the  Imperial  Princes  and  will  be  conducted  to  the  Imperial  German 
Legation.  On  the  following  day  His  Royal  Highness  will  pay  a  visit  to  the 
Emperor  in  His  Majesty's  summer  residence  of  Wan-show-shan.  His  Majesty 
will  rise  to  receive  him,  and  His  Royal  Highness  will  sit  down  in  the  seat  of 
honor  by  His  Majesty's  side.  Immediately  after  this  visit  the  Emperor  will 
pay  His  Royal  Highness  his  return  visit,  which  His  Royal  Highness  wU  await 
in  a  building  within  the  gardens  of  Wan-show-shan,  which  is  to  l)e  placed  at 
the  Prince's  disjiosal  as  a  temporary  residence.  Her  Imj^erial  iMajesty,  the 
ex-Regent,  has  also  spontaneously  expressed  the  wish  to  receive  His  Royal 
Highness  and  has  conuuanded  that  the  Prince  be  showni  all  those  portions  of 
the  Palace  which  Europeans  have  hitherto  been  forliidden  to  enter." 


TUEATY    OF    KIA()-CHAt)  249 

sador  at  Berlin'^  that  the  rights  and  privileges  ensured  by  treaties 
with  China  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  would  not  he  anywise 
impaired  within  the  acquired  area. 

This  treaty,  governing  the  transfer  of  Kiao-Chao,  embodied  by 
no  means  all  of  the  German  clahns  on  China  at  this  thne.  Aside 
from  those  demands^-  which  referred  directly  to  the  rei)aration 
for  the  murder  of  the  missionaries/^  there  was  included  a  demand 
that  German  engineers  should  have  preference  in  the  building  of 

"  F.  R.,  1899,  p.  129  f.  Russia  followed  by  declaring  Dalny  (Talienwan) 
a  free  and  open  port,  but  closed  Port  Arthur  to  all  but  Russian  and  Chinese 
vessels.     (See  F.  R.,  1898,  p.  184.) 

>2  A.  P..  '98,  CV  (C-8814),  No.  5  and  iXo.  73.  Also  F.  R.,  1898,  pp.  187  ff. 
The  demands  presented  by  Germany  to  China  upon  the  murder  of  the  two 
missionaries  were  briefly  the  following : 

"1.  The  building  of  an  Imperial  tablet  to  the  memory  of  the  missionaries 
who  were  murdered. 

2.  The  families  of  the  murdered  missionaries  to  be  indemnified. 

o.  The  Governor  of  Shantung  to  be  degraded  permanently. 

■i.  The  Chinese  Government  to  defray  the  cost  of  the  German  occupation 
of  Iviao-Chao. 

5.  German  engineers  to  have  preference  in  the  building  of  any  railway 
which  China  may  construct  in  the  province  of  Shantung,  and  also  in  the 
working  of  any  mine  which  may  exist  along  the  track  of  such  railway." 

These  were  the  demands  officially  presented  to  the  Chinese  Government  by 
German\-.  It  was  soon  discovered  from  the  Chinese  officials  that  there  was 
a  sixth  demand,  namely,  for  a  guarantee  that  no  murders  of  German  subjects 
should  ever  again  occur.  It  was  this  gurantee  which  assumed  concrete  form 
in  the  retention  by  Germany  of  Kiao-Chao. 

'3  A.  &  P.,  '98,  CV  (C-8814),  No.  73.  The  attitude  of  the  German  Gov- 
ernment was  well  brought  out  in  a  speech  by  Secretary  von  Buclow  before  the 
Budget  Commission  of  the  Reichstag.  After  summarizing  Germany's  demands 
on  China  he  concluded  (translation  by  source). 

"The  Chinese  Government  has  thus  agreed  to  all  the  demands  which  we 
have  made  in  this  respect.  In  accordance  with  my  instructions,  the  negotia- 
tions htive  been  conducted  by  the  German  Minister  at  Peking  in  understanding 
with  the  representative  of  Bishoj)  Auger.  In  the  Bishop's  oi)inion  the  grant 
of  the  three  Imperial  tablets — a  rare  distinction  will  greatly  enhance  the 
prestige  of  the  missionaries  in  China.  The  Imperial  Government  has  thus 
taken  every  step  without  employing  un-Christian  severity  to  secure  satisfaction 
for  the  outrages  perpetrated  on  Christian  missionaries,  and,  as^  regards  the 
future,  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such  acts  of  violence.  The  Imperial 
German  Representative  will  do  all  in  his  power  to  provide  for  the  carrying 
out  of  the  stijxilations  made  so  f;ir  as  that  had  not  already  been  done.  The 
best  security,  however,  is  the  i)ermanent  iiresence  of  a  German  force  at  Kiao- 
Chao  Bay,  which  now  rests  on  the  firm  grovmd  of  Treaty  right.  By  this  the 
Chinese  authorities  will  have  continually  before  their  eyes  the  evidence  of 
German  power,  and  will  realize  that  wrongs  committed  against  German 
nationals  will  not  remain  unavenged." 


250  GERMANY   AND   THE    OPEN   DOOR    IN   CHINA 

any  railway  which  China  might  construct  in  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung and  also  in  the  working  of  any  mines  along  that  railway. 
Negotiations  over  this  demand  were  conducted  for  several  months 
after  the  signing  of  the  treaty  transferring  Kiao-Chao  to  Germany 
and  finally  resulted  in  further  concessions  more  extensive  and 
advantageous  to  Germany  than  could  be  inferred  from  the  claim 
as  first  reported  by  Secretary  von  Buelow  to  the  Budget  Com- 
mission of  the  Reichstag.  These  new  concessions^'*  discriminated 
markedly  in  favor  of  German  commerce  and  capital  as  compared 
with  that  of  other  nations.  The  Chinese  Government  sanctioned 
the  construction  of  two  lines  of  railway  in  Shantung,  to  carry  out 
which  a  joint  German  and  Chinese  company  was  to  be  formed. 
The  Chinese  Government  was  to  afford  effectual  protection  to  the 
delegates  of  the  German  company  in  their  work.  The  object 
of  the  railway  was  declared  to  be  merely  for  the  de\'elopment  of 
trade,  and  in  demanding  it,  Germany  testified  against  any  aims 
at  illegal  extension  of  territory  in  the  province.  The  Chinese 
Government  conceded  to  German  subjects  the  right  of  acciuiring 
property  in  mines  along  the  whole  length  of  the  railway  line  and 
within  a  distance  of  30  li  (about  65  miles)  on  either  side  of  it. 
Chihese  capital  might  take  part  in  the  working  of  the  mines. 
Finally  there  came  the  provision  which  guaranteed  uneciui\'ocally 
the  preferential  treatment  of  Germany  in  the  province.  It  was 
stipulated  that — 

"  If  the  Chinese  Government  or  individual  Chinese  subjects 
should  at  any  time  have  plans  for  the  development  of  Shantung, 
for  the  execution  of  which  foreign  capital  is  required,  they  shall  in 
the  first  place,  apply  to  German  capitalists  for  it.  Similarly  in  the 
event  of  machines  or  other  materials  being  required,  German 
manufacturers  shall  in  the  first  instance  be  applied  to.  Only  when 
German  capitalists  or  manufacturers  have  refused  their  assistance 
shall  the  Chinese  be  entitled  to  apply  to  other  nations." 

Here  was  at  the  outset  an  arrangement  radically  contradictory 
to  the  principle  of  the  "open  door."  Germany  put  forth  in  defense 
of  the  claim  the  fact  that  similar  privileges  had  been  granted  to 

»  A.  &  P.,  1899,  CIX  (C-9131),  No.  235,  Inclosure. 


SHANTUNG   CONCESSIONS  251 

France  in  ISO').'''  Great  Britain  made  protest  to  the  Chinese 
Government  stating  that  she  had  decUned  in  1S95  to  recognize 
the  vaUdity  of  the  Chinese  concessions  to  the  French,  had  reserved 
all  her  rights  at  that  time,  and  now  claimed  most-favored- nation 
pri^•ileges  on  the  ground  of  the  new  concessions  to  Germany. 
These  she  secured. ^^  Russia  in  turn  secured  concessions  concern- 
ing railway  lines  near  the  Russian  frontier^^  and  trade  concessions 
immediately  north  of  Port  Arthur,  and  France  secured  further 
privileges  in  Tonquin.^^     The  situation  had  in  short  become  a 

'5  Ibid.,  No.  21.     Also  A.  &  P.  1898,  CV  (C-8814),  No.  70. 

The  Chinese  officials  in  an  interview  with  the  British  representative  declared 
that  the  German  demand  for  railroad  pri\'ileges  in  Shantung  was  similar  in 
character  to  the  stipulations  of  the  French  Convention  of  1895. 

"  A.  &  P.  1898,  CV  (C-8S14),  No.  85.     The  concessions  were  as  follows: 

1.  Opening  of  interior  waterways  to  British  and  other  foreign  steamers. 

2.  Assurance  that  China  would  never  alienate  any  territory  of  the  pro- 
vinces adjoining  the  Yang-tsze  to  any  other  power. 

3.  The  Inspector-General  of  Customs  for  the  Chinese  Government  shall 
be  in  the  future  as  in  the  past  an  Englishman — (for  as  long  as  the  British 
trade  with  China  shall  continue  to  surpass  that  of  any  other  nation.) 

Great  Britain  also  secured  extensions  of  her  possessions  at  Hong  Kong  and 
the  right  to  extend  the  Burmah  Railway  into  Yunnan  Province.  (See  A.  & 
P.  1899,  CIX  (C-9131),  No.  17. 

1-  A.  &  P.  1899,  CIX  (C-9329),  No.  2.     A.  &  P.  1899,  CIX  (C-9131),  No. 

273  inclosure. 

MacDonald  to  Salisbury 

June,  24,  1898. 
Russian  Foreign  Office  Special  Agreement  (St.  Petersburg,  May  7,  1898). 
(Supplement   to  Russo-Chinese  Agreement  of  March   15,    1898,   Russian 
calendar.) 

(neutral  ground  established  north  of  Port  Arthur). 

"Art.  V.     The  Chinese  Government  agrees 

1.  That  without  Russia's  consent  no  concession  will  be  made  in  the  neutral 
ground  for  the  use  of  subjects  of  other  Powers. 

2.  That  the  ports  on  the  sea-coast  east  and  west  of  the  neutral  ground  shall 
not  be  opened  to  the  trade  of  other  Powers. 

3.  And  that  without  Russia's  consent  no  road  and  mining  concessions, 
industrial  and  mercantile  privileges  shall  be  granted  in  the  neutral  territory. 

18  A.  &  P.  1899,  CIX  (C-9131),  No.  17.  These  concessions  to  France 
included : 

1.  The  lease  of  Kwangchow  Wan  as  a  coaling  station  (for  99  years). 

2.  The  right  to  construct  a  railway  to  Yunnan-fu  from  the  Tonquin  frontier. 

3.  The  ])r(MTiise  not  tf)  alienate  any  territory  in  the  three  provinces  of 
Kwangtung,  Kwangsi  and  Yunnan,  which  border  on  the  French  frontier. 

4.  The  agreement  that  if  the  Chinese  Government  should  ever  create  a 
Postal  Department  independent  of  the  maritime  customs  and  if  a  European 
is  to  be  appointed  Director,  France  will  have  equal  right  with  others  to  appoint 
a  candidate. 


252         GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

battle  for  concessions.^^  It  was  soon  realized,  however,  by  the 
nations  themselves  that  they  were  defeating  their  own  ends  in  this 
unrestrained  competition  and  that  it  would  promote  the  interests 
of  all  if  each  defined  its  zone  of  intended  future  activities.  Accord- 
ingly agreements  were  concluded-"  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  and  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia-^  defining  their 
respective  spheres  of  interest  in  China.  In  the  sphere  agreed 
upon  as  belonging  to  one  nation  the  other  nation  promised  not 

19  A.  &  P.  1899,  CIX  (C-9131),  No.  245.  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  British 
INIinister  to  China,  telegraphed  to  Sahsbury  July  23,  1898,  as  follows: 

"The  battle  of  concessions  is  not  in  my  opinion  going  against  us,  as  your 
Lordship  suggests  in  your  telegrams  of  13th  July.  .  .  .  Up  to  the  present 
any  concessions  granted  to  other  nationahties  are  far  outbalanced  in  financial 
value  by  the  Shansi  and  Honan  mining  and  railway  concessions  and  by  the 
Shanghai-Nanking  Railway  concession  with  its  possible  extensions." 

-"  F.  R.,  1899,  pp.  129  to  135.  The  British  sphere  was  the  valley  of  the 
Yang-tsze,  the  Russian  sphere  was  all  China  north  of  the  Great  Wall,  the 
German  sphere  was  the  province  of  Shantung  and  the  Valley  of  the  Hoang  Ho. 
France,  also,  by  treaty  with  China,  had  given  notice  that  her  sphere  of  interest 
lay  in  the  southern  provinces  bordering  on  her  possessions  in  Tonquin.  (See 
footnote  17).  The  British  and  German  spheres  were  defined  by  agreement 
between  British  and  German  banking  sjiidicates  in  September,  1S98,  and  this 
agreement  was  approved  by  the  two  governments.  (See  A.  &  P.  1899,  CIX 
(C-9131),  No.  3121. 

21  A.  &  P.  1899,  CX  (C-9241),  Treaty  Series  No.  11.  Exchange  of  Notes 
between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Russia  with  regard  to  their  Respective 
Railway  Interests  in  China. 

No.  1  Sir  C.  Scott  to  Count  Mouravielf 


"Great  Britain  and  Russia  animated  by  a  sincere  desire  to  avoid  in  China 
all  cause  of  conflict  on  questions  where  their  interests  meet,  and  taking  into 
consideration  the  economic  and  geographical  gravitation  of  certain  parts  of 
that  Empire,  have  agreed  as  follows: 

1.  Great  Britain  engages  not  to  seek  for  her  own  account  or  on  behalf  of 
British  sul)jects  or  of  others,  any  railway  concessions  to  the  north  of  the  Great 
Wall  of  China,  and  not  to  obstruct,  directlj'  or  indirectly,  applications  for 
railway  concessions  in  that  region  supported  by  the  Russian  Government. 

2.  Russia,  on  her  part,  engages  not  to  seek  for  her  own  account,  or  on  behalf 
of  Russian  subjects  or  of  others,  any  railway  concessions  in  the  basin  of  the 
Yang-tsze,  and  not  to  obstruct,  directly  or  indirectly,  applications  for  railway 
concessions  in  that  region  supported  by  the  British  Government. 

The  two  Contracting  Parties,  having  nowise  in  ^'^ew  to  infringe  in  any  way 
the  sovereign  rights  of  China  or  existing  Treaties,  will  not  fail  to  communicate 
to  the  Chinese  Government  the  jiresent  arrangement,  which,  by  averting  all 
cause  of  complications  between  them,  is  of  a  nature  to  consolidate  peace  in 
the  Far  East,  and  to  serve  primordial  interests  of  China  herself. 

(Signed) 

Chakles  S.  Scott. 
St.  Petersburg,  April  28,  1899." 


may's  first  notes  to  the  powers  253 

to  seek  for  itself  any  railway  or  miiiiiifi;  concessions,  and  not  to 
obstruct  the  efforts  of  the  first  nati(>n  to  accjiiire  from  Cliina 
railway  or  mining  concessions  within  the  sti])uhite(l  territory. 

It  was  these  agreements  acknowledging  the  special  interests 
of  certain  European  nations  in  certain  sections  of  China  which 
called  forth  Secretary-  Hay's  first  notes  to  the  powers  in  1899.'- 
In  the  note  to  Germany  the  secretary  wrote  that  although  at  the 
time  of  the  lease  of  Kiao-Chao  the  German  Government  had 
given  assurances  that  the  rights  and  privileges  of  United  States 
citizens  would  be  in  nowise  impaired  in  the  acquired  territory, 
nevertheless  the  formal  agreement  since  made  by  Germany  with 
Great  Britain,  recognizing  Germany's  exclusive  right  to  certain 
privileges  in  the  sphere  of  influence  contiguous  to  the  leased  area, 
had  created  a  different  situation.  As  the  exact  nature  and  extent 
of  the  rights  thus  recognized  had  not  been  clearly  defined,  conflicts 
might  arise  at  any  time  between  British  and  German  subjects 
and  the  interests  of  American  citizens  might  be  jeopardized. 
Being  anxious  to  remove  any  cause  for  such  conflict  and  to  ensure 
for  the  commerce  of  all  nations  equality  of  treatment  for  their 
commerce  and  navigation  throughout  China,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  would  be  pleased  to  receive  from  the  Govern- 
ment of  Germany  formal  assurances  that  it 

"First,  will  in  no  way  interfere  with  any  treaty  port  or  any 
vested  interest  within  any  so-called  'sphere  of  interest'  or  leased 
territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

Second,  that  the  Chinese  treaty  tarift"  of  the  time  being  shall 
apply  to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such  i)orts  as 
are  within  said  'sphere  of  interest'  (unless  they  should  be  free 
ports),  no  matter  to  what  nationality  it  may  belong,  and  that 
duties  so  leviable  shall  be  collected  by  the  Chinese  Government. 

Third,  that  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on  vessels  of 
another  nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such  'sphere'  than 
shall  be  levied  on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  rail- 

22  F.  R.,  1899,  pp.  128  to  143.  In  the  note  to  Great  Britain  Secretary  Hay 
stated  that  the  United  States  would  in  no  way  commit  itself  to  a  recofjnition 
of  the  exclusive  rights  of  any  power  within  or  control  over  any  portion  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  under  such  agreements  as  had  been  concludetl  during  the  past 
year. 


254  GEKMAXY    AXD   THE    OPEN   DOOR    IN   CHINA 

road  charges  over  lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its 
'sphere'  on  merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other 
nationalities  transported  through  such  'sphere'  than  shall  be 
levied  on  similar  merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  nationals 
transported  over  equal  distances." 

In  forwarding  this  request  Secretary'  Hay  stated  that  he  felt 
confident  of  the  support  of  the  German  Government  because  of  its 
liberal  policy  already  shown  in  declaring  Kiao-Chao  a  free  port 
and  in  aiding  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  estabUshment  of  a 
customs  house  there.  These  two  actions,  he  declared,  were  directly 
in  line  with  the  policy  which  the  United  States  \^^shed  to  see  estab- 
Ushed  in  China. 

The  German  Government  replied  first  informally  by  interview 
with  Mr.  Jackson,  American  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin,  declaring 
that  the  poUtics  of  Germany  in  the  Far  East  were  de  facto  the 
politics  of  the  "open  door"  and  that  Germany  proposed  to  main- 
tain this  principle  in  the  future.  In  regard  to  the  United  States' 
proposal,  Secretary  von  Buelow  ad\dsed  that  the  other  European 
cabinets  be  consulted  in  the  matter,  and  if  they  agreed  to  adhere 
to  it,  Germany  would  raise  no  objection.  He  was  also  willing  that 
the  other  cabinets  be  informed  of  this  fact.  This  provisional 
acceptance  Germany  embodied  later  in  written  form,  which  stated 
that  Germany  had  already  carried  out  to  the  fullest  extent  equality 
of  treatment  of  all  nations  in  its  Chinese  possessions  and  that  it 
entertained  no  thought  of  departing  from  this  principle  "so  long  as 
it  Avas  not  forced  to  do  so,  on  account  of  conditions  of  reciprocity, 
by  a  divergence  from  it  by  other  governments."  Similar  replies-^ 
accepting  with  the  same  reservation  the  American  proposal  were 
received  by  the  United  States  from  Great  Britain,  Russia,  France 
and  Japan.  Secretary  Hay  then  issued  a  circular  note  to  all  the  gov- 
ernments concerned,  stating  that  since  the  condition  attached  to 
their  acceptance  had  been  complied  with  the  UnitecTStates  would, 
therefore,  consider  the  assent  given  to  it  as  final  and  definitive. 

'^'  Ibid.,  p.  138.  Italy  having  learned  of  the  adherence  of  the  other  powers 
to  the  American  proposals  accepted  them  without  reservation. 


THE    HOXEH    KEHELLION  255 

Tlu'  Inited  States  had  thus  mado  its  first  i)r<)<jress  toward  the 
recognition  of  the  "open  door"  as  the  principle  to  govern  inter- 
national relations  in  China.  That  recognition  had  been  hesitating, 
however,  and  far  from  complete,  and  had  still  the  reservation 
attached  to  it  which  meant  that  if  any  nation  were  to  depart  from 
the  policy  all  the  rest  kept  themselves  free  to  do  the  same.  In 
Germany's  declaration  that  Kiao-Chao  should  be  a  free  port,  she 
was  carrying  out  the  "open  door"  principle,  and  to  this  Secretary 
Hay  gave  due  recognition.  The  privileges  secured  from  China 
in  the  province  of  Shantung,  however,  discriminated  in  favor  of 
German  trade,  capital  and  industry,  and  were  therefore  in  contra- 
diction to  any  policy  of  equal  opportunity.  Germany's  claim  was 
that  because  it  had  made  no  distinction  of  treatment  between  other 
nations  in  the  leased  territory,  it  was  therefore  carrying  out  to 
the  fullest  extent  the  principle  of  the  "open  door."  This  was 
true  only  so  far  as  it  went  and  only  for  Kiao-Chao.  The  fact  still 
remained  that  it  had  secured  important  concessions  for  its  own 
commerce  and  the  very  fact  and  character  of  a  sphere  of  interest 
contradicted  the  principle  of  the  "open  door." 

The  following  year  came  the  Boxer  rebellion  and  the  murder  by 
the  Chinese  of  Baron  von  Ketteler,  the  German  minister  to  China. 
The  great  Viceroy  of  China,  Li  Hung  Chang,  records  in  his 
Memoirs-^  his  consternation  at  the  news.     "If  she"  (Germany), 

"  Memoirs  of  Li  Hung  Chang,  p.  232  ff. 

June  22 

"A  telegraphic  message  tells  me  of  the  outrageous  killing  of  the  German 
minister.  In  the  name  of  hell  and  purgatory  and  all  the  black  valleys,  what 
are  the  national  miscreants  thinking  about?  .  .  .  Now  it  will  not  only 
be  war  with  Japan  l)Ut  with  the  German  Empire.     .     .     . 

And  Germany  will  take  no  ajjology  for  the  murder  of  her  minister!  If  she 
took  Kiao-Chao  from  us  for  the  lives  of  two  missionaries,  what  will  she  demand 
for  the,  life  of  Baron  von  Ketteler?  I  tremble  for  the  consequences  of  all  this 
folly! 

I  did  not  know  the  Japanese  official,  but  Baron  von  Ketteler  was  one  of  the 
last  to  say  good-bye  to  me  in  Peking,  and  upon  that  occasion  he  spoke  happily 
of  our  meeting  in  Germany  four  years  before,  when  I  was  the  guest  of  his  own 
great  nation.  And  now  my  fellow  countrymen  kill  him  in  the  streets  of  our 
capital!  \\'hat  will  the  Germans  think  now  of  the  fine  China  I  spoke  so  proudly 
of  and  which  I  endeavored  to  represent  so  worthily.  And  all  the  Christian 
world  will  more  than  ever  look  upon  us  as  a  vast  swarm  of  barbarians,  who  are 
not  possessed  of  the  first  principles  of  international  fair  dealing,  nor  deser\'ing 
of  the  first  advances  of  international  comitv. 

I  am  ill." 
17 


256  GERMANY   AND   THE   OPEN   DOOR    IN    CHINA 

he  writes,  "  took  Kiao-Chao  from  us  for  the  lives  of  two  mission- 
aries, what  will  she  demand  for  the  life  of  Baron  von  Ketteler? 
I  tremble  for  the  consequences  of  all  this  folly !"  It  was  Germany's 
determination  that  China  should  tremble  for  this  act  and  the  prep- 
arations for  the  avenging  expedition  under  Count  von  Waldersee 
were  made  with  vigor.-*  Li  Hung  Chang  viewed  with  alarm  the 
increasing  German  regiments  being  despatched  to  China  under  the 
German  Field  Marshal.  If  they  should  establish  a  big  army  in 
the  Chinese  capital,  he  reasoned,  and  demand  an  indemnity  such 
as  they  did  of  the  French  and  stay  until  it  should  be  paid,  there 
seemed  little  chance  of  their  leaving  China  at  all.  However,  the 
results  of  the  German  expedition  were  not  so  dire  as  China  had 
feared.  The  main  object  of  the  allied  intervention,  the  freeing 
and  protection  of  the  foreign  Legations  at  Peking,  had  been  accom- 
plished by  the  time  Count  von  Waldersee  arrived,  and  the  Chine^:e 
soldiers  had  been  ordered  not  to  fire  on  or  oppose  in  any  way  the 
movements  of  the  foreign  armies.-*^  There  was,  therefore,  no  imme- 
diate occasion  for  military  operations  on  a  large  scale,  and,  while 
the  German  forces  made  a  number  of  expeditions  throughout 
the  province,  these  did  not  have  the  harmful  effect  on  the  peace 
negotiations  which  was  feared  by  the  American  minister,  and  by 
Secretary  Hay." 

2^  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  the  German  Emperor  uttered  his  notorious 
speech  to  the  German  troops  as  they  were  about  to  sail  for  China.  As  pub- 
Hshed  in  the  collection  of  Utterances  of  German  Rulers,  etc.,  entitled  "Out 
of  their  own  Mouths,"  the  Kaiser's  instructions  were: 

'"You  know  very  well  that  you  are  to  fight  against  a  cmining,  brave,  well- 
armed  and  terrible  enemy.  If  you  come  to  grips  with  him,  be  assured  quarter 
will  not  be  given,  no  prisoners  will  be  taken.  Use  your  weapons  in  such  a  way 
that  for  a  thousand  years  no  Chinese  shall  dare  to  look  upon  a  German  ask- 
ance.   Be  terrible  as  Attila's  Huns.' 

William  II,  Speech  to  the  Chinese  E.xpeditionary  force  July  27,  1900.  The 
last  sentence  appeared  in  contemporary  reports  but  not  in  the  official  version." 

A.  &  P.  1900,  CV  (C-257),  No.  237.     The  Emperor  also  declared: 

"  I  will  not  rest  until  the  German  flags  united  with  those  of  the  other  powers 
float  victoriously  over  those  of  China,  and  planted  on  the  walls  of  Peking, 
dictate  the  terms  of  peace." 

2«  F.  R.,  1901,  Appendix,  i).  40. 

"  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  245.     Hay  wrote  on  October  16,  1900: 

"Everything  appeared  to  be  going  well  until  this  promenade  of  Waldersee's 
to  Tao  Ping,  which  I  fear  will  have  very  imfavorable  results  upon  the  rest  of 


AMERICAN    POLICY    IN    CHINA  L'o/ 

Tho  whole  weiji;ht  of  the  United  States'  inihtary  and  diplonuitic 
force  was  thrown  on  the  side  of  the  preservation  of  the  territorial 
inte.iijrity  and  soverei<;nty  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  At  the  most 
critical  period  of  the  Boxer  uprising  Secretary  Hay  issued  a  cir- 
cular telegram-"^  which  set  forth  the  immediate  purpose  and  the 


China.  The  great  Viceroys,  to  secure  whose  assistance  was  our  first  effort 
and  our  success,  have  been  stantHn";  by  us  si)lendidly  for  the  last  four  months. 
How  much  longer  they  can  hold  their  turbulent  populations  quiet  in  the  face 
of  constant  incitements  to  disturbance  which  Germany  and  Russia  are  giving 
is  hard  to  conjecture." 

See  also  F.  R.  1901,  Appendix,  pj).  91  and  92.  Mr.  Conger,  American 
Minister  at  Peking,  wrote  to  Secretary  Hay  Feb.  21,  1901,  concerning  an  order 
of  Count  Waldersee's  which  threatened  to  resume  mihtary  operations  on  a 
large  scale: 

"There  has  been  a  constant  disposition  upon  the  part  of  most  of  the  military 
commanders  to  do  something  or  go  somewhere  with  their  troops  upon  the 
fiimsiest  of  excuses,  so  that  during  the  winter  a  great  part  of  this  province  has 
been  gone  over. 

The  probabihty  was  that  under  this  order  some  kind  of  a  movement  would 
be  made  which  might  seriously  disturb  our  present  efforts  at  negotiation, 
frighten  the  court,  make  its  return  to  Peking  less  probable,  and  jeopardize 
the  final  .settlement." 

See  also  A.  &  P.  1901,  XCI  (C-()75),  Nos.  112  and  118. 
-*  F.  R.,  1901,  AppencUx,  p.  12.     Circular  note  of  .July  3,  1900,  to  the  powers 
cooperating  in  China,  defining  the  purposes  and  policy  of  the  United  States. 

Department  of  State, 
Washington, 

.July  .3,  1900. 
"In  this  critical  posture  of  affairs  in  China  it  is  deemed  appropriate  to  define 
the  attitude  of  the  I'nited  States  as  far  as  present  circumstances  permit  this 
to  be  done.  We  adhere  to  the  policy  initiated  by  us  in  18.57  of  peace  with  the 
Chinese  nation,  of  furtherance  of  lawful  commerce,  and  of  i)rotection  of  lives 
and  property  of  our  citizens  by  all  means  guaranteed  under  extraterritorial 
treaty  rights  and  by  the  law  of  nations.  If  wrong  be  done  to  eur  citizens  we 
propose  to  hold  the  responsible  authors  to  the  uttermost  accountability.  We 
regard  the  condition  at  Pekin  as  one  of  virtual  anarchy,  wherein'  power  and 
responsiliility  are  practically  devolved  upon  the  local  provincial  authorities. 
So  long  as  they  are  not  in  overt  collusion  with  rebellion  and  use  their  power 
to  protect  foreign  life  and  property,  we  regard  them  as  representing  the  Chinese 
people,  with  whom  we  seek  to  remain  in  peace  and  friendshij).  The  purpose 
of  the  President  is,  as  it  has  been  heretofore,  to  act  concurrently  with  the  other 
powers;  first,  in  opening  up  communication  with  Pekin  and  rescuing  the  Ameri- 
can officials,  missionaries,  and  other  Americans  who  are  in  danger;  secondly, 
in  affording  all  possilile  protection  everywhere  in  China  to  American  life  and 
property;  thirdly,  in  guarding  and  jirotecting  all  legitimate  American  interests; 
and  fourthly,  in  aiding  to  ])revent  a  spread  of  the  disorders  to  the  other  pro- 
vinces of  the  Emjjire  and  a  recurrence  of  such  disasters.  It  is  of  course  too 
early  to  forecast  the  means  of  attaining  this  last  result;  but  the  policy  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  is  to  seek  a  solution  which  may  bring  about 
permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve  Chinese  territorial  and  admin- 
istrative entity,  protect  all  rights  guaranteed  to  friendly  powers  by  treaty 


258         GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

general  policy  of  the  United  States  in  China.  This  note  sent  to  the 
American  embassies  throughout  Europe  declared  that  while  the 
American  Government  would  hold  to  the  "uttermost  accounta- 
bility" the  authors  of  any  wrongs  done  to  American  citizens,  it 
was  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  seek  a  solution  which  would 
"preserve  Chinese  territorial  and  administrative  entity,  protect 
all  rights  guaranteed  to  friendly  powers  by  treaty  and  international 
law  and  safeguard  for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial 
trade  with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire."  It  was,  in  a  word, 
a  reassertion  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "open  door."  The  Chinese 
Viceroy-^  saw  in  the  stand  taken  by  the  United  States  the  one 
hope  of  the  integrity  of  China — ^when  he  was  convinced  that  all 
the  other  powers  Avere  aiming  at  the  partition  of  the  empire. 
The  American  influence  was  brought  to  bear  wherever  possible,^" 

and  international  law,  and  safeguard  for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and 
impartial  trade  with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

You  will  communicate  the  purport  of  this  instruction  to  the  minister  for 
foreign  affairs.  Hay." 

-^  INIemoirs  of  Li  Hung  Chang,  p.  232. 

"All  the  foreign  nations  are  against  us  it  would  seem.  No,  there  is  an 
exception,  and  the  exception  may  prove  our  salvation  from  being  sliced  uj) 
like  a  watermelon.  The  Americans  are,  of  course,  acting  with  France,  Russia, 
England,  Germany,  and  Japan,  but  at  the  same  time  I  have  received  assur- 
ances from  the  American  commander  and  from  the  "Washington  Government 
that  the  United  States  will  oppose  morally  and  phj-sically,  if  necessary,  the 
partition  of  China. 

My  greatest  fear  now  is  from  the  Germans  and  Russians.  The  Germans 
because  of  the  death  of  their  minister,  are  despatching  regiments  every  day 
for  China,  and  are  sending  one  of  their  greatest  field-marshals  to  command 
their  troops.  If  they  establish  a  big  army  in  the  capital,  and  demand  an 
indemnity  such  as  they  did  cf  the  French,  and  stay  until  it  is  paid,  I  fear  they 
will  never  leave  us.  The  Russians,  too,  have  a  tremendous  force  in  Man- 
churia, and  along  the  Siberian  Railway;  and  if  .there  is  an  agreement  between 
them  it  may  take  more  than  a  ccmbinaticn  of  the  other  Powers  to  make  them 
relent.    My  hope,  however,  is  centred  in  the  attitude  of  the  Tnited  States." 

^^  F.  R.,  1901,  pp.  19  and  20.  Russia  haAing  declared  that  she  had  no 
designs  of  territorial  acquisition  in  China  and  had  occupied  Xiuchwang  purely 
temporarily  for  military  purposes,  tliQ  United  States  took  the  opportunity  to 
assert  once  more  her  general  policy  toward  China  and  her  immediate  purpose 
in  the  joint  operations.  This  purpose  was  to  join  with  the  other  powers  in  the 
occupation  of  Peking  until  the  Chinese  Government  should  be  reestabUshed 
there,  whereupon  the  United  States  would  immediately  withdraw  her  troops. 
Meanwliile,  if  any  other  power  should  withdraw  its  troops  and  proceed  to  look 
after  its  interests  in  China  by  its  own  methods  this  would  make  a  general 
withdrawal  of  all  expecUent.  In  short,  the  United  States  would  stay  in  Peking 
under  a  definite  understanding  and  not  otherwise.  (See  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay, 
Vol.  II,  p.  245,  also  p.  369.) 


HHlTISH-CiKKMAN    AOHKK.MKXT,   lODO  259 

l)ut,  staiidinii;  alone,  the  strength  of  the  United  States'  position 
was  entirely'  moral.  Secretary  Hay  testifies  that  it  was  successful 
in  moderating  the  German  policy  in  China  at  this  time.'*^ 

Another  factor,  however,  had  important  influence  for  the  benefit 
of  China  and  assisted  the  policy  of  the  United  States,  and  that 
was  the  rivalry  between  the  competing  powers.  As  Li  Hung 
Chang  aptly  described  the  situation,  "  Perhaps  between  the  quarrel- 
ing of  the  foxes  the  sheep  will  get  away."''-  It  is  quite  probable  that 
this  rivalry  rather  than  the  influence  of  the  United  States  accounted 
for  the  next  development  in  the  "open  door"  diplomacy.  This 
was  the  publication  of  an  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  declaring  the  principles  of  their  neutral  policy  in  China.^^ 

"  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  2-16: 

'"The  success  we  had  in  stopping  that  first  preposterous  German  movement 
when  the  whole  world  seemed  likely  to  join  in  it,  when  the  entire  press  of  the 
Continent  and  a  great  many  on  this  side  were  in  favor  of  it,  will  always  be  a 
source  of  gratification,'  he  confides  in  the  same  letter  to  an  intimate  friend. 
'The  moment  we  acted,  the  rest  of  the  world  paused,  and  finally  came  over 
to  our  ground;  and  the  German  Government,  which  is  generally  brutal  but 
seldom  silly,  recovered  its  senses,  cHmbed  down  of?  its  perch,  and  presented 
another  proposition  which  was  exactly  in  line  with  our  position.'  (October 
16,  1900.)" 

3-  Memoirs  of  Li  Hung  Chang,  p.  2.33: 

"October  12,  Peking.  I  have  learned  from  a  source  that  is  beyond  question- 
ing that  the  Powers  had  determined  immediately  after  the  capture  of  the  city 
to  make  a  division  of  China  between  them.  Yet  it  seems  that  like  so  many 
dogs  after  the  carcass  of  a  beast,  they  could  not  agree  upon  their  respective 
shares.  It  was  determined  that  the  European  nations  and  Japan  should  act 
in  concert,  ignoring  the  United  States.  This,  however,  was  not  found  to  be 
feasiVjle,  for,  first,  England,  and  then  Japan,  weakened.  The  troul^le  is  that 
Japan  wanted  that  part  of  China  as  her  sphere  of  influence  which  Russia 
claimed  as  her  own.  Perhaps  between  the  quarrelling  of  the  foxes  the  sheep 
will  get  away." 

^  F.  R.,  1901,  Appendix,  p.  31: 

"Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment, being  desirous  to  maintain  their  interests  in  China  and  their  rights  under 
e.xisting  treaties,  have  agreed  to  observe  the  following  principles  in  regard  to 
their  mutual  policy  in  China: 

I.  It  is  a  matter  of  joint  and  i^ermanent  international  interest  that  the  ports 
on  the  rivers  and  littoral  of  China  should  remain  free  :md  open  to  trade  and  to 
every  other  legitimate  form  of  economic  activity  for  the  nationals  of  all  coun- 
tries, without  distinction,  and  the  two  Governments  agree  on  their  part  to 
uphold  the  same  for  all  Chinese  territory  so  far  as  they  can  exercise  influence. 

II.  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  and  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment will  not  on  their  i)art  make  use  of  the  present  comf)lication  to  obtain  for 
themselves  any  territorial  advantages  in  Chinese  dominions  and  will  direct 


260         GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

They  agreed  that  the  ports  on  the  rivers  and  coast  of  China  should 
remain  free  and  open  to  the  trade  of  all  countries  without  distinc- 
tion and  the  two  governments  agreed  to  exercise  their  influence 
to  this  end.  The  British  and  German  Governments  secondly 
declared  that  they  would  not  make  use  of  the  complications  then 
prevailing  to  obtain  for  themselves  any  territorial  advantages  in 
Chinese  dominions,  but  would  seek  to  preserve  undiminished 
the  territory  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  And,  thirdly,  it  was  agreed 
that  in  case  another  power  made  use  of  the  existing  complications 
to  obtain  any  territorial  advantages,  the  two  contracting  parties 
would  come  to  a  preliminary  understanding  as  to  the  eventual 
steps  to  be  taken  for  the  protection  of  their  interests  in  China. 
The  other  powers  interested  were  then  invited  to  accept  these 
principles. 

This  agreement  came  as  a  great  surprise  to  the  United  States. 
Secretary  Hay  termed  it  a  bomb-shell  among  the  diplomats  at 
Washington.''^  It  was  a  tritimph  of  his  policy,  something  which 
because  of  the  American  policy  against  alliances  he  had  been 

their  policy  toward  maintaining  undiminished  the  territorial  conditions  of  the 
Chinese  Empire. 

III.  In  case  of  another  power  making  use  of  the  complications  in  China  in 
order  to  obtain  under  any  form  whatever  such  territorial  advantages,  the  two 
contracting  parties  reserve  to  themselves  to  come  to  a  preliminary  under- 
standing as  to  the  eventual  steps  to  be  taken  for  the  protection  of  their  own 
interests  in  China 

I^".  The  two  Governments  will  communicate  this  agreement  to  the  other 
powers  interested,  and  especially  to  Austria-Hungary,  France,  Italy,  Japan, 
Russia,  and  the  United  States  of  Ainerica,  and  will  invite  them  to  accept  the 
principles  recorded  in  the  agreement." 

3*  Letters  of  John  Hay,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  201. 

Hay  to  Adams 

Department  of  State, 
Washington, 

October  31,  1900. 
"The  A(nglo)-G(erman)  i)act  was  a  bomb-shell  here.  None  of  the  diplomats 
know  anything  about  it.  INIy  B(ritish?)  people  say  it  is  a  victory  for  G(ermany) 
and  Ru.ssia.  C(hoate)  can't  get  a  word  out  of  S(alisbury).  P(auncefote) 
thinks  it  all  right  and  apologizes  for  infringing  my  copy-right.  .  .  .  All 
of  the  powers  seem  to  be  shy,  except  J(apan),  who  plunged  in  boldly  and  said 
they  were  into  the  game  third  clause  and  all, — I  imagine  a  little  to  the  con- 
sternation of  the  two  signatories. 

Our  i)()sition  was  a  matter  of  course.  We  can't  make  alliances,  but  we  can't 
object  to  other  powers  making  alliances  to  do  our  chores  for  us.    If — of  course." 


llAV's   MKW    OF    BRITISH-GERMAN   AGREEMENT  2()l 

lal)()rinii-  ali)ne  to  accomplish.''''  And  yet  the  Secretary,  who  held 
marked  British  sympathies,  felt  grieved  over  the  situation  because, 
although  on  the  face  of  the  compact  it  seemed  to  he  an  alliance 
to  pre^'ent  further  aggressions  of  Russia  in  China,  he  soon  per- 
ceived that  it  was  in  reality  a  check  on  British  control  in  her 
sphere  of  interest,  the  valley  of  the  Yangtsze,  and  that  Great 
Britain  had  been  led  into  the  agreement  without  realizing  its  full 
import.'"^  Secretary  Hay,  however,  rejoiced  over  the  fact  that 
through  the  Anglo-German  compact  in  maintenance  of  the  "  open 
door"  the  United  States  was  spared  an  alliance  with  Germany. 

Secretary   Hay's   analysis   of  the   underlying  motive   for  the 
British-German  agreement,  namely,  the  prevention  of  increase  of 


35  Letters  of  John  Hay,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  199: 

Hay  to  C(lara)  S.  H(ay) 


Department  of  State, 
\Yashington,  D.  C, 
Oct.    29,    1900. 


"When  I  got  in  the  train  I  saw  in  the  evening  papers  the  news  of  the 
Anglo-German  agreement  to  defend  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  Open  Door. 
This  was  the  greatest  triumph  of  all.  Lord  S(alisbury)  proposed  this  to  me, 
Ijefore  I  left  England.  I  could  not  accept  it,  because  I  knew  that  unspeakable 
Senate  of  ours  would  not  ratify  it,  and  ever  since  I  have  been  laboring  to  bring 
it  abcnit  without  any  help,  and  succeeded  as  far  as  was  possible  for  one  power 
to  do  it.  Now  then,  two  great  powers,  who  are  not  dependent  upon  the  Senate, 
come  together  and  form  a  compact  to  confirm  and  fortify  my  work,  which 
makes  the  20th  of  October  a  great  day  in  my  little  life." 

3'5  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  248: 

To  Henry  Adams 

N0\'EMBER  21,    1900. 

What  a  business  this  has  been  in  China!    So  far  we  have  got 

on  by  being  honest  and  naif — I  do  not  clearlj'  see  where  we  are  to  come  the 
delayed  cropper?  But  it  will  come.  At  least  we  are  spared  the  infamy  of  an 
alUance  with  Germany.  I  would  rather,  I  think,  be  the  dupe  of  China,  than  the 
chum  of  the  Kaiser.  Have  you  noticed  how  the  world  will  take  anything 
nowadays  from  a  German?  Buelow  said  j'esterday  in  substance — "We  have 
demanded  of  China  everything  we  can  think  of.    If  we  think  of  anything  else 

we  \\\\\  demand  that,  and  be  d d  to  you" — and  not  a  man  in  the  world 

kicks. 

My  heart  is  hea\w  about  John  Bull.  Do  you  twig  his  attitude  to  Germany? 
When  the  Anglo-German  pact  came  out,  I  took  a  day  or  two  to  find  out  what 
it  meant.  I  soon  learned  from  Berlin  that  it  meant  a  horrible  practical  joke 
on  England.  From  London  I  found  out  what  I  had  suspected,  but  what  it 
astounded  me,  after  all,  to  be  assured  of— THAT  THEY  DID  NOT  KNOW! 
Germany  proposed  it,  they  saw  no  harm  in  it,  and  signed.  \\'hen  Japan 
joined  the  i)act,  I  asked  them  why.  They  said,  'We  don't  know,  oiil>-  if  there 
is  any  fun  going  on,  we  want  to  be  in.'  Cassini  is  furious — which  may  be 
because  he  has  not  been  let  into  the  joke." 


262  GERMANY   AND  THE   OPEN  DOOR   IN   CHINA 

British  control  in  China,  seems  to  be  confirmed  to  a  degree  by 
Secretary  von  Biielow  in  his  piibhc  comment"  on  the  position  of 
Germany  in  China  after  the  acquisition  of  Kiao-Chao.  Germany 
had  won,  he  declared,  in  Kiao-Chao  a  strategic  and  political  posi- 
tion which  assured  to  it  a  determining  influence  on  the  future  fate 
of  Eastern  Asia.  From  this  firm  position  Germany  could  look 
upon  the  further  development  of  affairs  there  with  equanimity. 
The  Germans  had  so  great  a  sphere  of  action  before  them  and  such 
important  tasks  ahead  that  they  had  no  need  to  be  envious  of 
the  concessions  made  to  other  powers.  The  gist  of  the  Secretary's 
words  was  that  Germany  was  well  satisfied  with  her  acquisition 
in  China  and  had  secured  enough  room  for  future  development. 
The  conclusion  seems  justifiable,  therefore,  that  the  next  move 
in  her  interest  was  not  to  seek  further  concessions  for  herself  but 
to  check  the  further  acquisitions  of  the  other  powers.  The  par- 
ticular determination  to  prevent  Great  Britain  from  advancing 
her  hold  on  the  Yangtsze  valley  came  out  two  years  later  during 
the  negotiations  concerning  the  withdrawal  of  the  foreign  troops 
from  Shanghai.  At  that  time  Germany  sought  to  obtain  from 
China  the  formal  pledge  not  to  grant  to  any  power  special  achan- 
tages  of  a  political,  military,  maritime  or  economic  nature  on  either 
the  upper  or  lower  Yangtsze.-^'^  The  policy,  therefore,  directly 
suited  to  Germany's  need  was  the  United  States  policy  of  the  "open 
door."  This  principle  the  new  agreement  with  Great  Britain 
reasserted  without  at  the  same  time  upsetting  the  status  quo  or  in 
any  way  disturbing  the  advantages  obtained  at  Kiao-Chao  or 
throughout  the  province  of  Shantung. 

The  replies^^  to  the  Anglo-German  note  were  in  principle  similar 
to  the  rephes  received  by  Secretary  Hay  in  his  first  note  to  the 
powers  the  previous  year.  Russia  and  France  each  declared  that 
the}^  had  already  demonstrated  their  intention  to  preserve  the 

"  V.  R.  '97-'98,  Bd.  Ill,  76  Sitz.,  27.  April,  '98,  S.  1987. 

38  A.  &  P.  1902,  CXXX  (C-1369),  No.  2. 

3"  For  the  replies  of  the  powers  see  "Correspondence  respecting  the  Anglo- 
German  Agreement  of  October  16,  1900,  relating  to  China."  A.  P.  1900 
CV  (C-365).  For  Hay's  description  of  the  attitude  of  the  other  powers, 
especially  Japan,  see  footnote  34. 


JOINT   NOTES   OF   THE    POWERS,    1900  263 

intesrity  of  Cliiiia  and  to  maintain  the  "open  door"  to  commerce 
in  that  Empire — Init  tliat,  in  the  case  of  the  infrin, element  of  these 
j)rinciples  by  any  jiower,  they  reserved  the  rio;ht  to  act  according 
to  circimistances  for  the  guariHno;  of  their  hiterests.  Secretary 
Hay's  reply  smiimed  up  the  previous  efforts  of  the  United  States 
to  secure  recognition  of  the  same  principles  set  forth  in  the  Anglo- 
German  agreement  and  recorded  the  full  sympathy  of  the  American 
Go\ernment  with  those  i)rinciples.  As  to  the  third  article,  however, 
referring  to  the  proi)osed  action  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
in  case  of  infringement  of  the  principles  by  a  third  party,  Secretary 
Hay  deemed  this  to  be  merely  an  arrangement  betvveen  the  two 
contracting  powers  and  did  not  consider  that  the  United  States 
was  called  upon  to  express  an  opinion  in  regard  to  it.  Japan 
took  a  different  stand  from  the  rest,  and  upon  being  assured  that 
acceptance  of  the  agreement  would  place  it  in  the  same  position 
as  if  it  had  concluded  with  Great  Britain  a  like  agreement,  it 
endorsed  unqualifiedly  the  whole  compact  and  was  recognized  as 
a  signatory  rather  than  an  adhering  state. 

Having  thus  definitely  agreed  not  to  use  the  Boxer  uprising  as 
an  occasion  for  further  territorial  demands  on  China,  the  powers 
framed  the  joint  note^°  to  the  Chinese  Government  upon  principles 
of  the  punishment  of  the  responsible  authorities  of  the  massacres 
and  upon  equitable  money  indemnities  to  the  governments  and 
individuals  injured  in  proportion  to  the  losses  suffered.  No  dis- 
tinction was  made  in  the  note  in  the  treatment  to  be  accorded  to 
the  several  nations  by  China,  except  that  in  the  case  of  Germany 
and  JajDan,  each  of  which  had  lost  an  official  representative  at  the 
hands  of  the  Boxers,  China  was  to  despatch  an  extraordinary 
mission,  headed  (in  the  case  of  Germany)  by  an  Imperial  Prince, 
to  express  the  regrets  of  the  Emperor  of  China  for  the  murders 
committed.  During  the  long  negotiations  of  the  commissioners 
on  the  subject  of  the  amount  of  indemnity^'  the  influence  of  the 

"  F.  R.  1901,  Appendix,  p.  59. 
*'  IV)id.,  pp.  141  and  142. 

Mr.  RockhiU  to  Mr.  Hay,  Commissioner  of  the  United  States  to  China 

Peking,  April  23,  1901. 


...     "The  term.s  of  the  .Joint  Note  of  December  24  last  stated  that  the 
indemnity  should  be  'equitable,'  in  other  words  just  and  reasonable,  by  which 


264         GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

United  States  was  constantly  on  the  side  of  moderating  the 
demands  and  reducing  them  to  amounts  which  China  could  pay 
"without  grave  financial  embarrassment  prejudicial  to  the  admin- 
istration of  the  country."  The  influence  of  the  German  representa- 
tive, on  the  other  hand,  was  in  favor  of  a  heavy  indemnity,  reim- 
bursing the  powers  for  their  expenses  as  far  as  the  revenues  of 
China  made  this  possible.*^  In  view  of  the  necessity  of  main- 
taining the  entente  with  Germany,  the  American  Commissioner, 
]\Ir.  Rockhill,  records^^  that  Great  Britain  made  frequent  conces- 

we  understood  that  it  should  not  exceed  the  power  of  China  to  pay  without 
creating  for  it  grave  financial  embarrassments,  prejudicial  to  the  administra- 
tion of  the  country,  administrative  reform,  and  to  all  foreign  interests,  and 
which  might  compel  it  to  have  recourse  to  financial  expedients,  which  all  the 
powers  must  condemn,  imperilling  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
Empire. 

Since  the  indemnity  to  be  asked  of  China  must  therefore  be  reasonable, 
it  mattered  little  to  us  whether  its  annual  revenues  were  eighty  or  a  hundred  or 
more  millions  of  taels.  We  were  bound  to  only  ask  that  which  China  was  in  a 
position  to  pay  us  of  our  losses  and  expenses  and  it  was  not  for  us  to  seek  to 
ascertain  what  was  the  full  extent  of  China's  resources  so  as  to  exact  the  last 
cent  of  it  of  her." 


"The  German  minister  stated  that  he  had  no  instructions  from  his  Gov- 
ernment on  our  proposition,  but  he  thought  that  if  the  commission  charged 
with  studying  the  revenue  ascertained  that  China  could  pay  the  full  amount 
of  the  expenses  of  the  powers  she  should  be  made  to  do  so,  and  that  he  saw  no 
reason  why  the  latter  should  show  excessive  generositj'  in  the  matter." 

Ibid.,  p.  171. 

Mr.  Rockhill  to  Mr.  Hay 

Commissioner  of  the  United  States  to  China, 
Peking,  May  22,  1901. 

"The  Austrian,  German,  and  Russian  ministers  were'  opposed  to  this 
proposition,  the  German  minister  expressing  himself  most  strongly  on  the 
subject,  saying  that  his  instructions  directed  him  to  insist  on  the  integral 
payment  of  every  cent  spent,  or  to  be  spent,  by  his  Government  on  the  expedi- 
tion to  north  China.  I  fancy,  however,  his  Government  has  before  this  prac- 
tically accepted  the  British  proposal." 

«  Ibid.,  p.  312  ff.     450,000,000  Haekwan  taels  equal  about  $340,000,000. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  175. 

Mr.  Rockhill  to  Mr.  Hay 

Conunissioner  of  the  United  States  to  China 

Peking,  China,  May  25,  1901. 


"The  position  of  Germany  on  the  question  of  the  indemnity,  has,  as  I 
have  advised  you  repeatedly,  been  most  uncompromising.  The  urgent 
necessity  for  Great  Britain  to  maintain  her  entente  with  Germany  in  China 
is,  of  course,  responsible  for  the  numerous  concessions  she  has  recently  made 


WlTllDKAW  AL    OF    POWERS    FROM    SIlAXCMAl  265 

sioiis  to  this  Gerinan  viewpoint.  The  total  indeiiuuty  as  finally 
agreed  upon  was  45(),(K)0,()l)()  Haikwan  taels,  an  amount  greater 
than  that  suggested  as  fitting  by  the  United  States. 

The  next  event  involving  the  assertion  of  the  "open  door" 
})olicy  by  Germany  occurred  in  1902  at  the  occasion  of  the  with- 
drawal of  the  foreign  troops  from  Shanghai.''*  During  the  dis- 
turbances the  cit>-  had  been  occupied  by  British,  French,  German 
and  Japanese  troops,  but  with  the  restoration  of  order,  negotia- 
tions were  initiated  for  a  simultaneous  withdrawal.  The  condi- 
tions'*^ laid  down  by  Germany  for  the  withdrawal  of  her  troops 
were,  first,  that  a  previous  arrangement  should  be  made  for  the 
simultaneous  and  uniform  evacuation;  secondly,  that  in  case  any 
power  should  proceed  to  a  fresh  occupation  of  Shanghai,  Germany 
should  reserve  the  right  to  take  similar  action;  and,  thirdly,  that 
the  Peking  Government  and  the  Yangtsze  Viceroys  should  engage 
"not  to  grant  to  any  power  special  advantages  of  a  political, 
military,  maritime  or  economic  nature,  nor  to  allow  the  occupa- 
tion of  any  other  points  commanding  the  river  either  below  or 
above  Shanghai."  The  German  Government  explained  that  this 
did  not  refer  to  individual  concessions — such  as  railway  conces- 
sions, but  that  its  purpose  was  merely  to  prevent  "  such  grants  as 
would  entail  the  exclusion  of  free  competition  on  the  part  of  the 
other  states  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  principle  of  the  'open 
door.'  "  These  conditions  were  accepted  by  China.  Great  Britain 
whose  sphere  of  interest  was  the  Yangtsze  Valley,  protested  at 
once  both  to  Germany  and  to  China  on  the  ground  that  the  "open 
door"  principle  was  already  sufficiently  safeguarded  by  existing 
agreements;  and  that  such  an  arrangement  would  be  binding  only 
on  a  limited  number  of  powers  and  restricted  to  only  a  portion  of 

to  German  insistence  on  being  paid  the  last  cent  of  her  expenses.  The  most 
remarkable  of  these  concessions  is  found,  however,  in  the  British  Government's 
willingness  to  have  the  tariff  on  imports  raised  to  an  effective  5  per  cent,  ad 
valorem,  without  compensating  commercial  advantages." 

See  also  A.  &  P.  1902,  CXXX  (C-1005),  Nos.  37,  56.  62,  65,  79,  90,  96, 
and  100. 

«  A.  &  P.  1902,  CXXX  (C-1369). 

«  A.  &  P.  1902,  CXXX,  No.  22  (C-1369).  The  first  two  conditions  were 
also  laid  down  bv  France. 


266  GERMANY   AND    THE    OPEN   DOOR   IN    CHINA 

Chinese  dominions.  To  the  Chinese  Government  the  IMarquess 
of  Lansdowne  sent  word^*^  that  the  British  Government  would 
not  pay  any  regard  to  any  pledges  given  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment or  Viceroys  by  which  the  British  freedom  of  action  in  the 
future  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  protection  of  British 
interests  in  the  Yangtsze  region  would  be  limited.  To  the  German 
Government  Lord  Lansdowne  declared,  further,  that  the  British 
Government  objected  to  the  German  condition,  not  because  it 
had  any  intention  of  receding  from  the  "open  door"  policy  but 
because  the  condition  seemed  specially  directed  against  Great 
Britain.^^    The  German  Government  therefore  modified  its  con- 


«  Ibid.,  No.  32. 

The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Sir  E.  Satow 

Foreign  Office,  October  16,  1902. 
"(Telegraphic) 

EVACUATION  of  Shanghai. 

Tell  Prince  Ching  that  His  Majesty's  Government  deeply  resent  his  treat- 
ment of  them.  Remind  him  that  Chinese  interests  have  constantly  been 
upheld  by  them,  and  that  the  consent  of  Germany  and  France  was  due  to  our 
initiative. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  compelled  by  Prince  Ching's  duplicity  to 
reconsider  their  attitude,  and  he  will  be  responsible  should  withdrawal  of 
troops  consequently  not  take  place. 

You  may  communicate  to  him  the  substance  of  reply  of  His  Majesty's 
Government  to  the  German  Government,  and  inform  him  that  we  shall  not 
pay  regard  to  any  pledges  given  by  the  Chinese  Govermuent  or  Viceroys  by 
which  their  and  our  freedom  of  action  in  the  future  as  regards  the  maintenance 
of  order  and  protection  of  our  interests  in  the  Yang-tsze  region  would  be 
limited. 

This  telegram  should  be  repeated  to  Sir  C.  MacDonald." 

^'  Ibid.,  No.  47. 

The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Count  Metternich 

Foreign  Office,  November  6,  1902. 


"To  that  condition  His  Majesty's  Government  took  exception,  not,  as 
you  are  aware,  because  they  desired  to  recede  from  their  adherence  to  the 
principle  of  the  "open  door,"  or  because  thej^  are  not  most  anxious  to  preserve 
the  sovereign  rights  of  China,  but  because  they  can  see  no  reason  why  the 
withdrawal  of  their  troops  from  Shangha*  should  be  made  the  occasion  for  a 
fresh  affirmation  of  those  accepted  principles,  or  for  a  renunciation  which,  if  it 
had  any  new  meaning  at  all,  seemed  specially  directed  against  Great  Britain. 

I  understood  from  your  Excellency  that  the  actual  terms  of  the  General 
declaration  which  has  now  been  made  by  the  Chinese  Government  are  not 
yet  in  your  possession,  but  I  gather  from  the  description  given  of  it  in  your 
note  that  it  has  reference  not  only  to  the  Yang-tsze  region,  but  to  the  whole 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  with  this  limitation,  that  it  would  not  extend  to  any 
alienation  of  sovereign  or  territorial  rights  by  China  which  might  already  have 
taken  place. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  not  a  party  to  this  arrangement,  and  do  not 
therefore  consider  themselves  affected  by  it,  and  of  this  they  have  informed 
the  Chinese  Government." 


GERMAN-CHINESE   AGREEMENT,    1902  267 

(litioii  to  ai)i)ly  to  tlir  whole  of  the  Chmese  Empire  aiid  secured 
from  China  a  formal  declar/ation  that  the  empire  would  not  part 
with  any  of  its  sovereign  riuhts  nor  would  it  agree  to  any  ])referen- 
tial  right  which  was  opposed  to  the  principle  of  the  "open  door."^'' 
The  German  ambassador  explained^^  to  the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne 
that  none  of  the  powers  should  take  offense  at  the  agreement 
since  they  had  all  repeatedly  declared  that  they  would  respect  the 
sovereignty  of  China  and  the  principle  of  the  open  door;  that  the 
])resent  agreement  was  binding  on  China  alone,  interfered  with  the 
rights  of  no  one  and  aimed  only  at  maintaining  the  status  quo. 
^Moreover,  he  declared,  this  declaration  of  China  in  no  way  preju- 
diced the  Anglo-German  treaty  of  October,  1900,  nor  the  adher- 
ence of  the  powers  to  the  principle  of  the  "open  door,"  agreed  to 
at  the  suggestion  of  the  Ignited  States,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
completed  and  confirmed  such  declarations.  The  INIarquess  of 
Lansdowne,  however,  reasserted  that,  as  Her  INIajesty's  Govern- 
ment was  not  a  party  to  the  arrangement,  it  would  not  consider^ 
Great  Britain  to  be  affected  by  it,  and  he  so  informed  the  Chinese 
Government. 


«  Ibid.,  No.  43.  «  Ibid.,  No.  48. 

Count  Metternich  to  the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne.     (Received  Nov.  7) 
(Translation) 
^ly  Lord,  German  Embassy,  London,  Nov.  7,  19  02. 

"1  had  the  honor  to-day  to  receive  your  Excellency's  note  of  the  6th 
instant,  and  ^hall  not  fail  to  make  known  its  contents  to  my  Government. 

I  would,  however,  at  once  venture  to  observe  that  the  condition  which  was 
referred  to  in  the  note  from  this  Embassy  of  the  7th  ultimo,  and  to  which 
objection  is  taken  by  the  British  Government,  cannot  be  considered  as  specially 
directed  against  Great  Britain.  By  a  declaration  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment will  not  cede  any  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  China  and  will  not  sanc- 
tion any  monopolj'  in  contradiction  to  the  i^rinciple  of  the  open  door  none  of 
the  participating  Powers  should  be  offended,  as  the  latter  have  re])eatedly 
positively  declared  that  they  would  respect  the  sovereignty  of  China  as  well  as 
the  principle  of  the  open  door.  Tliat  engagements  which  are  given  to  us  alone 
by  China,  and  which,  with  the  exception  of  China,  are  binding  on  no  one 
which  interfere  with  the  rights  of  no  one,  and  only  aim  at  maintaining  the 
stahis  quo  should  be  taken  as  containing  a  provision  directed  against  Great 
Britain  must  be  the  result  of  a  misapjirehension. 

As  the  Imperial  Government  merely  took  jiart  in  the  occupation  of  Shanghai 
because  the  serious  crisis  which  prevailed  in  the  interior  of  China  two  years 
ago  might  have  brought  about  a  change  in  the  status  quo  in  tlie  Yang-tsze 
territor}-,  it  apjieared  only  logical  to  require  guarantees  from  China  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  the  evacuation  of  Shanghie,  which  guarantees,  on  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  peace,  would  take  the  place  of  the  actual  guarantees  given  by  the 
occupation  of  Shanghae. 

I  have  etc. 
(signed)  P.  Metternich. 


268         GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

As  is  evident,  these  negotiations  represented  a  diplomatic 
game  of  the  two  powers.  Germany  had  in  the  agreement  of  1900 
secured  Great  Britain's  promise  not  to  infringe  upon  the  principle 
of  the  "  open  door  "  in  her  sphere  of  interest.  The  German  Govern- 
ment now  made  this  more  secure  by  obtaining  a  proiiiise  from 
China  that  no  further  cessions  of  her  sovereignty  would  be  made 
and  no  monopolies  granted  throughout  the  empire.  Although  it 
is  self-evident  that  China  had  no  desire  to  make  further  conces- 
sions and  would  avoid  it  if  possible,  still  it  was  valuable  to  Ger- 
many to  have  this  stated  in  formal  contract,  so  that  any  breach  of 
that  contract  in  the  future  might  furnish  ground  for  corresponding 
new  claims  by  Germany.  In  the  1900  agreement  Germany  had 
bound  herself  to  maintain  the  "  open  door."  In  the  1902  agreement 
she  had  bound  China  as  well. 

Two  years  later,  during  the  Husso-Japanese  war,  Germany  took 
the  initiative  still  more  definitely  in  defense  of  the  "open  door." 
This  was  done  through  the  medium  of  the  United  States."**  The 
German  Emperor  suggested  that  the  American  Government  call 
upon  the  powers  to  use  their  good  offices  to  influence  Russia  and 
Japan  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  China  outside  the  sphere  of 
mihtary  operations.  Secretary  Hay,  in  agreement  with  President 
Roosevelt,  acquiesced  in  the  suggestion,  modifying  it  by  eliminat- 
ing the  clause  "outside  the  sphere  of  mihtary  operations"  and 
adding  to  the  "neutrality"  the  "administrative  entity"  of  China. 

The  following  year  Germany  again  called  upon  the  United  States 
to  take  action  in  behalf  of  the  open  door.^^  The  Emperor  sent  word 
to  President  Roosevelt  that  he  believed  the  integrity  of  China  to 
be  gravely  menaced.  He  was  convinced  that  a  coahtion  was 
being  formed  under  the  leadership  of  France  for  the  spoliation  of 
China,  the  combination  consisting  of  France,  England  and  Russia. 
He  therefore  requested  the  United  States  to  frustrate  this  coalition 
by  asking  all  the  powers  having  interests  in  the  Far  East  whether 
they  Avould  pledge  themselves  not  to  claim  any  compensation  in 
China  or  elsewhere  for  any  services  they  might  render  to  the 

'"  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  p.  372.     Also  F.  R.  1904,  p.  309  ff,  327  ff. 
5'  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  H,  pp.  385  ff. 


OPEN-DOOR    DIl'LOMACY    DlHINCi    KUSSO-JAPANESK    WAR      269 

lielligeroiits.  This  would  force  the  powers  to  reveal  any  designs 
against  the  "open  door."  If  the  United  States  should  accede  to 
this  request,  Germany  would,  of  course,  at  once  declare  her  own 
policy  of  disinterestedness. 

President  Roosevelt  and  Secretary  Hay  agreed  that  it  would  be 
well  to  accept  the  Kaiser's  suggestion.  Accordingly  the  Secre- 
tary- framed  a  circular  letter^-  and  despatched  it  to  the  American 
embassies  throughout  Europe.  It  stated  that  it  had  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  United  States  that  apprehension  existed  on  the 
part  of  some  of  the  powers  lest  claims  be  made  after  the  close  of  the 
RusstvJapanese  war  for  concession  of  Chinese  territory  to  neutral 
powers.  While  the  President  was  loath  to  share  this  apprehension, 
the  United  States  considered  it  fitting  to  reassert  the  position  it  had 
maintained  and  which  it  had  repeatedly  made  known,  namely,  the 
maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  open  door  to  com- 
merce in  the  Orient.  The  United  States,  therefore,  in  the  existing 
situation  disclaimed  any  thoughTof  acquiring  territorial  rights  or 
control  in  the  Chinese  Empire  and  invited  the  other  governments 

=■  F.  R.  190.5,  p.  1.  ^     ^ 

(Circular  Telegram)  "^ 

Department  of  State, 
Washington, 

Jan.  13,  1905. 
To  the  .American  Ambassadors  to  Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Great 
Britain,  Italy  and  Portugal. 
"It  has  come  to  our  knowledge  that  apprehension  exists  on  the  part  of 
some  of  the  powers  that  in  the  eventual  negotiations  for  peace  between  Russia 
and  Japan  claim  may  be  made  for  the  concession  of  Chinese  territory  to  neutral 
powers.  The  President  would  be  loath  to  share  this  api)rehension,  believing 
that  the  introduction  of  extraneous  interests  would  seriously  embarrass  and 
postpone  the  settlement  of  the  issues^  involved  in  the  present  contest  in  the 
Far  East,  thus  making  more  remote  the  attainment  of  that  peace  which  is  so 
earnestly  to  be  desired.  P'or  its  part,  the  United  States  has  repeatedly  made 
its  position  well  known,  and  has  been  gratified  at  the  cordial  welcome  accorded 
to  its  efforts  to  .strengthen  and  perpetuate  the  broad  policy  of  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  China  and  the  "open  door"  in  the  Orient,  whereby  equality 
of  conmiercial  opportunity  and  access  shall  be  enjoyed  by  all  nations.  Holiling 
these  views  the  United  States  disclaims  any  thought  of  reserved  territorial 
rights  or  control  in  the  Chinese  Empire,  and  it  is  deemed  fitting  to  make  this 
purpose  frankly  known  and  to  remove  all  ai)prehonsion  on  this  score  so  far  as 
concerns  the  policy  of  this  nation,  which  maintains  so  considerable  a  share  of 
the  Pacific  commerce  of  China  and  which  holds  such  important  jrosses.sions  in 
the  western  Pacific,  almost  at  the  gateway  of  China. 

You  will  bring  this  matter  to  the  notice  of  the  government  to  which  you  are 
accredited,  and  you  will  invite  the  expression  of  its  views  thereon. 

JoH.N  Hay." 


270        GERMANY  AND  THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  CHINA 

to  express  their  views  on  the  subject.  The  repUes  from  all  the 
powers  declared  them  to  be  in  full  accord  with  the  principle  set 
forth  by  the  United  States.  Germany's  acceptances^  of  her  own 
invitation  was  of  course  especially  emphatic  and  gratification'  was 
expressed  that  the  American  Government  intended  to  continue  to 
assist  in  the  maintenance  and  strengthening  of  the  policy  of  the 
integrity  of  China  and  the  "open  door"  in  the  Far  East. 

It  is  thus  clear  that  after  the  taking  of  Kiao-Chao,  and  beginning 
with  the  Anglo-German  agreement  of  1900,  the  United  States' 
doctrine  of  the  "open  door"  received  the  active  support  of  Ger- 
many. The  German  Government  claimed  that  it  had  always 
acted  upon  that  doctrine  and  that  it  had  demonstrated  this  in 
declaring  Kiao-Chao  a  free  port.  This  explanation  ignored, 
however,  the  special  privileges  secured  to  Germany  in  the  province 
of  Shantung.  These,  while  they  left  all  other  nations  on  a  par 
with  one  another  in  relation  to  the  trade  of  that  province,  dis- 
criminated in  favor  of  German  industry,  products  and  capital 
in  a  manner  directly  contrary  to  the  doctrine.  The  general  atti- 
tude of  the  two  countries  toward  China  itself  was  radically  different 
The  United  Sta.tes,  although  possessing  a  most-favored-nation 
treaty  with  China,^^  did  not  assert  its  rights  under  that  treaty  as 

^'  F.  R.  1905,  p.  3  (Inclosure — translation  by  source). 

The  German  Chancellor  to  Ambaesador  Tower 

Berlin,  Jan.  IS,  1905. 

"Mr.  Ambassador:  I  have  had  the  honor  of  receiving  your  communication 
of  the  14th  of  January-,  1905,  in  which  you  were  good  enough  to  set  forth  the 
position  of  your  Government  in  regard  to  certain  questions  raised  by  the 
present  war  between  Russia  and  Japan.  I  am  extremely  gratified  to  learn 
by  it  that  the  President  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
intend  to  continue  to  assist  in  the  maintenance  and  strengthening  of  the  {policy 
of  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  ojjen  door  in  the  Far  East  for  the  benefit  of 
the  free  conunercial  intercourse  of  all  nations  and  that  they  have  no  thought 
of  acquiring  territorial  rights  in  the  Chinese  Empire. 

This  view  corresponds  entirely  with  that  of  the  German  Government  which 
has  repeatedly  declared  its  adherence  to  the  principles  of  the  integritj^  of  China 
and  the  open  door  in  the  Far  East.  Its  purpose  is  absolutely  to  stand  by  its 
former  declarations.  Germany's  position  is  defined  in  the  Anglo-German 
agreement  of  the  16th  of  Octol)er,  1900,  which  was  communicated  at  that  time 
to  all  the  jiowers  interested  and  accepted  by  them.  In  this  agreement  the 
Imix'rial  Government  has  bound  itself  to  support  the  principle  of  the  open  door 
in  China  wherever  its  influence  may  be  felt.  It  is  therefore  scarcely  necessary 
to  add  that  the  Imperial  Government  does  not  seek  for  itself  any  further 
acquisition  of  territory  in  China. 
I  avail  etc. 

BUELOW." 

s-iIMalloy:  Vol.  I,  p.  221. 


GERMAN'    AND    AMERICAN'    POLICIES    IN   CHINA  271 

a  basis  for  claim  to  Chinese  territory,  when  other  nations  were 
acquiring  ports  and  other  concessions  on  the  ground  of  their  most- 
favored-nation  treaties  with  China.  The  United  States  announced 
at  the  outset  and  consistently  acted  upon  its  purpose  of  maintain- 
ing the  integrity  of  China-^^  even  though  it  had  as  much  basis 
as  the  others  for  claims  to  similar  concessions.  In  the  case  of 
Germany  the  policy  was  governed  by  a  deliberate  expansion 
system,  which  ignored  the  rights  of  China  and  sought  to  justify 
itself  by  the  acti(ms  of  the  other  European  powers.  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Russia  had  each  secured  a  foothold  in  the  Empire, 
therefore  Germany  had  determined  to  secure  one  also  and  merely 
waited  for  the  suitable  occasion,  which  came  in  1897.  The  atti- 
tufle  of  the  government  was  described  openly  by  von  Buelow 
before  the  Reichstag  at  the  time  of  the  seizure  of  Kiao-Chao.^*^  The 
Secretary  stated  that  while  the  partition  of  China  would  not 
have  been  initiated  by  Germany,  that  the  Government  had  merely 
seen  to  it  that  whatever  happened  Germany  should  not  come  out 

5^  Memoirs  of  Li  Hung  Chang,  p.  234: 

"Peking,  at  U.  S.  Legation,  October  19. — Todaj-  I  received  an  American 
newspaperman,  and  gave  him  a  lengthy  interview.  I  would  not  have  talked 
at  all  with  him,  but  for  two  things:  his  paper,  which  is  one  of  great  influence 
at  Washington,  has  been  China's  advocate  in  all  this  miserable  affair;  and 
secondly,  he  told  me  that  he  tried  to  get  an  interview  with  me  at  the  Phila- 
delphia junction  (Germantown)  but  failed.  So  I  made  it  up  with  him,  and  sent 
the  thanks  of  China  and  myself  to  those  fair-dealing  people  who  live  in  the 
land  of  Lincoln  and  Grant  and  McKinley." 

'«  V.  R.  '97-'98,  Bd.  IH,  76  Sitz.,  27.  April,  '99,  S.  1987.     (transl.  by  author) : 

"Reference  has  been  made  to  the  partition  of  China.  Such  a  partition  would 
at  any  rate  not  have  proceeded  from  us;  we  have  only  seen  to  it  in  season  that 
whatever  may  happen,  we  shall  not  come  out  entirely  empty  handed.  When 
a  railroad  train  shall  start  does  not  always  depend  on  the  inclination  of  the 
traveller,  but  (it  is  his  business  to  see)  that  he  does  not  miss  connections.  The 
devil  takes  the  hindmost!  (Den  Letzen  beissen  die  Hunde)  (Amusement) 
But  we  do  not  desire — and  this  I  wish  to  mark  with  especial  emphasis — that  it 
should  come  to  a  partition  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  And  I  do  not  believe  today 
that  such  a  i)artition  will  occur  within  the  visible  future  (in  absehbarer  Zeit). 
At  any  rate  we  have  won  and  herewith  I  think  are  best  summed  up  the  reasons, 
which  led  u.s  to  Kiao-Chao  and  al.'^o  the  significance  of  Kiao-Chao  for  us — in 
Kiao-Chao  a  strategic  and  political  position,  which  assures  us  a  determining 
influence  on  the  future  fate  of  East  Asia.  From  this  firm  po-sition,  we  can 
await  the  further  develoiiment  of  affairs  with  calmness  and  ecjuanimity.  We 
have  before  us  so  great  a  sphere  of  action  and  such  important  tasks  tliat  we 
need  not  begruilge  other  nations  the  concessions  granted  to  them.  (Very 
good!)  German  foreign  policy  will,  as  everywhere,  so  also  in  East  Asia,  under- 
stand how  to  go  its  way  calmly,  firmly  and  peacefully.  We  will  nowhere  play 
the  role  of  disturber  of  the  peace,  but  also  not  that  of  Cinderella.  (Animated 
bravo!)" 
18 


272  GERMANY  AND   THE   OPEN  DOOR   IN   CHINA 

empty-handed.  It  was  not  the  privilege  of  the  traveller  to  deter- 
mine when  the  train  should  start,  but  it  was  his  business  to  see 
that  he  did  not  miss  it.  In  other  words,  as  the  secretary  expressed 
it,  it  was  a  case  of  "the  devil  takes  the  hindmost"  ("den  Letzten 
beissen  die  Hunde").  However,  having  secured  in  China  that 
which  suited  well  Germany's  putrposes,  both  from  the  viewpoints 
of  strategic  position  and  commercial  opportunity,  the  Imperial 
Government  considered  that  the  interests  of  the  empire  dictated 
a  maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  For  this  the  best  instrument  was 
kthe  American  doctrine  of  the  "open  door."  The  utterance  of  that 
doctrine,  however,  came  Avith  better  grace  from  its  first  champion, 
the  United  States.  For  this  reason"  the  Emperor  called  upon 
President  Roosevelt  for  a  reassertion  of  this  doctrine  at  the  time 
when  the  status  quo  in  China  seemed,  to  him  again  threatened. 
The  United  States  was  glad  to  take  advantage  of  another  oppor- 
tunity to  secure  from  the  powers  reinforcement  of  its  well-known 
principle.  Therefore,  it  resulted  that  from  the  time  of  the  Anglo- 
German  compact  to  the  end  of  the  period  under  consideration 
both  the  United  States  and  Germany  were  acting  as  champions 
of  the  "open  door." 

"  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  388.  Mr.  Thayer  holds  that  the  Kaiser 
felt  isolated  from  the  other  great  powers  at  this  time  and  feared  that  they 
aimed  at  the  partition  of  China  without  giving  Germany  a  share  of  the  spoils. 
Mr.  Thaj^er  also  holds  that  a  desire  to  humiliate  France  for  intrigues  in  Morocco 
was  an  additional  reason  for  the  Kaiser's  approach  to  the  United  States  on 
this  question.     Secretary  Hay  himself  records  in  his  diary: 

"What  the  whole  performance  meant  to  the  Kaiser  it  is  difficult  to  see. 
But  there  is  no  possible  doubt  that  we  have  scored  for  China." 

Mr.  Elihu  Root  spoke  of  this  subject  in  his  address  as  Temporarj'  Chairman 
of  the  Republican  National  Convention  at  Chicago  in  1904.  (See  "The 
Military  and  Colonial  Policy  of  the  United  States:  Address  and  Reports,"  by 
Elihu  Root,  pp.  105  and  106).     Mr.  Root  stated: 

"None  other  had  won  confidence  in  the  sincerity  of  its  purpose,  and  none 
other  but  America  could  render  the  service  which  we  have  rendered  to 
humanity  in  China  during  the  past  four  years.  High  evidence  of  that  enviable 
position  of  our  country  is  furnished  by  the  fact  that  when  all  Europe  was  in 
apprehension  lest  the  field  of  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  should  so  spread 
as  to  involve  China's  ruin  and  a  imiversal  conflict,  it  was  to  the  American  gov- 
ernment that  the  able  and  far-sighted  German  Emperor  appealed,  to  take  the 
lead  again  in  bringing  about  an  agreement  for  the  limitation  of  the  field  of 
action,  and  the  preservation  of  the  administrative  entity  of  China  outside  of 
Manchuria;  and  that  was  accomplished.     ...     " 


CHAPTER    VIII 

ger:many  and  the  monroe  doctrine 

F(^R  a  com})lete  and  adequate  study  of  the  German  policy  toward 
the  fundamental  American  policy  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  many 
factors  besides  the  events  leading  to  diplomatic  negotiations 
should  be  taken  into  account.  Such  a  study  should  give  full 
weight  to  the  general  expansion  policy  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment as  expressed  openly  by  its  representatives  and  demonstrated 
by  its  colonial  acquisitions.  Account  should  be  taken  of  the 
l)rograms  framed  and  voiced  by  the  Pan-Germanists,  opposed  by 
the  Radicals  and  ^Moderates,  but  followed — at  some  distance — by 
the  Imperial  Government.  There  should  also  be  considered  the 
avenues  through  which  this  policy  was  conducted — the  effective 
support  given  by  the  government  to  German  enterprise  in  foreign 
countries  and  the  efforts  of  the  government  to  use  the  stream  of 
German  emigration  to  further  the  commerce  and  national  prestige 
of  the  empire.  It  was  the  consciousness  of  these  facts,  rather  than 
the  factors  of  actual  controversy  between  the  two  countries,  which 
caused  the  American  public  to  look  upon  Germany  as  the  new  foe 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  this  chapter,  however,  the  attemjjt 
only  is  made  to  view-  the  German  Government's  attitude  from 
tiiose  diplomatic  negotiations  in  which  the  IMonroe  Doctrine  was 
the  main  principle  involved. 

During  the  forty->ear  period  under  consideration  there  were 
comparatively  few  di])lomatic  controversies  between  Germany  and 
the  United  States  relating  to  a  possible  violation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  with  the  exception  of  the  Venezuela  episode  of  1902 
to  1904,  none  which — so  far  as  published  documents  reveal — 
threatened  to  become  serious.  The  first  episode  occurred  shortly 
after  the  unification  of  the  empire  in  1871  and  related  to  the  country 
so  frequently  the  center  of  complications  with  European  powers — 


274  GERMANl'   AND   THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

Venezuela.  Germany  planned^  to  present  to  the  various  powers 
having  claims  against  that  country  the  proposal  that  they  unite 
to  secure  satisfaction  of  their  claims.  Before  taking  the  step, 
however, '  Baron  Gerolt,  the  German  Minister  at  Washington, 
consulted  Secretary  Fish  as  to  how  the  United  States  would  receive 
such  a  proposal.  He  had  been  instructed  not  to  make  the  proposal 
formally  to  the  American  Government  unless  sure  that  it  would 
be  favorably  received.  Secretary  Fish  informed  the  baron  that 
the  United  States  had  a  vivid  recollection  of  a  combined  European 
movement  against  Mexico  a  few  years  previous,  and  would  wish 
now  to  know  more  definitely  Germany's  intentions  and  the  causes 
of  her  complaints  against  ^^enezuela.  If  the  object  was  merely 
a  united  remonstrance  against  the  chronic  revolutionary  conditions 
of  ^  enezuela  and  her  non-observance  of  obligations,  the  American 
Government  would  not  object  and  would  itself  make  a  similar 
protest.  But  if,  however,  the  purpose  were  the  forcible  coercion 
of  ^'enezuela  by  a  combination  of  European  powers,  then  the 
United  States  would  view  such  action  with  the  greatest  concern. 
Xo  forcible  action  was  taken,  the  countries  leaving  their  claims 
to  mixed  commissions  for  settlement.'  Mr.  Bancroft,  American 
INIinister  to  Germany,  wrote  to  Secretary  Fish^  that  Germany 
intended  nothing  further  than  the  protection  of  her  subjects  in 
^'enezuela  and  would  do  nothing  against  the  wishes  of  the  United 
States.  The  British  minister  at  Washington  showed  that  the 
British  Charge  d 'Affaires  at  Caracas  had  been  instructed  to  join 


1  Moore:  Vol.  VI,  p.  531. 

-  House    Reports    No.  29,  42nd  Cong.,    2nd    Sess.     Also    A.  &  P.,   1871. 
LXXll  (C-30S),  571. 

^  J.  C.  B.  Davis  Corresp. 
Fish  to  Davis. 

July  7,  1871. 


"Bancroft  writes  me  that  Germany  means  nothing  in  the  Venezuela 
business,  except  to  show  a  watchfulness  over  the  rights  of  some  of  her  subjects 
in  l)usiness  there,  and  that  she  will  do  nothing  without  advising  us  or  against 
our  wishes.  He  exjjresses  a  desire  to  be  allowed  to  say  that  in  the  Joint 
Commission  the  U.  S.  Commissioners  wished  that  Germany  (name)  one  of  the 
Arbitrators  and  that  we  i)roposed  to  refer  the  question  to  Germany — the 
latter  I  am  not  sure  that  we  did  in  terms — we  sounded  them.  I  do  not  know 
that  there  will  be  any  harm  in  letting  Bancroft  state  the  facts — not  officially 
or  by  authority  l)ut  he  may  'blal).'  Do  you  see  any  objection?  If  not  you 
may  say  so  to  him." 


PROPOSAL    FOH    .JOINT   ACTION    AC.AINST   VENEZUELA,   1871       275 

in  a  diplomatic  repJresentation  to  Venezuela,  hut  to  <>;()  no  further 
should  the  representation  be  unsuccessful.'*  The  episode  did  not 
develop  into  any  real  controversy"  but  served  to  place  attain  on 
record  the  opposition  of  the  United  States  to  combined  action 
by  European  powers  against  an  American  State. 

In  1S74  the  rumor  became  current  that  Germany  was  nef];otiatinjj 
with  Denmark  for  the  acquisition  of  the  Danish  West  Indies." 
Mr.  Bancroft  was  instructed  to  inquire  discreetly  into  the  subject 
and  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  the  report,  as  the  transfer  of  those 
islands  to  another  European  power  could  not  be  regarded  with 
favor  by  the  United  States.  Mr.  Bancroft  was  emphatic  in  his 
denial  of  the  report  that  Germany  was  planning  to  acquire  the 

^  J.  C.  B.  Davis:    Journal. 

July  6,  1871. 

"Ho  (Sir  Edward  Thornton  (British  minister  to  United  States))  then  said 
that  Mr.  Fish  had  s{)oken  to  him  about  a  communication  from  Baron  Gerolt 
to  this  Government  about  Venezuela,  proposing  a  joint  note  of  the  several 
creditor  governments  to  be  followed  Ijy  joint  hostile  action  if  the  note  should 
l)rove  to  he  ineffectual,  and  that  Mr.  Fish  had  informed  him  that  he  had 
replied  to  the  Baron  that  should  such  a  note  l)e  followed  by  comliined  hostile 
action  from  the  European  governments  the  United  States  would  look  with 
disfavor  upon  such  a  course.  Sir  Edward  then  said  that  he  would,  although 
not  instructed  to  do  so  (show?  a  dispatch  which  he  had  received  from  his 
government,  and  proceeded  to  read  a  dispatch  inclosing  a  copy  of  instructions 
to  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires  at  Caracas.  It  appeared  from  this  that  the 
Charge  was  instructed  to  advise  with  his  colleagues  and  to  join  in  a  dii:)lomatic 
representation  but  to  make  it  clear  that  Great  Britain  would  not  imdertako 
to  go  further  should  the  representation  be  unsuccessful." 

^  F.  R..  LS73,  p.  1171.     The  American  representative  at  Caracas  recorded 
the  following  year  (December  10,  1S72)  the  visit  of  a  fleet  of  five  German 
war  vessels  at  La  Guayra,  but  could  not  rejjort  as  to  its  oV)ject. 
«  F.  R.,  1874,  p.  439  f.,  No.  253. 
Mr.  Bancroft  to  Mr.  Fish. 

A.MEKic.\N  Legation, 

Berlin,  January  9,  1S74. 


"As  to  Saint  Thomas,  Germany  does  not  want  it,  would  not  accept  it  as 
a  gift;  has  no  hankering  after  that  or  any  other  West  India  colony;  from 
principle  avoids  them;  wishes  at  most  a  coaling  station  in  Asiatic  seas,  and 
that  only  in  case  it  can  be  enjoyed  in  security  without  being  made  a  military 
I^ost.  This  statement  I  have  had  often  from  every  member  of  the  govern- 
ment that  could  by  any  jiossibility  have  charge  of  any  negotiation  made  for 
the  acfjuisition  of  territory.  They  have  said  it  to  me  over  and  over  again. 
This  much  in  answer  to  a  telegram  received  night  before  last  through  General 
Schenck. 

Geo.  Bancroft." 

Mr.  Bancroft  was  therefore  instructed  by  Secretary  Fish  to  be  watchful 
should  any  negotiations  of  this  character  occur. 


276  GERMANY  AND  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE 

Danish  islands,  and  a  similar  denial  was  made^  by  ]\Ir.  Cramer, 
the  American  representati^'e  at  Copenhagen.*  From  this  date 
throughout  the  period  under  consideration  no  evidence  was 
published  connecting  German  diplomacy  with  the  Danish  posses- 
sions in  the  West  Indies.^ 

For  over  twenty  years  after  this  report  the  published  corre- 
spondence reveals  no  negotiations  betAveen  Germany  and  the 
United  States  involving  the  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
In  1897,  however,  Germany  made  a  demonstration  of  national 
power  in  the  West  Indies.  A  German  citizen,  Emil  Lueders,''' 
living  in  Haiti,  came  into  conflict  with  the  local  authorities,  and 
on  the  charge  of  assaulting  a  policeman,  who  had  entered  his  place 
of  business  without  a  warrant,  was  sentenced  to  prison  for  a  year. 
The  sentence  was  made  under  an  act  which  denied  the  defendant 
the  right  of  appeal.  The  personal  efforts  of  the  German  representa- 
tive to  secure  his  release  were  fruitless.  Therefore  the  German 
Government  took  up  the  matter  and  instructed  its  representative 
to  demand  the  release  of  Lueders,  the  punishment  of  the  officials, 
an  apology  and  indemnity.  The  demands  were  presented  by  the 
German  representative  to  the  President  of  Haiti  in  person  at  a 
public  reception  instead  of  through  the  Foreign  Office.  The 
Haitian  President  resented  what  he  considered  to  be  an  indignity 

'  F.  R.,  1874,  p.  368. 

*  F.  R.,  1879,  p.  208  ff.  In  1879  another  rumor  was  spread  that  Denmark 
was  negotiating  for  the  sale  of  the  islands — to  an  unnamed  government,  pre- 
sumed to  be  that  of  Great  Britain.  On  inquiries  being  made  by  Mr.  Cramer, 
American  minister  at  Copenhagen,  the  Danish  minister  of  foreign  affairs  at 
first  denied  the  report  categorically  but  at  a  later  date  stated  that,  although 
he  had  had  no  information  on  the  subject,  he  did  not  know  what  England 
might  do.  The  Danish  islands  had  suffered  much  from  crop  failures  and 
riots  and  England  would  be  strong  enough  to  helj)  and  j^rotect  them. 

'■'Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  294.  Mr.  Thayer  holds  that  Secretary 
Hay  suspected  that  the  United  States'  treaty  with  Denmark  for  the  jiurchase 
of  the  Danish  West  Indies  was  defeated  in  the  Danish  Parliament  by  German 
influence. 

'"  Moore:  Vol.  VI,  pp.  474  ff.  Lueders  had  at  first  been  sentenced  for 
just  a  month,  had  appealed  and  was  tried  again  under  another  act  by  which 
he  was  fined  $500  and  sentenced  for  a  year.  The  indemnity  demands  of  the 
German  Government  stipulated  the  payment  of  $1000  for  each  day's  imprison- 
ment before  the  second  judgment  and  .$5000  for  every  day  thereafter. 


LUEDERS   EPISODE   IN   HAITI,    1897  277 

and  rt't'useil  to  rec"ei\"e  the  German  demands.  At  this  juncture 
the  American  minister  inter\'ened  in  behalf  of  Mr.  Lueders  and 
secured  his  release  from  prison  and  his  safe  departure  from  Haiti. 
The  release  was  granted  as  an  act  of  pardon  by  the  president  in 
recognition  of  the  intercession  of  the  American  representative. 
The  Haitian  Government  then  suggested  that  the  matter  be 
referred  to  arbitration.  Germany  declined  to  arbitrate  and  insisted 
on  an  inunediate  apology  and  the  payment  of  an  indemnity.  The 
Government  of  Haiti  refused  both  at  first,  though  it  later  agreed 
to  the  indemnity.  The  German  Government,  howe^'er,  despatched 
two  naval  \'essels  to  Port  au  Prince  and  presented  its  ultimatum. 
The  Haitian  Government  was  informed  that  the  forts  and  public 
buildings  of  Port  au  Prince  would  be  bombarded  within  eight 
hours  unless  the  Haitian  Go^'ernment  should  grant  at  once  the 
following  demands:  (1)  an  indemnity  of  5^30,000,  (2)  the  return 
of  Lueders  and  the  responsibility  for  his  safety,  (3)  an  apology  for 
the  treatment  of  the  German  Emperor's  representative,  (4)  the 
renewal  of  relations  and  the  prompt  acceptance  of  a  German  repre- 
sentative. With  the  German  guns  trained  on  the  city  the  Haitian 
Government  offered  no  further  resistance  and  complied  with  all 
of  the  demands. 

The  episode  represented  a  demonstration  of  force  on  the  part 
of  Germany  to  assert  its  power  and  intention  to  exact  severe  penal- 
ties for  injuries  to  its  citizens  in  distant  lands.  Occurring  simul- 
taneously with  the  German  descent  upon  Kiao-Chao,  it  resembled 
that  expedition  in  the  aggressive  character  of  the  demands,  the 
imperious  methods  of  exaction  and  in  the  general  motive  of  dis- 
play of  power.  The  German  Social  Democrats  ridiculed^^  the 
expedition  as  a  crusade  by  sea,  which  should  act  as  an  advertise- 
ment of  German  interests  overseas  and  help  to  manufacture  in 
Germany  enthusiasm  for  the  government's  fleet  policy.  Admiral 
\()n  Tirpitz'-  then  demonstrated  the  correctness  of  their  assertions 
by  declaring  that  the  Haitian  episode,  in  which  Germany  was  able 
at  that  time  to  despatch  only  two  school  ships,  to  the  scene,  gave 

»  V.  R.,  1897-1898,  Bd.  Ill,  76  Sitz.,  27.  April,  1898,  S.  1982. 
12  V.  R.,  1897-1898,  Bd.  I,  5  Sitz.,  7.  Dezember,  1897,  S.  80. 


278  GERMANY   AND  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE 

clear  evidence  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  German  navy.  The  Navy 
bill  was  introduced  that  year^^  and  the  empire  entered  definitely 
upon  its  program  for  development  as  a  naval  power. 

The  United  States  did  not  treat  the  German  action  at  Haiti  as 
having  any  great  significance.  Secretary  Sherman  wrote^^  to  the 
American  minister  to  Haiti  that  the  INIonroe  Doctrine  was  wholly 
inapplicable  to  the  case  and  that  the  Government  of  the  United 

"Von  Buelow:    Imperial  Germany,  p.  42. 

"Moore:   Vol.  VI,  p.  475. 

Mr.  Sherman,  Sec.  of  State,  to  Mr.  Powell,  minister  to  Ha>i:i. 

Jantjary  11,  1898. 

"I  have  received  your  No.  134,  of  the  24th  ultimo,  in  which  you  report  that, 
in  view  of  the  'severe  lesson'  of  the  recent  German  event,  you  have  been 
approached  by  friends  of  the  present  Haytian  administration  'to  get  the 
views  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  to  arrange  for  a  new  treaty, 
in  which  they  desire  a  closer  alhance  with  us,  virtually  placing  themselves 
under  our  protection.'    You  accorchngly  ask  instructions  in  this  regard     .     .     . 

It  would  be  unfortunate  if,  by  your  reception  of  the  overtures  you  now 
report,  or  in  your  intercourse  with  the  Haytian  administration  or  its  friends, 
you  have  encouraged  any  impression  that  this  Government  entertaip  a 
policy  in  this  relation  other  than  that  to  which  it  has  scrupulously  actWi'ed 
from  the  begiruiing  of  our  national  life. 

You  can  not  be  unaware  that  the  proposal  for  a  congress  of  the  American 
States  to  be  held  at  Panama  in  1825-6,  rested  on  the  theory  that  all  of  them, 
with  the  United  States  at  their  head,  should  stand  pledged  to  mutual  pro- 
tection against  foreign  aggression  looking  to  interference  with  their  political 
organization,  yet,  even  as  to  this  important  aspect  of  the  question,  this  country 
held  aloof,  in  the  conviction  that  in  any  such  system  'the  United  States  would 
necessarily  be  its  protector,  and  the  party  responsible  to  the  world,  while  the 
Spanish-American  States  would  get  the  benefits  of  a  system  of  mutual  pro- 
tection which  the  United  States  did  not  need.'  (See  Dana's  Wheaton,  page 
101,  footnote.) 

Moreover,  protectorates  over  our  neighbors  have  never  been  advocated 
in  our  foreign  policy,  being  contrary  to  the  principles  upon  which  this  Govern- 
ment is  founded.  A  protectorate,  however,  qualified,  assimies  a  greater 
or  less  degree  of  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  protector  for  the  acts  of  the 
protected  state,  without  the  aliility  to  shape  or  control  these  acts,  unless  the 
relation  created  be  virtually  that  of  colonial  dependency,  with  jiaramoimt 
intervention  of  the  jirotector  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  protected  com- 
munity. Any  such  relation  is  oliviously  out  of  the  question  in  an  arrangement 
between  sovereign  states  and  would  assuredly  never  be  proposed  bj-  a  state 
so  jealous  of  its  independence  as  Hayti. 

These  observations  are  made  for  your  personal  guidance  in  dealing  with 
the  embarrassing  suggestions  which,  it  would  see,  are  made  to  you  by  well- 
meaning  jiersons,  who  have  not  considered  the  suV)ject  in  its  true  fights. 
They  are  not  intended  for  commmiication  to  such  ]iersons.  You  certainly 
should  not  proceed  on  the  hypothesis  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
to  protect  its  American  neighbors  from  the  responsibilities  which  attend  the 
exercise  of  independent  sovereignty. 

It  behooves  me  to  enjoin  upon  you  the  utmost  circumspection  and  reti- 
cence as  to  matters  of  this  character  in  your  intercourse  with  the  Haytians, 
in  order  that  your  representative  utility  be  not  impaired,  nor  the  true  poficies 
of  your  Government  be  misunderstood." 


THE    ISLAND    OF   MARGARITA,    1901  279 

States  Avas  under  no  obligation  to  "become  involved  in  the  con-  ' 
stantly  recurring  quarrels  of  the  republics  of  this  hemisphere  with 
other  states."  The  Government  of  Haiti,  however,  had  become 
alarmed  at  the  aggressive  German  demonstration  and  sought  to 
arrange  with  the  United  States  a  new  treaty  which  should  virtually 
place  the  island  under  American  protection.  Secretary  Sherman 
instructed  the  American  minister  to  refuse  emphatically  any 
suggestion  of  a  protectorate  and  not  to  proceed  "  on  the  hypothesis 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  protect  its  American 
neighbors  from  the  responsibilities  which  attend  the  exercise  of 
independent  sovereignty." 

With  the  development  of  plans  for  the  Panama  Canal  under 
American  construction  and  ownership,  increased  importance  was 
given  to  the  region  of  the  Caribbean  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
became  more  frequently  involved.  In  1901  Secretary  Ha;^was 
informed  that  Germany  was  negotiating  to  secure  the  island  of 
jMargarita  off  the  coast  of  Venezuela.  The  details  of  this  attempt 
have  never  been  published,  but  that  it  was  looked  upon  with 
concern  by  the  United  States  Government  is  evident  from  the 
instructions  sent  by  Secretary  Hay  to  Mr.  Jackson, ^^  Charge 
d'Aff aires  at  Berlin.  Mr  Hay  wrote  that,  "Having  in  view  the 
long  declared  and  widely  known  policy  of  the  United  States,  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  a  European  power  to  acquire  the  A>nezuelan 
coast-island  of  Margarita  would  be  a  source  of  concern  to  this 
Government,  if  not  tending  to  the  embarrassment  of  the  cordial 
and  frank  relations  between  the  United  States  and  such  power." 
It  has  also  been  stated^*'  that  the  German  Emperor  was  negotiating 
for  the  purchase  '  for  his  own  personal  use '  of  two  harbors  in  Lower 

'^  Moore:  Vol.  VI,  p.  583.  Mr.  Moore  cites  this  event  from  State  Depart- 
ment manuscript.  "Mr.  Hay,  Sec.  of  State,  to  Mr.  Jackson,  Charge  at 
Berlin,  No.  1186,  April  10,  1901.  Ms.  Inst.  Germany,  XXI,  283."  This 
source  is  referred  to  liy  Kraus  (Die  Monroedoktrin,  p.  243)  in  his  accovnit 
of  the  incident. 

'«  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  284.     Mr.  Thayer  states: 

"In  May,  1901,  Hay  received  information  that  German  warships  had  been 
inspeotins  the  Santa  Margarita  Islands,  off  the  coast  of  Venezuela,  with  a 
view  to  occupying  them  as  a  naval  base.  Later  he  learned  that  the  Kaiser 
was  secretly  negotiating  for  the  purchase  of  two  harbors,  'for  his  own  personal 
use,'  whatever  that  meant — on  the  desolate  coast  of  Lower  California." 


280  GERMANY  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

California.  Such  reports,  if  borne  out  by  the  facts  not  yet  made 
pubHc,  would  demonstrate  the  intention  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment to  ignore  the  well-known  policy  of  the  United  States.  That 
they  did  not  materialize  is  evidence  of  the  acquiescence  of  Germany 
though  under  what  pressure  cannot  be  determined. 

In  the  year  1902  several  events  took  place  involving  Ger- 
many, the  United  States  and  the  ISIonroe  Doctrine.  One  of  these 
concerned  the  foreign  debt  of  Guatemala.  Ambassador  von 
Holleben^"  left  at  the  Department  of  State  a  "  pro-memoria " 
stating  that  the  council  of  foreign  bondholders  in  London  was 
seeking  a  new  arrangement  with  the  government  of  that  country 
and  desired  to  have  that  arrangement  endorsed  by  the  most 
interested  powers,  Germany,  the  United  States  and  England,  in 
order  to  secure  from  Guatemala  the  fulfilment  of  her  pledges-^ 
The'Imperial  German  embassy  therefore  requested  to  be  informed 
whether  the  Ignited  States  Government  would  join  in  such  a  pro- 
ceeding if  it  should  be  entered  upon  by  the  German  and  British 
Governments.  The  United  States  declined  this  proposition, 
stating  that  it  was  "  indisposed  to  join  in  any  collective  act  which 
might  bear  the  aspect  of  coercive  pressure  upon  Guatemala." 
The  Government  of  the  United  States  reserved,  howe^■er,  for  its 
citizens  "equal  benefits  with  those  which  might  be  obtained  for 
creditors  of  any  other  nationality  in  the  adjustment  of  the  Guate- 
malan foreign  debt."  The  American  jMinister  to  Guatemala 
informed  Secretary  Hay^^  that  the  Governments  of  Belgium, 
England,  France,  Germany  and  Italy  had  during  the  previous  year 
presented  to  Guatemala  identic  notes  regarding  the  external  debt 
of  that  country.  Since  the  reply  of  Guatemala  had  been  considered 
unsatisfactory  the  powers  had  addressed  a  joint  note  of  protest. 
Secretary  Hay  re])lied  to  Mr.  Hunter,  the  American  representative 
at  Guatemala,  that  this  joint  note  of  the  powers  called  for  no  action 
or  comment  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  'inasmuch  as  it  was 
within  the  right  of  the  creditor  nations  to  require  pa^-ment  of  debts 
due  to  their  nationals."'  No  action  appears,  therefore,  to  have 
been  taken  by  the  United  States  by  way  of  protest  to  the  powers, 

"  F.  R.,  1902,  p.  426.  "*  Ibid.,  p.  569  ff. 


FOREIGN   DF:irr   OK   GUATEMALA,  1902  281 

although  it  was  later  leanu'd  by  the  American  representative  that 
they  had  threatened  to  blockade  the  ports  of  Guatemala^'-'  if 
arrangements  to  satisfy  their  respective  creditors  were  not  made  hy 
a  specific  date.  The  controversy  represented  a  familiar  problem 
to  the  Inited  States — the  demands  of  European  powers  upon  a 
Latin-American  nation  for  the  payment  of  its  debts — and  the 
American  Government  acted  consistently  with  its  established 
interpretENtion  of  the  IMonroe  Doctrine.  Although  refusing  to  join 
in  collective  action  of  such  a  character,  it  nevertheless  did  not 
interfere  with  the  enforcement  of  just  claims,  pro^'ided  that  enforce- 
ment did  not  take  the  form  of  acquisition  of  territory  or  interfer- 
ence with  the  system  of  go\'ernment  of  any  American  nation. 

During  the  same  year  a  revolution  in  Haiti-*^  resulted  in  a  second 
demonstration  of  German  naval  power  at  that  island.  Following 
the  forced  resignation  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  by  anti- 
government  parties,  a  number  of  rival  candidates  entered  upon 
campaigns  for  election.  Of  these,  two  were  considered  to  have 
the  support  of  foreign  interests.-^  jNIr.  Firmin,  Haitian  minister 
to  France  and  former  secretary  of  Foreign  Relations  in  the  Haitian 
cabinet,  was  said  to  have  the  favor  of  the  French  minister  and  the 
strong  opposition  of  the  German  Charge  d'Affaires.  Another 
candidate,  General  Leconte,  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  was  said  to 
be  supported  by  the  leading  German  commercial  and  banking 
interests  in  the  capital.  In  return  for  this  support,  Leconte,  if 
elected,  was  to  grant  certain  commercial  favors.  It  was  rumored 
that  he  was  to  grant  to  the  German  Government  a  coaling  station 
near  the  ]Mole  St.  Nicholas.  This  report  the  American  minister 
declared  was  untrue,  but  that  it  was  supposed  that  General  Leconte 
had  made  arrangements  with  the  Hamburg-American  Steamship 
( "oniijany  by  which  if  elected  he  would  favor  granting  the  company 
a  })lace  near  the  mole  for  storing  coal  and  also  that  he  would  grant 
the  company  concessions  giving  it  almost  exclusive  control  over 
certain  mineral  lands  on  the  island.  On  the  discovery  and  publica- 
tion of  Leconte's  proposed  agreement  by  his  opponents,  great 

'<*  F.  R.,  1902,  p.  579.  2"  Ibid.,  pp.  oS7  IT. 

2'  Ibid.,  pp.  590  and  591. 


282         GERMANY  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

opposition  to  him  was  aroused  and,  although  both  he  and  the 
German  Company's  agents  at  once  pubhshed  denials  of  the  arrange- 
ment, the  denials  were  not  generally  credited.  The  feelings  of 
most  Haitians  had  been  hostile  to  Germany  since  the  time  of  the 
Lueders  incident,  and  the  result  was  that  the  populace  forcibly 
broke  up  the  election  proceedings,  prevented  the  election  of  General 
Leconte  and  caused  him  soon  aftenvard  to  leave  the  island. 

Meanwhile  a  committee  of  public  safety  had  taken  charge  of 
affairs,  and,  although  not  formally  recognized  by  the  foreign 
diplomatic  corps,  was  in  general  treated  as  a  provisional  govern- 
ment. The  main  issue  of  the  revolution  then  continued  to  be  the 
attempt  of  the  former  candidate  Mr.  Firmin,  to  secure  the  presi- 
dency by  force.  He  received  support  by  sea  from  the  Haitian 
Vice-Admiral  KilHck,  who  in  his  gunboat,  the  "Crete-a  Pierrot," 
cruised  the  Haitian  waters  carrying  ammunition  to  the  Firminist 
forces  and  holding  up  Haitian  merchant  vessels  loaded  with 
supplies  for  the  provisional  government.  The  admiral  had  been 
declared  an  outlaw  by  the  provisional  government,  which  reciuested 
the  members  of  the  foreign  diplomatic  corps  to  consider  him  as 
such  and  to  capture  his  vessel.  This  the  foreign  representatives 
felt  that  they  could  not  do,  since  the  admiral  had  committed  no 
depredations  on  neutral  vessels  on  the  high  seas  and  no  other  acts 
fulfilling  the  conditions  of  outlawry  as  determined  by  international 
law.  Later,  however,  x\dmiral  Killick  held  up  a  German  merchant 
vessel,  the  "INIarkomannia,"  sent  an  armed  crew  on  board  and  took 
from  the  vessel  arms  and  ammunition  intended  for  provisional 
government  forces.--  This  action  met  with  prompt  response  from 
the  German  Government.  It  des])atched  at  once  the  corvette 
"Panther"  in  pursuit  of  Admiral  KilHck.  On  finding  the  "Crete" 
anchored  in  the  harbor  of  Gonaives  the  German  commander 
ordered  the  surrender  of  the  vessel.  This  was  refused.  Thereupon 
the  "Panther"  fired  upon  and  sank  the  "Crete."-*    Although  the 

=2  F.  R.,  1902,  p.  645. 

-^  Iliid.,  pp.  656  ff.  Admiral  Killick,  seeing  that  his  vessel  was  helpless,  sent 
his  crew  ashore  and  then  arranged  powder  about  the  Crete  and  blew  up 
himself  and  his  ship.  This  dramatic  act  won  the  admiration  of  the  Haitians, 
strengthened  the  Firminist  power  and  increased  the  hostility  to  the  Germans. 


ACTION   OV   THE    "  PANTHER,"    HAITI,    1902  283 

act  was  one  of  assistance  to  the  provisional  goA'ernment,  whicli 
had  aiiain  called  upon  the  powers  to  capture  the  vessel  as  a  pirate 
ship,  the  ert'ect  was  ne\ertheless  in  general  to  increase  the  hos- 
tility of  the  Haitian  people  toward  Germany.  As  was  the  case 
after  the  Lueders  ei)is()de,  reports  immediately  were  circulated 
that  the  American  Government  would  take  over  the  island.  The 
Haitian  minister  at  ^Yashingt(m  warned-^  his  government  that  the 
American  press  was  calling  for  intervention  and  annexation.  This 
excitement  aroused  by  the  German  demonstration  was  allayed 
by  ]Mr.  Adee's  statement  c(mtradicting  all  reports  of  the  intention 
of  the  United  States  to  annex  Haiti.  The  American  Government 
made  no  public  protest  to  Germany  for  the  action  of  the  "  Panther," 
and  that  fact  was  received  with  satisfaction  by  the  German  press, 
which  considered  it  e\-idence  that  the  "  INIonroe  Doctrine  did  not 
mean  that  the  United  States  would  object  to  the  proper  protection 
of  its  commercial  interests  by  a  European  power. "-^ 

The  controversy,  however,  which  assumed  the  greatest  propor- 
tions of  those  episodes  invohning  Germany's  attitude  toward  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  that  of  the  claims  against  Venezuela  during 
the  years  1901  to  1904.  The  Gennan  case  as  presented  by  the 
Imperial  Government  to  the  United  States  in  December  of  1901-'' 

■'*  F.  R.,  1902,  p.  665  ^s  ibid.,  p.  443. 

-'^  F.  R.,  1901,  pp.  192  ff.  For  correspondence  between  Germany  and 
N'enezuela  <jn  which  this  statement  of  Germany's  is  based,  see  Sen.  Doc.  No. 
119,  oSth  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  Part  III,  Appendix  to  the  Case  of  Venezuela. 
This  correspondence  shows  (p.  261)  that  Germany  did  at  this  time  propose 
to  Venezuela  that  the  claims  of  German  subjects  be  submitted  to  arbitration. 
Translation  by  source. 

Imperial  Legation  of  Germany  in  Venezuel.\, 
Caracas,  July  16,  1901. 


"The  j)roposal  which  I  already  had  the  honor  to  make  orally  to  your 
excellency  is  as  follows: 

The  Venezuelan  Government  on  the  one  i)art,  and  the  Imperial  Legation  on 
the  other,  would  each  name  an  arl)itrator,  so  that  both  would  jointly  examine 
the  claims  of  German  subjects  growing  out  of  the  civil  wars. 

Whenever  the  arbitrators  should  agree  the  i)ayment  of  the  indenniity  would 
tie  effected  without  any  delay  whatever,  and  all  cases  in  which  the  arbitrators 
could  not  come  to  an  agreement  would  be  made  the  sut)ject  of  special  con- 
ferences between  the  Venezuelan  Government  and  the  Imperial  Legation. 
If  these  were  hkewise  barren  of  result,  then  the  matter  would  in  advance  be 
deferred  to  the  arliitral  tribunal  of  The  Hague  for  a  decision. 

While  believing  that  this,  my  proj)osal,  meets  all  the  demands  of  equitj', 
I  would  nevertheless  lay  special  stress  on  the  point  that,  should  the  Venezuelan 


284  GERMANY  AND  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE 

was  as  follows:  In  building  the  great  Venezuelan  Railway  the 
Venezuelan  Government  had  borrowed  large  sums  from  the  Berlin 
Company  of  Discount  (Berliner  Discontogesellschaft)  and  had 
failed  to  meet  its  obligations,  which  were  steadily  increasing. 
In  addition  the  German  citizens  residing  in  Venesuela  had  sus- 
tained heavy  losses  during  the  civil  wars  of  1898  to  1900.  The 
German  Government  became  convinced  that  the  Government  of 
Venezuela  did  not  intend  to  try  to  meet  these  obligations,  since 
it  had  enacted  on  the  subject  of  foreign  claims  several  decrees, 
one  of  which  dismissed  from  consideration  all  claims  for  damages 
received  before  the  administration  of  President  Castro.  The 
efl'orts  of  the  German  Government  to  induce  the  Castro  Govern- 
ment to  alter  these  decrees  had  been  fruitless.  It  had  therefore 
declared  its  refusal  to  abide  by  the  decrees  and  similar  action  had 
been  taken  by  other  interested  powers,  including  the  United  States. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  Imperial  Government  held  that 
further  negotiations  with  Venezuela  were  hopeless,  and  announced 
its  intention  of  presenting  an  ultimatum  to  President  Castro. 
If  this  should  be  disregarded  measures  of  coercion  were  to  be 
applied.  First,  however,  the  German  Government  considered  it 
important  to  inform  the  United  States  of  its  purposes.  These,  it 
declared,  had  nothing  else  in  view  than  to  help  German  citizens 
^^•ho  had  sufi'ered  damages,  and  aimed  under  no  circumstances  at 
the  acquisition  or  permanent  occupation  of  Venezuelan  territory. 
The  measures  of  coercion  contemplated  in  the  event  of  the  refusal 
of  Venezuela  to  accept  the  ultimatum  were  "first  of  all  the  blockade 
of  the  more  important  Venezuelan  harbors,"  and  later,  if  this  did 
not  seem  efficient,  Germany  would  have  to  consider  the  temporary 
occu})ation  of  different  Venezuelan  harbors  and  the  levying  of 
duties  in  those  places. 

Such  was  the  situation  and  program  as  formally  presented  by 
Ambassador  von  Holleben  to  Secretary  Hay.    The  United  States 

Government  have  any  reason  whatever  for  not  being  suited  with  it,  I  stand 
ready  to  accede  to  any  other  sokition  of  the  question  by  which  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  authorities  of  the  Empire  in  the  examination  of  the  claims  of 
German  subjects  and  in  the  determination  of  the  indemnities  appertaining 
thereto  will  i)e  assured.  Such  a  cooperation  is  the  only  foundation  on  which 
a  solution  of  the  question  can  be  established." 


OPENING    OF   THE   VENEZUELAxN   CONTROVERSY,    1901  285 

in  reply  accei^ted  the  a.s.surances  of  tlie  (ierinan  Government." 
Secretary  Hay  at  the  same  time  quoted  in  his  memorandum  the 
principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  expressed  by  President 
Roosevelt  only  two  weeks  })revious  in  his  message  to  Congress. 
The  ^'lonroe  Doctrine  President  Roosevelt  had  declared  to  be 
"  a  declaratit)n  that  there  must  be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by 
any  non-American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  American  power 
on  American  soil,"  but  that  it  w^as  "in  no  wise  intended  as  hostile 
to  any  nation  in  the  Old  World."  Finally,  the  President  asserted, 
"We  do  not  guarantee  any  State  against  punishment  if  it  miscon- 
ducts itself,  pro\ided  that  punishment  does  not  take  the  form  of 
the  acquisition  of  territory  by  any  non- American  power."  The 
German  ambassador  on  his  recent  return  from  BerHn  having 
"conveyed  personally  to  the  President  the  assurance  of  the  German 
Emperor  that  His  ^Majesty's  Government  had  no  purpose  or  inten- 
tion to  make  even  the  smallest  acquisition  of  territory  on  the  South 
American  Continent  or  the  islands  adjacent,"  the  President, 
according  to  Hay's  memorandum,  accepted  these  assurances  and 
stated  that  he  believed  no  measures  would  be  taken  by  agents  of 
the  German  Government  contrary  to  the  declared  purpose  of  the 
emperor. 

The  announcement  of  Germany's  intention  to  enforce  her  claims 
against  Venezuela  was  presented  singly  and  with  no  reference  to 
.the  action  of  other  European  powers.  The  subject  was  given  a  new 
phase,  however,  during  the  following  year  when  the  German 
temporary  alliance  with  Great  Britain  became  public.  The  initia- 
tive seems  to  have  been  taken  by  Germany.-*    On  July  23,  1902, 

"  F.  R.,  1901,  p.  19.5. 

"The  President  of  the  United  States,  appreciating  the  courtesy  of  the 
German  Government  in  making  him  acquainted  with  the  state  of  affairs 
referred  to,  and  not  regarding  himself  as  called  ujjon  to  enter  into  the  con- 
sideration of  the  claims  in  question,  believes  that  no  measiu'es  will  he  taken 
in  this  matter  by  the  agents  of  the  German  Government  which  are  not  in 
accordance  with  the  well-known  purpose,  above  set  forth,  of  His  Majesty 
the  German  Emi)eror." 

28  A.  &  P.,  1902,  CXXX  (Cd-1372),  No.  2.  tSee  also  Thayer:  Life  of  Hay, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  284  ff. 

Mr.  Thayer  .states,  "By  offers  which  cannot  yet  be  made  pul)lic,  Germany 
persuaded  the  Tory  Government  to  draw  closer  to  her."     ...     In  refer- 


286  GERMANY  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  records  an  interview  with  the  German 
ambassador  in  which  the  latter  spoke  to  him  of  affairs  in  Venezuela. 
Lord  Lansdowne  informed  the  German  representative  that  Great 
Britian  had  various  causes  of  complaint  against  Venezuela,  that 
it  intended  to  obtain  satisfaction  for  the  claims  of  British  subjects 
and  that  the  British  Government  would  be  quite  ready  to  confer 
with  the  German  Government  with  a  view  to  joint  action.  The 
British  causes  of  complaint  against  Venezuela  as  put  forward  by 
the  foreign  office^^  were,  in  addition  to  the  financial  claims  of  British 
subjects,  the  interference  of  the  Venezuelan  Government  in  the 
liberty  and  property  of  British  subjects  and  the  refusal  of  the 
Government  of  Caracas  to  heed  the  British  protests  or  to  render 
satisfaction.^"  These  complaints,  together  with  the  small  amovmt 
of  shipping  claims  involved  in  their  settlement,  became  in  the 
course  of  the  controversy  the  British  "first-line  claims,"  and  were 
placed  beside  those  of  the  Germans  incurred  during  the  revolu- 
tions of  1898  and  1899,  as  subjects  which  would  not  be  submitted 
to  arbitration. 

With  the  prospect  of  mutual  aid  both  go^'ernments  decided  that 
further  claims  could  be  pressed.^^    Consequently  they  formulated 


ence  to  Great  Britain's  part  in  the  proceedings,  Mr.  Thayer  vvTites  (p.  289) : 
"England,  we  presume,  had  never  intended  that  her  half-alliance  with  Ger- 
many should  Ijring  her  into  open  rupture  with  the  United  States.  Although 
her  pact  was  kept  as  secretly  as  possible  at  home,  inklings  of  it  leaked  out, 
and  it  has  since  been  esteemed,  by  those  who  know  the  details,  one  of  the 
least  creditable  items  in  Lord  Salisbury's  foreign  policy.  Whether  he  or  Mr. 
Balfour  originated  it,  the  friends  of  neither  have  cared  to  extol  it,  or  indeed 
to  let  its  details  be  generally  known." 

^'A.  &P.,  1902,  CXXX  (Cd-1372),  No.  1.  The  Venezuelan  Government 
had  refused  to  consider  British  claims  until  its  own  claims  for  rei^aration 
for  damages  inflicted  by  the  insurgent  gunboat  the  "Ban  Righ,"  with 
the  assistance  of  the  authorities  of  Trinidad,  should  have  received  satisfac- 
tion from  the  British  Government.  These  claims  of  the  Venezuelan  Govern- 
ment were  steadily  refused.  There  was  also  a  dispute  between  the  British 
and  Venezuelan  governments  over  the  island  of  Patos,  each  claiming  ownership. 

3P  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  No.  122.  On  one  occasion,  when 
the  British  minister  had  presented  with  much  emphasis  the  serious  character 
of  the  British  demands  and  intentions,  the  VenczUelan  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  replied  that  they  were  used  to  such  communications.  The  British 
minister  at  once  retorted  that  that  might  be  the  case,  but  not  from  England. 

"Sen.  Doc.  No.  119,  f^Sth  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  p.  224. 


AXGLO-GERMAN   ALLIANCE  287 

a  second  class  of  demands,  Germany  placinij;  in  this  class  her  claims 
arishiii  ont  of  the  civil  war  still  going  on,  and  also  the  large  amonnts 
owed  to  the  Discontogesellschaft  for  the  building  of  the  \'enezuela 
railway.  Great  Britain  decided  to  include  as  second-class  claims 
the  demands  of  the  English  railways  in  \>nezuela  for  damages 
done  to  their  lines  and  for  the  failure  of  the  Venezuelan  govern- 
ment to  meet  liabilities.  These  further  demands  we're  to  be 
enforced^'-  in  case  the  two  powers  upon  the  refusal  of  Venezuela 
to  yield  should  have  recourse  to  coercive  measures.  At  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  German  Government^'  the  two  countries  agreed  further 
tiiat  should  such  coercive  action  be  undertaken,  each  would  support 
the  other's  demands  and  that  (except  by  mutual  agreement) 
neither  would  withdraw  from  the  undertaking  until  the  demands 
of  both  should  be  satisfied. 

There  remamed,  therefore,  only  the  methods  of  procedure  to 
be  considered.  The  German  ambassador  suggested  in  general 
terms  that  the  two  powers  concerned  should  take  part  in  a  joint 
naval  demonstration.''^  The  British  Foreign  Office  thereupon 
consulted  the  admiralt\'  for  the  ^•iews  of  the  Lords  Commissioners 


<•-  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  No.  137. 
"  A.  &  P.,  1902,  CXXX  (Cd-1372),  No.  13. 
The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Mr.  Buchanan. 

Foreign  Office,  November  11,  1902. 
(Extract)     .... 

"As  to  the  joint  execution  of  measures  of  coercion,  the  German  Govern- 
ment recognized  that  there  was  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  character  of 
the  British  and  German  "first-line"  claims;  nevertheless,  the  two  claims 
ought  to  stand  or  fall  together,  and  we  ought  to  exclude  the  possilnlity  of  a 
settlement  between  Venezuela  and  one  of  the  two  powers  without  an  equally 
satisfactory  settlement  in  the  case  of  the  other.  Each  Government  ought, 
therefore,  to  come  to  an  understanding  before  it  eml)arked  upon  a  [project  of 
coercion  that  neither  Government  should  be  at  hl)erty  to  recede  e.xcept  by 
mutual  agreement ;  and  before  common  action  was  initiated,  we  ought  to  come 
to  a  distinct  agreement  to  this  effect. 

I  told  Count  Metternich  that  it  seemed  to  be  only  reasonable  that  if  we 
agreed  to  act  together  in  apjilying  coercion,  W(>  should  also  agree  that  each 
should  support  the  other's  demands,  and  should  not  desist  from  doing  so  except 
by  agreement." 

«  A.  &  P.,  1902,  CXXX  (Cd-1372),  Nos.  5  and  G.  The  Admiralty  advised, 
however,  that  .such  a  blockade  should  be  deferred  till  November  when  the 
unhealthy  season  would  Ije  over.  Vice-.\dmiral  Douglas  (see  Inclosure  in  No. 
9)  also  advised  waiting  till  November  when  the  Newfoundland  fishery  season 
should  have  concluded  and  released  the  ships  employed  on  that  division. 
19 


288  GERMANY  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

as  to  the  most  effectual  and  convenient  manner  of  putting  pressure 
on  the  Venezuelan  Government.  The  admiralty  replied  that  the 
best  method  would  be  a  blockade  of  Venezuelan  ports — which 
could  be  effectively  accomplished  by  the  British  squadron  already 
present  at  the  North  America  and  West  Indies  station.  The  Vice- 
Admiral  at  Halifax,  however,  suggested  as  an  alternative  scheme 
to  the  blockade  that  all  the  Venezuelan  gunboats  should  be 
seized  until  the  demands  should  be  compHed  with.  This  suggestion 
was  approved  by  the  Foreign  Office  as  preferable,^^  a  blockade 
appearing  open  to  some  objection.  Lord  Lansdowne  therefore 
informed  the  German  Government  that  the  first  measures  of 
coercion  would  be  the  seizure  of  the  gunboats,  and  that  if  this 
should  not  produce  the  desired  effect  it  would,  of  course,  be  neces- 
sary to  decide  w^hat  should  be  the  next  step,  and  that  this  further 
action  would  be  carefully  considered.  This  plan  was  agreed  to  by 
Germany. 

Having  settled  upon  the  military  measures  to  be  taken  following 
a  refusal  of  Venezuela  to  accede  to  the  demands  the  next  matter 
to  be  decided  was  the  diplomatic  procedure.^*'  Hereupon  the  Ger- 
man Government  was  seized  with  compunctions  concerning  the 
fact^^  that  its  last  notes  with  Venezuela  had  been  exchanged  six 
months  before  and  had  not  been  "couched  in  a  tone  which  would 
justify  an  immediate  resort  to  coercion."  Therefore  the  Imperial 
Government  considered  it  necessary  to  give  ^  enezuela  one  more 
chance  and  suggested  that  each  of  the  two  powers  should  simul- 
taneously present  an  ultimatum,  embodying  its  own  collective 
demands  and  referring  to  the  demands  of  the  other  power.    This 

'5  Ibid.,  Nos.  10  and  14. 

36  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  Xos  134  and  138.  As  the  German 
Government  had  done  in  1901,  the  British  Government  now  informed  the 
United  States  of  its  intention  of  using  force  against  Venezuela.  The  British 
Government  did  not,  however,  refer  to  its  intentions  in  regard  to  the  occupa- 
tion or  acquisition  of  Venezuelan  territory.  Secretary  Hay  replied  that, 
although  "the  United  States  Government  regretted  that  European  Powers 
should  use  force  against  Central  and  South  American  countries,"  it  "could 
not  object  to  their  taking  steps  to  obtain  redress  for  injuries  suffered  by  their 
subjects,  provided  that  no  acquisition  of  territory  was  contemplated." 

"  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1.399),  Xo.  153. 


ENTRANCE   OF  ITALY  289 

Hnal  etl'ort,  the  Ciorman  ambassador  explained,  need  not  delay 
the  aetive  measures  arranged,  since  the  ultimatums  miji^ht  be 
presented  at  once  and  a  jDeriod  of  twenty-four  hours  granted  for 
compliance. 

The  agreement  finally  reached*'^  was  that  the  ultimatums  should 
be  ])resented  simultaneously,  though  without  announcing  to 
\'enezuela  the  twenty-four-hour  time-limit.  The  communications 
should  demand  that  the  Venezuelan  Government  accept  in  principle 
all  the  German-British  claims,  accept  without  fresh  investigation 
the  so-called  first-line  claims  and  agree  to  refer  to  a  mixed  com- 
mission the  claims  of  the  second  class. 

At  this  juncture,  just  a  few^  days  before  the  presentation  of  the 
British-German  ultimatums,  Italy  appeared  on  the  scene  and 
announced  her  tlesire  to  take  part  in  the  coercive  measures. ^^  The 
Italian  ^Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  informed  the  British  represen- 
tative at  Rome  that  Italy  also  had  just  cause  for  complaint  against 
\'enezuela,  that  the  Italian  Government  had  informed  the  United 
States  of  its  intention  to  use  coercive  measures  and  had  received 
a  very  satisfactory  reply.  Therefore  the  Italian  Government, 
although  not  disposed  to  take  the  initiative  in  this  undertaking, 

'''A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  No.  153.  The  German  Govern- 
ment classified  its  demands  as  follows: 

"  (a)  Payment  of  the  German  claims  arising  out  of  the  civil  wars  of  the 
years  1898-1900,  amounting  to  about  1,700,000  bolivars. 

(b)  Settlement  of  claims  arising  out  of  the  present  civil  war  in  Venezuela. 

(c)  Guarantee  for  the  claims  of  German  firms  on  account  of  the  building  of 
the  slaughter-house  in  Caracas,  amounting  to  a  round  sum  of  800,000  bf)livar8. 

(d)  Guarantee  for  the  payment  of  the  claims  of  the  German  Great  Venezuela 
Railway  Company  for  interest  and  sinking  fund  of  the  Venezuelan  Loan  of 
1896." 

The  demands  under  class  (a)  the  Imperial  Government  stated  had  already 
been  thoroughly  investigated  and  it  refused  to  have  them  suljjected  to  a  fresh 
examination  at  the  hands  of  the  Commission.  (The  investigations,  however, 
had  been  made  by  German  authorities — alone — on  the  ground  that  Venezuela 
had  refused  a  mixed  commission.)  The  British  claims  to  be  "paid  at  once" 
(see  Ibid.,  No.  161)  were  "the  compensations  in  the  shipping  cases,  and  in 
cases  where  British  subjects  have  been  falsely  imprisoned  or  maltreated," 
and  in  additif)n  to  these  a  sum  sufficient  to  make  the  whole  immediate  pay- 
ment equal  to  that  which  might  in  the  first  instance  be  paid  to  the  German 
Government. 

'» A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  Nos.  162  and  166. 


290  ger:mani-  and  the  monroe  doctrine 

would  be  glad  to  join  in  any  action  taken  by  Great  Britain  if  this 
should  be  favorably  viewed  by  the  British  Government. 

The  reception  given  to  this  proposal  was  not  enthusiastic.  Lord 
Lansdowne  told  the  Italian  Ambassador  that  while  in  principle 
he  saw  no  objection  to  Italian  participation,  there  were  many 
practical  difficulties.  The  British  Government  had  for  some  time 
past  been  discussing  with  the  German  Government  the  scope  and 
character  of  the  measures  to  be  taken  and  these  measures  had 
required  most  careful  consideration,  "not  only  on  account  of  the 
manner  in  which  they  affected  the  two  European  powers  concerned, 
but  on  account  of  the  international  questions  to  which  they  were 
calculated  to  give  rise."  Having  reached  an  agreement  and  pro- 
posing to  take  action  at  once,  there  was  no  time  available  for 
settling  the  conditions  upon  which  Italy  might  join  Great  Britain 
and  Germany,  "supposing  that  were  desired."  Lord  Lansdowne 
therefore  ventured  to  suggest  that  under  the  circumstances  the 
Italian  Government  should  not  press  its  demands  at  that  moment. 
The  Italian  ambassador  seemed  in  no  wise  disheartened  by  this 
reception.  He  replied  that  while  he  realized  that  it  M'ould  probably 
be  impossible  for  Italy  to  take  part  in  the  initial  action  agreed 
upon  b>-  Germany  and  Great  Britain,  still  he  though  it  desirable 
to  enter  into  discussion  of  the  cooperation  of  Italy  in  the  near 
future.  In  the  meanwhile  Italian  ships  might  visit  Venezuelan 
waters  to  show  that  "Italy  was  not  indifferent  to  what  was 
occurring."  Lord  Lansdowne  promised  to  confer  with  Germany 
on  the  subject. 

Throughout  these  preparations  for  naval  action  against  Venezuela 
the  United  States  had  made  no  formal  protest  and  had  informed 
both  Great  Britain  and  Germany  that  it  would  put  fon\'ard  no 
objections  so  long  as  there  should  be  no  attempt  at  the  acquisition 
of  \'enezuelan  territory. ^'^  Secretary  Hay  made  it  quite  clear, 
however,  that  such  application  of  force  to  a  South  American 
country  was  regretted  by  the  Government  of  the  Ignited  States. 
Evidence  of  his  effort  diplomatically  to  divert  the  two  countries 

«  F.  R.,  1901,  p.  195,  and  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  Xo.  138. 


BRITISH-GERMAN  ULTIMATUMS  291 

from  tlu'ir  eonteniphited  action  is  rovealod  in  tho  official  approval'^ 
given  to  the  eti'orts  of  the  l)ankin.s2;  firm  of  SeHjiinan  &  Co.  to  effect 
a  settlement  of  the  \'enezuelan  debt.  Secretary  Hay  telegraphed 
to  the  American  representatives  at  Berlin  and  London,  informing 
them  of  the  efforts  of  Seligman  &  Co.,  and  stating  that  at  the 
re(piest  of  that  com})any  it  gave  him  pleasure  to  say  that  "the 
President  would  be  glad  if  such  an  arrangement  could  be  made 
as  might  ob^•iate  the  necessity  of  any  exhibition  of  force  on  the 
part  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain."  It  was  to  be  understood, 
however,  that  the  United  States  Government  assumed  "no 
obligation  whatever  in  the  nature  either  of  a  material  or  moral 
guarantee  of  any  liabilities  created  by  the  transaction."  This 
attempt  to  assist  the  banking  firm  to  settle  an  international 
difficulty  was  without  result. 

Germany  and  Great  Britain  presented  their  ultimatums  to 
Venezuela  on  December  7,  1902."^-  During  the  follow'ing  day  Presi- 
dent Castro  published  in  the  newspapers  a  statement^^  declaring 
that  foreign  creditors  must  await  the  reestablishment  of  peace 
when  all  promises  would  be  fulfilletl,  and  that  in  the  meantime  he 
would  not  try  to  "placate  with  phrases"  nor  "accept  humiliation." 
The  ultimatums,  therefore,  were  rejected,^  and  on  the  9th  the  two 

*^  F.  R.,  1903,  pp.  418  ff.  and  p.  452.  The  correspondence  with  Great 
Britain  shows  no  reply  to  the  instructions  sent  to  Mr.  White.  In  the  cor- 
respondence with  Germany  the  American  Ambassador  records  a  declaration 
by  Doctor  von  Muehlberg  of  the  Foreign  Office  that  aside  from  newspaper 
accounts  he  knew  nothing  of  the  efforts  of  Seligman  &  Company. 

«V.  R.,  1900-1903,  VII,  Anlageband,  M.  786,  S.  4957.  (Contains  official 
government  account  (Denkschrift)  of  Germany's  case  against  Venezuela.) 
See  also  Sen.  Doc.  No.  119,  58th  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  pp.  272  ff. 

«  F.  R.,  1903,  p.  789. 

**  Sen.  Doc.  No.  119,  58th  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  p.  279.  After  setting  forth  at 
length  his  country's  side  of  the  case,  the  Venezuelan  Minister  of  Foreign 
Ivelations  concluded,  in  reply  to  the  German  ultimatum  as  follows: 

■'Having  thus  returned  in  an  essentially  conciliatory  and  friendly  manner 
a  reply  to  your  note,  I  pass  by,  under  special  orders  of  the  Governnu^nt, 
that  part  which  relates  to  the  joint  action  of  the  Empire  and  the  United 
Kingdom;  for  a  power  like  Venezuela,  which  need  not  be  urged,  much  less 
constrained,  to  discharge  as  far  as  it  is  in  its  power,  its  lawful  obligations,  will 
never,  in  its  intercourse  with  the  other  civilized  nations,  look  for  anything  that 
will  not  be  in  accordance  with  the  princij^les  of  mutual  respect  antl  with  tlie 
rules  of  reciprocal  cordiality." 


292  GERMANl'    AND   THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

powers  entered  upon  their  program.  Both  British  and  German 
interests  were  placed  in  charge  of  ]\Ir.  Bowen,  American  minister 
at  Caracas  and  the  Venezuelan  gunboats  in  the  harbor  of  La 
Gua\ra  were  seized  by  the  combined  forces,  no  resistance  being 
offered. ^^  The  German  commander  sank  the  two  vessels  captured 
by  him.^®  These  actions  aroused  great  excitement  in  Caracas  and 
resulted  in  attacks  on  the  legations  and  the  imprisonment  of  many 
German  and  British  subjects.  Mr.  Bowen's  efforts  to  obtain 
their  release  were  not  immediately  successful. 

The  counter-effect  of  the  Venezuelan  demonstrations  was  that 
the  attacking  powers  lost  no  time  in  advancing  to  the  second 
measure  on  their  program — the  blockade.  Just  two  days  after 
the  seizure  of  the  gunboats  the  decision  was  reached  that  these 
measures  already  taken  would  not  be  sufficiently  effective  and  that 
the  blockade  should  commence  as  soon  as  possible.^^  The  blockade 
was  formally  announced  on  the  20th  and  included  the  ports  of 
La  Guayra,  Caranero,  Guanta,  Cumana,  Carupano  and  the  mouths 
of  the  Orinoco.  In  the  meantime  the  overtures  of  Italy  had  been 
accepted,  and  it  was  agreed  that  if  a  blockade  should  be  resorted 
to  Italy  might  take  part  in  it.  Vessels  of  the  three  nations,  there- 
fore, held  the  blockaded  harbors. 

The  establishment  of  the  blockade  gave  rise  to  a  discussion  with 
the  United  States  as  to  the  status  and  character  of  such  a  measure 
when  not  accompanied  by  a  declaration  of  war.  In  its  first  note  on 
this  subject  to  the  Ignited  States  in  190P*  the  German  Government 

«  A.  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (C-1399),  Nos.  173  and  174. 

^*  F.  R.,  1903,  p.  422.  The  reason  given  for  sinking  the  ships  was  that 
the  two  vessels  were  not  sufhcientlj-  seaworthy  to  undertake  the  voyage  to 
Trinidad  under  their  own  steam,  and  to  have  towed  them  there  woukl  have 
impaired  the  movements  of  the  German  squadron  in  search  of  the  rest  of 
the  \'enezuelan  fleet. 
1.  ^"  Ibid.,  Nos.  182  and  183. 

«  F.  R.,  1901,  p.  196. 

Promemoria. 

Imperial  Germ.\n  Emb.\ssy, 

W.\sHiNGTON,  December  20,  1901. 
"In  case  the  German  Government  should  be  obhged  to  use  coercion  against 
Venezuela  in  connection  with  the  pending  claims,  it  will  have  to  be  considered 
what  kind  of  measures  should  bo  apjihed.  The  most  important  measure  of 
coercion — that  is,  the  blockade  of  Venezuelan  harbors — would  have  to  be 
carried  through  without  a  declaration  of  war  preceding  it.     The  l)lockade 


LEGAL  ASPECTS  OF  BLOCKADE  293 

hail  (loc'lared  that  the  measures  to  be  taken  would  not  be  preceded 
1\\  a  (ieclaration  of  war,  would  constitute  only  a  peace  blockade, 
but  would  attt'ct  neutral  ships  which  would  have  to  be  turned 
away  from  the  harbor.''  The  United  States  refused  to  acquiesce 
in  this  extension  of  the  doctrine  of  pacific  blockade  to  include  inter- 
ference with  the  commerce  of  neutral  nations,  and  Secretary  Hay 
referred  to  the  fact  that  the  American  Government  had  taken 
this  same  stand  in  1897  when  the  European  powers  had  declared 
a  similar  })lockade  of  Crete.^"  The  German  Government  later 
informecP^  Secretary  Hay  that  although  Germany  was  at  first 
inclined  to  a  peace  blockade,  Great  Britain  had  insisted  on  estab- 
lishiniT  a  warlike  one,  to  which  Germany  had  yielded.^-  The  stand 
taken  by  Great  Britain  coincided^^  with  the  viewpoint  of  the  United 
States,  which  recognized  no  form  of  blockade  affecting  neutral 
commerce  except  the  complete  effective  blockade  of  war  as  laid 
down  l)y  international  law.  Mr.  Balfour,  British  Prime  Minister, 
declared  before  the  House  of  Commons  that  personally  he  agreed 
with  the  United  States  that  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  a  peace 
blockade  and  that  a  blockade  did  involve  a  state  of  war.    Never- 


would  therefore  be  a  peace  blockade.  Such  a  blockade  would  touch  likewise 
the  ships  of  neutral  powers,  inasmuch  as  such  ships,  although  a  confiscation  of 
tlicni  would  not  have  to  be  considered,  would  have  to  be  turned  away  and 
l)rohibited  until  the  blockade  should  be  raised.  In  the  same  manner  Euro- 
jiean  states  have  proceeded  on  such  occasion,  especially  England  and  France." 

«  F.  R.,  1903,  pp.  420  and  421. 

*"  F.  R.,  1897,  p.  255.  In  reply  to  the  announcement  by  the  powers  of  the 
blockade  of  Crete,  Secretary  Sherman  wTote  (March  26,  1897): 

"As  the  United  States  is  not  a  signatory  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  nor  other- 
wise anionalile  to  the  engagements  thereof,  I  confine  myself  to  taking  note  of 
the  conununication,  not  conceding  the  right  to  make  such  a  blockade  as  that 
referred  to  in  your  communication,  and  receiving  the  consideration  of  all 
international  rights  and  of  any  questions  which  may  in  any  way  affect  the 
commerce  or  interests  of  the  United  States." 

5'  F.  R.,  1903,  p.  421. 

52  F.  R.,  1903,  p.  454.  The  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  explained 
ta  Mr.  White  that  Germany  had  used  the  word  "war-like  blockade"  because 
a  regular  "jure  gentium"  lilockade  required  a  vote  of  the  Bundesrath.  This 
full,  recognized  form  was  insisted  on  t)V  Great  Britain  and  the  vote  of  the 
Bundesrath  endorsed  it. 

='  Parliamentary  Debates,  Session  1902,  Vol.  1(3,  pp.  1490  f. 


294  GERMANY   AND   THE   iMONROE   DOCTRINE 

theless  both  countries  avoided^'*  a  direct  declaration  of  war  against 
Venezuela.  The  whole  controversy  over  the  doctrines  involved 
in  the  blockade  has  been  considered^^  important  as  having  estab- 
lished the  American  viewpoint  and  having  definitely  fixed  the 
status  of  the  "pacific  blockade." 

But  the  theoretical  aspects  of  the  case  were  of  less  pressing 
significance  to  the  United  States  than  the  facts  of  the  situation 
and  the  immediate  intentions  of  the  blockading  powers  in  ^'ene- 
zuela.  The  German  Government  had  announced  in  1901  that  it 
considered  under  no  circumstances  the  acquisition  or  permanent 
occupation  of  A'enezuelan  territory,  but  it  had  suggested  at  that 
time  that  it  might  consider  temporary  occupation  necessary.  Mr. 
Balfour,  on  the  other  hand,  declared  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons^*^  that  the  British  Government  had  no  intention  of  landin* 
troops^''  in  Venezuela  or  even  temporarily  of  occupying  territory 
there.  The  United  States  Government  was  anxious  to  prevent, 
if  possible,  occupation  in  any  form,  even  though  declared  to  be 
temporary.    As  President  Roosevelt  stated^^  to  Ambassador  von 

=■*  F.  R.,  1903,  p.  421.  The  German  Secretary  of  State  for  foreign  affairs 
declared  to  Ambassador  Tower  that  Germany  had  ("at  present")  no  inten- 
tions of  declaring  war  or  of  going  beyond  the  measures  of  a  "war-like  block- 
ade." In  the  House  of  Commons  Mr.  Balfour  met  the  question  as  follows: 
Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour: 

"The  question  of  the  honorable  and  learned  Gentleman  the  member  for 
Louth,  does  not  arise  when  you  are  in  a  state  of  war  with  a  third  party." 
Mr.  T.  M.  Healy: 

"A  state  of  war!     Has  war  been  declared? 
Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour: 

"Does  the  honorable  and  learned  gentleman  sup])ose  that  without  a  state 
of  war  you  can  take  the  shijjs  of  another  Power  and  blockade  its  ports?" 

=5  North  American  Review,  1903,  Vol.  CLXXVII,  pp.  86  ff.,  article  entitled 
"The  Anglo-German  Intervention  in  Venezuela,"  by  W.  L.  Penfield,  Solicitor 
of  the  Department  of  State,  Agent  and  Counsel  for  Venezuela  and  the  United 
States  at  the  Venezuelan  Arbitration  before  the  Hague  Tribunal. 

*6  Parliamentary  Debates,  Session  1902,  Vol.  16,  pp.  1290  and  1490. 

"A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  Xos.  192  and  230.  After  bom- 
barding the  forts,  a  British  force  was  landed  at  Puerto-Cabello,  but  withdrew 
after  dismantling  the  fort  guns.  The  German  warships  took  part  in  the 
bomliardment  (F.  R.,  1903,  p.  796). 

=*  Thayer,  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  Appendix,  p.  413. 


BRITISH    AXD    GERMAN    ATTITUDES   TOWARD    ARBITRATION     295 

Holleben,  Kiao-Chao  was  not  a  permanent  possession  of  Germany's 
merely  held  by  a  ninety-nine  year  lease,  and  he  did  not  intend  to 
have  another  Kiao-(^hao  on  the  approach  to  the  Panama  Canal. 

For  this  reason  the  United  States  Government  gave  support 
at  once  to  the  prompt  proposal  of  \'enezuela  that  the  differences 
with  Great  Britain  and  Germany  be  submitted  to  arbitration.'^^ 
]\Ir.  Bowen,  the  American  minister,  was  permitted  to  accept  the 
request  of  the  ^'enezuelan  Government  that  he  act  as  arbitrator 
representing  \'enezuela  should  the  other  powers  agree  to  arbitrate. 
The  crux  of  the  whole  controversy  thus  became  the  endeavor  to 
induce  Great  Britain  and  Germany  to  arbitrate.  Here  the  pub- 
lished correspondence  reveals  no  hint  of  the  decisive  action  taken 
by  President  Roosevelt.''''  This  correspondence*^^  shows  only  the 
following  facts:  First,  that  the  United  States  forwarded  without 
comment  to  Great  Britain  and  Germany  the  Venezuelan  proposal 
to  arbitrate.  Secondly,  that  the  German  minister  gave  to  Lord 
Lansdowne  as  his  personal  view  that  "  there  seemed  to.  him  to  be 
considerable  objections  to  encouraging  the  idea  of  arbitration" 
and  that  this  personal  view  had  later  been  sustained  by  his  instruc- 
tions from  his  government.  Thirdly,  that  Great  Britain  also 
considered  the  Venezuelan  proposal,  as  it  stood,  to  be  unacceptable, 
for  the  same  reasons  in  the  main  as  those  advanced  by  the  German 
Government,  but  that  Great  Britain,  while  refusing  to  arbitrate 
concerning  cases  of  injury  to  the  person  and  property  of  British 
subjects,  suggested  that  the  other  claims  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion and  that  the  United  States  be  invited  to  arbitrate  upon  them. 
It  may  be  also  significant  of  a  divergence  of  policy  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  that  Lord  Lansdowne  told  the  German 
Ambassador  that  it  seemed  to  him  desirable  that  the  countries 
send  separate  replies  to  the  Venezuelan  proposal — although  he 
considered  that  in  substance  they  should  make  them  as  similar 
as  possible.    Also  the  correspondence  shows  that  the  United  States 

59  F.  R.,  1903,  pp.  790  ff. 

*"  Thayer,  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II,  ])]•>.  2S()  IT.  and  Appendix.  This  action  of 
President  Roosevelt  was  first  made  public  by  Mr.  Thayer  in  the  above  work. 

"  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  Nos.  185,  190,  191,  193,  195,  198, 
199.     Also  F.  R.,  1903,  pp.  423  ff.,  4.53  ff.  and  790  ff. 


296  GERMAXl-    AND   THE    MOXROE    DOCTRIXE 

repeated  its  inquiries  concerning  the  intentions  of  the  blockading 
powers,  adding  tliis  time  the  recommendation  of  the  American 
Government  that  the  Venezuelan  proposals  be  accepted.  And, 
fourthly,  that  shortly  thereafter  the  principle  of  arbitration  for 
certain  classes  of  claims  was  accepted  by  both  the  British  and 
German  Governments. 

There  has  since  been  revealed,*-  however,  the  pressure  exercised 
by  President  Roosevelt  upon  the  German  Government  before  it 
announced  willingness  to  arbitrate.  The  President  had  become 
convinced  that  Germany  was  the  leader  in  the  transaction  and 
intended  to  seize  some  Venezuelan  harbor  and  fortify  it  with  a 
view  to  exercising  some  degree  of  control  over  the  prospective 
Isthmian  Canal.  Mr.  Roosevelt  also  became  convinced  that  Great 
Britain  would  not  back  Germany  in  the  event  of  hostilities  with 
the  United  States  over  the  situation.  The  President  therefore, 
assembled  for  maneuvers  in  the  West  Indies  under  Admiral  Dewey 
an  American  squadron  superior  to  the  German  fleet  assembled  at 
^'enezuela.  Admiral  Dewey  was  given  secret  instructions  to  have 
his  fleet  "in  fighting  trim"  and  ready  to  sail  at  an  hour's  notice. 
When,  therefore,  the  German  Ambassador  von  Holleben  repeated 
that  his  government  would  not  arbitrate,  President  Roosevelt 
notified  him  that  unless  within  a  specified  number  of  days  the 
German  Government  should  signify  its  willingness  to  arbitrate, 
Dewey  would  be  ordered  to  Venezuela  to  "see  that  the  German 
forces  did  not  take  possession  of  any  territory."  Though  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  expressed  grave  concern  over  the  consequences 
of  such  an  act,  he  seems  to  have  concluded''^  that  President  Roose- 
velt was  bluffing,  for  the  Imperial  Government  furnished  no  reply 
within  the  time  set.  Thereupon  President  Roosevelt  notified  him 
that  there  was  no  use  waiting  longer  and  that  Admiral  Dewey 
would  be  ordered  to  sail  a  day  earHer  than  the  date  specified.  The 
German  ambassador  then  awoke  to  the  situation.  He  discovered 
that  not  only  was  the  American  President  not  bluffing,  but  that 

«^  Thayer,  Life  of  Hay,  Vol.  II. 

"'  Ibid.,  p.  416.  It  is  asserted  in  an  inclosure  in  Roosevelt's  letter  to  Mr. 
Thayer  that  it  was  this  misjudgment  of  the  Venezuelan  situation  which  caused 
von  Holleben's  recall. 


ACTION  OF  PRESIDENT  KOOSEVELT  297 

the  Aniericaii  Heet,  outmatching  in  strenjj;th  the  German  naval 
forces,  was  in  readiness  and  could  act  to  ad^'antage  in  the  Carib- 
l)ean.  Within  twenty-four  hours  President  Roosevelt  received 
from  the  (lerman  Emperor  not  only  the  consent  to  arbitrate  but 
tile  invitation  that  the  President  himself  act  as  arbitrator.  There- 
upon Mr.  Roosevelt  ])ublicly  ex])ressed  his  gratification  at  this 
endorsement  by  Germany  of  the  principle  of  arbitration. 

By  the  decisive  action  the  President  thus,  without  letting  the 
public  become  aware  of  it,  removed  what  he  evidently  believed  to 
be  a  real  threat  against  the  ^Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  region  of  his 
pet  enterprise,  the  Isthmian  Canal.  The  American  Ambassador 
to  Germany,  Dr.  White,  seems  not  to  have  shared  in  any  degree 
the  President's  suspicions  of  the  purposes  of  Germany.  The 
action  of  the  German  naval  forces  at  Venezuela  he  describes"^ 
as  "perfectly  legitimate,"  and  states  that  "the  Monroe  Doctrine 

"  White,  Autobiography,  Vol.  II,  pp.  247  and  248.  After  relating  the  acts 
of  the  Castro  Government  in  Venezuela,  Dr.  White  states: 

"At  this  the  German  Government,  as  every  government  in  similar  cir- 
cvunstances  is  bound  to  do,  demanded  redress  and  sent  ships  to  enforce  the 
demand.  This  was  perfectly  legitimate;  l^ut  immediately  there  arose  in 
the  United  States  an  outcry  against  a  'violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.' 
.\s  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  no  more  concerned  in  the 
matter  than  was  the  doctrine  of  the  Perseverance  of  the  Saints;  but  there  was 
enough  to  start  an  outcry  against  Germany,  and  so  it  began  to  spread.  The 
Germans  were  careful  to  observe  the  best  precedents  in  international  law,  yet 
every  step  they  took  was  exhibited  in  sundry  American  papers  as  a  menace  to 
the  United  States.  There  was  no  more  menace  to  the  United  States  than  to  the 
l)lanet  Saturn.  The  conduct  of  the  German  Government  was  in  the  interest 
of  the  United  States  as  well  as  of  every  other  decent  government.  Finally, 
the  soldiers  in  a  \'enezuelan  fort  wantonly  fired  upon  a  German  war  vessel — 
whereui)on  the  commander  of  the  shij),  acting  entirely  in  accordance,  not  only 
with  international  la\y,  but  with  natural  right,  defended  himself,  and  knocked 
the  f(jrt  about  the  ears  of  those  who  occupied  it,  thus  giving  the  creatures  who 
directed  them  a  lesson  which  ought  to  rejoice  every  thinking  American.  At 
this  the  storm  on  paper  against  Germany,  both  in  America  and  Great  Britain, 
l)roke  out  with  renewed  violence,  and  there  was  more  talk  about  dangers  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  As  one  who,  at  The  Hague  Conference,  was  at)le  to  do 
something  for  recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  European  powers,  and 
who,  as  a  member  of  the  \'enezuelan  Commission,  did  what  was  possible  to 
secure  justice  to  Venezuela,  I  take  this  ()])portunity  to  express  the  opinion 
that  the  time  has  rome  for  plain  speaking  in  this  matter.  Even  with  those 
f;f  us  who  believe  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  there  begins  to  arise  a  (|uestion  as 
to  which  are  nearest  the  interests  and  the  hearts  of  Americans — the  sort  of 
'duiul)  driven  cattle'  who  allow  themselves  to  be  governed  by  such  men  as 
now  control  \'enezaela,  or  the  i)eople  of  Germany  and  other  civilized  parts  of 
Europe,  as  well  as  those  of  the  better  South  American  repulilics,  like  Chile,  the 
Argentine  Republic,  Brazil,  and  others,  whose  interests,  aspirations,  ideals, 
and  feelings  are  so  mucli  more  closely  akin  to  our  own." 


298  GERMAXY   AND   THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE 

was  no  more  concerned  in  the  matter  than  was  the  doctrine  of  the 
Perseverance  of  the  Saints."  He  also  declared  that  "  There  was  no 
more  menace  to  the  United  States  than  to  the  planet  Saturn"  and 
that  "  the  conduct  of  the  German  Government  was  in  the  interest 
of  the  United  States  as  well  as  of  every  other  decent  government." 
Absolute  proof  of  Germany's  intention  to  overthrow  its  assurances 
and  seek  to  acquire  territory  in  Venezuela  at  this  period  has  not 
been  made  public.  But  the  reluctance  to  arbitrate,  the  increased 
assertion  of  power  in  regions  of  the  Caribbean  within  the  few  years 
preceding  the  acquisition  of  the  canal  rights  by  the  United  States, 
the  programs  of  the  Pan-Germanists,  and  the  general  expansion 
policy  as  frequently  expressed  by  German  Government  officials, 
combine  to  create  foundation  for  the  fears  of  the  President. 

The  subsequent  negotiations  related  rather  to  the  measures  of 
securing  pajnient,  to  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  of  creditor 
nations  and  to  the  procedure  of  arbitration  rather  than  to  the 
IMonroe  Doctrine,  yet  they  are  significant  of  the  contrasting  poHcies 
of  the  United  States  and  the  blockading  powers  toward  a  debtor 
state.  The  alHed''^  powers  demanded  that  Venezuela  recognize 
in  principle  all  their  claims  and  offer  provision  for  immediate 
payment  of  their  "first-line"  claims  which  they  had  declared  to  be 
not  suited  for  settlement  by  arbitration .'^^  ]Mr.  Bowen,  duly 
accepted  as  representative  of  the  case  of  Venezuela,  forwarded  the 
reply  of  President  Castro  that,  bowing  to  superior  force,  he  recog- 
nized in  principle  the  claims  of  the  allied  powers.  This  was  not 
considered  satisfactory,  the  allied  governments  demanding  to  know 
the  means  by  which  Venezuela  would  guarantee  payment  of  their 

«  F.  R.,  1903,  pp.  602  and  606.  Italy  declared  that,  while  well  disposed  to 
arbitration,  she  would  be  governed  in  her  action  by  the  attitude  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain.  Italy  later  proposed  as  her  conditions  of  arbitration: 
First,  that  the  arbitration  should  include  all  her  claims  against  Venezuela 
so  as  to  leave  nothing  for  further  dispute;  second,  that  her  claims  should 
receive  precisely  the  same  treatment  and  guarantees  as  the  claims  of  other 
countries. 

8«A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399),  Nos.  199,  215,  228.  See  especially 
Lord  Lansdownc's  instructions  to  Sir  M.  Herljcrt,  British  Ambassador  at 
Washington  in  No.  234. 


PREFERENTIAL  TREATMENT   FOR   BLOCKADING   POWERS      209 

(laiiiis.    This  <i;uarantee  was  later  declared  to  be  the  receipts  from 
tlie  customs  hoiises.*^^ 

Meanwhile  the  blockade  of  Venezuelan  ports  was  maintained 
and  the  negotiations  with  Mr.  Bowen  at  Washinjjton  were  ham- 
pered iiy  a  new  |iroblem — that  of  the  treatment  of  the  claims 
against  Venezuela  of  the  other  nations  who  had  taken  no  part  in 
the  blockade.  The  government  of  ^'enezuela  was  ready  to  accord 
equal  treatment  to  all  and  ]\Ir.  Bowen  had  stated  that  30  per  cent, 
of  the  customs  receipts  of  the  ports  of  La  Guayra  and  Puerto 
Cabello  represented  the  maximum  amount  which  Venezuela  could 
att'ord.  The  British  and  German  GoN'ernments,  upon  computing 
the  average  income  from  those  ports,  realized  that  should  this 
amount  be  divided  equally  amt)ng  all  the  creditor  nations  (a  long 
list)  the  full  payment  of  their  claims  would  take  many  years,  and" 
that  "the  interest  of  the  creditors  would  be  far  from  assured  con- 
sidering the  insecurity  of  affairs  in  Venezuela."  They  therefore 
demanded  preferential  treatment  for  the  three  blockading  powers."^ 

'^''  Ibid.,  No.  236.  President  Castro's  declaration  embodied  in  the  form  of 
a  confidential  postscript  to  Mr.  Bowen,  that  the  guarantee  of  the  payment 
would  be  the  customs  houses,  seems  not  to  have  been  forwarded  to  the  German 
Government,  although  it  was  forwarded  to  the  British.  The  German  ambas- 
sador at  London  stated  to  Lord  Lansdowne  that  President  Castro's  answer 
had  contained  no  statement  as  to  when  or  how  the  payment  was  to  be  made. 
Lord  Lansdowne,  who  had  received  the  confidential  ])ostscript,  aj^pears  to 
have  made  no  mention  of  it  to  the  German  Ambassador  but  advised  against 
pressing  President  Castro  further  on  that  point. 

6s  Ibid.,  236  and  245. 

No.  236. 

The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Sir  F.  Lascelles: 

Foreign  Office,  January  15,  1003. 
.  .  .  .  (Lord  Lansdowne  relates  to  Sir  F.  Lascelles  his  interview  witli 
the  German  Ambas.sador) : 
''His  Excellency  called  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  President  Castro's 
letter  ajjparently  contemplated  that  Mr.  Bowen  should  confer  not  only  with 
the  Rei)resentatives  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  Init  with  those  of  all 
other  nations  haying  claims  against  Venezuela.  His  Excellency  regarded 
this  instruction  with  some  alarm. 

I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  blockading  powers  stood  on  an  entirely 
different  footing  from  the  rest,  and  that  in  my  view,  it  would  be  impossible 
for  us  to  allow  our  Representatives  to  take  jiart  in  a  general  discussion  at 
which  a  number  of  other  Powers  would  also  be  represented. 

In  my  view  the  most  convenient  procedure  would  be  that  the  British  and 
German  Representatives  should  negotiate  separately  with  Mr.  Bowen  but 
should  keep  one  another  fully  informed  as  to  their  proceedings.     ..." 


300  GERMANY    AND    THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE 

Mr.  Bowen,  who,  as  representative  of  Venezuela,  had  signed  an 
agreement  assigning  the  30  per  cent,  of  the  customs  receipts  of 
the  two  ports  to  satisfy  the  claims  of  all  the  creditor  nations, 
refused^^  to  grant  to  the  blockading  powers  a  preferred  status  in 
relation  to  their  claims.  He  considered  it  unjust  to  tie  the  hands 
of  the  other  nations  for  the  five  or  six  years  required  to  pay  the 
claims  and  that  to  grant  such  a  reward  to  those  who  had  used  force 
would  encourage  the  other  nations  to  use  the  same  method.  He 
also  contended  that  if  the  alhed  powers  wanted  preferential  treat- 
ment, they  should  have  asked  for  this  in  the  beginning  and  not  after 
he  had  understood  that  all  their  conditions  had  been  presented. 
The  British  Government  rephed  that  it  refused  to  be  bound  by 
any  agreements  ]\Ir.  Bowen  might  have  made  with  other  powers. 
"The  outcome  of  this  controversy  was  that  in  the  separate  pro- 
tocols^'' signed  by  ]Mr.  Bowen  for  Venezuela  with  Germany,  Great 

«3  Ibid.,  No.  252. 

Sir  M.  Herbert  to  the  Marque.ss  of  Lansdowne.     (Received  Jan.  29.) 

(Telegraphic)  Washington,  January  29,  1903. 

"Venezuela.     The  Italian  Ambassador,  the  German  Charge  d' Affaires, 

and  I  called  to-night  on  Mr.  Bowen.     I  informed  him  that  we  were  forced 

to  reckon  with  pubhc  opinion  in  England,  and  that  it  might  be  necessary  to 

fall  back  on  the  Triljunal  of  the  Hague. 

We  were  imable  to  obtain  a  satisfactory  answer  from  JMr.  Bowen,  who  was 

very  obdurate. 

He  ultimately  made  a  statement  in  reply  in  the  following  terms: 

'I  object  to  paying  first  the  claims  of  the  allied  Powers  and  the  claims  of 

the  other  nations  afterwards,  because 

1.  I  think  it  is  unjust,  unfair,  and  illegal  to  tie  the  hands  of  the  said  other 
nations  for  the  period  of  five  or  six  years  that  it  would  take  to  pay  the  claims 
of  the  allied  Powers; 

2.  If  I  recognize  that  brute  force  alone  can  be  respected  in  the  collection 
of  claims  I  should  encourage  the  said  other  nations  to  use  force  also; 

3.  If  the  allied  Powers  wanted  preferential  treatment  they  should  have 
asked  for  it  in  the  beginning,  and  should  not  now  propose  it  after  I  understood 
that  all  the  conditions  of  the  allied  Powers  had  been  stated. 

If,  however,  this  demand  for  preferential  treatment  is  raised  simply  as  a 
point  of  honor,  I  am  willing  to  agree  that  the  entire  30  per  cent,  be  paid  to  the 
allied  Powers  for  the  first  month!'  " 

'"Sen.  Doc.  No.  119,  58th  Cong.,  3rd  Sess. :  Venezuelan  Protocol  with 
Great  Britain,  pp.  769  ff.  Venezuelan  Protocol  with  Germany,  pp.  831  ff. 
Venezuelan  Protocol  with  Italy,  pp.  849  ff.  (also  pp.  23  to  40).  Each  of  the 
three  powers  received  an  immediate  cash  payment  of  5500  poimds.  ,\11 
further  claims  of  Great  Britain  were  referred  to  a  mixed  commission.  The 
German  claims  originating  from  the  Venezuelan  civil  wars  of  1898  to  1900 
(the  "first  rank  claims")  amounted  to  1,718,815.67  bolivars,  and  were  to  be 
paid  in  monthly  installments  within  that  year  (1903).     The  remaining  Ger- 


HAGUE-TRIBUNAL  ARBITRATION  301 

Britain  and  Italy  the  provision  was  made"  that  the  question  of 
preferential  treatment  be  referred  to  the  Ha^ne  Tribnnal.'^'- 

When  finally  submitted  to  that  Tribunal  the  main  ground  set 
forth  by  the  American  delegates^^  for  opposing  preferential  treat- 
ment of  the  blockading  powers  was  that  such  a  recognition  would 
jjlace  a  premium  on  the  use  of  military  force  for  the  collection 
of  claims,  a  principle  which  the  Hague  Tribunal  founded  in  the 
interests  of  peace  should  not  endorse.  As  precedent  for  the 
equality  of  treatment  of  the  claims  of  all  nations  the  American 
delegates  cited  that  after  the  Boxer  rebellion,  in  the  awarding  of 
the  indemnities,  no  distinction  was  made  between  the  nations  who 
had  used  force  and  those  who  had  not.  The  main  contention^-* 
of  the  blockading  powers  was  that  it  was  the  measures  taken  by 
them  which  alone  obtained  from  Venezuela  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  claims,  that  therefore  the  nations  which  did  the  work 
should  have  at  least  first  access  to  the  benefits.  Moreover,  they 
asserted  that  the  other  powers  had  acquiesced  in  their  action  and 
should  not  therefore  seek  to  deprive  the  blockading  powers  of 

man  claims  were  referred  to  a  mixed  commission.  The  Italian  claims  derived 
from  the  revolutions  of  1898-1900  amounted  to  2,810,255  bolivars.  It  was 
agreed  that  these  were  to  be  paid  without  submission  to  a  commission,  but  the 
time  or  method  of  payment  was  not  stipulated.  All  further  Italian  claims 
were  sul>mitted  to  a  mixed  commission.  Later,  on  May  7,  1903,  fm-ther 
protocols  were  signed  between  Venezuela  and  the  three  blockading  powers 
definitely  referring  to  the  Hague  tribunal  for  arbitration  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  blockading  powers  should  have  preferential  treatment.  (See 
Ibid.,  pp.  .31  ff.) 

■1  A.  &  P.,  1903,  LXXXVII  (Cd-1399): 

Article  V 


"Any  question  as  to  the  distribution  of  the  customs  revenues  so  to  be 
assigned,  and  as  to  the  right  of  Cireat  Britain,  Germany  and  Italy  to  a  separate 
settlement  of  their  claims,  shall  be  determined  in  default  of  arrangement,  by 
the  Trilnmal  at  the  Hague,  by  arbitration  to  which  any  other  Power  interested 
may  make  itself  a  Party." 

"  Ibid.,  No.  269.  It  had  been  agreed  upon  to  submit  to  the  Hague  Tribunal 
the  second  class  claims  of  the  Powers,  since  President  Roosevelt  had  declined 
their  invitation  to  serve  as  arbitrator.  These  second-class  claims  were  now, 
by  the  protocols,  referred  to  mixed  commissions. 

■'  Sen.  Doc.  No.  119,  58th  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  pp.  239  to  244. 

"^  Ibid.,  pp.  1325  ff. 


302  GERMANY  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

advantages  gained  through  activities  to  which  they  had  given 
their  tacit  or  expressed  consent.  The  tribunal  decided^^  in  favor 
of  the  blockading  powers  and  awarded  to  Great  Britain,  Germany 
and  Italy  preferential  treatment  of  their  claims. 

The  presentation  of  the  cases  before  the  Hague  Tribunal  shows 
very  clearly  the  opposing  policies  of  the  United  States  and  Germany 
(in  unison  with  Great  Britain  and  Italy)  in  regard  to  the  applica- 
tion of  force  against  small  nations  for  the  satisfaction  of  financial 
claims.  The  same  is  true  throughout  the  whole  Venezuela  episode. 
While  the  United  States  offered  no  formal  protest  when  Gennany 
announced  her  proposal  to  use  coercion,  and  stipulated  only  against 
the  acquisition  of  territory,  still  it  made  clear  its  disapproval  of 
such  methods  by  its  many  attempts  to  bring  about  a  settlement 
by  arbitration,  and  by  its  own  abstention  from  the  use  of  similar 
methods  for  the  satisfaction  of  its  own  claims.  It  is  true  that 
Germany,  when  acting  alone  (in  1901),  had  proposed'^*'  to  ^'enezuela 
the  solution  of  their  differences  by  arbitration  and  had  suggested 
referring  the  claims  of  German  subjects  to  the  Hague  Court.  Fof 
this  both  the  American  representatives  and  the  arbitrator  gave 
her  due  credit  before  the  tribunal.  Nevertheless,  after  securing 
the  support  of  Great  Britain  in  the  enterprise,  Germany's  influence 
had  been  exerted  against  the  policy  of  arbitration  when  President 
Castro,  under  the  military  constraint,  had  offered  it.  Only 
under  the  effective  pressure  exerted  by  President  Roosevelt  did 
the  Imperial  Government  yield.  But  that  pressure  was  applied  so 
quietly  that  it  was  not  known  to  the  public,  and  Mr.  Penfield, 
the  Solicitor  of  the  Department  of  State  and  Counsel  for  Venezuela 
and  the  United  States  before  the  Hague  Court,  classes  as  one  of 
the  important  features  of  the  Anglo-German  intervention  in 
Venezuela  that  it  constituted  a  "solemn  recognition  of  the  INIonroe 
doctrine  bv  non- American  States."''^ 


i 


/'     '6  gen.  Doc.  No.  119,  58th  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  pp.  106  ff. 
/      '^  8ee  footnote  20  of  this  chapter. 

"  North  American  Review,  1903,  Vol.  CLXXVII,  p.  86.     Penfield,  W: 

"The  Anglo-German  Intervention  in  Venezuela." 

"Measured  l)y  its  consequences,  the  intervention  of  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  in  \'cnczuela  in  December,  1902,  was  a  notable  event  in  its  relation 


INDICATIONS   OF   POLICY  303 

Suiiiiniiiii;  up  the  inciiients  bearing  on  the  American  national 
j)olicy,  as  they  appear  from  published  diplomatic  sources,  it  is  seen 
that  within  tlie  forty-year  period  under  consideration  there  were 
comparati\ely  few  controversies  with  Germany  in  which  that  prin- 
ciple was  involved.  It  is  also  seen  that  whatever  the  views  of  Pan- 
(rerman  writers,  official  Germany,  by  its  declarations  of  its  pur-'^ 
poses  in  Venezuela,  gave  official  outward  recognition  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine."*^  On  the  other  hand  it  seems  significant  that  just  about 
the  time  of  the  acquisition  of  the  Panama  Canal  by  the  United 
States  the  German  demonstrations  of  power  in  the  region  of  the 
Caribbean  became  more  frequent  and  more  important. .  Having 
secured  the  support  of  Great  Britain  in  the  Venezuelan  episode, 
Germany  had  asserted  her  claims  with  more  vigor  and  had  showed 
less  willingness  to  defer  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States.  More 
significant  still  was  the  fact  that  President  Roosevelt,  who  was 
never  considered  by  the  Germans  to  hold  an  anti-German  policy 
and  who  was  on  very  frieiindly  terms  with  both  the  Ambassador, 
von  Sternburg,  and  the  Emperor,  should  become  convinced  that 
Germany  was  seeking  a  foothold  on  the  American  Continent  and 
should  take  prompt  measures  to  prevent  it.  These  facts  are  also 
given  sui)port  b>'  the  openly  expressed  expansion  policy  of  the 
German  Go\ernment,  although  that  colonial  sphere  was  never 
officially  admitted  to  include  the  American  Continent. 

to  the  law  of  nations.  It  was  notable,  first,  as  an  impressive  assertion  of  the 
right  of  intervention  for  the  protection  of  subjects  of  intervening  states; 
second,  as  definitely  fixing  the  status  of  the  'Pacific  blockade;'  third,  as  a  < — 

solemn  recognition  <jf  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  non- American  states;  fourth, 
in  finally  strengthening  the  position  of  the  Hague  Court,  and  in  advancing 
the  cause  of  international  arbitration." 

"Root,  The  Military  and  Colonial  Policy  of  the  United  States,  p.  107. 
Secretary'  Root  stated  on  this  subject: 

"The  armed  demonstration  by  the  European  Powers  against  Venezuela     | 
was  made  the  occasion  for  disclaimers  to  the  United  States  of  any  intention    j    ^-^ 
to  seize  the  territory  of  Venezuela,  recognizing  in  the  most  unmistakable    / 
way  the  rights  of  the   United  States  expressed  in  the  declaration  of  that 
traditional  policy." 


20 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


PRIMARY  WORKS 

Manuscript  Material 

Bancroft  Manuscript. 
Manuscript  Division,  Public  Library,  New  York  City: 

A  collection  of  letters  written  by  George  Bancroft  to  Hamilton  Fish,  Secre- 
tary of  State,  during  the  years  1868  to  1871  inclusive,  when  Mr.  Bancroft  was 
serving  as  American  Minister  to  the  North  German  Union  and  subsequently 
as  Minister  to  the  German  Empire.  Some  of  these  letters  appear  in  the  pub- 
lished diplomatic  corresi)ondence  of  the  United  States,  Foreign  Relations 
Series,  for  the  corresponding  years. 

J.  C.  B.  Davis  Correspondence  and  Journal, 

Manuscript  Division,  Library  of  Congress,  Washington,  D.  C. 

"A  collection  of  the  diplomatic  papers  of  Mr.  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis,  com- 
prising his  journal  of  the  negotiations  of  the  treaty  of  Washington,  1871, 
January-May  (3  volumes)  A  record  of  the  Geneva  Arbitration  being  four 
volumes  of  Davis's  diary,  copies  of  correspondence,  official  and  personal, 
newspaper  cHppings  etc.,  1871-1872.  The  letter-press  copy  books,  A.  B.  and 
C.,  1872,  January-September  (3  volumes)  and  four  volumes  of  Letters  received, 
1871-1872.     (14  volumes  in  all)" 

The  above  is  the  official  description  of  the  whole  collection  as  published  in 
the  Handbook  of  Manuscripts  in  the  Library  of  Congress,  for  1918.  For  this 
thesis  the  author  found  most  valuable  the  Journal  kept  by  Mr.  Davis  while 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  and  his  correspondence  with  Mr.  Fish,  Secretary 
of  State,  and  with  Mr.  George  Bancroft,  Minister  to  Germany  during  the  same 
period.  Mr.  Davis  was  a  nephew  of  Mr.  Bancroft  and  this  close  kinship  gave 
to  their  correspondence  a  freedom  and  informality  which  resulted  in  very 
frank  comments  on  international  situations  and  policies — with  the  result  that 
they  throw  much  light  on  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many at  this  period. 


GOVERNMENT  PUBLICATIONS 

The  United  States 

Congressional  Globe. 

Published  by  F.  and  J.  Rives  and  George  A.  Bailey. 
Office  of  the  Congressional  Globe,  Washington,  D.  C. 

A  record  of  the  debates  and  proceedings  of  the  United  States  Congress  1835 
to  1872. 


308  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Commercial  Relations  of  the  United  States. 

Published  by  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  Commerce,  Department  of 
State. 
Washington:  Government  Printing  OflBce,  1870  to  1914. 

A  compilation  of  reports  of  consuls  and  consuls-general  on  economic  con- 
ditions in  the  countries  of  their  residence  and  on  the  trade  relations  of  those 
countries  with  the  United  States. 

Congressional  Documents. 

Published  by  the  United  States  Congress. 

Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1870-1910. 

These  include  Journals,  Reports,  Executive  and  Miscellaneous  Documents 
of  both  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  during  the  forty  year  period 
treated. 

Congressional  Record : 
Proceedings  and  Debates  of  the  United  States  Congress. 
Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1873-1910. 

Malloy,  W.  M.: 

"Treaties,    Conventions,    International    Acts,    Protocols    and 
Agreements  between  the  United  States  of  America  and 
other  Powers,  1776-1909." 
Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1910. 

This  collection  was  prepared  under  the  direction  of  the'  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  United  States  Senate,  pursuant  to  a  resolution  of  the  Senate, 
January  IS,  1909,  and  appears  also  at  Senate  Document  No.  357,  61st  Congress 
2nd  Session.  The  "Saratoga  Agreement"  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany  in  1891  is  omitted  from  this  collection  and  appears  in  Senate  Execu- 
tive Document  No.  119,  52nd  Congress,  1st  Session,  1891-1892,  p.  110.  The 
Mallov  collection  was  followed  by  a  Supplement  covering  the  treaties  etc. 
from  i910  to  1913. 

"Papers  Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States." 
Published  by  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1870-1910. 

The  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the  United  States  with  foreign  powers, 
so  far  as  made  public  by  the  Government.  It  omits,  however,  considerable 
published  material  and  requires  to  be  constantly  supplemented  by  the  Con- 
gressional Documents. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  309 

"Richardson,  James  D.: 

"A  Compilation  of  the  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presi- 
dents, 17S9-1S97." 
Published  by  authority  of  Congress. 

Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1898. 

This  collection  also  appears  as  House  Miacellaneous  Document  No.  210, 
53rd  Congress,  2nd  Session. 

Statutes  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1870-1910. 

United  States  Tariff  Commission : 

"Reciprocity  and  Commercial  Treaties." 
Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1919. 

A  thorough  study  of  the  commercial  agreements  of  the  United  States  with 
foreign  countries.  The  report  sets  forth  the  conditional  and  the  unconditional 
forms  of  the  most-favored-nation  clause  and  the  practice  of  the  United  States 
in  regard  to  these  principles.  A  clear  account  is  given  of  the  relations  and 
discussion  with  Germany  on  the  subject  of  the  most-favored-nation  clause  as 
the  basis  of  the  commercial  relations  between  the  two  countries. 

Germany 

"Anlagen  zu  den  stenographischen  Berichten  der  \^erhandlungen 
des  Reichstags," 
Berlin:  Xorddeutsche  Buchdruckerei,  1870-1910. 

The  public  documents  of  the  Reichstag — corresponding  approximately  to 
the  United  States  Congressional  Documents.  The  Anlagen  often  contain 
official  accounts  (Denkschriften)  of  the  Imperial  Governments'  actions,  or 
negotiations.  Occasionally  the}'  contain  extracts  from  official  correspondence 
(Aktenstuecke) 

" Stenographische  Berichte  der  \>rhandlungen  des  Reichstags." 
Berlin:  Xorddeutsche  Buchdruckerei,  1870-1910. 

A  stenographic  record  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Reichstag.  Well-indexed. 
This  is  a  valuable  source  for  official  German  Government  utterances  on 
national  policy  as  well  as  for  Aie  views  of  the  various  parties  of  the  Reichstag. 


310  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Reichs-Gesetzblatt. 

Berlin:     Kaiserliche$  Postzeitungsamt,  1870-1910. 

Collection  of  Imperial  Government  statutes  and  proclamations. 

Weissbuecher.    Vorgelegt  dem  Deutschen  Reichstag. 
Berlin:  Carl  Heymann's  Verlag. 

These  contain  the  official  correspondence  of  the  German  Government  with 
foreign  countries,  instructions  to  German  consuls,  diplomatic  officers  etc. 
The  "white-books"  are  not  published  continuously  like  the  United  States 
Foreign  Relations  Series,  but  only  occasionally.  There  are  several  white 
books  on  Samoa  in  parts  V,  VI,  and  VIII  of  the  white-book  series. 


Great  Britain 

Accounts  and  Papers.     State  Papers  Presented  to  both  Houses  of 
Parliament  by  Command. 
London:   1870-1910. 

Contain  the  Official  Correspondence  of  the  British  Foreign  Office.  As 
Great  Britain  was  involved  in  several  of  the  most  important  issues  between 
the  United  States  and  Germany,  the  correspondence  between  Great  Britain 
and  Germany  on  these  subjects  is  particularly  valuable — especially  since  the 
German  Government  published  comparatively  little  of  its  foreign  correspond- 
ence. 

'^Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties. 

London:   Harrison  &  Sons,  1870-1910. 

A  collection  of  the  treaties  and  conventions  between  Great  Britain  and 
Foreign  Powers.  Compiled  by  Richard  W.  Brant,  Librarian  of  the  Foreign 
Office  and  Godfrey  E.  P.  Hertslet,  Esq.,  clerk  in  the  Librarian's  Department. 


Parliamentary  Debates. 

London:  Wjman  &  Sons,  1870-1910. 

The  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  several  times  a  party  to  the  controversies 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany  causes  the  Parliamentary  Debates 
to  contain  frequently  discussions  of  these  questions  which  contribute  informa- 
tion as  to  the  British  government  attitude. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  311 


AUTOBIOGRAPHY 


l^owey,  Admiral  George: 

"Autobiography  of  George  Dewey." 
New  York:   Scribners,  1913. 

The  firtit  jniblished  report  by  the  American  Admiral  of  his  difficulties  with 
tlu'  (leniKUi  Admiral  after  the  battle  of  Manila.  Admiral  Dewey  gives  a  clear 
account  of  the  size  and  activities  of  the  German  forces  in  the  harbor — both 
of  which  were  in  contrast  to  those  of  the  other  nations  represented  there. 


Foster,  John  W. : 

"Diplomatic  Memoirs."  ^ 

Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin,  1900. 

Contributes  an  account  of  the  negotiations  with  Mr.  von  Mumm  concerning 
the  "Saratoga  Agreement"  with  Germany. 


I  lay,  John: 

"Letters  of  John  Hay  and' Extracts  from  Diary." 
Washington,  1908. 

A  collection  of  the  Secretary's  letters,  printed  by  Mrs.  Hay.  Great  care 
has  been  taken  throughout  to  omit  nearly  all  names  of  persons  referred  to  in 
the  letters,  giving  first  initials  only.  The  reader,  therefore,  while  grateful  to 
have  the  letters  at  all,  feels  greatly  handicapped  and  is  forced  to  do  much 
guessing. 


Li  Hung  Chang:  l/^reR    Ff^o^EA^   ro  Je  ^ 

"Memoirs  of  the  Viceroy  Li  Hung  Ch^.g^ Z1^^;l^sfe1^J';:Z7^ 
London:   Constable  &  Co.,  1913. 

In  addition  to  its  unique  qualities  as  an  autobiography  this  work  gives 
valuable  insight  into  the  viewpoint  of  the  great  Chinese  statesman  towards 
the  foreign  powers  in  general  and  his  contrasting  opinions  of  the  different 
western  nations.  The  \'iceroy's  comments  reflect  most  clearly  the  effects  of 
the  contrasting  policies  of  Germany  and  the  United  States  towards  Cliina. 


312  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Schurz,  Carl: 

"Speeches,  Correspondence  and  Political  Papers,"  selected  and 

edited  by  Frederic  Bancroft. 

New  York:   Putnam,  1913. 

Some  of  the  letters  contained  in  this  collection  throw  valuable  light  on  the 
relations  between  Germany  and  the  United  States.  Mr.  Schurz  as  a  German 
by  birth,  and  a  United  States  Senator,  was  unusually  equipped  to  understand 
the  relations  between  the  two  countries.  His  sympathies  were  thoroughly 
American  and  as  a  fugitive  from  Prussian  autocracy  in  1849,  he  became  a 
particularly  staunch  champion  of  American  democracy.  The  Senator  sought 
whenever  possible -to  promote  friendship  between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many. 

Seward,  Frederick  W. : 

"Reminiscences  of  a  War-Time  Statesman  and  Diplomat,  1830- 

1915." 

New  York:   Putnam,  1916. 

Mr.  Seward  was  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  during  the  Administrations 
of  Lincoln,  Johnson  and  Hayes.  He  gives  an  interesting  account  of  the  nego- 
tions  in  1877  over  the  first  American  Treaty  with  Samoa. 

Stevenson,  Robert  Louis : 

"A  Footnote  to  History— Eight  Years  of  Trouble  in  Samoa." 

Letters  and  Miscellanies  of  Robert  Louis  Stevenson,  \o\.  XIX 

New  York:   Scribners,  1897. 

Mr.  Stevenson  is  a  most  valuable  eye-witness  of  events  in  Samoa  and  of  the 
workings  of  the  representatives  of  the  three  nations  there.  Mr.  Stevenson 
writes  graphically  and  without  national  bias,  taking  in  general  the  point  of 
view  of  the  native  Samoans. 

Von  Diederichs,  Admiral: 

"A  Statement  of  Events  in  Manila  Bay." 

Translated  from  the  INIarine  Rundschau  alid  published  in  the 

Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service  Listitution.  Vol.  LIX, 

No.  437,  August,  1914,  pp.  421  to  446  inclus. 

This  account  was  WTitten  by  Admiral  von  Diederichs  as  a  reply  to  Admiral 
Dewey's  account  of  events  at  Manila  which  the  latter  published  in  his  Auto- 
biography in  19i;3.  Admiral  von  Diederichs  takes  up  point  for  point  the 
complaints  made  In'  Dewey  and  either  seeks  to  explain  away  their  significance 
or  contradicts  the  facts  presented.  In  general  the  German  Admiral's  account 
seeks  to  smooth  over  the  differences  with  Dewey  at  that  time  and  to  minimize 
the  significance  of  German  naval  operations  in  the  harbor. 


BIBLIOGRVrilY  313 

Whito.  Andrew   Dickson: 

"Autobiography  of  Andrew  D.  "White." 

New  York:   Century  Company,  1905. 

Dr.  White's  autobiography  is  one  of  the  most  vahiablc  sources  of  information 
on  the  relations  l)et\veen  the  two  countries.  Serving  as  Minister  to  Germany 
from  1S7!)  to  18S1  and  again,  as  Ambassador  to  that  country  from  1897  to 
190:^  Dr.  \A'hite  was  in  close  touch  with  the  two  governments  in  ])eriods  of 
cordial  and  of  strained  relations.  Through  all  conditions  he  served  efficiently 
the  interests  of  the  United  States,  retained  the  respect  and  admiration  of  the 
German  Government  and  was  an  important  factor  in  maintaining  harmony 
in  the  period  of  the  Spanish  War. 

Witte,  Emil: 

"ReveLations  of  a  German  Attache."     "Ten  Years  of  German- 
American  Diplomacy." 
Translated  by  Florence  Clarkson  Taylor. 

New  York:  Doran,  1916.  From  the  German  edition 
entitled  "Aus  einer  Deutschen  Botschaft" — "Zehn  Jahre 
Deutsch-Amerikanischer  Diplomatic."  Leipzig:  Zeit- 
bilder-Verlag :    1907. 

The  author  of  this  work  was  employed  as  confidential  press-agent  of  the 
German  Legation  at  Washington,  and  was  therefore  a  part  of  the  German 
diplomatic  system  in  the  United  States  at  this  time.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
he  has  allowed  his  personal  grievances  against  the  German  Ambassador  and 
other  officials  to  distort  his  narrative  and  that  he  has  given  his  book  a  sensa- 
tional and  exaggerated  tone  which  undermines  the  reader's  impressions  of  its 
reliability.  In  many  instances  he  uses  insinuations  instead  of  direct  state-- 
ments  and  the  particular  "revelations"  which  he  transmitted  to  Am(>rican 
Government  authorities  are  never  given  at  all.  Nevertheless,  his  work  sheds 
much  light  on  the  general  methods  of  German  diplomacy  in  the  United  St^ates, 
especially  its  activities  among  German-American  societies.  Mr.  Witte's 
general  attitude  seems  to  be  that  of  a  genuine  desire  for  good  relations  between 
the  two  countries  and  his  book  is  a  protest  against  the  cUplomatists  of  Germany 
who  were  undermining  those  good  relations  by  national  propaganda  in  the 
United  States. 

SECONDARY  WORKS 

Benton,  E.  J.: 

"International  Law  and  Diplomacy  of  the  Spanish-American 

War." 

Baltimore:   Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1908. 

A  thorough  study  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Spanish- American  \var  l)oth  as  a 
history  of  the  negotiations  preceding  the  conflict  and  an  exposition  of  events 
and  jiractices  of  the  war  in  their  relation  to  international  law.  There  is  ample 
referefitce  to  source  materials. 


314  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Calwer,  Richard:- 

"Die  Meistbeguenstigung  der  Vereinigten  Staaten  von  Xord- 
america." 
Akademischer  Verlag  fuer  sociale  Wissenschaften.     Berlin, 
1902. 

A  liberal  exposition  of  the  commercial  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany,  and  of  the  poUcies  of  the  two  nations  in  regard  to  the  "most- 
favored-nation"  clause.  Dr.  Calwer  was  a  member  of  the  Reichstag,  Social- 
democratic  Party.  • 


Fisk,  Dr.  George  M. : 

"  Die  handelspolitischen  imd  sonstigen  voelkerrechtlichen  Bezie- 
hungen  zwischen  Deutschland  und  den  Vereinigten  Staaten 
von  Amerika." 
Muenchener  Volswirtschaftliche  Studien.     Stuttgart:    A'erlag 
der  J.  G.  Cotta'schen  Buchhandlung  Nachfolger,  1897. 

An  excellent  study  of  the  history  of  the  political  and  commercial  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany  from  colonial  days,  when  the  chief 
relations  were  wth  Prussia — until  1S94.  Dr.  Fisk  was  employed  as  secretary 
to  the  American  Embassy  in  BerUn  and  had  access  to  the  material  in  the 
Embassy  Archives.  Dr.  White  speaks  -n-ith  praise  of  Dr.  Fisk's  record  and 
services  at  the  Embassy.  (See  A.  D.  White:  Autol^iographv,  Vol.  II  pp.  131 
and  i;32) 


Fisk,  Dr.  George  M. : 

"Continental  Opinion  Regarding  a  Proposed  Middle  European 
Tariff  Union." 
Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies,  1902.     Vol.  XX. 

Fisk,  Dr.  George  M.: 

"Most-favored-nation  Relations,  German-American." 
Article  in  the  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  March,  1903. 

A  very  good  exposition  based  on  the  official  correspondence  pubhshed  in  the 
Foreign  Relations  Series  and  also  upon  certain  archives  of  the  American  Lega- 
tion in  Berlin  where  Dr.  Fisk  was  employed  as  secretary. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  315 

Foster,  John  \V.: 

"The  Praetice  of  Diplomacy." 
Boston:  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Company,  1900. 

Mr.  Foster  illustrates  his  exposition  of  diplomatic  practice  with  actual 
incidents  in  the  careers  of  American  diplomatic  officers — anecdotes  culled 
from  his  experience  as  Secretary  of  State.  A  few  of  these  relate  to  American 
representatives  in  Germany. 

Ilepner,  Adolf: 
"America's  Aid  to  Germany  in  1870-71." 
St.  Louis,  Mo.,  190.5. 

Ex-tracts  from  the  official  correspondence  of  E.  B.  Washburne,  U.  S. 
Ambassador  to  France  during  the  Franco-Prussian  war. 

Howe.  M.  A.  D.: 

"Life  and  Letters  of  George  Bancroft." 
New  York:  Scribner,  1908. 

Contains  several  letters  by  Mr.  Bancroft  on  the  Franco-Prussian  War  which 
are  not  contained  in  the  New  York  Library  collection  nor  in  the  pubhshed 
government  correspondence. 

Tde,  Henry  C: 

"The  Imbroglio  in  Samoa." 

North  American  Review,  1899,  Vol.  108,  p.  G79. 

Mr.  Ide,  as  former  Chief  Justice  of  Samoa,  gives  an  authoritative  resume 
of  the  Samoan  question  as  a  whole,  and  a  first-hand  account  of  the  events 
immediately  preceding  the  partition  of  the  islands.  Mr.  Ide  urges  m()re  active 
support  on" the  part  of  the  United  States  (Government  of  the  Berlin  treaty 
provisions  and  of  the  American  interests  in  the  islands. 

Kraus,  Dr.  jur.  Herbert : 

"Die  Monroedoktrin  in  ihreu  Beziehungen  zur  amerikanischen 
Diplomatic  und  zum  Voelkerrecht." 
Berlin:   Guttentag,  1913. 

An  exhaustive  ai^  scholarly'  study  of  the  American  policy  from  a  view- 
point non-American,  but  not  anti-.\merican.  Dr.  Kraus  -cites  his  sources 
throiig^mut  and  contributes  an  extensive  bibhography. 


316  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Latane,  J.  H.: 

"America  as  a  World  Power,  1897-1907." 
The  American  Nation:    A  History,     Edited  by  A.  B.  Hart, 
Vol.  25.     New  York:    Harpers,  1907. 

McKinley,  William : 

"A  Review  of  the  Tariff  Legislation  of  the  United  States  from 
1812  to  1896." 
New  York:  Putnam,  1904. 

Moore,  John  Bassett : 

"A  Digest  of  International  Law." 
Washington:   Government  Printing  Office,  1906. 

Professor  Moore's  epochal  work  reveals  occasionally  in  its  citations  from 
State  Department  correspondence  events  and  situations  which  are  not  pub- 
lished elsewhere.  So  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  discover,  Professor  Moore's 
work  is  the  only  published  source  of  information  on  the  attempt  of  Germanj' 
to  acquire  the  island  of  Margarita  from  Venezuela  in  1901. 

Paullin,  C.  O.: 

"Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  American  Naval  Officers,  1778- 
1883." 
Baltimore:   Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1912. 

'  Contains  extracts  from  Commanders'  Letters  and  is  based  on  research  in 
the  Navy  and  State  Departments.  Contains  account  of  the  first  American 
agreement  with  Samoa  made  by  Commander  Meade  in  1872. 

Penfield,  AV.  L.: 
"The  Anglo-German  Intervention  in  Venezuela." 
North  American  Review,  1903,  Vol.  CLXXVII,  pp.  86  ff. 

Mr.  Penfield,  Solicitor  of  the  Department  of  State,  was  agent  and  counsel 
for  Venezuela  and  the  United  States  at  the  Venezuelan  Arbitration  before  the 
Hague  Triljunal. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  317 

Root.  Elilui: 

"The    Military    and    (\)lonial    Policy    of    the    riiited   States. 

Addresses  and  Reports  by  Elihu  Root." 

Cambridge:   Harvard  University  Press,  1916. 

A  collection  made  and  edited  by  Robert  Bacon  and  James  Brown  Scott. 
Most  of  the  addresses  are  on  military  subjects,  but  a  few  deal  with  the  foreign 
policies  of  the  United  States  and  American  principles  in  regard  to  colonization. 

Taussig,  F.  W. : 

"A  Tariff  History  of  the  United  States." 
New  York:  Putnam,  1914. 

Thayer,  William  Roscoe: 

"The  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay." 

Boston:  Houghton,  Mifflin  Co.,  1915. 

Mr.  Thayer's  work  is  an  invaluable  contribution  to  an  understanding  of 
American  foreign  poHcy.  By  publishing  directly  so  many  of  Secretary  Hay's 
letters  the  work  retains  the  character  of  source  material,  yet  that  material  is 
clarified  by  Mr.  Thayer's  own  able  delineations  of  the  situations  and  episodes 
treated  in  the  letters.  Secretary  Hay's  letters  deal  so  frankly  and  tellingly 
with  the  national  and  international  problems  of  his  time  that  there  is  at  no 
point  any  doubt  of  what  the  American  policy  toward  foreign  nations,  individ- 
ually and  collectively,  was  to  be,  so  far  as  the  Secretary  of  State  was  able  to 
direct  it.  The  seventeenth  impression,  1916,  and  subsequent  impressions  con- 
tain in  the  appendix  Ex-President  Roosevelt's  owm  account  of  the  episode 
with  von  Holleben  by  which  Germany  was  induced  to  arbitrate  the  Venezuelan 
question. 

Thayer,  W.  R. : 

"Out  of  their  own  Mouths." 

Xew  York:  x\ppleton,  1917. 

A  collection  made  for  the  purpose  of  showing  German  national  i)olicy. 
Aggressive  vitterances  are  selected  from  the  sj)eeches  and  writings  of  Cierman 
.rulers,  statesmen,  servants,  publicists,  poets,  business  men  and  others — with 
introduction  by  Mr.  Thayer. 

^'()n  Biielow,  Prince  Bernhard:  ♦ 

"Imperial  Germany." 

Translated  by  Marie  A.  Lewenz,  M.A.     Xew  York:    Dodd, 

Meade  &  Co.,  1914. 

A  clear  exposition  of  German  Imperialism.  The  work  is  a  glorification  by 
the  Chancellor  of  the  national  strength  achieved,  of  the  successes  of  the  Gov- 
ernment's world  policy  and  of  the  consequent  relations  with  other  powers 
including  the  United  States. 


318  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

^'on  Halle,  Ernst: 

"  Deutschland  iind  die  oeffentliche  Meinung  in  den  Vereinigten 
Staaten." 
Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  Band  107,  1902. 

An  article  outlining  the  general  history  of  German- American  relations. 
The  author  deprecates  the  anti-American  sympathies  shown  in  Germany 
during  the  Spanish-American  war,  declares  as  false,  hostile  propaganda  the 
accusations  spread  in  America  against  Germany  and  advocates  the  further- 
ance of  good  relations  with  the  United  States.  The  article  is  typical  of  the 
efforts  of  the  German  Government  in  the  period  following  the  Spanish-Ameri- 
can war  to  win  favor  in  America. 


APPENDIX 


21 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX  I 

GERMAN-AMERICAN  TREATIES  AND  CONVENTIONS. 

Treaties  Concluded  between  the  United  States  and  Separate  German 
States  Previous  to  1870. 


Date. 

German  State. 

Subject  of  Treaty. 

17S5 

Prussia 

Amity  and  Commerce. 

1799 

Prussia 

Amity  and  Commerce. 

1827 

Hanseatic  Republics 

Friendship,  Commerce  and  Naviga- 
tion. 

1828    ' 

Prussia 

Commerce  and  Navigation. 

1828 

Hanseatic  Republics 

Additional  Article  to  Convention  of 
1827. 

1840 

Hannover 

Commerce  and  Navigation. 

1844 

Hesse 

Abohshing  "Droit  D'Aubaine"  and 
Taxes  on  Emigration. 

1844 

Wiirttemberg 

(Same  Subject). 

1845 

Bavaria 

(Same  Subject). 

1845 

Saxony 

(Same  Subject). 

184G 

Nassau 

(Same  Subject). 

1846 

Hannover 

Commerce  and  Navigation. 

1847 

Mechlenburg-Schwerin 

Commerce  and  Navigation. 

1847 

Oldenburg 

Commerce  and  Navigation. 

1852 

Hanseatic  Republics 

Consular  Convention. 

1853 

Bavaria 

Extradition. 

1853 

Bremen 

Extradition. 

1853 

Mechlenburg-Schwerin 

Extradition. 

1853 

Mechlenh)urg-Strelitz 

Extradition. 

1853 

Oldenburg 

Extradition. 

1853 

Wiirttemberg 

Extradition. 

1854 

Schaumburg-Lippe 

Extradition. 

1854 

Bnmswic'k  and  Lucnolnirg 

Disposition  of  Property. 

1855 

Hannover 

Extradition. 

1857 

Baden 

Extradition. 

1861 

Hannover 

Abolishment  of  Stade  dues  (Naviga- 
tion tolls  on  Elbe  River). 

1868 

Baden 

Naturalization. 

1868 

Bavaria 

Naturalization. 

1868 

Hesse 

Naturalization. 

1868 

North  German  Union 

Naturalization. 

1868 

Wiirttemberg 

Naturahzation  and  Extradition. 

Treaties  Concluded  and  Ratified  between  the  United  States  and  the 
German  Empire  between  1870  and  1910. 

Date.  Character  of  Treaty. 

1871         Consular  Convention. 
1909         Patent  Convention. 


Agreements  Concluded  between  the  United  St.ates  and  the  German 
Empire  betm'een  1870  and  1910. 


Date.  Subject  of  Agreement. 

1891  Reciprocal  Commercial  Arrange- 

ment.    (The    "Saratoga" 
Agreement) 

1892  Copyright  Agreement 

1900  Reciprocal  Commercial  Arrange- 

ment 

1901  Agreement    for    Protection    of 

Trademarks  in  Morocco 

1905  Agreement    for    Protection    of 
Trademarks  in  China 

1906  Reciprocal  Commercial  Arrange- 

ment 

1907  Commercial  Agreement 

1910         Commercial  Agreement 


Form. 

Exchange  of  notes. 


Signed  but  not  proclaimed. 
Signed  and  proclaimed. 

Exchange  of  notes. 

Exchange  of  notes. 

Proclamation. 


by 


Signed    and    accompanied 

diplomatic  notes. 
Proclamation   by    President    of 

United  States  and  in  Germany 

by  statute. 


Treaties  and  Conventions  Signed  Jointly  by  the  United 
States,  Germany  and  a  Third  Power. 

Date.  Subject  of  Treaty.  Third  Power. 

1889         General  Act  providing  for  neutralit}',  etc.,  of        Great  Britain. 

Samoan  Islands 
1899         Convention  Relating  to  Settlement  of  Samoan        Great  Britain. 

•   Claims 
1899         Convention    to    Adjust    the    Question    of    the         Great  Britain. 

Samoan  Islands 


INTERNATIONAL   CONVENTIONS   AND    ACTS 


:^2?. 


Date  of 
Conclusion 

Plnoe  of 
.     Conclusion. 

1875 

Paris 

*18S3 

Paris 

1884 

Paris 

1886 

Paris 

1890 

Brussels 

tl899 

Brussels 

tl899 

The  Hag:iie 

§1900 

Brussels 

1901 

Peking 

1903 

Paris 

1904 

Paris 

1904 

The  Hague 

1905         Peking 


International  Conventions  and  Acts  to  which  the  United  States  and 
THE  German  Empire  Were  Signatories  from  1870  to  1910. 

Subject  of  Convention. 

International  Bureau  of  Weights  and  Measures. 
International  Protection  of  Industrial  Property. 
Protection  of  Submarine  Cables. 
Interpretation  of  certain  articles  of  Convention  of 

1SS4  for  Protection  of  Submarine  Cables. 
Repression  of  African  Slave  Trade. 
Regulation  of  Importation  of  Spirituous   Licjuors 

into  Certain  Regions  of  Africa. 
International  Peace  Conference. 
Additional  Act  for  Protection  of  Industrial  Property. 
Conclusion    of    "Boxer"    troubles,    Provisions    for 

Indemnities. 
International  Sanitary  Convention. 
Sujijiression  of  White  Slave  Traffic. 
Exemption  of  Hospital  Ships  in  War  Time  from 

Taxation. 
New  agreement  between  China  and  Certain  Powers 

concerning  Whang-Pu  Conservancy. 
Creation  of  International  Institute  of  Agriculture. 
Regulating  Trade  and  Administration  of  Morocco. 
International  Red  Cross  Convention. 
Revision  of  duties  imposed  by  Brussels  Convention  of 

1899  on  Spirituous  Liquors  Imported  into  Africa. 
Unification  of  Pharmacopoeial  Formulas  for  Potent 

Drugs. 
International  Wireless  Telegraph  Convention. 
Arbitration,  Rules  of  Warfare,  etc. 
Repression  of  Obscene  Publications. 
Regulation  of  Assistance  and  Salvage  at  Sea. 

*  Xot  signed  at  conclusion  but  adhered  to  later  by  United  States  and  German 
Empire. 

t  Signed  by  German  Empire  at  time  of  conclusion,  later  adhered  to  by 
United  States. 

t  Includes  separate  articles  not  all  of  which  were  signed  by  Ijoth  nations. 

§  Signed  by  United  States  at  time  of  conclusion,  later  adhered  to  by  German 
Empire. 

II  Signed  by  United  States  with  reservation. 

Compiled  from  Senate  Document  No.  357,  61st  Cong.,  2nd  Session. 

"Treaties,  Conventions,  International  Acts,  Protocols  and  Agreements 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  Other  Powers,"  1776-1909. 

Supplement  to  above  Document,  1910  to  1913. 

Reichsgesetzblatt.     U.  S.  Revised  Statutes. 

Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  No.  119,  52nd  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  '91-'92,  p.  110.  (For  the 
Saratoga  Agreement  of  1891 — which  is  omitted  in  the  Malloy  Collection, 
Senate  Doc.  No.  357,  61st  Congress,  2nd  Session.) 


1905 

Rome 

1906 

Algeciras 

1906 

Geneva 

1906 

Brussels 

1906         Brussels 


1906 

Berlin 

tl907 

The  Hague 

1910 

Paris 

1910 

Brussels 

324  APPENDIX 


APPENDIX  II 

Prussian-American  Treaty   of  1828  and  Articles  revived 
FROM  Former  Treaties 

(Malloy,  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1477  ff.) 

1828  Treaty  of  Commerce  and  Navigation 

O 
Concluded  May  1,  1828;  ratification  advised  by  the  Senate 

May  14,  1828;  ratification  again  advised  and  time  for  exchange 

of  ratification  extended  by  the  Senate  March  9, 1829.;  ratifications 

exchanged  March  14,  1829;  proclaimed  March  14,  1829. 

Articles 

I.  Freedom  of  commerce  and  nav-  VIII.  No    preference    to     importing 

igation.  vessel. 

II.  No  discrimination  of  shipping  IX.  Most  favored  nation  commer- 

charges.  cial  privileges. 

III.  No    discrimination    in    import  X.  Consular  privileges  and  juris- 

duties  on  account  of  vessels.  diction. 

IV.  Application  of  two  preceding        XI.  Deserters  from  ships. 

sections.  XII.  Articles     of     former     treaties 

V.  No    discrimination  of    import  revived, 

duties.  XIII.  Blockades. 

VI.  No    discrimination  of    export     XIV.  Estates  of  deceased  persons, 
duties.  XV.  Duration. 

VII.  Coastwise  trade.  XVI.  Ratification. 

The  United  States  of  America  and  His  IMajesty  the  King  of 
Prussia,  equally  animated  with  the  desire  of  maintaining  the 
relations  of  good  understanding  which  have  hitherto  so  happily 
subsisted  between  their  respective  States,  of  extending,  also,  and 
consolidating  the  commercial  intercourse  between  them,  and  con- 
vinced that  this  object  cannot  better  be  accomplished  than  by 
adopting  the  system  of  an  entire  freedom  of  navigation,  and  a 
perfect  reciprocity,  based  upon  principles  of  equity  equally  bene- 
ficial to  both  countries,  and  applicable  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as 
in  time  of  war,  have,  in  consequence,  agreed  to  enter  into  negotia- 


PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN  TREATY   OF   1828  325 

tions  for  the  conclusion  of  a  treat\'  of  navigation  and  commerce; 
for  which  jHU-pose  the  President  of  the  United  States  has  con- 
ferred full  powers  on  Henry  Clay,  their  Secretary  of  State;  and 
His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  has  conferred  like  powers  on  the 
Sieur  Ludwig  Xiederstetter,  Charge  d'Affaires  of  His  said  INIajesty, 
near  the  I'nited  States;  and  the  said  Plenipotentiaries,  having 
exchanged  their  said  full  powers,  found  in  good  and  due  form, 
have  concluded  and  signed  the  following  articles: 


Article  I 

There  shall  be  between  the  territories  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  a  reciprocal  liberty  of  commerce  and  navigation.  The 
inhabitants  of  their  respective  States  shall  mutually  have  liberty 
to  enter  the  ports,  places,  and  rivers  of  the  territories  of  each  party, 
wherever  foreign  commerce  is  permitted.  They  shall  be  at  liberty, 
to  sojourn  and  reside  in  all  parts  whatsoever  of  said  territories, 
in  order  to  attend  to  their  affairs ;  and  they  shall  enjoy,  to  that 
effect,  the  same  security  and  protection  as  natives  of  the  country 
wherein  they  reside,  on  condition  of  their  submitting  to  the  laws 
and  ordinances  there  prevailing. 


Article  H 

Prussian  vessels  arriving  either  laden  or  in  ballast  in  the  ports 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  and,  reciprocally,  vessels  of  the 
United  States  arriving  either  laden  or  in  ballast  in  the  ports  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Prussia,  shall  be  treated,  on  their  entrance,  during 
their  stay,  and  at  their  departure,  upon  the  same  footing  as  national 
vessels  coming  from  the  same  place,  with  respect  to  the  duties  of 
tonnage,  light-houses,  pilotage,  salvage,  and  port  charges,  as  well 
as  to  the  fees  and  perquisities  of  public  officers,  and  all  other 
duties  and  charges,  of  Avhatever  kind  or  denomination,  levied  in 
the  name  or  to  the  profit  of  the  Government,  the  local  authorities, 
or  of  any  private  establishment  whatsoever. 


326  APPENDIX 

Article  III 

All  kinds  of  merchandise  and  articles  of  commerce,  either  the 
produce  of  the  soil  or  the  industry  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
or  of  any  other  country,  which  may  be  lawfully  imported  into  the 
ports  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  in  Prussian  vessels,  may  also 
be  so  imported  in  vessels  of  the  United  States  of  America,  without 
paying  other  or  higher  duties  or  charges,  of  whatever  kind  or 
denomination,  levied  in  the  name  or  to  the  profit  of  the  Govern- 
ment, the  local  authorities,  or  of  any  private  establishments 
whatsoever,  than  if  the  same  merchandise  or  produce  had  been 
imported  in  Prussian  vessels.  And,  reciprocally,  all  kind  of  mer- 
chandise and  articles  of  commerce,  either  the  produce  of  the  soil 
or  of  the  industry  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  or  of  any  other 
country,  which  may  be  lawfully  imported  into  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  in  vessels  of  the  said  States,  may  also  be  so  imported 
in  Prussian  vessels,  without  paying  other  or  higher  duties  or  charges 
of  whatever  kind  or  denomination,  levied  in  the  name  or  to  the 
profit  of  the  Government,  the  local  authorities,  or  of  any  private 
establishments  whatsoever,  than  if  the  same  merchandise  or  pro- 
duce had  been  imported  in  vessels  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Article  IV 

To  prevent  the  possibility  of  any  misunderstanding,  it  is  hereby 
declared  that  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  two  preceding 
articles  are  to  their  full  extent  applicable  to  Prussian  vessels  and 
their  cargoes  arriving  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
and,  reciprocally,  to  vessels  of  the  said  States  and  their  cargoes 
arriving  in  the  ports  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  whether  the  said 
vessels  clear  directly  from  the  ports  of  the  country  to  which  they 
respectively  belong,  or  from  the  ports  of  any  other  foreign  country. 

Article  V 

No  higher  or  other  duties  shall  be  imposed  on  the  importation 
into  the  United  States  of  any  article  the  produce  or  manufacture  of 
Prussia,  and  no  higher  or  other  duties  shall  be  imposed  on  the 


PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN  TREATY   OF   1828  327 

importation  into  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia  of  any  article  the  pro- 
duce or  manufacture  of  the  United  States,  than  are  or  shall  be 
payable  on  the  like  article  being  the  produce  or  manufacture  of 
any  other  foreign  country.  Xor  shall  any  prohibition  be  imposed 
on  the  importation  or  exportation  of  any  article  the  produce  or 
manufacture  of  the  Tnited  States,  or  of  Prussia,  to  or  from  the 
ports  of  the  United  States,  or  to  or  from  the  ports  of  Prussia,  which 
shall  not  equally  extend  to  all  other  nations. 

Article  VI 

All  kind  of  merchandise  and  articles  of  commerce,  either  the 
produce  of  the  soil  or  of  the  industry  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  or  of  any  other  country,  which  may  be  lawfully  exported 
from  the  ports  of  the  said  United  States  in  national  vessels,  may 
also  be  exported  therefrom  in  Prussian  vessels  without  paying  other 
or  higher  duties  or  charges,  of  whatever  kind  or  denomination, 
le\ied  in  the  name  or  to  the  profit  of  the  Government,  the  local 
authorities,  or  of  any  private  establishments  whatsoever,  than  if 
the  same  merchandise  or  produce  had  been  exported  in  vessels 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 

An  exact  reciprocity  shall  be  observed  in  the  ports  of  the  kingdom 
of  Prussia,  so  that  all  kind  of  merchandise  and  articles  of  co- 
merce  either  the  produce  of  the  soil  or  the  industry  of  the  said 
Kingdom,  or  of  any  other  country,  which  may  be  lawfully  exported 
from  Prussian  ports  in  national  vessels,  may  also  be  exported 
therefrom  in  vessels  of  the  United  States  of  America,  without  pay- 
ing other  or  higher  duties  or  charges  of  whatever  kind  or  denomi- 
nation, levied  in  the  name  or  to  the  profit  of  the  Government,  the 
local  authorities,  or  of  any  private  estalishments  whatsoever,  than 
if  the  same  merchandise  or  produce  had  been  exported  in  Prussian 
vessels. 

Article  VII 

The  preceding  articles  are  not  applicable  to  the  coastwise 
navigation  of  the  two  countries,  which  is  respectively  reserved  by 
each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  exclusively  to  itself. 


328  APPENDIX 

Article  VIII 

No  priority  or  preference  shall  be  given,  directly  or  indirectly, 
by  either  of  the  contracting  parties,  nor  by  any  company,  cor- 
poration, or  agent,  acting  on  their  behalf  or  under  their  authority, 
in  the  purchase  of  any  article  of  commerce,  lawfully  imported,  on 
account  of  or  in  reference  to  the  character  of  the  vessel,  whether  it 
be  of  the  one  party  or  of  the  other,  in  which  such  article  was 
imported;  it  being  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  the  contracting 
parties  that  no  distinction  or  difference  whatever  shall  be  made  in 
this  respect. 

Article  IX 

If  either  party  shall  hereafter  grant  to  any  other  nation  any 
particular  favor  in  navigation  or  commerce,  it  shall  immediately 
become  common  to  the  other  party,  freely,  where  it  is  freely  granted 
to  such  other  nation,  or  on  yielding  the  same  compensation  when 
the  grant  is  conditional. 

Article  X 

The  two  contracting  parties  have  granted  to  each  other  the 
liberty  of  having,  each  in  the  ports  of  the  other.  Consuls,  Yice- 
Consuls,  Agents  and  Commissaries  of  their  own  appointment, 
who  shall  enjoy  the  same  pri\ileges  and  powers  as  those  of  the  most 
favored  nations.  But  if  any  such  Consul  shall  exercise  commerce, 
they  shall  be  submitted  to  the  same  laws  and  usages  to  which  the 
private  individuals  of  their  nation  are  submitted,  in  the  same 
place. 

The  Consuls,  Vice-Consuls  and  Commercial  Agents  shall  have 
the  right,  as  such,  to  sit  as  judges  and  arbitrators  in  such  differ- 
ences as  may  arise  between  the  captains  and  crews  of  the  vessels 
belonging  to  the  nation  whose  interests  are  committed  to  their 
charge,  without  the  interference  of  the  local  authorities,  unless 
tlie  conduct  of  the  crews  or  of  the  captain  should  disturb  the  order 
or  tranquillity  of  the  country,  or  the  said  Consuls,  Yice-Consuls  or 
Commercial  Agents  should  require  their  assistance  to  cause  their 
decisions  to  be  carried  into  effect  or  supported.     It  is,  however. 


PRUSSIAN- AMERICAN  TREATY   OF   1828  329 

understood,  that  this  sj)ecies  of  judgment  or  arbitration  shall  not 
deprive  the  contending  parties  of  the  right  they  have  to  resort, 
on  their  return,  to  the  judicial  authority  of  their  country. 

Article  XI 

The  said  Consuls,  Vice-Consuls  and  Commercial  Agents  are 
authorized  to  require  the  assistance  of  the  local  authorities,  for 
the  search,  arrest,  and  imprisonment  of  the  deserters  from  the 
ships  of  war  and  merchant  vessels  of  their  country.  For  this 
purpose  they  shall  apply  to  the  competent  tribunals,  judges  and 
officers,  and  shall  in  writing  demand  said  deserters,  proving,  by 
the  exhibition  of  the  registers  of  the  vessels,  the  rolls  of  the  crews, 
or  by  other  official  documents,  that  such  individuals  formed  part 
of  the  crews;  and,  on  this  reclamation  being  thus  substantiated, 
the  surrender  shall  not  be  refused.  Such  deserters,  when  arrested 
shall  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  said  Consuls,  Vice-Consuls, 
or  Commercial  Agents,  and  may  be  confined  in  the  public  prisons, 
at  the  request  and  cost  of  those  who  shall  claim  them,  in  order  to 
be  sent  to  the  vessels  to  which  they  belonged,  or  to  others  of  the 
same  country.  But  if  not  sent  back  within  three  months  from  the 
day  of  their  arrest,  they  shall  be  set  at  liberty,  and  shall  not  be 
again  arrested  for  the  same  cause.  However,  if  the  deserter  should 
be  found  to  have  committed  any  crime  or  offence,  his  surrender 
may  be  delayed  until  the  tribinial  before  which  his  case  shall  be 
depending  shall  have  pronounced  its  sentence,  and  such  sentence 
shall  have  been  carried  into  effect. 

Article  XII 

The  twelfth  article  of  the  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  con- 
cluded between  the  parties  in  1785,  and  the  articles  from  the 
thirteenth  to  the  twenty-fourth,  inclusive,  of  that  which  was 
concluded  at  Berlin  in  1799,  with  the  excei)tion  of  the  last  jxira- 
graph  in  the  nineteenth  article,  relating  to  treaties  with  Great 
Britain,  are  hereby  rexdved  with  the  same  force  and  virtue  as  if 
they  made  part  of  the  context  of  the  present  treaty,  it  being,  how- 


330  APPENDIX 

ever,  understood  that  the  stipulations  contained  in  the  articles 
thus  revived  shall  be  always  considered  as  in  no  manner  affecting 
the  treaties  or  conventions  concluded  by  either  party  with  other 
Powers,  during  the  interval  between  the  expiration  of  the  said 
treaty  of  1799,  and  the  commencement  of  the  operation  of  the 
present  treaty. 

The  parties  being  still  desirous,  in  conformity  with  their  inten- 
tion declared  in  the  twelfth  article  of  the  said  treaty  of  1799,  to 
establish  between  themselves,  or  in  concert  with  other  maritime 
Powers,  further  provisions  to  ensure  just  protection  and  freedom 
to  neutral  navigation  and  commerce,  and  which  may,  at  the  same 
time,  advance  the  cause  of  civilization  and  humanity,  engage 
again  to  treat  on  this  subject  at  some  future  and  convenient 
period. 

Article  XIII 

Considering  the  remoteness  of  the  respective  countries  of  the 
two  high  contracting  parties,  and  the  uncertainty  resulting  there- 
from, with  respect  to  the  various  events  which  may  take  place,  it 
is  agreed  that  a  merchant  vessel  belonging  to  either  of  them,  which 
may  be  bound  to  a  port  supposed  at  the  time  of  its  departure  to 
be  blockaded,  shall  not,  however,  be  captured  or  condemned  for 
having  attempted  a  first  time  to  enter  said  port,  unless  it  can  be 
proved  that  said  vessel  could  and  ought  to  have  learnt,  during  its 
voyage,  that  the  blockade  of  the  place  in  question  still  continued. 
But  all  vessels  which,  after  ha%'ing  been  warned  off  once  shall, 
during  the  same  voyage,  attempt  a  second  time  to  enter  the  same 
blockaded  port,  during  the  continuance  of  the  said  blockade,  shall 
then  subject  themselves  to  be  detained  and  condemned. 

Article   XIV 

The  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  party  shall  have  power  to  dis- 
pose of  their  personal  goods  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  other, 
by  testament,  donation,  or  othenvise;  and  their  representatives, 
being  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  other  party,  shall  succeed  to  their 
said  personal  goods,  whether  by  testament  or  ab  intestato,  and 


PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN  TREATY   OK   1828  331 

may  take  possession  thereof,  eitlier  by  themselves  or  by  others 
aethig  for  tliem,  and  (Uspose  of  the  same  at  their  will,  paying  such 
dues  only  as  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  wherein  the  said  goods 
are  shall  be  subject  to  pay  in  like  cases.  And  in  case  of  the  absence 
of  the  representative,  such  care  shall  be  taken  of  the  said  goods 
as  would  be  taken  of  the  goods  of  a  native,  in  like  case,  until  the 
lawful  owner  may  take  measures  for  receiving  them.  And  if 
question  should  arise  among  several  claimants  to  which  of  them 
said  goods  belong,  the  same  shall  be  decided  finally  by  the  laws 
and  judges  of  the  land  wherein  the  said  goods  are.  And  where, 
on  the  death  of  any  person  hold,ing  real  estate  within  the  territories 
of  the  one  party,  such  real  estate  Avould,  by  the  laws  of  the  land, 
descend  on  a  citizen  or  subject  of  the  other,  were  he  not  dis- 
qualified by  alienage,  such  citizens  or  subject  shall  be  allowed  a 
reasonable  time  to  sell  the  same,  and  to  withdraw  the  proceeds 
without  molestation  and  exempt  from  all  duties  of  detraction,  on 
the  part  of  the  Government  of  the  respective  States.  But  this 
article  shall  not  derogate  in  any  manner  from  the  force  of  the  laws 
already  published,  or  hereafter  to  be  pul>lished  by  His  IMajesty 
the  King  of  Prussia,  to  prevent  the  emigration  of  his  subjects. 

Article  XV 

The  present  treaty  shall  continue  in  force  for  twelve  years, 
counting  from  the  day  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications;  and  if 
twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  that  period,  neither  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  shall  have  announced,  by  an  official 
notification  to  the  other,  its  intention  to  arrest  the  operation  of 
said  treaty,  it  shall  remain  binding  for  one  year  beyond  that  time, 
and  so  on  until  the  ex{)iration  of  the  twelve  months,  which  will 
follow  a  similar  notification,  whatever  the  time  at  which  it  may 
take  place. 

Article  XVI 

I 

This  treaty  shall  be  approved  and  ratified  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
by  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia, 


332  APPENDIX 

and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  in  the  city  of  Washington, 
within  nine  months  from  the  date  of  the  signature  hereof,  or  sooner 
if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  above  articles,  both  in  the  French  and  English  languages,  and 
they  have  thereto  affixed  their  seals;  declaring,  nevertheless,  that 
the  signing  in  both  languages  shall  not  be  brought  into  precedent, 
nor  in  any  way  operate  to  the  prejudice  of  either  party. 

Done  in  triplicate  at  the  city  of  Washington  on  the  first  day  of 
May,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twenty-eight,  and  the  fifty-second  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

(seal)  H.  Clay, 

(seal)  Llt)wig  Niederstetter. 


Articles  Revived  from  the  Treaty  of  1799  between  the 
United  States  and  Prussia 

Article  XIII 

And  in  the  same  case  of  one  of  the  contracting  parties  being 
engaged  in  Mar  with  any  other  Power,  to  prevent  all  the  difficulties 
and  misunderstandings  that  usually  arise  respecting  merchandise 
of  contraband,  such  as  arms,  ammunition,  and  military  stores  of 
every  kind,  no  such  articles  carried  in  the  vessels,  or  by  the  sub- 
jects or  citizens  of  either  party,  to  the  enemies  of  the  other,  shall 
be  deemed  contraband,  so  as  to  induce  confiscation  or  condem- 
nation and  a  loss  of  property  to  individuals.  Nevertheless,  it  shall 
be  lawful  to  stop  such  vessels  and  articles,  and  to  detain  them  for 
such  length  of  time  as  the  captors  may  think  necessary'  to  prevent 
the  inconvenience  or  damage  that  might  ensue  from  their  pro- 
ceeding, paying,  however,  a  reasonable  compensation  for  the  loss 
such  arrest  shall  occasion  to  the  proprietors;  and  it  shall  further 
be  allowed  to  use  in  the  service  of  the  captors  the  whole  or  any 
part  of  the  military  stores  so  detained,  paying  the  owners  the  full 
value  of  the  same,  to  be  ascertained  by  the  current  price  at  the 


ARTICLES   KE^•IVED   FROM    1799  TREATY  333 

I^laco  of  its  destination.  Bnt  in  tlie  case  supposed  of  a  vessel 
stopped  for  articles  of  contraband,  if  the  master  of  the  vessel 
stopped  will  deliver  out  the  goods  supposed  to  be  of  contraband 
nature,  he  shall  be  admitted  to  do  it,  and  the  vessel  shall  not  in 
that  case  be  carried  into  port,  nor  further  detained,  but  shall  be 
allowed  to  proceed  on  her  voyage. 

All  cannons,  mortars,  fire-arms,  pistols,  bombs,  grenades, 
bullets,  balls,  muskets,  flints,  matches,  powder,  saltpeter,  sulphur, 
cuirasses,  pikes,  swords,  belts,  cartouch  boxes,  saddles  and  bridles 
beyond  the  quantity  necessary  for  the  use  of  the  ship,  or  beyond 
that  which  e\'ery  man  serving  on  board  the  vessel,  or  passenger, 
ought  to  have;  and  In  general  whatever  is  comprised  under  the 
denomination  of  arms  and  military  stores,  of  what  description 
soever,  shall  be  deemed  objects  of  contraband. 

Article  XIV 

To  ensure  to  the  vessels  of  the  two  contracting  parties  the 
advantage  of  being  readily  and  certainly  known  in  time  of  war, 
it  is  agreed  that  they  shall  be  provided  with  the  sea-letters  and 
documents  hereafter  specified: 

1 .  A  passport,  expressing  the  name,  the  property,  and  the  burthen 
of  the  vessel,  as  also  the  name  and  dwelling  of  the  master,  which 
])assport  shall  be  made  out  in  good  and  due  form,  shall  be  renewed 
as  oftcTi  as  the  vessel  shall  return  into  port,  and  shall  be  exhibited 
whensoe\'er  required,  as  well  in  the  open  sea  as  in  port.  But  if 
the  vessel  be  under  convoy  of  one  or  more  vessels  of  war,  belonging 
to  the  neutral  party,  the  simple  declaration  of  the  officer  com- 
manding the  convoy,  that  the  said  vessel  belongs  to  the  party  of 
which  he  is,  shall  be  considered  as  establishing  the  fact,  and  shall 
relieve  both  parties  from  the  trouble  of  further  examination. 

2.  A  charter-party,  that  is  to  say,  the  contract  passed  for  the 
freight  of  the  whole  vessel,  or  the  bills  of  lading  given  for  the  cargo 
in  detail. 

3.  The  list  of  the  ship's  company,  containing  an  indication  by 
name  and  In  detail  of  the  persons  composing  the  crew  of  the  vessel. 
These  documents  shall  always  })e  authenticated  according  to  the 


334  APPENDIX 

forms  established  at  the  place  from  which  the  vessel  shall  have 
sailed. 

As  their  production  ought  to  be  exacted  only  when  one  of  the 
contracting  parties  shall  be  at  war,  and  as  their  exhibition  ought  to 
have  no  other  object  than  to  prove  the  neutrality  of  the  vessel,  its 
cargo,  and  company,  they  shall  not  be  deemed  absolutely  neces- 
sary on  board  such  vessels  belonging  to  the  neutral  party  as  shall 
have  sailed  from  its  ports  before  or  withm  three  months  after  the 
Government  shall  have  been  informed  of  the  state  of  war  in  which 
the  belligerent  party  shall  be  engaged.  In  the  interval,  in  default 
of  these  specific  documents,  the  neutrality  of  the  vessel  may  be 
established  by  such  other  evidence  as  the  tribunals  authorized  to 
judge  of  the  case  may  deem  sufficient. 

Article  X^' 

And  to  prevent  entirely  all  disorder  and  violence  in  such  cases, 
it  is  stipulated  that,  when  the  vessels  of  the  neutral  party,  sailing 
without  convoy,  shall  be  met  by  any  vessels  of  war,  public  or  pri- 
vate, of  the  other  party,  such  vessel  of  war  shall  not  send  more  than 
two  or  three  men  in  their  boat  on  board  the  said  neutral  vessel  to 
examine  her  passports  and  documents.  And  all  persons  belonging 
to  any  vessel  of  war,  public  or  private,  who  shall  molest  or  insult 
in  any  manner  whatever,  the  people,  vessels,  or  effects  of  the 
other  party,  shall  be  responsible  in  their  persons  and  property 
for  damages  and  interest,  sufficient  security  for  which  shall  be 
given  by  all  commanders  of  private  armed  vessels  before  they  are 
commissioned. 

Article  X\l 

In  times  of  war,  or  in  cases  of  urgent  necessity,  when  either 
of  the  contracting  parties  shall  be  obliged  to  lay  a  general  embargo, 
either  in  all  its  ports,  or  in  certain  particular  places,  the  vessels 
of  the  other  party  shall  be  subject  to  this  measure,  upon  the  same 
footing  as  those  of  the  most  favored  nations,  but  without  haAing 
the  right  to  claim  the  exemi)tion  in  their  favor  stii)ulated  in  the 
sixteenth  article  of  the  former  treatv  of  1785.    But  on  the  other 


ARTICLES    REVIVED    FROM    1799   TREATY  335 

hand,  the  ])r()])ri(.>t()rs  of  tlio  vessels  which  shall  have  been  detained, 
whetluT  for  some  military  ex])edition,  or  for  what  other  use  soever 
shall  obtain  from  the  (iovernment  that  shall  have  employed  them 
an  equitable  indemnity,  as  well  for  the  freii!;ht  as  for  the  loss 
occasioned  by  the  delay.  And  furthermore,  in  all  cases  of  seizure, 
detention,  or  arrest,  for  debts  contracted  or  offences  committed 
by  any  citizen  or  subject  of  the  one  party  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  other,  the  same  shall  be  made  and  prosecuted  by  order  and 
authority  of  law  only,  and  according  to  the  regular  course  of  pro- 
ceedings usual  in  such  cases. 

Article  XVII 

If  any  vessel  or  effects  of  the  neutral  Power  be  taken  by  an 
enemy  of  the  other,  or  by  a  pirate,  and  retaken  by  the  Power  at 
Mar,  they  shall  be  restored  to  the  first  proprietor,  upon  the  con- 
ditions hereafter  stipulated  in  the  twenty-first  article  for  cases  of 
recaj)ture. 

Article  XVIII 

If  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  either  party,  in  danger  from  tem- 
j)ests,  i)irates,  enemies,  or  other  accidents,  shall  take  refuge  with 
their  vessels  or  effects,  within  the  harbors  or  jurisdiction  of  the 
(!ther,  the\'  shall  be  received,  protected,  and  treated  with  humanity 
and  kindness,  and  shall  be  permitted  to  furnish  themselves,  at 
reasonable  prices,  with  all  refreshments,  provisions,  and  other 
things  necessary  for  their  sustenance,  health,  and  accom(m)oda- 
tion,  and  for  the  re])air  of  their  vessels. 

Article  XIX 

The  vessels  of  war,  pul)lic  and  private,  of  both  parties,  shall 
carry  freely,  wheresoever  the>'  please,  the  vessels  and  effects 
taken  from  their  enemies,  without  being  obliged  to  pay  any  duties, 
charges,  or  fees  to  officers  of  admiralty,  of  the  customs,  or  any 
others;  nor  shall  such  prizes  be  arrested,  searched,  or  put  under 
legal  process,  when  they  come  to  and  enter  the  ports  of  the  other 
party,  but  may  freely  be  carried  out  again  at  any  time  b>'  their 


336  APPENDIX 

captors  to  the  places  expressed  in  their  commissions,  which  the 
commanding  officer  of  such  vessel  shall  be  obliged  to  show.  But, 
conformably  to  the  treaties  existing  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  no  vessel  that  shall  have  made  a  prize  upon  British 
subjects  shall  have  a  right  to  shelter  in  the  ports  of  the  United 
States,  but  if  forced  therein  by  tempests,  or  any  other  danger  or 
accidents  of  the  sea,  they  shall  be  obliged  to  depart  as  soon  as 
possible. 

i^RTICLE   XX 

No  citizen  or  subject  of  either  of  the  contracting  parties  shall 
take  from  any  Power  with  which  the  other  may  be  at  war  any 
commission  or  letter  of  marque,  for  arming  any  vessel  to  act  as  a 
privateer  against  the  other,  on  pain  of  being  punished  as  a  pirate; 
nor  shall  either  party  hire,  lend,  or  give  any  part  of  its  naval  or 
military  force  to  the  enemy  of  the  other,  to  aid  them  offensively  or 
defensively  against  the  other. 

Article  XXI 

If  the  two  contracting  parties  should  engage  in  a  war  against  a 
common  enemy,  the  following  points  shall  be  observed  between 
them : 

1.  If  a  vessel  of  one  of  the  parties,  taken  by  the  enemy,  shall, 
before  being  carried  into  a  neutral  or  enemy's  port,  be  retaken  by  a 
ship  of  war  or  privateer  of  the  other,  it  shall,  with  the  cargo,  be 
restored  to  the  first  owners,  for  a  compensation  of  one-eighth  part 
of  the  value  of  the  said  vessel  and  cargo,  if  the  recapture  be  made 
by  a  public  ship  of  war,  and  one-sixth  part,  if  made  by  a  privateer. 
.  2.  The  restitution  in  such  cases  shall  be  after  due  proof  of 
property,  and  surety  given  for  the  part  to  which  the  recaptors  are 
entitled. 

3.  The  vessels  of  war,  public  and  private,  of  the  two  parties, 
shall  reciprocally  be  admitted  with  their  prizes  into  the  respective 
ports  of  each,  but  the  said  prizes  shall  not  be  discharged  or  sold 
there,  until  their  legality  shall  have  been  decided  according  to  the 
laws  and  regulations  of  the  State  to  which  the  captor  belongs,  but 


ARTICLES   REVIVED    FROM    1799   TREATY  337 

by  the  judicatories  of  tlio  place  into  which  the  prize  shall  have 
been  conducted. 

4.  It  shall  be  free  to  each  party  to  make  such  rejjulations  as 
they  shall  judjje  necessary,  for  the  conduct  of  their  respective 
vessels  of  war.  jMiblic  and  private,  relative  to  the  vessels,  which 
they  shall  take,  and  carry  into  the  ports  of  the  two  parties. 

Article  XXII 

When  the  contractin*;  parties  shall  have  a  common  enemy,  or 
shall  l)oth  be  neutral,  the  vessels  of  war  of  each  shall  upon  all 
occasions  take  under  their  protection  the  vessels  of  the  other  going 
the  same  course,  and  shall  defend  such  vessels  as  long  as  they  hold 
the  same  course,  against  all  force  and  violence,  in  the  same  manner 
as  they  ought  to  protect  and  defend  vessels  belonging  to  the  party 
of  which  they  are. 

Article  XXIII 

If  war  should  arise  between  the  two  contracting  parties,  the 
merchants  of  either  country  then  residing  in  the  other  shall  be 
allowed  to  remain  nine  months  to  collect  their  debts  and  settle 
their  affairs,  and  may  depart  freely,  carrying  off  all  their  effects 
without  molestation  or  hindrance;  and  all  women  and  children, 
scholars  of  every  faculty,  cultivators  of  the  earth,  artisans,  manu- 
facturers, and  fishermen,  unarmed  and  inhabiting  unfortified 
towns,  villages,  or  places,  and  in  general  all  others  whose  occu- 
pations are  for  the  common  subsistence  and  benefit  of  mankind, 
shall  be  allowed  to  continue  their  respective  employments,  and 
shall  not  be  molested  in  their  persons,  nor  shall  their  houses  or 
goods  be  burnt  or  otherwise  destroyed  nor  their  fields  wasted  by 
the  armed  force  of  the  enemy,  into  whose  power  by  the  events  of 
war  they  may  hajjpen  to  fall;  but  if  anything  is  necessary  to  be 
taken  from  them  for  the  use  of  such  armed  force,  the  same  shall 
be  paid  for  at  a  reasonable  price. 

Article  XXIV 

And  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  prisoners  of  war,  by  sending 
them  into  distant  and  inclement  countries,  or  by  crowding  them 


338  APPENDIX 

into  close  and  noxious  places,  the  two  contracting  parties  solemnly 
pledge  themselves  to  the  world  and  to  each  other  that  they  will 
not  adopt  any  such  practice;  that  neither  will  send  the  prisoners 
whom  they  may  take  from  the  other  into  the  East  Indies  or  any 
other  part  of  Asia  or  Africa,  but  that  they  shall  be  placed  in  some 
parts  of  their  dominions  in  Europe  or  America,  in  wholesome 
situations;  that  they  shall  not  be  confined  in  dungeons,  prison- 
ships,  nor  prisons,  nor  be  put  into  irons,  nor  bound,  nor  otherwise 
restrained  in  the  use  of  their  limbs;  that  the  officers  shall  be 
enlarged  on  their  paroles  within  convenient  districts,  and  have 
comfortable  quarters,  and  the  common  men  be  disposed  in  canton- 
ments open  and  extensive  enough  for  air  and  exercise,  and  lodged 
in  barracks  as  roomly  and  good  as  are  provided  by  the  party  in 
in  whose  power  they  are  for  their  own  troops;  that  the  officers 
shall  also  be  daily  furnished  by  the  party  in  whose  power  they  are 
with  as  many  rations,  and  of  the  same  articles  and  quality  as  are 
allowed  by  them,  either  in  kind  or  by  commutation,  to  officers  of 
equal  rank  in  their  own  army;  and  all  others  shall  be  daily  fur- 
nished by  them  with  such  ration  as  they  shall  allow  to  a  common 
soldier  in  their  own  service;  the  value  whereof  shall  be  paid  by  the 
other  party  on  a  mutual  adjustment  of  accounts  for  the  subsistence 
of  prisoners  at  the  close  of  the  war;  and  the  said  accounts  shall  not 
be  mingled  with  or  set  off  against  any  others,  for  any  other  article 
or  for  any  other  cause,  real  or  pretended,  whatever.  That  each 
party  shall  be  allowed  to  keep  a  commissary  of  prisoners  of  their 
own  appointment,  with  every  separate  contonment  of  prisoners  in 
possession  of  the  other,  which  commissary  shall  see  the  prisoners 
as  often  as  he  pleases,  shall  be  allowed  to  receive  and  distribute 
whatever  comforts  may  be  sent  to  them  by  their  friends,  and  shall 
be  free  to  make  his  reports  in  open  letters  to  those  who  employ  him ; 
but  if  any  officer  shall  break  his  parole,  or  any  other  prisoner  shall 
escape  from  the  limits  of  his  cantonment  after  they  shall  have  been 
designated  to  him,  such  individual  officer  or  other  prisoner  shall 
forfeit  so  much  of  the  benefit  of  this  article  as  provides  for  his 
enlargement  on  parole  or  cantonment.  And  it  is  declared,  that 
neither  the  pretence  that  war  dissolves  all  treaties,  nor  any  other 
whatever,  shall  be  considered  as  annulling  or  suspending  this  and 


ARTICLE    REVIVED    FROM    1785   TREATY  339 

the  next  preceding  article;  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  state  of 
svar  is  precisely  that  for  which  they  are  provided,  and  <hiring 
which  they  are  to  be  as  sacredly  observed  as  the  most  acknowledged 
articles  in  the  law  of  nature  and  nations. 

Article  Rkvued  from  the  Treaty  of  1785  between  the 
United  States  and  Prussia 

Article  XII 

If  one  of  the  contracting  parties  should  be  engaged  in  war  with 
any  other  Power,  the  free  intercourse  and  commerce  of  the  sub- 
jects or  citizens  of  the  party  remaining  neuter  with  the  belligerent 
Powers  shall  not  be  interrupted.  On  the  contrary,  in  that  case, 
as  in  full  peace,  the  vessels  of  the  neutral  party  may  navigate 
freely  to  and  from  the  ports  and  on  the  coasts  of  the  belligerent 
parties,  free  vessels  making  free  goods,  insomuch  that  all  things 
shall  hv  adjudged  free  which  shall  be  on  board  any  vessel  belonging 
t»  the  neutral  party,  although  such  things  belong  to  an  enemy  of 
the  other;  and  the  same  freedom  shall  be  extendetl  to  persons  who 
shall  be  on  board  a  free  vessel,  although  they  should  be  enemies 
to  the  other  i)arty,  imless  they  be  soldiers  in  actual  service  of  such 
enemy. 

APPENDIX  III 

ACJREEMENT   BETWEEN    HaSSENPFLUG    AND    WeBER    AND   THE 

Samoan  Chiefs,  1877 

(V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Arilagen  No.  239,  p.  67) 
^Inlagc  9. 

(Ubersetzung) 

Faleasiu,  3.  Juli,  1877. 
Wir  versprechen  hierdurch  den  deutschen  Vertretern: 
1.  Wir  werden  die  Neutralitaet  des  Distriktes  von  Letogo  bis 
Mulinuu,  einschliesslich  dieserbeiden  Plaetze,  annehmen  (derselben 
entsprechen ,  nachkommen) . 


340 


APPENDIX 


2.  Falls  Krieg  ausbricht,  werden  wir  iinsere  in  Mulinuu  auf- 
gezogene  Flagge  herunternehmen,  und  die  Angestellten  unserer 
Regienmg  werden  IMulinuu  verlassen. 

3.  Wir  werden  fuer  deutsches  Eigenthum,  Haeuser,  Land  und 
Pflanzungen  gute  Sorge  tragen.  Sollte  irgend  einer  der  zu  unserer 
Regienmg  gehoert,  einem  Deutschen  oder  irgend  etwas  einem 
Deutschen  Gehoeriges  Schaden  zufuegen,  so  werden  wir  dafuer 
zahlen  (solches  entgelten). 

4.  Wir  werden  in  keiner  Weise  die  deutsche  Regienmg  zurueck- 
setzen  oder  irgend  einer  anderen  fremden  Regiermig  Vorrechte  vor 
der  Deutschen  gewaehren. 

Wir  heharren  gaenzlich  bei  Allem,  was  wir  den  deutschen  Ver- 
tretern  in  jener  Beziehung  geschriehen  haben,  in  Uehereinstimmvng 
niit  den  uns  in  ihreni  {den  deutschen  Vertretern)  Briefe  an  iins  vom 
24.  Mai  angezeigten  Punkten. 

5.  Wir  werden  den  deutschen  Konsul  den  Tag  anzeigen,  wann 
der  Krieg;  ausbricht. 


Wir  die  Taimua  und  Faipule. 

(gez.)       Samoa 

(gez.) 

Aiono 

"          Lavea 

" 

Loto 

"          Aufai 

a 

Masua 

"          Tagaloa 

<( 

Tuisalega 

(gez.)     Neli 

Tuia 

« 

Mataia 

Sekretaer 

Le  Tufuga 

« 

Sua 

"          Asiata 

<< 

Leaeno 

Tia 

« 

Laiataua 

(L.  S. 

"          Tuataga 

<< 

Alapa 

grosses  Samoa-Staats- 

Mataafa 

It 

Tupuola 

siegel) 

"          Leutele 

« 

Fiame 

"          Lemana 

« 

Mamea 

Leiato 

« 

Mulipola 

%  "          Letuli 

« 

Talao 

Geschehen  auf  Befehl  d 

cr  Taimua  und  Faipule. 

(gez.) 

Meisake, 

Zweiter  Sekretaer 

Anlage  10 

(Uebersetzung) 

Vaiusu,  5.  JuH  1877. 
Wir  sprechen  hierdurch  den  deutschen  Vertretern: 
1.  Wir  werden  die  Neutralitaet  des  Distriktes  von  Letogo  bis 


GERMAN    ACHEK.MKXT    WITH    SAMOAN   CHIEF,    1S77  ^Ul 

jMulinuu,  einscliliesslich  dieser  beiden  Plaetze,  annehmen  (derselben 
oiitsprechen,  naclikoniinon). 

2.  Wir  warden  iinsero  Flaij;i;e  iiicht  auf  jcnem  neutralen  Grunde 
aufzichen.  notli  werden  Angestellte  unserer  Regiorunjj;  dort 
rcsidireii. 

o.  Wir  werdeii  fuer  deutsches  Eigenthum,  Haeuser,  Land  imd 
Pflanzungen  giite  Sorge  tragen.  Sollte  irgeiid  eiiier,  der  zu  unserer 
liegierung  gehoert,  einem  Deutschen  oder  irgend  etwas  einem 
Dtnitsehen  Gehoeriges  Schaden  ziifiiegen,  so  werden  wir  dafuer 
zahlon  (solches  engelten). 

4.  ]]'ir  werden  in  keiner  Weise  die  deutsche  Regierung  zunieck- 
setzen  oder  irgend  einer  andern  Regierung  Vorrechte  vor  der  Deuhchen 
gewaehren. — ^^Vi^  beharren  gaenzlich  bei  Allen,  was  wir  dea 
deutschen  Vertretern  in  jener  Beziehung  geschrieben  haben  in 
I'ebereinstimmung  mit  den  in  ihrem  (der  deutschen  Vertreter) 
Briefe  vom  24.  ]\Iai  derTaimua  und  Faipule  angezeigten  Punkten, 
wovon  wir  eine  Abschrift  empfangen. 

5.  Wir  werden  dem  deutschen  Konsul  den  Tag  anzeigen,  wenn 
der  Krieg  ausbricht. — Wir  nehmen  diese  Uebereinkunft  gaenzUch 
an  und  setzen  unsere  Unterschrift  darunter. 

Wir  zeichnen  unseren  Xamen. 

(gez.)  Malietoa. 


APPENDIX  IV 
"The  Story  of  Samoa" 

IX 

Frederick  W.  Seward's  "Reminiscences  of  a  War-time 
Statesman  and  Diplomat,"  p.  437. 

One  morning  in  1877,  while  sitting  at  my  desk  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  I  was  informed  that  two  gentlemen  "from  some 
Pacific  Islands"  desired  to  see  me.  On  centering,  they  introduced 
themselves.  One  was  an  American  merchant,  who  had  been 
engaged  in  business  at  Apia  Harbor.  The  other  was  a  tall,  fine- 
looking,  swarthy-complexioned  man,  in  ordinary  American  dress, 


f 


342  APPENDIX 

who  proved  to  be  the  Secretary  of  State  and  ]Miilister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  the  Samoan  Islands. 

He  spoke  EngHsh  easily  and  fluently,  but  with  some  quaint 
idioms  that  seemed  to  render  it  more  impressive.  ^Yhen  I  asked 
how  he  had  learned  it,  he  told  me  that  he  was  taught  by  the  mission- 
aries. Schools  and  text-bcoks  not  being  available,  his  chief  bcok 
for  study  of  the  language  had  been  the  Bible. 

His  credentials  proved  to  be  all  in  proper  form,  and  as  the 
business  which  brought  him  to  Washington  was  so  important  it 
had  been  deemed  wise  that  he  should  come  on  himself,  instead 
of  entrusting  it  to  any  diplomatic  or  consular  representative,  I 
duly  presented  him  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Evarts,  and  to 
President  Hayes,  and  I  was  authorized  to  discuss  matters  with  him 
on  the  part  of  our  Government. 

With  the  increase  of  intercourse  and  trade,  the  Samoan  Islanders 
had  perceivetfthat  they  might  become  the  object  of  some  intrigue, 
or  perhaps  fall  under  the  sway  of  some  one  of  the  maritime  powers 
of  Europe,  whom  they  would  be  powerless  to  resist.  Doubtful 
of  their  ability  to  maintain  peaceful  and  stable  existence,  they 
wished  the  United  vStates  to  recognize  and  protect  their  independ- 
ence, to  establish  commercial  relations  with  their  peoj^le,  and  to 
assist  them  in  their  steps  toward  regulated  and  responsible  go^'ern- 
ment. 

In  short,  his  mission  was  nothing  less  than  to  ask  that  they  might 
'  come  under  the  flag  of  the  United  States  and  become  a  part  of  our 
extended  dominion,  either  by  formal  annexation  or  under  a  pro- 
tectorate, in  such  form  as  the  American  Government  might  prefer. 

Having  seen  Pacific  islands,  one  after  another,  eagerly  seized 
upon  by  some  European  power,  and  having  no  wish  to  become 
subjects  of  any  such  power,  they  had  decided  to  oft'er  their  islands 
to  the  United  States.  Of  course,  they  hardly  anticipated  that  there 
would  be  any  hesitation  on  our  part  in  accepting  such  an  oft'er. 

I  explained  that,  while  the  American  people  had  in  former  years 
been  willing  and  desirous  of  extending  their  national  domain  on 
the  continent,  yet  there  had  now  come  a  decided  change  in  public 
opinion.  Extension  of  the  national  boundaries  was  now  looke^ 
upon  with  dis?avor.  ^^ 


"the  stohy  of  Samoa"  343 

Especially  was  there  a  strong  opposition  to  the  acquisition  of 
any  islands,  near  or  remote,  inhabited  by  any  race  but  our  o\vn7~ 
The  proposed^  treaties  "for  naval^harbors  in  the^West^Jndies,  and- 
for  the  acquisition  of  St.  Thomas,  Santa  Cruz,  and  Santo  Domingo, 
had  been  shelved  or  summarily  rejected.  Even  the  Panama  Canal 
had  been  allowed  to  pass  into  the  hands  of  a  European  power; 
and  the  purchase  of  Alaska  was  still  a  subject  of  reproach  and 
ridicule  and  pronounced  a  gigantic  folly. 

Having  had  a  hand  myself  in  the  negotiation  of  these  treaties, 
I  could  foresee  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  mission  he  had 
undertaken.  Of  course,  I  believed  this  dread  of  national  expansion 
was  a  passing  phase  and  an  unreasonable  and  unnatural  one.  But, 
while  it  lasted,  it  had  to  be  reckoned  with. 

The  Samoan  proposals  were  laid  before  Secretary  Evarts,  and 
by  him  laid  before  the  President  and  Cabinet.  Both  President 
Hayes  and  ]\Ir.  Evarts  believed  that  my  father's  policy  in  this 
reganl  had  been  wise  and  judicious.  But  they  saw  also  that  it 
would  now  encounter  the  same  opposition  that  it  had  during  the 
administration  of  President  Johnson  and  subsequently  imder  that 
of  President  Grant. 

(The  Navy  Department  warmly  favored  the  Samoan  proposition, 
as  it  had  always  desired  the  establishment  of  naval  outposts  in 
the  Pacific.  In  fact,  tentative  steps  had  already  been  taken  by 
naval  officers  for  obtaining  a  port  in  the  islands  for  coaling  and 
repairs. 

^'^The  leading  members  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committees  in 
Congress,  and  the  leading  Republicans  in  both  Houses  were 
sounded.  There  were  differences  of  opinion  among  them,  but 
practically  all  were  agreed  that  the  times  were  inauspicious  for  the 
consideration  of  any  such  project.  The  Senate  would  not  consent 
to  any  treaty  that  involved  expense  or  obligation,  and  the  House, 
in  which  there  was  an  anti-administration  majority,  would  vote  it 
down  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  seemed  to  be  considered  a  mark  of 
patriotism  to  oppose  any  addition  to  our  own  country. 

The  Samoan  Envoy  listened  gra\el\'  and  sadl>'  to  the  recital  of 
these  adverse  conditions.  Finally,  he  said  that  I  might  draw  up 
the  treaty  in  any  form  I  thought  best,  and  he  believed  his  i)eople 


344  APPENDIX 

■would  agree.  They  would  give  us  their  best  harbor,  that  of  Pago- 
Pago,  which  fortunately  was  as  yet  unoccupied,  and  in  return 
would  ask  nothing,  except  our  assurances  of  peace  and  fri^irdshTp. 
"""l  drafted^  treaty,  and  then  another  and  yet  another,  endeavor- 
ing to  meet  the  various  Congressional  and  popular  objections. 
It  seemed  as  if  the  Senate  might  be  induced  to  consent  to  the 
acceptance  of  a  harbor,  pro^'ided  the  country  was  not  to  pay 
an^iihing  for  it,  or  even  to  agree  to  protect  or  defend  it. 

So,  at  last,  the  treaty  was  put  into  that  form.  Even  the  phrases 
tendering  our  good  offices  in  case  of  disputes  with  other  powers 
were  objected  to,  but  were  finally  allowed  to  stand.  The  treaty 
was  signed  and  sealed  by  the  Secretary  and  ^Ir.  ]\Iamea,  the 
Samoan  Envoy.  It  was  sent  to  the  Senate  and  in  due  time  was 
confirmed. 

The  press  and  the  public  seemed  to  regard  the  matter  with 
indifference,  and  the  House  refused  any  appropriation  for  a  coal 
jv'ard  for  Pago-Pag'Spvvliich  remained  deserted  and  unused^_^ 

The  liiplomatic  Corps,  of  course,  iook  fioEe^of  fhe  Samoan  affair. 
Some  of  them  were  amused  and  others  puzzled  by  it.  For  a  nation 
of  "  landgrabbers, "  as  we  were  called  in  Europe,  we  seemed  to  be 
very  slow  and  reluctant  to  take  steps  for  our  own  aggrandizement. 

When  I  mentioned  to  the  British  Minister,  Sir  Edward  Thornton, 
that  the  Samoans  might  perhaps  ask  Queen  Victoria  for  a  pro- 
tectorate in  case  their  negotiations  with  us  should  fail,  he  smiled 
and  said, 

"Well,  I  suppose  we  should  take  them,  but  I  do  not  think  we 
should  care  to  enter  into  any  quarrel  about  it." 

A  few  months  later.  Dr.  von  Schloezer,  the  German  Minister, 
came  into  my  room  in  very  cheerful  mood. 

"Aha!"  said  he.  "Also  we  have  a  harbor  in  Samoa.  Not  the 
best — no,  you  have  the  best.  You  have  Pago-Pago.  But  we 
have  the  next  best." 

"What  one  have  you,  mein  Herr?" 

"Apia — Apia  Harbor.  It  is  a  good  harbor.  It  is  where  the 
people  are,  and  the  trade.  We  shall  use  our  harbor  now.  You 
do  not  use  yours — no.  But  you  will,  some  day.  Some  day,  you 
will." 

And  in  so  saying  the  cheery  Envoy  proved  himself  a  prophet. 


AMKUU'AN-SAMOAN   THKATY,   1.S7S  345 


APPENDIX  V 

Commercial  TRf:ATY  between  the  United  States  and  Samoan 

Islands,  1878. 

(U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  45th  Congress,  1877-1779,  Vol.  20,  p.  704) 

Jan.  17.  1878.  Treaty  between  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Government  of  the  Samoan  Islands.  Friendship  and  Com- 
merce. Concluded  January  17, 1878;  ratification  advised  by  Senate, 
with  amendments,  January  30,  1878;  ratified  by  President 
February  8,  1878;  ratified  by  the  Samoan  Envoy  February  11, 
1878;  ratifications  exchanged  at  Washington  February  11,  1878; 
proclaimed  P'ebruary  13,  1878. 

By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America 
A  Proclamation 

preamble 

^Yhe^eas  a  treaty  of  friendshij)  and  commerce  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Government  of  the  Samoan  Islands  was 
concluded  and  signed  by  their  respective  Plenipotentiaries  at  the 
city  of  Washington  on  the  seventeenth  day  of  January,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-eight; 
which  treaty,  after  having  been  amended  and  ratified  by  the 
contracting  parties,  is  word  for  word  as  follows: 

contil\cting  parties 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  the  Samoan  Islands,  being  desirous  of  concluding 
a  treaty  of  friendship  and  commerce,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  for  this  purpose  conferred  full  i^owers  u})on  William  M. 
Evarts,  Secretary'  of  State;  and  the  Government  of  the  Samoan 
Islands  has  conferred  like  powers  ui)on  ]MK.  Le  Mamea,  its  Envoy 


346  APPENDIX 

Extraordinary  to  the  United  States.  And  the  said  Plenipoten- 
tiaries having  exchanged  their  full  powers,  which  were  found  to  be 
in  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following  articles: 

Article  I — Peace  and  Friendship 

There  shall  be  perpetual  peace  and  friendship  between  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Government  of  the 
3amoan  Islands. 

Article  II — Naval  Station  and  Freedom  to  Trade 

Xaval  vessels  of  the  United  States  shall  have  the  privilege  of 
entering  and  using  the  port  of  Pago-Pago,  and  establishing  therein 
and  on  the  shores  thereof  a  station  for  coal  and  other  naval  supplies 
for  their  naval  and  commercial  marine,  and  the  Samoan  Govern- 
ment will  hereafter  neither  exercise  nor  authorize  any  jurisdiction 
within  said  port  adverse  to  such  rights  of  the  United  States  or 
restrictive  thereof.  The  same  vessels  shall  also  have  the  privilege 
of  entering  other  ports  of  the  Samoan  Islands.  The  citizens  of  the 
United  States  shall  likewise  have  free  liberty  to  enter  the  same 
ports  with  their  ships  and  cargoes  of  w^hatsoever  kind,  and  to  sell 
the  same  to  any  of  the  inhabitants  of  those  islands,  whether  natives 
or  foreigners,  or  to  barter  them  for  the  products  of  the  islands. 
All  such  traffic  in  whatever  articles  of  trade  or  barter  shall  be 
free,  except  that  the  trade  in  fire-arms  and  munitions  of  war  in 
the  Islands  shall  be  subject  to  regulations  by  that  government. 

Article  III^ — Duties 

No  import  or  export  duty  shall  be  charged  on  the  cargoes  of  the 
vessels  of  the  United  States  entering  or  clearing  from  the  ports  of 
the  Samoan  Islands,  and  no  other  than  a  tonnage  duty  of  one- 
half  of  one  per  cent,  per  ton  actual  measurement  shall  be  charged 
on  the.  entrance  of  such  vessels. 


AMKKICAN-SAMOAN   TREATY,    1878  347 

Article  IV — Consular  and  Mixed  Court 

All  disputes  between  citizens  of  tlio  United  States  in  the  Samoan 
Islands,  whether  relating  to  civil  matters  or  to  offences  or  crimes, 
shall  be  heard  and  determinefl  by  the  Consul  of  the  United  States 
at  Apia,  Samoa,  under  such  regulations  and  limitations  as  the 
United  States  may  provide;  and  all  disputes  between  citizens  of 
the  United  States  and  the  people  of  those  islands  shall  be  heard  by 
that  Consul  hi  conjunction  with  such  officer  of  the  Samoan  Govern- 
ment as  may  be  designated  for  that  purpose.  Crimes  and  offences 
in  cases  where  citizens  of  the  United  States  may  be  convicted  shall 
be  punished  according  to  the  laws  of  that  country. 

Article  V — Intercession 

If,  unhappily,  any  differences  should  have  arisen,  or  shall  here- 
after arise,  between  the  Samoan  Go\-ernment  and  any  other  go\'crn- 
ment  in  amity  with  the  United  States,  the  government  of  the  latter 
will  employ  its  good  offices  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  those 
differences  upon  a  satisfactory  and  solid  foundation. 

Article  VI — Privileges 

The  Government  of  Samoa  agrees  to  allow  to  the  Government 
and  citizens  of  the  United  States  free  and  equal  participation  in 
any  pri\ilege  that  may  have  been  or  may  hereafter  be  granted  to 
the  government,  citizens,  or  subjects  of  any  other  nation. 

Article  VII — Duration 

The  ])rcsent  treaty  shall  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from  its 
date.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given  to  the  other  six  months 
previous  notice  of  its  intention  then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall 
further  remain  in  force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either 
l^arty  shall  have  given  notice  to  the  other  of  such  intention. 

Article  VI II — lUttification  and  Prodantation 

The  present  treaty  shall  l)e  ratified  and  the  ratifications  ex- 
changed as  soon  as  possible. 


348  APPENDIX 

In  faith  whereof  the  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and  sealed 
this  treaty  at  Washington,  the  seventeenth  day  of  January,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-eight. 

William  Maxwell  Evarts         (seal) 
MK.  Le  Mamea  (seal) 

x4nd  whereas  the  said  treaty,  as  amended,  has  been  duly  ratified 
on  both  parts,  and  the  respective  ratifications  of  the  same  were 
exchanged  in  the  city  of  Washington  on  the  elcAenth  day  of 
February,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-eight: 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  known,  that  I,  Rutherford  B.  Hayes, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  have  caused  the  said 
treaty  to  be  made  public,  to  the  end  that  the  same,  and  every 
clause  and  article  thereof,  may  be  observed  and  fulfilled  with  good 
faith  by  the  United  States  and  the  citizens  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  name  and  caused  the 
seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington  this  thirteenth  day  of  February, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy- 
eight,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one 
hundred  and  second. 

(Seal)  R.  B.  Hayes. 

By  the  President: 

Wm.  M.  Evarts,  Secretary  of  State. 

APPENDIX  VI 

Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Commerce  between  the  German 
Empire  and  Samoa,  1879 

(V.  R.,  1879,  Vol.  VI,  Anlagen  No.  239,  p.  1) 

Freundschafts — Vertrag  zwischen  Seiner  INIajestaet  Dem  Deuts- 

cheii  Kaiser,   Koenig  von   Preussen,  etc.,   Im   Namen   Des 

Deutschen  Reiches,  und  Ihren  Excellenzen  Den  Herren 

Der  Taimua,  Im  Namen  der  Regierung  von  Samoa. 

Seine  Majestaet  der  Deutsche  Kaiser,  Koenig  von  Preussen, 
etc.,    im    Namen    des    Deutschen    Reiches    einerseits,    und    Ihre 


GERMAN-S.VMOAN  TREATY,    1S79  349 

Excellenzen  die  Herren  der  Taimiia,  im  Xamen  der  Regierung  von 
Samoa  andererseits,  von  dem  Winische  geloitet,  Ihro  freunds- 
chaftlichen  Bezieliungeri  iind  Hire  Interessen  gegenseitig  zii 
foerdern  and  zu  befestigen,  haben  beschlossen,  einen  Freund- 
schaftsvertrag  abzuschliessen.  Zu  diesem  Ende  haben  Sie  zu 
Uiren  Bevollmaechtigten  ernannt,  naemlich: 

Seine  Majestaet  der  Deutsche  Kaiser,  Koenig  von 
Preussex,  etc.:  Allerhoechst  Ihren  Korvetten-Kapitaen  Carl 
Bartholomaeus  von  Werner,  Kommandanten  Seiner  ^Nlajestaet 
Korvette  "Ariadne, "  Ritter  des  Koenigliehen  Kronenordens  dritter 
Klasse  iind  des  Rothen  Adlerordens  vierter  Klasse,  und  Aller- 
hoechst ihren  Konsul  fner  die  Samoa  und  Tonga  Inseln,  Theodor 
August  Ludwig  Weber,  und  Ihre  Excellenzen  die  Herren  der 
Taimua:  das  Mitglied  der  Taiinua,  Tuia  und  das  Mitglied  der 
Taimua,  Lemana  und  den  I'nterstaatssekretaer  ^Nleisake,  welche 
naeh  gegenseitiger  jNIittheilung  ihrer  in  guter  und  gehoeriger  Form 
befundenen  \'ollmachten  ueber  nachstehende  Artikel  uebereinge- 
kommen  sind. 

Artikel  I 

Es  soil  Friede  und  immerwaehrende  Freundschaft  sein  zwischen 
dem  Deutschen  Reich  einerseits  und  Samoa  andererseits,  sowie 
zwischen  den  beiderseitigen  Angehoerigen  ohne  Unterschied  der 
Personen  und  der  Orte. 

Artikel  II 

Den  Angehoerigen  <ler  beiden  vertragenden  Theile  soil  in  beiflen 
Laendern  der  voUstaendigste  imd  immerwaehrende  Schutz  ihrer 
Person  und  ihres  Eigenthums  zu  Theil  werden,  und  sollen  ferner  die 
Deutschen  in  Samoa  und  die  Samoaner  in  Deutschland  von  alien 
Kriegskontributionen,  militaerischen  Requisitionen  oder  Kriegs- 
diensten,  und  zwar  besonders  die  Deutsche])  in  Samoa  von  einer 
Okkupation  ihrer  Haeuser,  Laendereien  und  Pflanzungeu  durch 
kriegfuehrende   Parteien   befreit   sein. 


350  APPENDIX 

Artikel  III 

Die  Deutsche!!,  welche  sich  in  Samoa  und  die  Samoaner,  welche 
sich  in  Deutschland  aufhalten,  geniessen  vollstaendige  Kiiltus- 
iind  Gewissensfreiheit,  und  sollen  dieselben  in  keiner  Weise  wegen 
ihres  religioesen  Glaubens  oder  wegen  der  Ausuebung  ihres 
Gottesdienstes  in  ihren  Haeusern  oder  Kirchen  belaestigt,  beun- 
rubigt  .oder  gestoert  werden.  Auch  sollen  die  Angehoerigen 
beider  Laender  die  Befugniss  haben,  ihre  Landsleute,  welche  in 
Deutschland  oder  auf  den  Samoa-Inseln  mit  dem  Tode  abgehen, 
an  Orten,  welche  sie  zu  dem  Zwecke  erworben  und  eingerichtet 
haben,  zu  bestatten,  mid  sollen  die  ihren  kirchlichen  Gebrauechen 
entsprechenden  Begraebnissfeierlichkeiten  in  keiner  Weise  gestoert, 
noch  die  Graeber  aus  irgend  einem  Gnmde  beschaedigt  oder 
zerstoert  werden. 

In  alien  diesen  Faellen  haben  die  Samoaner  in  Deutschland  sich 
den  Gesetzen  und  A^rordnungen  des  Landes  zu  unterwerfen  mid 
sich  nach  den  betreftenden  Sitten  und  Gebraeuchen  zu  richten 
sowie  die  kirchliche  Schicklichkeit  zu  beobachten.  Die  Deutschen 
in  Samoa  sollen  in  der  Beziehung  gehalten  sein,  sich  nach  etwaigen, 
spaeter  zwischen  den  beiderseitigen  Regierungen  zu  vereinbarenden 
Gesetzen  mid  Verordnungen  zu  richten,  inzwischen  jedoch  sollen 
dieselben  nichts  tliun,  was  gegen  die  Gesetze  und  Verordnungen 
ihres  eigenen  Landes  verstossen  wuerde. 

Artikel  IV 

Es  soil  fuer  die  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  vollstaendige 
Handelsfreiheit  in  alien  Gebieten  Samoas  bestehen.  Dieselben 
koennen  ungehindert  mit  ihren  Schiffen  und  Ladungen  aller  Art 
in  alle  Plaetze,  Haefen  und  Gewaesser  Samoas  einlaufeii,  die 
La<lungen  ihrer  Schiffe  verkaufen,  an  Land  nehmen  und  lagern, 
sowie  auch  alle  ihnen  gehoerigeji  Landeserzeugnisse  oder  andere 
Gegenstaende  irgend  ciner  Art  absenden  und  ihre  Schiffe  daniit 
beladen.  Die  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  sollen  weder  fuer 
ihre  ankommenden  und  ausgehenden  Schiffe  und  deren  Ladungen, 
noch  fuer  die  Betreibung  des  Handels  irgendwelchen  Steuern, 
Abgaben  oder  Beschraenkungen  imterworfen  sein,  so  lange  solche 


GEUMAX-SAMOAN   TREATY,    1S79  351 

nicht  besonders  zwischen  den  beiderseitigeii  Regierungen  verein- 
bart  sind,  jedoch  sollen  die  deiitschen  Staatsangolioerigen  audi  in 
solcheni  Fallo  ininier  die  gleichen  Keehte  und  \'()rt]ieile  in  Samoa 
geniessen.  Avie  die  Samoaner  oder  die  Angehoerigen  der  meist- 
beguenstigten  Nation. 

Artikel  V 

Es  soil  den  deutschen  Kriegsschiffen  freistehen,  in  den  Hafen 
von  Saluafata  einznlaiifen,  daselbst  zu  ankern,  zu  verweilen, 
Bedarf  einzunehmen  und  auszubessern,  und  der  deutschen  Regier- 
ung  soil  es  ferner  freistehen,  in  jenem  Hafen  nach  eigenem  Ermes- 
sen  alle  fuer  die  deutschen  Kriegsschiffe  und  deren  Besatzungen 
nuetzlichen  Einrichtungen  und  Anordnungen  zu  treffen. 

Die  Samoaregierung  ist  ferner  damit  einverstanden,  dass  die 
deutsche  Regierung  an  den  Ufern  jenes  Hafens  Gebaeude  zwecks 
Lagerung  von  Kohlen  und  irgend  anderen  Bedarfsgegenstaenden 
fuer  die  deutschen  KriegsschiflFe  und  deren  Besatzungen  errichtet. 
Es  soil  der  deutschen  Regierung  audi  freistehen  auf  deni  Laiide,  wo 
die  Stationsgebaeiide  errichtet  werden,  ihre  Flagge  aufzuziehen, 
jedoch  soli  die  Oberhoheit  der  Samoa-Regierung  ueber  den  Hafen 
von  Saluafata  dadurch  in  keiner  Weise  geschmaelert  oder  beein- 
traechtigt  werden,  andererseits  aber  verspricht  diese  auch  iiichts 
zu.thun,  wodurch  die  der  deutschen  Regierung  in  diesem  Artikel 
gewaehrteii  Rechte  irgendvne  werthlos  geniacht  oder  beeintraechtigt 
werden  koennten.  Auch  soil  durcli  die  in  diesem  Artikel  der 
deutschen  Regierung  gewaehrten  Rechte  der  Hafen  von  Saluafata 
den  Kriegs-  oder  Handelsschiffeii  derjenigen  Nationen,  welchen 
die  Samoa-Regierung  ihre  Hafen  offen  haelt,  nicht  verschlossen 
werden,  jedoch  darf  die  Regienmg  von  Samoa  in  Bezug  auf  diesen 
Hafen  und  seine  I'fer  keiner  anderen  Nation  gleiche  Rechte,  wie  die 
der  deutschen  Regierung  gewaehrten,  liewilligeii. 

Es  soil  den  deutschen  Kriegsschiffen  ferner  freistehen,  audi  in 
alle  anderen  Plaetze,  Haefen  und  Gewaesser  Samoas  einzulaufen, 
daselbst  zu  ankern,  zu  venveilen,  Bedarf  einzunehmen  und  auszu- 
bessern, nach  ]Massgabe  etwaiger,  zwischen  den  beiderseitigen 
Regierungen  zu  vereinbarender  Gezetze,  und  verspricht  die  Samoa- 
Regierungen  hierdurch  ferner,  dass  sie  keiner  aiifleren  Nation  in 


352  APPENDIX 

irgend  einer  Weise  irgendwelche  Vorrechte  vor  der  deiitschen 
Regierung  in  Bezug  aiif  den  Hafen  von  Apia  imd  dessen  Ufer 
bewilligen  will,  sondern  dass  die  deutsche  Regierung  audi  in  dieser 
Beziehung  mit  anderen  Nationen  immer  gleichberechtigt  sein  solL 

Artikel  VI 

Die  Angehoerigen  eines  jeden  der  beiden  vertragenden  Theile 
koennen  gegenseitig  mit  voller  Freiheit  jeden  Theil  der  betref- 
fenden  Gebiete  betreten,  daselbst  reisen,  ihren  Wohnsitz  nehmen, 
Handel  und  Gewerbe  treiben,  Laendereien  und  Grundstuecke 
kaufen  oder  miethen,  dieselben  bebauen  und  benutzen,  sowie 
Haeuser,  Magazine  und  Laeden  darauf  errichten.  In  alien  diesen 
Faellen  sollen  die  Samoaner  in  Deutschland  sich  den  Gesetzen  und 
Verordnungen  des  Landes  unterwerfen  und  alien  anderen  ^>^pflicht- 
ungen  nachkommen,  sowie  dieselben  Steuern,  Beitraege  oder 
Auflagen  entrichten  wie  die  eigenen  Landesangehoerigen.  Ebenso 
sollen  die  Deutschen  in  Samoa  sicli  nach  den  Gesetzen  und  ^'e^- 
ordnungen  richten  und  die  Steuern  und  Abgaben  an  die  Samoa- 
Regierung  zahlen,  welche  spaeter  zwischen  den  beiderseitigen  Re- 
gierungen  vereinbart  werden  moegen,  jedoch  sollen  die  deutschen 
Staatsangehoerigen  darin  immer  dieselben  Rechte  und  Vortheile 
in  Samoa  geniessen,  wie  die  Samoaner  oder  die  Angehoerigen  der 
meistbeguenstigten  Nation. 

Insbesondere  sichert  die  Samoa-Regierung  hierdurch  den 
deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  den  friedlichen  Besitz  aller  Laender- 
eien in  Samoa  zu,  welche  dieselben  bisher  in  ordnungsmaessiger 
mid  zu  seiner  Zeit  gebraeuchlicher  Weise  von  Samoanern  gekauft 
haben,  und  sind  durch  diese  Bestaetigung  des  Eigenthumsrechts 
der  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  durch  die  Samoa-Regierung 
alle  ferneren  Anfechtungeii  in  Bezug  auf  solche  Laendereien  ausges- 
chlossen.  Es  soil  den  Deutschen  daher  freistehen,  alle  ihre  Laender- 
eien in  Samoa  ungestoert  zu  benutzen,  Pflanzungen  darauf  anzii- 
legen  und  die  noethigeii  Arbeitskraefte,  sowohl  zu  dieseni  Zwecke 
wie  ini  Allgemeinen  fuer  ihre  Werften,  Geschaeftsplaetze  und 
Haeuser  heranzuziehen  und  zu  verwenden. 


CiKUMAN-SAMOAN   TREATY,    1870  353 

Artikel  VII 

Die  Bostiiniiunifi;  dor  (lerichtsbarkeit,  welcher  die  in  Samoa  sich 
aiifhaltendeii  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigeii  uiul  Schutzgenossen 
hei  Ueclitsstreitigki'iten  imter  sich,  sowio  in  Bczng  aiif  von  ihnen 
gegen  einander  begangcne  ^  ergehen  und  \'erl)reclien  untenvorfen 
sind,  hleibt  der  deutschen  Regierung  und  deren  Anordnungen 
neberlassen,  dagegen  bleibt  die  Feststelhmg  einer  Gerichtsbarkeit 
iind  des  ^'e^fah^ens  ui  Bezug  auf  Rechtsstreitigkeiten  zwischen  den 
in  Samoa  sich  aiifhaltenden  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  und 
Schutzgenossen  einerseits  und  Samoanem  andererseits,  sowie  in 
Bezug  auf  Vergehen  und  Verbrechen  der  Angehoerigen  des  einen 
vertragenden  Theils  gegen  die  des  anderen,  einer  besonderen 
Vereinbarung  zwischen  den  beiderseitigen  Regierungen  vorbe- 
halten,  einschliesshch  der  noethigen  Bestimmlmgen  ueber  die 
Ausfuehrung  der  Bestrafung  der  als  schuldig  ueberwiesenen  Per- 
sonen,  sowie  ueber  die  Anwendung  des  gegenseitig  zustaendigen 
Zeugenzwanges  bei  Gerichtsverfahren. 

Inzwischen,  bis  die  beiderseitigen  Regierungen  solche  Verein- 
barung getroffen  haben,  soUen  alle  zwischen  Deutschen  und 
Samoanern  in  Samoa  entstehenden  Streitigkeiten  in  bisher 
gebraeuchhcher  Weise  von  dem  deutschen  Konsul  oder  dessen 
Stellvertreter  in  Gemeinschaft  mit  einem  Beamten  der  Samoa- 
Regierung  entschieden  werden. 

Artikel  VIII 

Alle  Gesetze  und  Verordnungen,  welche  die  in  Samoa  sich  auf- 
haltenden  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  und  Schutzgenossen 
sich  zu  unterwerfen,  sowie  alle  Steuern  und  Abgaben,  welche 
dieselben  demgemaess  der  Samoa-Regieriuig  zu  entrichten  habcn, 
soUen  ^•oll  dem  deutschen  Konsul  oder  anderen  zu  dem  Zwecke 
von  der  deutschen  Regierung  ernanntcn  IVrsonen  zusammcn  mit 
Beamten  der  Samoa-Regiennig  berathen  werden,  ebenso  alle 
zweckdienlichen  ]\Iassregeln,  um  die  Beobachtung  solcher  Gesetze 
und  Verordnungen  durch  die  Deutschen  in  Samoa  herbeizuf uehren ; 
jedoch  soUen  alle  solche  gemeinschafthch  von  den  Beamten  der 


354  APPENDIX 

beiderseitigen  Regierungen  berathenen  und  vereinbarten  Gesetze 
mid  ]Massnahmen  erst  nach  erlaiigter  Bestaetigiing  derselben 
diirch  die  deutsche  Regienmg  in  Kraft  treten. 

Etwaige  Vereinbarungen  jedoch,  welche  Beamte  der  beider- 
seitgen  Regierungen  mit  Beziig  aiif  IMunizipal-Einrichtimgen  oder 
Polizei-  Quarantaine-  und  Apia-Hafenverordnungen,  so\ne  ueber 
ein  Verbot  oder  die  Regelung  des  Verkaufs  oder  der  Abgabe  von 
spirituoesen  und  berauschehden  Getraenken  an  Samoaner  und 
Eingeborene  von  anderen  Inseln  des  Stillen  Ozeans  durcli  Deutsche 
in  Samoa  getroffen  haben,  sollen  sofort  von  den  deutschen  Staats- 
angehoerigen  beobachtet  werden  und  zwar  so  lange,  als  die 
deutsche  Regierung  die  Bestaetigung  nicht  versagt  hat. 

Die  deutschen  Staatsangehoerigen  sollen  indess  auch  in  alien 
diesen  Faellen  immer  die  gleichen  Rechte  und  Vortheile  wie  die 
Samoaner  oder  die  Angehoerigen  der  meistbeguenstigten  Nation 
in  Samoa  geniessen  und  keinen  Gesetzen  oder  IVIassnahmen  unter- 
worfen  sein,  wodurch  sie  den  Angehoerigen  anderer  Nationen  in 
Samoa  gegenueber  zurueckgesetzt  oder  benachtheiligt  werden. 

Artikel  IX 

Ausser  den  in  den  vorstehenden  Artikein  gedachten  verschie- 
denen  Vereinbarungen  bleibt  auch  die  Regelung  des  Civilstands — 
inid  anderer  noch  nicht  beruehrter  A'erhaeltnisse  der  Angehoerigen 
und  Schutzgenossen  des  einen  Staates  waehrend  des  Aufenthalts 
in  dem  Gebiete  des  anderen  Theils,  wie  auch  die  Feststellung  der 
Rechte,  Befugnisse  und  Verpflichtungen  der  gegenseitigen  Kon- 
sularvertretung  mid  der  in  Bezug  auf  den  Handel  noch  uneriedig- 
ten  Punkte,  einer  ^>^einba^ung  der  beiderseitigen  Regierungen 
^'()rbehalten. 

Artikel  X 

Die  Regierung  \'()n  Samoa  Aerspriclit,  im  eigenen  Lande  keine 
]Mono{)()le,  Entschaedigungen  oder  wirklichen  ^'orreehte  zum 
Nachtheile  des  deutschen  Handels  oder  der  Flagge  und  der 
Staatsangehoerigen  des  Deutschen  Reichs  zu  bewilligen. 


(■ERMAN-SAMOAN   TREATY,    1S79  855 

Artikel  XI 

Die  Regierunj;  von  Samoa  verspricht,  dass  sie  der  deutschen 
Reiiierung  sowohl  in  Betreff  aller  in  den  vorhertjehenden  Artikeln 
dieses  \'ertra<!;es  beruehrten  Ge^jenstaende,  wie  anch  uel)eriiaupt 
eben  so  viele  Rechte  zugestehen  will,  als  den  meistbeguenstigten 
Xationen,  nnd  als  den  letzteren  in  Znknnft  eingeraeumt  werden 
nioegen. 

Artikel  XII 

Der  gegenwaertige  Vertrag  wird  vom  Tage  der  Unterzeichniuig 
ab  in  Kraft  treten  und  Giieltigkeit  haben,  vorbehaltlich  dessen, 
dass  derselbe  wieder  ungiieltig  wird,  falls  die  Ratifikation  desselben 
seitens  der  deutschen  Regiernng  innerhalb  der  Frist  von  viernnd- 
zwanzig  Monaten,  vom  Tage  der  Unterzeichnung  ab,  nicht  erfolgen 
sollte. 

Artikel  XIII 

Der  gegenwaertige  Vertrag,  aus  dreizehn  Artikeln  bestehend,  soli 
ratifizirt  und  die  Ratifikationen  sollen  sobald  als  moeglich  in  Apia 
ausgetauscht  werden. 

Die  Ratifikation  seitens  der  Samoa-Regierung  soil  jedoch  gleich 
nach  Unterzeichnung  dieses  Vertrages  erfolgen,  und  die  betref- 
fende  Urkunde  bis  zur  Ankunft  der  Ratifikation  der  deutschen 
Regierung  im  Kaiserlich  deutschen  Konsulat  zu  Apia  verwahrt 
werden,  mit  der  Bedingung,  dass  der  Samoa-Regierung  ihre 
Ratifikations-Urkunde  zurueckerstattet  w'ird,  im  Falle  die  deutsche 
Regierung  diesen  ^'ertrag  nicht  innerhalb  der  festgesetzten  PVist 
ratifiziren  sollte. 

Zu  Urkund  dessen  haben  die  beiderseitigen  Bevollmaechtigten 
den  gegenwaertigen  ^  ertrag  in  doppelter  Ausfertigung  unterzeich- 
net  und  besiegelt. 

So  geschehen  im  Kaiserlich  deutschen  Konsulat  zu  Apia  aut" 
Upolu  am  vier  und  zwanzigsten  Januar  Achzehnhundert  neun 
und  siebenzig. 

(gez.)  Von  Werner,    (l.  s.)  Tuia.  (l.  s.) 

A.  Weber,     (l.  s.)  Lemana.       (l.  s.) 

Meis.\ke.     (l.  s.) 


356  APPENDIX 


APPENDIX  VII 

Treaty  of  Friendship,  etc.,  Between  Great  Britain  and 

Samoa 

(See  Hertslet's  Commercial  Treaties,  Vol.  XV,  p.  334) 

Samoa 

Treaty  of  Friendship,  etc.,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  King 
and  Government  (Malo)  of  Samoa.  Signed  at  Apia,  August 
28,  1879. 

Her  ]\Iajesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  and  the  King  and  Government  (jNIalo)  of  Samoa, 
being  desirous  to  establish  relations  of  friendship  between  their 
respective  dominions  and  subjects,  have  resolved  to  conclude  a 
Treaty  for  that  purpose,  and  have  therefore  named  as  their 
Plenipotentiaries : 

Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  etc.,  the  Honorable  Sir  Arthur  Hamilton  Gordon, 
Knight  Grand  Cross  of  the  INIost  Distinguished  Order  of  St. 
Michael  and  St.  George,  Her  ]\Iajesty's  High  Commissioner  and 
Consul-General  for  the  Western  Pacific,  Governor  of  Fiji;  and 
Alfred  Percival  Maudslay,  Esq.,  one  of  Her  jNIajesty's  Deput}' 
Connnissioners  for  the  Western  Pacific;  and 

The  King  and  Govermnent  (Malo)  of  Samoa,  the  High  Chief 
Mahetoa  Laupepa  and  the  High  Chief  Saga; 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respective 
full  poA\ers,  have  agreed  upon  and  concluded  the  following  Articles : 

Art.  I.  There  shall  be  perpetual  peace  and  friendship  between 
the  subjects  of  Her  Britannic  INIajcsty  and  those  of  the  Samoan 
State. 

II.  The  King  and  Go\'ernment  (INIalo)  of  Samoa  engage  to 
grant  to  no  other  Sovereign  or  State  any  rights,  pri\'ileges, 
authority,  or  predominance  in  Samoa  in  excess  of  such  as  are  or 


BRITISII-SAMOAN  TREATY,    1879  357 

may  he  accorded  to  Her  Britannic  Majesty.  The  subjects  of  Her 
Britannic  ^Majesty  shall  always  enjoy  in  Samoa  whatever  rights, 
privileges,  and  immimities  shall  he  granted  to  those  of  the  most 
fa\»)red  nation;  and  no  rights,  privileges  or  immmiities  shall  be 
granted  to  the  subjects  of  any  foreign  State  that  shall  not  be 
equally  and  unconditionally  accorded  to  the  subjects  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty. 

III.  Full  liberty  for  the  free  pursuit  of  commerce,  trade,  and 
agriculture  is  guaranteed  to  British  subjects,  as  well  as  the  peaceful 
possession  of  all  lands  heretofore  purchased  by  them  from  Samoans 
in  a  customars'  and  regular  manner,  and  in  the  event  of  an>' 
dispute  arising  as  to  the  fact  of  such  purchase,  it  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  a  Commission,  to  consist  of  one  person  nominated  by 
the  Samoan  Govenmient  (^Nlalo),  and  one  nominated  by  her 
Britamiic  ^Majesty's  Consul;  and  in  the  event  of  their  disagree- 
ment, they  shall  themselves  select  an  umpire;  or,  if  they  fail  to  do 
so,  such  umpire  shall  be  appointed  by  Her  ^lajesty's  Consul- 
General.  All  British  subjects  resident  in  Samoa  shall  be  exempt 
from  war  contributions,  military  requisitions,  and  occupation  of 
their  houses  and  lands  by  war  parties. 

l\.  If  any  subject  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  in  Samoa  is  charged 
with  a  crimmal  offence  cognizable  by  British  law,  such  charge 
shall  be  tried  by  Her  Britannic  ^Majesty's  High  Commissioner  for 
the  Western  Pacific  Islands,  or  other  British  officer  duly  author- 
ized by  Her  Britannic  Majesty  in  that  behalf.  The  expression 
"British  Law"  in  this  Article  includes  any  rules  duly  made  and 
issued  by  Her  Britannic  ^lajesty's  High  Commissioner  for  the 
Western  Pacific  Islands,  for  the  government  of  British  subjects 
within  his  jurisdiction. 

V.  Everv-  civil  suit  which  may  be  brought  in  Samoa  against 
any  subject  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  shall  be  brought  before,  and 
shall  be  tried  by.  Her  Britannic  ^Majesty's  High  Commissioner,  or 
such  other  British  officer  duly  authorized  as  aforesai<l. 

VI.  Every  sinnmons  or  warrant  to  appear  as  a  witness  before 
Her  Britannic  Majesty's  High  Commissioner,  or  such  other  British 
officer  duly  authorized  as  aforesaid,  and  directed  to  a  Samoan 


358  APPENDIX 

subject,  shall  have  the  same  authority,  and  may  be  enforced  m 
like  manner,  as  if  such  summons  or  warrant  had  been  directed  to 
a  subject  of  Her  Britannic  ^Majesty. 

VII.  Her  Britannic  Majesty  engages  to  cause  Regulations  to  be 
issued  to  enforce  the  observance  by  British  subjects  of  such  of  the 
existing  municipal  laws  and  police  regulations  of  Samoa  as  may  be 
hereafter  agreed  upon  by  agreement  between  the  Government 
of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  and  that  of  the  Samoan  State,  and  for 
the  due  observance  of  ciuarantine  by  British  subjects. 

VIII.  Her  ^Majesty  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain  may,  if  she  think 
fit,  establish  on  the  shores  of  a  Samoan  harbor,  to  be  hereafter 
designated  by  Her  ]Majesty,  a  naval  station  and  coaling  depot;  but 
this  Article  shall  not  apply  to  the  harbors  of  Apia  or  Saluafata,  or 
to  that  part  of  the  harbor  of  Pago-Pago  which  may  be  hereafter 
selected  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  as  a  station  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  concluded  between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  Samoan  Government,  on  the  17th  day  of 
Januars',  1878. 

IX.  The  present  Treaty  shall  come  into  force  from  the  date 
thereof,  but  shall  again  become  null  and  of  no  effect  if  not  ratified 
within  the  prescribed  period. 

X.  The  present  Treaty,  consisting  of  10  Articles,  shall  be 
ratified,  and  the  ratifications  exchanged  at  Apia  within  one  year 
from  the  date  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  same,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Done  at  Apia,  the  2Sth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  of  Our  Lord, 
1879. 

(l.  s.)  Arthur  Gordon, 

(l,  s.)  Alfred  P.  ^NIaudslay. 

(l.  s.)  Malietoa  Laupepa. 

(l.  s.)  Saga  le  Auauxa. 


APIA    Ml'NICIPAL   CONVENTION,    1S71)  359 

APPENDIX  VIII 

Municipal  Convention  Establishing  Municipality  of  Apia, 
Sept.  2,  1879 

(See  House  Executive  Documents,  50th  Congress,  First  Session, 
1SS7-1S88,  Vol.  28,  No.  238,  p.  132.) 

Convention  between  Great  Britain  (Germany,  the  United  States), 
and  the  King  and  Government  of  Samoa,  for  the  government 
of  the  town  and  district  of  Apia.  Signed  at  Apia,  September 
2,  1879.  Ratifications  exchanged  at  MuHnuu,  August  27, 
1880. 

Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  and  the  King  and  Government  of  Samoa,  being 
desirous  to  make  better  provisions  for  the  good  government  of  the 
town  and  district  of  Apia,  and  the  preservation  of  peace  and  good 
order  therein,  as  well  as  for  the  maintenance  of  its  neutrality, 
should  internal  disturbances  unhappily  take  place  in  the  Samoan 
State,  have  determined  to  conclude  a  convention  for  that  purpose 
and  have  named  as  their  plenipotentiaries : 

Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  etc.,  the  Honorable  Sir  Arthur  Hamilton 
Gordon,  Knight  Grand  Cross  of  the  Most  Distinguished  Order 
of  St.  Michael  and  St.  George,  Her  Majesty's  High  Commissioner 
and  Consul-General  for  the  Western  Pacific,  Governor  of  Fiji; 
and  Alfred  Percival  Maudslay,  Esquire,  one  of  Her  Majesty's 
deputy  commissioners  for  the  ^Vestern  Pacific : 

And  the  King  and  Gov^ernment  of  Samoa,  the  High  Chief 
Malietoa  Laupepa;  and  the  High  Chief  Saga; 

Who,  ha\ing  met  and  conferred  with  the  representatives  at 
Apia  of  otiier  nations  having  entered  into  treaty  relations  with 
Samoa,  tiiat  is  to  say,  Corvetten-Capitaen  F.  Mensing,  Imperial 
German  Navy,  commanfling  His  Imperial  German  ^Majesty's 
gun- vessel  Albatross;  Theodor  Weber,  Esquire,  Imperial  German 
Consul  for  Samoa  and  Tonga;  Captain  R.  Chandler,  United  States 


360  APPEXDIX 

Navy,  commanding  the  United  States  ship  Lackawanna;  and 
Thomas  M.  Dawson,  Esquire,  Consul  of  the  United  States  of 
America  at  Apia,  have,  in  conjunction  with  them,  agreed  upon  and 
concluded  the  following  articles : 

Article  I 

The  space  comprised  within  the  following  limits,  that  is  to 
say,  commencing  at  ^'ailoa,  passing  thence  along  the  coast  to  the 
mouth  of  the  P^ulnasa  River,  thence  up  the  course  of  the  river 
Fulnasa  to  the  point  at  which  the  Alafuala  road  crosses  such  river, 
thence  along  the  said  road  to  the  point  where  it  reaches  the  river 
Vaisigo,  and  thence,  in  a  straight  line,  to  the  point  of  commence- 
ment at  Vailoa,  shall  constitute  and  be  known  as  the  town  and 
district  of  Apia.  The  waters  of  the  harbor  of  Apia  are  also  com- 
prehended within  the  district. 

Article  II 

Such  town  and  district  shall  be  placed  under  the  government  of 
a  municipal  board,  consisting  of  those  foreign  consuls  resident  in 
Apia  whose  nations  have  entered  into  treaty  relations  with  Samoa. 
Representati^'es  of  every  such  nation,  having  a  consul  in  Samoa, 
shall,  at  a  future  period,  be  added  to  the  said  board,  and  shall  be 
chosen  in  such  manner  and  exercise  such  functions  as  may  be 
pro^•ided  b>-  regulations  to  be  hereafter  agreed  upon  and  published 
by  the  said  board. 

Article  III 

The  municipal  board  shall  have  power  to  make  and  enforce 
regulations  and  by-laws  with  regard  to  police  and  good  order, 
])ublic  works,  sanitary  regulations,  the  issue  of  licenses,  the  imposi- 
tion of  harbor  regulations,  the  p;"evention  of  the  sale  and  supply 
of  spirituous  liquors  to  Samoans  and  other  islanders  of  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  and  other  similar  matters,  within  the  said  district,  and  such 
regulations  shall  be  binding  upon  all  persons  within  the  said  dis- 
trict, and  may  be  enforced  by  penalties  not  exceeding  S200  fine. 


APIA   MUNICIPAL   CONVENTION,    1879  361 

or  imprisonment  witli  hard  labor  for  a  period  not  exceeding  six 
months,  or  both  fine  and  imprisonment  not  exceeding  the  before- 
mentioned  penalties. 

Article  IV 

The  municipal  board  of  Apia  may,  for  the  purpose  of  defraying 
expenses  incurred  under  the  above  article,  levy  rates  upon  the 
occupiers  of  houses  or  lands  within  the  district  of  Apia,  not  exceed- 
ing 5  per  cent,  annually  on  the  annual  assessed  value  of  such 
premises,  as  calculated  on  the  presumed  rental  valuation  thereof, 
or  1  per  cent,  annually  on  the  real  value  of  such  property. 

Article  V 

All  offenses  against  the  regulations  of  the  municipal  board,  by 
whomsoever  committed,  shall  be  tried  by  a  magistrate  to  be 
appointed  by  the  board. 

Article  VI 

If  a  subject  or  citizen  of  any  of  the  contracting  parties  in  Apia 
be  charged  with  an  offense  against  the  laws  of  his  own  country, 
he  shall  be  tried  according  to  the  jurisdiction  provided  therefor  by 
the  legislation  of  the  nation  to  which  he  belongs,  or  according  to 
the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  concluded  between  his  nation  and 
Samoa. 

Article  VII 

Every  Samoan  subject  charged  with  a  criminal  offense  within 
the  limits  of  the  district  of  Apia,  other  than  an  ofTense  against  the 
municipal  regulations,  shall  be  liable  to  trial  by  the  magistrate 
appointed  under  the  provisions  of  Article  V,  in  conjunction  with 
a  Samoan  magistrate. 

Article  VIII 

The  foregoing  articles  shall  in  no  way  prejudice  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Samoa,  and  the  Samoan  flag  shall  be  hoisted  at  such 
place  of  meeting  of  the  municipal  board  as  may  be  permanently 
adopted. 


362  APPENDIX 

Article  IX 

In  case  of  civil  war,  the  town  and  district  of  Apia,  and  the 
adjacent  districts  comprised  between  the  boundaries  of  the  town 
and  district  of  Apia  and  Letoga,  Tiapepe  Point,  and  Siusega,  shall 
be  considered  as  neutral  territory,  and  the  municipal  board  may 
frame  and  issue  such  regulations  as  may  be  considered  necessary 
for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  such  neutrality. 

Article  X 

The  present  convention  shall  be  revised  at  the  end  of  four  years 
from  its  date,  and  if  the  internal  state  of  Samoa  at  that  time  will 
happily  admit  thereof,  without  prejudice  to  the  interests  of  foreign 
residents  in  Samoa,  the  powers  conferred  by  the  present  conven- 
tion upon  the  municipal  board  of  Apia  shall  cease  and  determine, 
and  the  district  again  pass  under  the  control  and  authority  of  the 
Samoan  Government,  or  such  other  authority  as  may  be  agreed 
upon  between  the  Samoan  Government  and  the  high  contracting 
parties. 

Article  XI 

The  representatives  of  the  Imperial  German  Government,  in 
virtue  of  the  powers  accorded  to  them  by  Article  Xlll  of  the  treaty 
concluded  between  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  German  Emperor 
and  the  Government  of  Samoa  on  the  24th  day  of  January  last 
past,  accede  and  agree  to  the  present  convention,  on  behalf  of  the 
Imperial  German  Government,  subject  to  the  conditions  of  the 
said  article. 

Article  XII 

The  representatives  of  the  United  States  Government  provision- 
ally accede  and  assent  to  the  present  convention,  on  behalf  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  subject  to  the  approval  of  that 
Government. 

Article  XIII 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifications 
exchanged  at  Apia  within  one  year  from  the  date  thereof. 


CONSULAR   S.VilOAN    AGREEMENr,    1880  3C3 

In  witness  whereof  we  luive  signed  the  same  and  affixed  thereto 
our  seals. 

Done  at  Apia,  this  2nd  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  Our 
Lord  1879. 

(l.  s.)  Arthur  Gordon. 

(l.  s.)  Alfred  P.  Maudslay. 

(l.  s.)  F.  Mensing, 

Corvetten-Capitaen, 
(l.  s.)  T.  Weber, 

Imperial  German  Consul. 
(l.  s.)  R.  Chandler, 

Cai)tain,  United  States  Navy,  Commanding  United 
States  Ship  "Lackawanna." 
(l.  s.)  Thomas  M.  Dawson. 

(l.  s.)  Malietoa  Laupepa. 

(l.  s.)  Saga  le  Auauna. 


APPENDIX  IX 

Agreement  between  Three  Consuls  and  the  King  of  Samoa 
March  24,  1880 

(House  Executive  Documents,  50th  Congress,  First  Session, 
1877-1878,  Vol.  28,  No.  238,  p.  207) 

An  agreement  made  between  the  King  and  Government  of  Samoa 
and  the  foreign  consuls  in  Samoa. 

Whereas  the  King  and  Government  of  Samoa  did,  on  the  31st 
day  of  August,  1879,  address  a  letter  to  the  three  Governments 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain, 
requesting  them  to  take  some  concerted  action  for  the  preservation 
of  peace  and  good  order  in  Samoa,  and  for  the  protection  of  the 
King  and  Government  thereof:  and 

Whereas  on  the  loth  day  of  December,  LS79,  the  civil  war  in 
Samoa  was  terminated  in  the  treaty  of  peace  between  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  opposing  forces;  and 


364  APPENDIX 

Whereas  on  the  23d  day  of  December,  1879,  on  board  H.  I.  G.  M. 
ship  "Bismarck,"  a  permanent  agreement  was  entered  into  by  the 
representatives  of  both  parties  electing  and  recognizing  Malietoa 
Talavou  King  for  life;  and 

Whereas  on  the  12th  day  of  January,  1880,  the  Imperial  German 
Government  sent  instructions  tp  the  Imperial  German  Consul- 
general  in  Samoa  that  the  Governments  of  England  and  America 
had  accepted  the  proposals  of  the  German  Government,  and 
ordering  him  to  recognize  and  enter  into  an  agreement  with  his 
colleagues  for  the  protection  of  Malietoa  and  his  government  by 
the  three  powers  already  named  in  this  preamble;  and 

Whereas  on  the  14th  day  of  January,  18^0,  the  English  Govern- 
ment ordered  H.  B.  M.  ship  "Danae"  to  Samoa  with  instructions 
to  Captain  Purvis,  commanding,  to  recognize  Malietoa  and  protect 
his  government  in  conjunction  with  the  naval  forces  of  Germany 
and  America;  and 

Whereas  the  present  King  and  Government  of  Samoa  earnestly 
desire  that  this  arrangement  may  be  consummated  as  speedily 
as  possible,  for  the  greater  security  of  life  and  property  within  the 
kingdom,  and  for  the  utmost  prosperity  of  the  Samoan  Islands. 
Therefore  the  King,  Malietoa  Talavou,  and  the  Government  of 
Samoa,  the  Taimua  and  Faipule,  and  Captain  Zembsch,  Imperial 
German  consul-general,  on  behalf  of  the  German  Government, 
and  Thomas  M.  Dawson,  United  States  Consul,  on  behalf  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  J.  Hicks  Graves, 
Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Consul,  on  behalf  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  etc.,  have  agreed  upon  and  con- 
cluded the  following  four  articles,  to  take  effect  immediately,  and 
to  continue  in  force  until  ratified,  modified,  or  rejected  by  the  three 
protecting  powers: 

Article  I 

The  present  King,  ]\Ialietoa  Talavou,  shall  be  supported  as  the 
head  of  the  Samoan  Government  during  his  life-time,  and  his 
successor  shall  be  agreed  upon  by  the  three  protecting  powers. 


GERMAN-SAMOAN  COUNCIL  AGREEMENT,    1884  365 

Article  II 

There  shall  be  an  executive  council  for  the  King  and  Govern- 
ment of  Samoa  consisting  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  a  German  and  a  British  subject,  and  they  sliall  lic^ld  the 
offices,  respectively,  of  minister  of  justice,  minister  of  finance, 
and  minister  of  public  works. 

x\rticle  III 

The  members  of  the  executive  council  shall  be  nominated  from 
among  the  residents  of  Samoa  by  the  consuls  of  their  respective 
nations  resident  at  Apia,  and  they  shall  hold  office  from  the  date 
of  their  nomination,  which  must  subsequently  be  confirmed  by 
the  home  Governments. 

Article  IV 

The  members  of  the  executive  council  shall  hold  office  until 
their  successors  are  nominated  by  the  consuls,  and  they  shall 
receive  such  salaries  as  may  be  agreed,  upon  between  the  Govern- 
ment of  Samoa  and  the  consular  representatives  of  the  three  pro- 
tecting powers. 

In  witness  whereof  we  have  signed  the  same  and  affixed  thereto 
our  seals. 

Done  at  Apia  this  twenty-fourth  day  of  March,  in  the  year  of 
Our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty. 

Zembsch.  (l.  s.) 

Thomas  M.  Dawson.         .  (l.  s.) 
J.  Hicks  Graves.  (l.  s.) 

APPENDIX  X 

Agreement  between  German  Consul  Stuebel  and  Malietoa, 
Nov.  10,  1884,  Establishing  German-Samoan  Council 

(See  V.  R.  1885.    Anlagen  Vol.  VI,  Aktenstueck  Xo.  167,  p.  726  f.) 

Anlage  2  zu  X'r.  47  (Uebersetzung) 
Um  den  in  Samoa  lebenden  Deutschen  die  ^'ortheile  einer  guten 
Regierung  zu  sichern  und  in  Ausfuehrung  von  Artikel  MI,  des 


3(56  APPE^T)Ix 

deutschsamoanischen  Freundschaftsvertrages  vom  24.  Januar, 
1879  haben  sich  der  "\"erw'eser  des  Kaiserlichen  Konsulates  fuer  die 
Suedsee-Inseln  und  der  Koenig,  der  Vizekoenig  und  die  Regierung 
von  Samoa  ueber  die  nachstehenden  Bestimmungen  geeinigt: 

Artikel  I 

Es  wird  ein  deutsch-samoanischer  Staatsrath  gebildet.  Zu 
demselben  sollen  gehoeren  der  deutsche  Konsul  oder  dessen 
Stellvertreter,  zwei  Samoaner,  von  denen  der  eine  von  dem  Koenige, 
der  andere  von  dem  Vizekoenig  im  Einvernehmen  mit  den  Taimua 
und  Faipiile  ernannt  werden,  und  zwei  Deutsche,  welche  ^'on  dem 
deutschen  Konsul  ernannt  werden. 

Artikel  II 

Der  deutsch-samoanische  Staatsrath  soil  ueber  alle  Gesetze 
und  Einrichtungen  berathen,  und  Beschluss  fassen,  deren  Ein- 
fuehrung  dem  gemeinsamen  Interesse  der  Samoa-Regierung  und 
der  in  Samoa  lebenden  Deutschen  entspricht.  Er  wird  insbeson- 
dere  gesetzliche  Vorschriften  aufstellen,  welche  auf  die  strafbaren 
Handlungen  von  Samoanern  Anwendimg  leiden,  wenn  damit  ein 
Deutscher  oder  ein  in  deutschen  Diensten  stehender  Angehoeriger 
eines  anderen  Staates  oder  ein  in  deutschen  Diensten  stehender 
farbiger  Arbeiter  oder  das  Eigenthum  solcher  Personen  verletzt 
worden  ist.  Die  gleichen  Vorschriften  sollen  auf  die  strafbaren 
Handlungen  der  in  deutschen  Diensten  stehenden  farbigen 
Arbeiter  Anwendung  leiden. 

Artikel  III 

Die  von  dem  deutsch-samoanischen  Staatsrath  aufgestellten 
Vorschriften  werden  von  dem  Koenig  und  dem  Vizekoenig  unter 
ihrer  Untcrschrift  als  Gesetz  erlassen.  In  dem  Eingang  ist  zu 
ervvaehnen,  dass  das  Gesetz  nach  vorgaengiger  Feststellung  durch 
den  deutsch-samoanischen  Staatsrath  erlassen  wird. 


GERMAN-SAMOAN   COUNCIL  AGREEMENT,    1SS4  :^()7 

Artikel  IV 

Der  Koenig  \\  inl  im  Einvcrnehmen  mit  dem  deutschen  Konsul 
einen  (leutsclien  Beaniton  dvv  Sanioa-Re<i:ierun<ii:  cnuMinon.  Der- 
selbe  wm\  dor  Sekretaer  und  der  Rathgeber  des  Koenigs  in  alien 
Angelegenheiten  sein,  welche  die  in  Samoa  lebenden  Deutschen 
betreffen.  Er  wird  in  den  Strafsachen,  an  welchen  die  in  Samoa 
lebenden  Deutschen  ein  Interesse  haben,  sofern  nicht  auf  mehr 
als  zwei  Jahre  Gefaengniss  mit  barter  Arbeit  erkannt  werden  kann, 
das  Amt  eines  deutschen  Richters  ausueben;  in  Gemeinschaft  mit 
einen  samoanischen  Richter  ueber  Samoaner  und  farbige  Arbeiter, 
welche  sich  der  \'erletzung  von  Samoanern  oder  von  samoan- 
ischen Eigenthum  schuldig  gemacht  haben,  allein  ueber  farbige 
Arbeiter  wegen  der  von  denselben  unter  einander  begangenen 
strafbaren  Handlungen.  Wenn  auf  mehr  als  zwei  Jahre  Gefaeng- 
niss mit  barter  Arbeit  erkannt  werden  kann,  wird  der  deutsche 
Konsul,  neben  einen  samoanischen  Richter,  das  Richteramt 
selber  uebernehmen  oder  den  deutschen  Beamten  der  Samoa- 
Regierung  oder  eine  dritte  Person  damit  beauftragen. 

Artikel  V 

Zur  Unterbringung  der  Strafgefangenen  aus  Strafsachen,  an 
welchen  die  in  Samoa  lebenden  Deutschen  ein  Interesse  haben, 
wird  ein  Gefaengniss  errichtet  werden.  Die  zu  Gefaengniss  mit 
barter  Arbeit  ^'erurtheilten  sollen  zu  angemessener  Arbeit  ange- 
halten  werden,  welche  zur  Deckung  der  entstehenden  A^erwal- 
tungskosten  vervverthet  werden  kann.  Der  deutsche  Beamte  der 
Samoa-Regierung  wird  die  Aiifsicht  ueber  das  Gefaengnisswesen 
fuehren. 

Artikel  VI 

I  )er  Koenig  wird  im  Einvernehmen  mit  dem  deutschen  Konsul 
Polizisten  anstellen,  welche  den  Gefaengnissdienst  und  den  Sicher- 
heitsdienst  auf  den  deutschen  Pflanzungen  versehen  werden. 
Dieselben  unterstehen  dem  Befehle  des  deutschen  Beamten  der 
Samoa-Regierung. 
23 


368  APPENDIX 


Artikel  VII 

Die  in  Folge  dieser  Vereinbarung  sich  noethig  machenden 
Ausgaben  werden  aus  den  eingehenden  Gerichtsgebuehren,  Geld- 
strafen,  Einkuenften  aus  der  Gefangenenarbeit  iind  aus  den 
Steuern  gedeckt  werden,  welche  von  den  deutschen  Interessenten 
aufzubringen  sind. 

Mit  Verwaltung  dieser  Gelder  soil  ein  Vertreter  der  deutschen 
Steuerzahler  beauftragt  werden.  Die  Umlegung  der  Steuern, 
sowie  die  Feststellung  der  Hoehe  der  Ausgaben,  erf olgt  durch  de  n 
deutsch-samoanischen  Staatsrath. 


Artikel  VIII 

Dieses  Uebereinkommen  tritt  sofort  in  Kraft  vorbehaltlich  der 
Genehmigung  durch  die  Kaiserlich  deutsche  Regierung.  So  lange 
diese  nicht  erfolgt  ist,  soil  von  Deutschen  die  Zahlung  von  Steuern 
nicht  verlangt  werden  koennen.  Die  Kaiserlich  deutsche  Regie- 
rung  soil  das  Recht  haben,  dieses  Uebereinkommen  zu  kuendigen, 
welchenfalls  dasselbe  nach  sechs  Moisten  ausser  Kraft  tritt. 

Zu  Urkunde  dessen  haben  wir  hierunter  unsere  Unterschriften 
gesetzt. 

Geschehen  im  Kaiserlichen  Konsulate  zu  Apia  am  10.  November 
1884. 

(gez.)  Dr.  Stuebel.  (gez.)  Malietoa, 

Kaiserlicher  Konsulats-Verweser  Le  Tupu  o  Samoa 

(gez.)  Th.  Weber,  (gez.)  Tupua, 

als  Zeuge.  Le  Sui  Tupu 

Es  wird  hierdurch  bescheinigt,  dass  Vorstehendes  eine  getreue 
Uebersetzung  des  im  Archiv  des  Kaiserlichen  Konsulats  auf- 
bewahrten  in  samoanischer  Sprache  abgefassten  Originals  ist. 

Apia,  den  11.  November  1884. 

Der  Kaiserliche  Konsulats-Verweser. 
(l.  s.)  (gez.)  Dr.  Stuebel. 


HRITISIl-GEHMAN    A(iUEEMENT,    1886  369 


APPENDIX  XI 

Declaration  Relating  to  the  Demarcation  of  the  German 

AND  British  Spheres  of  Influence  in  the 

Western  Pacific.  (1886) 

(V.  R.  1885-86,  Anlagen,  Vol.  VI.  Aktenstueck  No.  291,  p.  1570) 

The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor  and  the 
Government  of  her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  having  resolved  to  define  the  limits  of 
the  German  and  British  spheres  of  influence  in  the  Western  Pacific, 
the  Undersigned  duly  empowered  for  that  purpose,  viz.: 

1.  Count  Herbert  Bismarck, 

His  Imperial  jNIajesty's  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs, 

2.  Sir  Edward  Baldwin  Malet, 

Her  Britannic  ^Majesty's  Ambassador  Extraordinary  and 
Plenipotentiary, 

have  agreed  on  behalf  of  their  respective  Governments  to  make  the 
following 

DECLARATION 


For  the  purpose  of  this  Declaration  the  expression  "Western 
Pacific"  means  that  part  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  lying  between  the 
15th  parallel  of  North  latitude  and  the  30th  parallel  of  South  lati- 
tude, and  between  the  165th  Meridian  of  longitude  West  and  130th 
Meridian  of  longitude  East  of  Greenwich. 

II 

A  conventional  line  of  demarcation  in  the  Western  Pacific  is 
agreed  to,  starting  from  the  North  East  coast  of  New  Guinea  at  a 
point  near  Mitre  Rock  on  the  eighth  parallel  of  South  latitude, 


370  APPENDIX 

being  the  boundary  between  the  German  and  British  possessions 
on  that  coast  and  following  that  parallel  to  point  A  and  thence  con- 
tinuing to  points  B,  C,  D,  E,  F  and  G  as  indicated  in  the  accom- 
panying Charts;  which  points  are  situated  as  follows: 

A:     8°  South  lat^°  154°  long^'  East  of  Greenwich. 

B:    7°  15'  South  laf^'  155°  25'  East  long^'. 

C:    7°  15'  South  laf^^  155°  35'  East  long'^^ 

D:    7°  25'  South  laf^'  156°  40'  East  long'^^ 

E:    8°  50'  South  laf^'  159°  50'  East  long'^^ 

F:    6°  North  laf^"^  173°  30'  East  long'^^ 

G:  15  °  North  lat^'  173  °  30'  East  long'^^ 
The  point  A  is  indicated  on  the  British  Admiralty  Chart  780 
"Pacific  Ocean"  (South  West  Sheet);  the  points  B,  C,  D  and 
E  are  indicated  on  the  British  Admiralty  Chart  214  (South 
Pacific  Solomon  Islands)  and  the  points  F  and  G  on  the  British 
Admiralty  Chart  781  "Pacific  Ocean"  (North  West  Sheet). 

Ill 

Germany  engages  not  to  make  acquisitions  of  territory,  accept 
Protectorates,  or  interfere  with  the  extension  of  British  influence 
and  to  give  up  any  acquisitions  of  territory^  or  Protectorates  already 
established  in  that  part  of  the  Western  Pacific  hing  to  the  East, 
South-East  or  South  of  the  said  conventional  line. 


IV 

Great  Britain  engages  not  to  make  acquisitions  of  territory, 
accept  Protectorates  or  interfere  with  the  extension  of  German 
influence  and  to  give  up  any  acciuisitions  of  territory  or  Protec- 
torates already  established  in  that  part  of  the  Western  Pacific 
lying  to  the  West,  North- West  or  North  of  the  said  comentional 
line. 

V 

Should  further  surveys  show  that  any  Islands  now  indicated  on 
the  said  Charts  as  lying  on  one  side  of  the  said  conventional  line, 


SCHURZ-RAYAKD   CORRESPONDENCE   ON   SAMOA  371 

are  in  rcalitx  on  the  other  side,  the  said  Hne  shall  be  modified  so 
that  such  islands  shall  appear  on  the  same  side  of  the  line  as  at 
present  shown  on  the  said  Charts. 

VI 

This  Declaration  does  not  apply  to  the  Navigator  Islands 
(Samoa)  which  are  affected  by  Treaties  with  Germany,  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States;  nor  to  the  Friendly  Islands  (Tonga) 
which  are  affected  by  Treaties  with  Germany  and  Great  Britain; 
nor  to  the  Island  of  Xiue  (Savage-Island)  which  groups  of  Islands 
shall  continue  to  form  a  neutral  region;  nor  to  any  Islands  or 
places  in  the  Western  Pacific  which  are  now  under  the  sovereignty 
or  protection  of  any  other  civilized  Power  than  Germany  or  Great 
Britain. 


Declared  and  signed  in  duplicate  at  Berlin,  this  sixth  day  of 
April  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-six. 

(l.  s.)     Graf  Bismarck, 
(l.  s.)     Edward  B.  Malet. 


APPENDIX  XII 

Correspondence  on  the  Samo.\n  Question  between  Senator 
ScHURZ  .\ND  Secretary  Bayard 

From  "Speeches,"  etc.,  of  Carl  Schurz,  Vol.  V,  p.  1) 
To  Thomas  F.  Bayard 

New  York,  Jan.  30,  1889. 
As  a  loyal  American  citizen  I  feel  in  duty  bound  to  make  to  you 
the  following  confidential  communication. 

Early  this  morning  I  received  a  note  from  Count  Arco  informing 
me  that  he  would  be  in  this  city  during  the  day  and  requesting  me 
to  meet  him  at  such  time  and  place  as  I  might  designate — if  pos- 
sible during  the  forenoon.  Having  been  for  years  pleasantly 
acquainted  with  Count  Arco,  I  called  up<m  hhn  at  the  Albennarle 


372  APPENDIX 

Hotel  on  my  way  down  town.  He  at  once  asked  me  for  my  opinion 
on  the  present  state  of  the  Samoan  business,  adding  that  he 
intended  to  write  to  Count  Bismarck  today. 

I  repHed  that  as  to  all  I  should  say  I  wished  him  to  keep  in  mind 
that  I  could  only  speak  for  myself  as  a  private  citizen ;  that  I  had 
had  no  communication  concerning  this  subject  with  any  one 
connected  with  the  Government,  and  that  I  had  only  the  official 
publications,  the  newspapers  and  my  acquaintance  with  people  of 
different  classes  as  sources  of  information  and  opinion.  -Froni 
my  study  of  the  matter  it  appeared  to  me  that  the  Germans 
had  committed  the  error  common  to  civilized  nations  coming, 
in  the  pursuit  of  their  material  interests,  into  contact  with  savage 
or  semi-civilized  populations  —  namely  the  error  of  relying 
mainly  upon  the  application  of  force  in  the  treatment  of  those 
populations.  The  English  had  frequently  committed  this  error, 
we  had  sometimes  in  our  intercourse  with  the  Indians,  and  the 
Germans  seemed  to  repeat  it  in  Africa  as  well  as  in  Samoa.  This 
policy  frequently  led  to  acts  of  injustice,  was  always  costly  as  well 
as  cruel,  but  by  no  means  always  successful  in  the  way  desired/  In 
this  case  it  has  produced  situations  irritating  to  others  more  or  less 
concerned. 

Count  Arco  observed  that,  while,  according  to  reliable  informa- 
tion received  at  Berlin,  the  hostility  of  the  Samoans  to  the  Germans 
was  largely,  if  not  entirely,  owing  to  constant  instigation  on  the 
part  of  Americans,  officials  as  well  as  private  persons,  in  Samoa, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  made  little,  if  any, 
com})laint  in  the  diplomatic  way  of  the  conduct  of  German  officials 
in  Samoa.  The  whole  controversy,  if  there  was  any,  seemed  to  be 
carried  on  by  the  subordinate  officials  among  themselves  and  by  the 
newspapers,  but  was,  perhaps,  for  this  reason  all  the  more  exciting 
(to)  the  public  mind. 

I  interrui)ted,  saying  that  I  remembered  an  elaborate  despatch 
or  instruction  addressed  by  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  Pendleton  explicitly 
stating  the  things  complained  of  by  this  Government,  and  that  in 
the  official  correspondence  I  found  plenty  of  criticism  of  the  conduct 
of  the  Germans  in  Samoa  by  the  American  officials,  but  no  evidence 
of  their  having  incited  a  refractory  spirit  among  the  natives.    How- 


SCHURZ-BAYARD  CORRESPONDENCE   ON  SAMOA  373 

over,  those  were  questions  of  fact  which,  thousands  of  miles  away, 
we  niiijlit  not  at  i)resent  he  able  to  answer. 

The  conversation  then  turned  upon  the  more  imj)()rtant  question 
what  was  now  best  to  be  done  to  avoid  further  difficulty.  Count 
Arco  repeatedly  assured  me  that  the  German  Government  was 
most  peaceably  disposed,  and  I  said,  that  as  I  knew  the  character 
of  the  American  people  and  the  traditions  of  the  Government,  the 
prevailing  disposition  here  was  certainly  of  the  same  nature,  and 
that  I  had  been  very  much  surprised  to  see  in  some  important 
German  newspapers  remarks  imputing  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  with  regard  to  the  Samoan  business,  a  quarrelsome 
and  grasping  temper.  Nothing  could  be  farther  from  the  truth. 
Without  ever  having  exchanged  a  word  on  the  subject  with  any 
member  of  the  Administration,  I  felt  confident  that  the  Govern- 
ment, in  accord  with  public  opinion,  asked  for  nothing  but  that 
the  autonomy  of  the  Samoan  people  and  the  treaty  rights  of  the 
United  States  be  properly  respected. 

Count  Arco  replied  that  his  Government  had  time  and  again 
declared  that  it  had  no  purposes  in  any  w^ay  hostile  to  Samoan 
autonomy  or  to  American  treaty  rights,  and  would  be  ever  ready 
to  respect  that  declaration.  In  fact,  a  proposition  of  Prince  Bis- 
marck for  another  conference  on  Samoan  affairs  was  on  its  way  to 
this  country,  the  conference  this  time  to  be  held  at  Berlin.  The 
British  Government  had  already  assented  to  it  and  ]\Ir.  Bayard 
seemed  to  be  favorably  inclined. 

The  Count  asked  me  what  else,  in  my  opinion,  could  be  done  to 
avoid  further  excitement  about  the  matter  and  to  restore  the  old 
good  feeling.  In  answering  this  question  I  again  called  his  atten- 
tion to  my  private  station,  and  said  that  if  the  invitation  to  the 
new  conference  were  accompanied,  by  the  German  Government, 
with  a  declaration,  in  the  frankest  and  most  cordial  language 
possible,  that  the  maintenance  of  the  Samoan  autonomy  and  of 
all  treaty  rights  should  be  the  basis,  the  recognized  fundamental 
condition,  of  further  understandings  between  the  treaty  Powers, 
it  would  undoubtedly  have  a  very  good  effect  on  public  opinion  in 
this  country,  and,  as  appeared  from  the  official  correspondence  and 
from  Senator  Sherman's  speech  reported  in  today's  papers,  go  far 


374  APPENDIX 

to  meet  the  demands  put  fonvard  by  the  present  Administration 
as  well  as  by  the  party  to  come  into  power  on  the  4th  of  March. 

Count  Arco  asked  whether  the  situation  would  not  in  some 
important  respects  be  changed  by  the  incoming  of  the  Republican 
Administration.  I  answered  that  if  the  German  Government 
made  a  fair  proposition  accompanied  by  satisfactory  assurances, 
a  situation  would,  as  it  seemed  to  me,  thereby  be  created  which 
would  have  to  be  dealt  with  upon  its  own  merits  by  any  Adminis- 
tration, whatever  its  party  character. 

Count  Arco  observed  that  some  persons  seemed  to  apprehend 
that  Mr.  Blaine,  if  appointed  Secretary  of  State,  might  be  in  favor 
of  annexing  the  Samoan  Islands  to  the  United  States,  or  at  least 
of  establishing  an  American  protectorate  over  them.  I  replied 
that  I  would  be  slow  to  give  weight  to  such  an  apprehension;  as 
was  well  known,  the  traditional  policy  of  the  country  was  most 
decidedly  averee  to  such  distant  annexations  and  to  the  entangle- 
ments certain  to  grow  out  of  such  protectorates;  and  that  tra- 
ditional policy  was  too  deeply  rooted  in  public  opinion  to  be 
disregarded.  The  conservative  and  cautious  spirit  of  the  American 
people  in  this  respect  was  clearly  demonstrated  by  their  refusal  to 
accept  Saint  Thomas  and  Santo  Domingo  when  those  countries 
were  offered  to  the  United  States. 

I  further  suggested  that  a  pleasant  impression  might  be  produced 
by  the  German  Government  permitting  the  publication  of  the  so- 
called  protocols,  so  as  to  show  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  con- 
cealed ;  and  I  alluded  to  what  I  had  said  in  an  interview,  that  those 
minutes  might  at  least  be  communicated  in  confidence  to  the 
Senate — which  seemed  to  strike  the  Count  more  fa^•orably  than 
the  publication  asked  for  by  the  Ford  resolution  in  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

Count  Arco  expressed  the  hope  that  the  "war"  in  Samoa  might 
by  this  time  be  practically  ended;  possibly  the  military  honor  of 
Germany,  after  the  killing  of  the  German  marines,  might  consider 
itself  satisfied  by  the  bombardment  of  the  Samoan  villages;  but 
he  did  not  know.  I  suggested  that,  if  the  war  was  not  yet  con- 
sidered ended,  this  might  be  a  good  opportunity  for  calling  upon 
the  "friendly  offices"  of  the  United  States,  of  which  the  American 


SCnrKZ-RAYARD    ('(MJUESI'ONDENCE    ON    SAMOA  ;^75 

troat>-  with  Samoa  contained  a  standinji;  otter.     I  added  that  I 

thoiifiht  the  Germans  had  made  a  great  mistake  in  trying  to  impose 

u\Hm  ttie  Samoans,  Taniasese,  aiding  not  clioseii  by  tTTtnTatives^ 

that  poputaHons  of  that  kind,  if  unwilling  to  submit  to  a  foreigner, 

will  be  still  more  uinvilling  to  submit  to  a  man  of  their  own  race 

imposed  upon  them  by  foreigners;  that  under  such  circumstances 

conspiracies   and   revolutions   are   inevitable;  and   that,   in  my 

\  opinion,  the  Germans  as  well  as  all  others  concerned  would  serve 

:  their  own  interests  much  better  b>'  permitting  the  natives  to  choose 

their  own  king  without  foreign  influence  of  any  sort!  roinit  Arco 

^yserved  that  this  might  be  so,  and  he  thought  the  German 

Government  might  finally  accept  Mataafa  himself  as  Samoan 

king. 

The  conversation  turning  upon  what  the  coming  conference 
between  the  treaty  Powers  might  do,  I  said,  in  answer  to  a  question, 
that  as  to  the  future  government  of  Samoa  perhaps  some  proi)o- 
sition  intermediate  between  that  advanced  by  Prince  Bismarck 
and  that  of  Mr.  Bayard  might  be  found,  satisfactorily  securing 
Samoan  autonomy  as  well  as  treaty  rights,  and  Count  Arco  shared 
that  hope. 

He  expressed  regret  at  the  fact  that  the  Consular  representatives 
(of  the  United  States)  in  Samoa  had  in  most  instances  been  inferior 
to  those  of  the  other  Powers  in  point  of  mental  equipment  as  well 
as  social  standing,  and  he  attributed  their  unsatisfactory  relations 
in  great  part  to  that  circumstance.  I  said  that,  not  knowing  any 
of  the  gentlemen  in  question,  I  could  neither  assent  or  dissent; 
but  I  fear  the  Count  in  making  that  remark  was  not  wholly  wrong. 

Count  Arco  asked  me  whether,  notwithstanding  the  sul)stantial 
agreement  of  the  purposes  of  the  two  Governments  with  regard  to 
Samoa,  I  saw  any  point  of  danger.  I  replied  that  the  onh-  danger 
under  such  circumstances  might  possibly  arise,  as  1  thought,  from 
the  forwardness  of  some  naval  officer,  or  from  some  indiscretion 
in  the  conduct  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  one  party  taking, 
or  putting  the  other  party  into,  an  offensive  position  from  which 
retreat  with  honor  would  be  difficult. 

After  some  final  exchange  of  sentiment  as  to  the  desirability  of 
a  prompt  and  complete  restoration  of  the  traditional  cordiality 


376  APPENDIX 

of  feeling  between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  the  Count 
said  that  he  would  today  send  a  cable  message  as  well  as  a  more 
elaborate  letter  to  his  Government,  and  we  separated. 

In  making  this  confidential  communication  to  you  I  trust  you 
will  understand  that  I  am  very  far  from  desiring  to  meddle  with 
the  business  of  the  Government.  But  being  asked  for  my  opinion 
on  this  important  affair  by  the  German  Minister  in  a  manner 
manifesting  a  sincere  desire  on  his  part  to  see  all  differences 
between  the  two  countries  amicably  and  honorably  adjusted,  I 
thought  there  would  not  only  be  no  harm  in  my  giving  him  my 
indi\ddual  xiews,  but  I  might  possibly  aid  a  little  in  bringing  about 
what  all  lovers  of  peace  must  wish  to  accomplish.  I  give  you  so 
elaborate  an  account  of  our  conversation,  in  the  hope  that,  if 
anything  I  said  to  Count.  Arco  was  erroneous  in  point  of  fact  or 
conclusion,  you  will  have  the  goodness  to  set  me  right  and  enable 
me  to  correct  the  impressions  I  may  have  conveyed  to  his  mind. 

From  Thomas  F.  Bayard 

,.  •        Department  of  State, 

Washington,  Feb.  1,  1889. 
Confidential  and  Personal. 

I  read  with  entire  appreciation  of  its  friendly  motive  and  high 
intelligence  your  letter  of  the  30th,  and  am  glad  to  inform  you  that 
today  Count  Arco  came  with  a  note-verbale  from  Berlin,  which  he 
read  to  me^ — to  the  effect  that  the  extreme  action  of  the  German 
Consul  at  Samoa  in  declaring  martial  law  in  that  region  had  been 
disapproved  by  his  Government  and  that  orders  countermanding 
such  steps  had  been  sent  by  telegraph.  This  apparent  return  of 
Prince  Bismarck  to  the  line  of  the  perfectly  well  understood  agree- 
ment— that  native  autonomy  and  independence  should  be  sus- 
tained by  the  three  treaty  Powers — leads  me  to  be  hopeful  of  a 
satisfactory  adjustment  by  the  conference  to  which  I  understood 
the  German  Go\ernment  has  decided  to  invite  the  I'nited  States 
and  Great  Britain,  and  the  terms  of  which  may  be  expected  to  be 
presented  here  in  a  few  days. 

You  are  perfectly  correct  in  your  diagnosis  of  the  case — it  is  a 
mercenary  clash  of  riYal  traders  in  the  course  of  which  German\-  has 


SCIIURZ-BAYARD   CORRESPONDENCE   ON   SAMOA  'XII 

allowed  official  action  to  be  too  freely  employed  in  aid  of  private 
"schenfe^  Tn  tlieltisciissions,  which  are  fully  re])ortcd  in  the  proto- 
cols, this  became  ai)i)arcnt,  and  as  I  told  Count  Arco  today,  \Mr. 
\'on  Ah-ensleben  was  inspired  throughout  by  the  counsel  and 
presence  here  of  ]Mr.  Weber,  formerly  a  Consular  officer  in  Samoa, 
and  now  connected  with  the  German  Company  there. 

As  a  result  our  plans  for  a  sensible  and  just  government  in 
SanK)a  were  drifted  away  from  the  orighial  basis  of  concurrent 
agreement,  into  a  scheme  which  would  have  connected  the  group 
into  a  German  dependency.  It  is,  I  think,  unfortunate  that 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  should  decline  to  publish  these  papers, 
the  contents  of  which  have  been  discussed  in  the  correspondence 
with  Berlin,  and  which  serve  now  only  as  bases  for  charges  of 
"secrecy"  and  "suppression,"  creating  mystery  where  all  should 
be  clear  as  day. 

Today  Count  Arco  intimated  that  he  would  ask  the  consent  of 
his  Government  for  the  communication  of  these  protocols  to  the 
Senate  in  confidence. 

If  that  body  called  for  them  to  be  used  in  confidence,  I  scarcely 
see  how  the  President  could  withhold  them,  although  the  point  is 
delicate  and  I  should  be  very  sorry  to  have  it  raised. 

I  am  very  sure,  however,  that  the  various  plans  for  a  native 
government  assisted  by  the  treaty  Powers,  in  which  no  preponder- 
ance of  control  should  be  awarded  to  any  one  of  the  three,  will 
under  candid  treatment  yield  a  just  and  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  present  unhappy  and  distressing  and  dangerous  condition  of 
affairs.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  wholly  different  ])oli(ics 
of  the  United  States  and  Germany  in  respect  of  colonics  and 
dependencies  increase  the  difficulties  of  cooperation,  but  knowing 
the  whole  ground  of  the  Samoan  question,  I  can  say  to  you  unhesi- 
tatuigly  it  can  be  adjusted  without  difficulty  if  mercenary  forces 
are  not  allowed  to  obtrude  themselves  into  the  discussions. 

When  you  come  to  read  these  protocols,  which  will  some  day  be 
done,  I  have  no  doubt  that  our  judgments  will  be  at  one. 

As  soon  as  I  received  the  (Jcrman  note  today,  the  President  sent 
it  in  to  Congress,  and  with  an  understanding  that  the  natives  are 
not  to  be  crushed,  and  the  Government  with  whom   the  treaties 


37^'  APPENDIX 

were  made  is  to  be  respectfully  considered,  and  American  treaty 
rights  guarded,  I  believe  the  mischief-makers  will  subside  and 
settlement  will  rapidly  progress. 

It  is  difficult  to  describe  the  singular  bitterness  of  feeling  which 
seems  to  control  the  Republican  managers,  and  which  has  led  to 
a  systematic  obstruction,  misrepresentation  and  aspersion  of  the 
Administration  in  every  Department,  and  towards  none  so  fiercely 
as  the  Department  of  State,  in  which  I  am  just  closing  four  years 
of  constant  duty. 

They  have  sought,  and  only  with  too  much  success,  to  embarrass 
me  in  deahng  with  foreign  Governments;  and  I  was  only  too  glad 
to  see  in  John  Sherman's  speech  signs  of  an  appreciation  of  the 
responsibility  which  approaching  power  naturally  brings. 

Your  criticism  on  the  tone  and  character  of  our  Consular  repre- 
sentative in  Samoa  is  just.  But  with  the  pittance  allowed  for 
salary,  it  was  difficult,  indeed  impossible,  to  obtain  men  of  ade- 
quate ability,  lender  my  urgent  applications  the  pay  was  raised 
from  $1500  to  -12000,  and  at  this  session  I  have  succeeded  in 
getting  the  salary  placed  at  $3000. 

The  Senate  Committee  have  been  examining  in  secret  the  present 
Consul,  to  see  whether  some  error  or  something  of  discredit  to  me 
could  not  be  unearthed.  But  all  I  want  is  the  whole  history  to  be 
made  public.  Nevertheless  you  can  appreciate  such  treatment  of 
the  head  of  a  Department. 

I  shall  endeavor  to  get  a  sensible,  good-tempered  man  as  soon 
as  I  can,  though  the  time  for  me  is  short  to  do  so. 

I  cannot  avoid  anxiety,  lest  the  indiscretion  of  some  naval 
officer,  on  one  side  or  the  other,  may  lead  to  a  broil,  which  may 
expand  itself.  But  I  have  been  so  single-minded  in  pursuing 
justice  and  friendly  relations  with  Germany,  as  I  belie\e  my 
correspondence  will  thoroughly  prove,  that  I  believe  we  will  find 
a  clear  channel  and  come  to  a  worthy  settlement. 

I  thank  you  for  your  letter,  and  shall  continue  to  believe  you 
the  friend  of  our  country  and  of 

T.  F.  Bayard. 

I  read  your  letter  to  the  President. 


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